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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 271637Z FEB 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 DATED 27 FEBRUARY 81
INFO F C O

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO KNOW THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY ON THE SUBJECTS WHICH MAY ARISE AT HER MEETING WITH WALDHEIM TOMORROW.

2. AFGHANISTAN. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD LIKE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE (DE CUELLAR) TO VISIT THE AREA IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS OR SO, INCLUDING MOSCOW AS WELL AS KABUL, ISLAMABAD AND TEHRAN. THE SECRETARIAT HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEGUN TO TAKE INFORMAL SOUNDINGS ABOUT HOW DE CUELLAR WOULD BE RECEIVED: THE PROPOSED TIMETABLE MAY THEREFORE BE OPTIMISTIC. THE INITIAL RUSSIAN REACTION WAS NON-COMMITTAL. THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD SEE NO POINT IN THE EXERCISE IF THE PAKISTANIS CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THEY COULD ONLY TALK TO THE AFGHANS ON A TRILATERAL BASIS, IE WITH THE IRANIANS (AND WALDHEIM'S REPRESENTATIVE) PRESENT. THE CURRENT IRANIAN UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK TO THE AFGHANS AT ALL IS AN OBVIOUS COMPLICATION. THE SECRETARIAT ACCORDINGLY INTEND THAT FORMAL SOUNDINGS SHOULD START WITH THE PAKISTANIS NEXT WEEK.

3. PRESIDENT GISCARD'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SEEMS TO BE DEAD, OR AT LEAST DORMANT. BABRAK KARMAL REJECTED IT PUBLICLY IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK, AND THE FRENCH MISSION HERE SAY THAT BREZHNEV HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO GISCARD WHICH, WHILE NOT EXPLICITLY NEGATIVE, OFFERS LITTLE HOPE. WALDHEIM'S OWN INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT A CONFERENCE OF THIS SIZE WOULD NOT WORK.

4. CAMBODIA. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS PRESSED WALDHEIM IN DELHI TO CALL THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROVIDED FOR IN GA RESOLUTION 35/6. HE ARGUED THAT THE AUGURIES WERE POOR AND URGED ASEAN

TO PURSUE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE. HE DID HOWEVER AGREE TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA, INCLUDING HANOI AND PHNOM PENH. BUT WHEN I SAW HIM ON 24 FEBRUARY (MY TELNO 167) WALDHEIM SAID MERELY THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO GO AHEAD AND CALL A CONFERENCE FOR THE TIME BEING AND THAT BOTH ASEAN AND THE VIETNAMESE WANTED FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE HAD STAYED HIS HAND AT ASEAN REQUEST. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA.

5. IF WALDHEIM TAKES A SIMILARLY DISINGENUOUS LINE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS THATCHER MAY WISH TO SAY THAT ASEAN HAVE TOLD US CLEARLY, BOTH HERE AND IN THE FIELD, THAT THEY WANT A CONFERENCE SOON AND THAT THEY EXPECT WALDHEIM TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA. IT WOULD SEEM IMPORTANT THAT THE APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE CLEARED UP URGENTLY.

6. IRAN/IRAQ. AT A PRIVATE MEETING I HAD WITH HIM EARLIER THIS WEEK, PALME INDICATED THAT HE HAD MADE ONLY SLOW PROGRESS ON THE MAIN ISSUE DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE AREA, BUT WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SHIPS (MY TELNO 162). WALDHEIM DOES NOT KNOW ABOUT MY MEETINGS WITH PALME AND THE LINE IN THE BRIEF STILL HOLDS.

7. NAMIBIA. THERE WILL BE A RESUMED SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEGINNING ON 2 MARCH WITH PROBABLY TEN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. WE ARE WORKING FOR COMMON ABSTENTIONS AND A COMMON EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE FIVE WHICH HAS BEEN THE REGULAR PRACTICE OF THE FIVE OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. IT IS HOWEVER UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMERICANS WILL BE ABLE TO JOIN US IN COMMON ABSTENTIONS OR A COMMON STATEMENT AS THEIR POLICY REVIEW ON SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. TO JUDGE FROM WHAT WE HEAR, AND FROM REPORTS FROM THE CURRENT OAU MEETING, THE AFRICANS SEEM TO INTEND THAT THE RESUMED GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ALL NEXT WEEK, SHOULD BE FOLLOWED SOME TIME IN MARCH OR APRIL BY RESORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEREAFTER BY AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GA IF THE WEST VETO MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

8. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS WELL AWARE OF HOW UNHELPLESS ALL THIS WOULD BE. HE IS HOWEVER UNABLE TO STEM THE TIDE. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY NEVERTHELESS WISH TO EMPHASISE THE DAMAGE THAT WOULD BE CAUSED AND PERHAPS GIVE HIM SOME ACCOUNT OF HER DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

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.SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS EMBARGO. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HOLDING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TODAY ON THE REPORT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE. IF ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT TAKES PLACE, I SHALL BRIEF MRS THATCHER ORALLY TOMORROW.

10. FINALLY, THERE IS MR BREZHNEV'S DREADFUL PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL "WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE TOP LEADERS OF ITS MEMBER STATES IN ORDER TO LOOK FOR KEYS TO IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND PREVENTING WAR". THERE IS A RISK THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE ITS ATTRACTIONS FOR WALDHEIM. HE IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PROPOSALS WHICH ENHANCE HIS PRESTIGE. AND IF HE HAS DECIDED TO STAND FOR A THIRD TERM AS SECRETARY GENERAL, HE MIGHT SEE ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE IN A MEETING IN SAY OCTOBER AT WHICH HE WOULD HOBNOB WITH WORLD LEADERS.

11. IF WALDHEIM RAISES THE IDEA, WHICH HAS BEEN OVERSHADOWED ELSEWHERE BY BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A BILATERAL US/SOVIET SUMMIT, I HOPE THAT MRS THATCHER WILL FIRMLY DISCOURAGE HIM FROM PURSUING IT. SHE COULD POINT TO THE UNWIELDLINESS OF SUCH A MEETING, PARTICULARLY SINCE BREZHNEV HAS SAID THAT "LEADERS OF OTHER STATES COULD EVIDENTLY ALSO TAKE PART": ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW ATTENDANCE COULD BE LIMITED, HOW THE AGENDA WOULD BE DECIDED, WHAT THE END RESULT WOULD BE ETC: AND GENERALLY EXPRESS SCEPTICISM.

PARSONS