

POLAND: ADVANCE COPIES

1980

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MR FERGUSSON
SIR A ACLAND
MR P H MOBERLY

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DIO CABINET OFFICE
ASSESSMENTS STAFF
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DESKBY FCO 271430Z

DESKBY WASHINGTON 271600Z

FM UKDEL NATO 271340Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 27 MARCH 1981,
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, WARSAW,
ISLAMABAD (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY).

*Useful summary of the
essence. Read in full.*

mb

POLAND.

1. THE COUNCIL MET AT U S REQUEST THIS MORNING TO REVIEW THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.
2. BENNETT (US) SAID THAT THE CRISIS HAD REACHED THE MOST SERIOUS STAGE SINCE LAST AUGUST. INTERNAL REPRESSION OR SOVIET INTERVENTION WERE POSSIBLE WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING. PREPARATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN NOTED IN POLAND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MARTIAL LAW. ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE HAD DIMINISHED FOR BOTH SIDES. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON SUNDAY AND THE PARLIAMENT SESSION ON MONDAY COULD BRING ABOUT A GOVERNMENT RE-SHUFFLE OR THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY. IF GOVERNMENT CHANGES WERE AT THE EXPENSE OF HARDLINERS, THAT MIGHT AVERT THE GENERAL STRIKE. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, THE HARDLINERS CAME OUT ON TOP, A GENERAL STRIKE, FOLLOWED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MARTIAL LAW, WAS ALL THE MORE LIKELY. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WAS INCREASINGLY DESPARATE.
3. BENNETT THEN REFERRED TO THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ISSUED LAST

3. BENNETT THEN REFERRED TO THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ISSUED LAST NIGHT (WASHINGTON TELNO 1020), AND SAID THAT THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN CALLED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND ASSURED THAT THE STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE HELPFUL AND TO HAVE A DE-FUSING EFFECT. THE POINT WOULD ALSO BE MADE IN WARSAW.

4. SUMMARISING THE LATEST INTELLIGENCE, BENNETT NOTED THAT THE EXTENSION OF EXERCISE SOYUZ 81 BEYOND ITS EXPECTED FINISHING DATE OF 25 MARCH, TOGETHER WITH THE CONTINGENCE PREPARATIONS MADE AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, MEANT THAT THE SOVIET FORCES WERE IN THE RIGHT POSTURE TO BEGIN MOBILISATION FOR INTERVENTION. FORCES IN THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS (WMDS) WOULD HOWEVER HAVE TO MAKE FURTHER PREPARATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR INTERVENTION, AND THESE WOULD BE EVIDENT AT THE TIME. AT PRESENT THERE WERE NO (NO) SIGNS OF MOBILISATION IN THE WMDS, OF THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET FORCES TOWARDS THE POLISH BORDER. BENNETT SUGGESTED THREE REASONS FOR THE EXTENSION OF SOYUZ 81:

- (I) THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF TO ORGANISE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES;
- (II) THE THREAT OF USE OF SOVIET FORCE WAS KEPT IN THE FOREGROUND;
- (III) STAFFS AND UNITS COULD TRAIN FOR NEW TASKS.

5. THE POLISH MILITARY HAD SO FAR KEPT A LOW PROFILE AND AVOIDED GATHERING IN STRENGTH NEAR THE MAJOR CITIES. JARUZELSKI WOULD NOT IN THE U.S. VIEW USE POLISH FORCES FOR INTERNAL REPRESSION OR DECLARE MARTIAL LAW UNLESS HE THOUGHT SOVIET INTERVENTION IMMINENT. HE MIGHT POSSIBLY, HOWEVER, USE MARTIAL LAW TO DEPLOY POLISH FORCES AROUND THE CITIES AS A SIGNAL TO MOSCOW TO KEEP OUT.

6. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ADDED THAT HE HAD ONE REPORT OF UNIDENTIFIED LOW LEVEL ELEMENTS OF SOVIET FORCES DEPLOYING FROM SOUTHERN POLAND TO THE WARSAW AREA.

7. SVART (DENMARK) SAID THAT HIS AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS NOW THE WORST CRISIS EVER FOR MODERN POLAND. UNLIKE LAST AUGUST, ALMOST THE WHOLE POPULATION WAS INVOLVED, AS A RESULT OF THE FOOD SHORTAGES AND THE MORE OPEN PRESS REPORTING. THE MANDATES FOR BOTH SIDES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NARROWED. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE COUNCIL OF STATE HAD EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL UNITY FRONT OF 23 MARCH. THEY WERE CLEARLY LOOKING FOR COMPROMISE IN CONTRAST TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLITBURO. RAKOVSKI HAD GIVEN A REMARKABLE INTERVIEW TO A LOCAL PARTY NEWSPAPER REVEALING DEEP DISCOURAGEMENT AND DEPRESSION AT SOLIDARITY'S BEHAVIOUR. IN THE DANISH EMBASSY'S VIEW AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER RADICAL

LOCAL PARTY NEWSPAPER REVEALING DEEP DISCOURAGEMENT AND DEPRESSION AT SOLIDARITY'S BEHAVIOUR. IN THE DANISH EMBASSY'S VIEW AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER RADICAL CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. THEY NOTED MARKED SUPPORT AT ALL LEVELS OF THE POPULATION FOR A POLICY OF NON-VIOLENCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE SITUATION WAS TENSE AND INFLAMMABLE.

8. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE U S AND DANISH ASSESSMENTS. WIECK (FRG) ADDED THAT GENSCHER HAD, AFTER HIS VISIT TO WARSAW, WRITTEN TO ALL WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED CALLING FOR A SPEEDING UP OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, WHICH WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL SIGNAL AT THIS TIME.

9. SCOTT NOTED THAT IN THE U S GOVERNMENT STATEMENT, THE TWO SEPARATE SCENARIOS OF INTERNAL REPRESSION BY POLISH FORCES AND INTERVENTION BY SOVIET FORCES SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN CLASSED TOGETHER. HE POINTED OUT THE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM. SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE ALLIANCE TO CONDEMN THAN FORCEFUL ACTION BY THE POLISH AUTHORITIES, AND CONDEMNATION OF THE LATTER COULD IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES LAY THE WEST OPEN TO CHARGES OF INTERFERENCE IN POLISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS) AGREED GENERALLY, BUT ADDED THAT IT WAS ALSO A GOOD THING TO SOUND SOME WARNINGS NOW ABOUT REPRESSION BY POLISH FORCES. ARNAUD (FRANCE) ENDORSED SCOTT'S COMMENT. THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SCENARIOS. THE ALLIES WOULD NEED TO MEASURE CAREFULLY THEIR RESPONSE TO THE USE OF FORCE BY THE POLISH AUTHORITIES. BENNETT AGREED THAT THE ALLIED RESPONSE WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED BY THE EXTENT OF REPRESSION USED BY THE POLISH AUTHORITIES.

10. SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES HAD REPORTS THAT THE EVENTS IN BYDGOSZCZ WERE A RESULT OF PROVOCATION BY HARD LINE ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY, POSSIBLY INTENDED TO COINCIDE WITH SOYUZ 91.

ROSE.

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