

SECRET

GRS 430

SECRET

DEDIP

BURNING BUSH

FROM ROME 040045Z MAY 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 131 OF 4 MAY 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON. PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, WARSAW,
UKDEL NATO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

QUADRIPARTI TE MINISTERIAL DINNER IN ROME 3 MAY:

POLAND

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. GENSCHER SPOKE AS HE HAD DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO BONN LAST WEEK. THE WEST COULD EXPECT AN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL MORATORIUM IN POLAND FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT THE PERIOD BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JULY WOULD BE ONE OF SERIOUS RISKS, ESPECIALLY IF THE SELECTION OF DELEGATES LED TO A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY, ITS LEADERSHIP AND THEREFORE ITS POLICIES. GENSCHER WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE HEALTH OF CARDINAL WYSZINSKI. HE ASKED WHAT INSTRUMENTS WERE AVAILABLE TO THE WEST TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL DURING THE PERIOD JUNE TO AUGUST. THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE PROSPECT OF HAIG'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO, BY THE COURSE OF THE MADRID CONFERENCE, BY THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS ETC. ALL THESE THINGS WOULD HELP TO REMIND THE RUSSIANS WHAT THEY STOOD TO LOSE IF THEY INVADED POLAND.

2. HAIG AGREED THAT THE SUMMER WOULD BE A DIFFICULT PERIOD AND THAT THERE WERE THINGS THE WEST COULD DO TO INFLUENCE EVENTS. THE POPE HAD TOLD HIM ON 2 MAY THAT WHAT HAD ALREADY OCCURED IN POLAND HAD EXCEEDED THE TOLERANCE OF 'THE RUSSIANS'. HE HAD ADMITTED THAT THE SUCCESSOR TO WYSZINSKI COULD NOT EXPECT TO EXERCISE THE SAME INFLUENCE. HE HAD NOT REPEAT NOT SEEN SOVIET INTERVENTION AS A DANGER THAT WAS BEHIND US. THE POPE HAD DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THE HUNGARIAN AND CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS ON THE ONE HAND AND THOSE IN POLAND ON THE OTHER: THE LATTER WERE A HISTORICAL EVENT OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE, INVOLVING THE PARTY ITSELF. THE POPE BELIEVED THAT WESTERN UNITY AND WESTERN STATEMENTS HAD TWICE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN AVERTING A SOVIET DECISION TO INTERVENE. HE HAD BEEN PLEASED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS REBUILDING ITS STRENGTH, AND HAD SAID THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ANOTHER TOTALITARIAN COMMUNIST REGIME IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IF AMERICA HAD NOT ACTED ON EL SALVADOR.

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3. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST HAD ISSUED ENOUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. THE PROSPECT OF FREE ELECTIONS LEADING TO A TOTALLY DIFFERENT PARTY MEMBERSHIP MUST BE CAUSING THE RUSSIANS TO CONSIDER WHAT THEY COULD DO TO PREEMPT THIS RESULT. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO GET THE TONE OF THE REFERENCE TO POLAND IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUE EXACTLY RIGHT.

4. FRANCOIS PONCET WAS NOT INCLINED TO BE OPTIMISTIC. THE WORST LAY AHEAD, NOT ASTERN. SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS BECOMING DAILY BOTH MORE NECESSARY AND MORE DIFFICULT. THE CALM WAS MISLEADING. HE AGREED THAT FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED. THE WEST MUST ENSURE THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE THINGS THE SOVIET UNION WAS LOOKING FOR WERE NOT CUT OFF OR EXCLUDED. IF WE COULD GET OVER THE JULY PERIOD THE OCCASION FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION MIGHT NOT RECUR.

ARCULUS

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