



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1981

*Dear Michael,*

Japanese Prime Minister's Visit to UK: 18-18 June

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr Suzuki for talks at 11.45 am on Wednesday 17 June and to give a lunch for him afterwards. Mr Suzuki will be accompanied by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Sonoda (who called on Mrs Thatcher in May 1979 during his first period as Foreign Minister), by Mr Kawara, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary and by officials.

*in folder attached to file*  
/ — I enclose three sets of briefs for the meeting and a  
*on the* draft for a short speech which the Prime Minister may wish to make  
*speech file* at her lunch.

There is no formal agenda for the talks. The Japanese were asked whether there were any specific subjects Mr Suzuki wished to discuss. At one point they indicated that they were likely to have suggestions to put forward but they have not in fact done so. They have however made it clear that Mr Suzuki will be reluctant to discuss trade issues in detail.

The briefs include the programme for the visit. You will note that Mr Suzuki will be speaking at Chatham House on the evening of 17 June on the subject: 'Towards a new Japanese/European Relationship'. So far as we know this will be Mr Suzuki's only public speech during his current tour. The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that in the early stages of planning for the visit the Japanese asked whether it would be possible for Mr Suzuki to be received in audience by the Queen. The Queen does not receive distinguished foreign visitors during Ascot Week and it quickly became clear that it would be impracticable to arrange for Mr Suzuki to meet the Queen at Ascot. The Japanese therefore withdrew their request.

It seems likely that Mr Suzuki will invite the Prime Minister to visit Japan at some point. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to accept the invitation in principle without committing herself to any particular timing. (We may in due course wish to recommend that the Prime Minister should include Japan in her itinerary if she visits China next year (my letter to Willie Rickett of 2 June).)

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*  
(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

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10 Downing St



THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER,  
11.45 AM ON 17 JUNE 1981

Japanese participants

Mr Suzuki	Prime Minister
Mr Sonoda	Foreign Minister
Mr Fujiyama	Ambassador
Mr Kawara	Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Mr Takashima	Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr Muto	Director General, European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, MFA
Mr Fukada	Director General, Economic Affairs Bureau, MFA
Mr Tanino	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Mr Kitajima	Interpreter

JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UK, 16-18 JUNE 1981

LIST OF BRIEFS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
1	Steering Brief
2	EC/Japan
3	Bilateral Economic Issues
4	Ottawa Summit and Relations with Developing Countries
5	Far East and South East Asia
6	East-West Relations: Poland and Afghanistan
7	Middle East

BACKGROUND BRIEFS

8	Background Brief:  (a) Anglo-Japanese Relations (b) Politics in Japan (c) Japanese Economy
9	Personality Notes:  (a) Mr. Zenko Suzuki (b) Mr. Sunao Sonoda (c) Mr. Tsutomu Kawara (d) Mr. Masuo Takashima



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Mr Fujiyama	Ambassador
Mr Kawara	Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Mr Takashima	Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr Muto	Director General, European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, MFA
Mr Fukada	Director General, Economic Affairs Bureau, MFA
Mr Kato	Director General, International Finance Bureau, Ministry of Finance
Mr Fujiwara	Director General, International Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of International Trade & Industry
Mr Tanino	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Mr Kitajima	Interpreter

*[All will be staying on to lunch except Mr Muto.]*

JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UK, 16-18 JUNE 1981

BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

#### INTRODUCTION

1. Mr Suzuki's visit to London is part of a European tour, including West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the EC Commission and (after London) the Netherlands and France. It is the first by a Japanese Prime Minister to the UK since Mr Tanaka's visit in 1973 (Mr Heath in 1972 was the last British Prime Minister to pay a bilateral visit to Japan; Mrs Thatcher made visits in 1977 as Leader of the Opposition and in 1979 for the Tokyo Summit).
2. The present series of visits (Suzuki's first to Europe in any official capacity) is taking place at Japanese initiative. Its ostensible purpose is to enable Suzuki to meet his European counterparts before the Ottawa Summit and to put Japan's relations with Europe more on a par with those with the US. The importance which the Japanese attach to their political relations with Europe reflects their recognition that they must now play a more active role in international affairs; a divergence of interests on some issues with the Americans (though the relationship with the US remains the central pillar of Japan's foreign policy); and awareness of the similarity of Japanese and European interests following events in Afghanistan and Iran. At the same time Suzuki himself has little personal knowledge of Europe and little or no feel for European concerns; he appears not fully to appreciate the seriousness of the trade problems on which he will hope to avoid detailed discussion. His visit to Europe comes less than 6 weeks after a trip to Washington whose results aroused great controversy in Japan. Suzuki's inept handling of the situation has severely dented his reputation. He is likely to remain Prime Minister for some time, but he will hope for a successful European tour

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restore his credentials at home as a statesman.

3. Details of Suzuki's programme are at Annex A.

#### UK OBJECTIVES

4. (a) To leave the Japanese in no doubt about our economic concerns and the reasons for them; to persuade them of the validity of our case; and to get them to move in the right direction over specific practical issues;
- (b) To reaffirm the importance we attach to co-operation with Japan on political as well as economic issues.

#### MR SUZUKI'S PROBABLE OBJECTIVES

5. Suzuki's aims, which will be broadly similar in all European capitals, are likely to be:

- (a) to get to know the Prime Minister;
- (b) to prepare the way for the Ottawa Summit;
- (c) to demonstrate Japan's interest in closer political ties with Europe and willingness to play a role in world affairs; and
- (d) to play down economic problems, particularly with Ottawa in mind.

#### RESUME OF BRIEFS

6. Our principal objective is set out at paragraph 4(a) above. Suzuki is likely to be more receptive to this message if it is coupled with a general welcome for closer political relations between Japan and the Ten. We are already working for this in the Ten and will continue to do so during our Presidency: it is in our interest that Japan should play its proper part as 'a member of the Western camp' (a phrase now generally used in Japan) - and Suzuki will probably want to make a presentation on this general theme at some point.

7. The Prime Minister might therefore begin with a reference to our wish to work with Japan on major international issues, such as Afghanistan and Poland; and go on to welcome

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the increasing frequency of contacts at ministerial and official level. It would be useful at this point to remind Suzuki that difficulties over trade inevitably affect the overall relationship between the EC/UK and Japan, but it would be tactically best to defer discussion of trade issues until there has been some discussion of the international scene.

BRIEF NO  
6

8. Suzuki is one of the leading doves in the Liberal Democratic Party and it will be important to stiffen his resolve in dealing with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister might refer to the fragility of the situation in Poland; and stress the need for the West, including Japan, to react swiftly (and unitedly) to any Soviet intervention. Lord Carrington will probably have mentioned the Afghanistan initiative during his earlier meeting with Sonoda but the Prime Minister may wish to refer to it briefly, stressing its confidentiality at this stage.

BRIEF NO  
2

9. To get our economic concerns across, the best approach might be to open with a firm presentation of the general case for Japanese restraint on exports and action to increase imports, stressing that the European Community is united in the view that the concentration of Japanese exports in sensitive industrial sectors, coupled with the impenetrable Japanese market for manufactured goods, is placing increasing strain on the open world trading system. The EC has been able to resist protectionist pressures so far, but may not be able to do so indefinitely unless Japan too makes an appropriate contribution.

BRIEF NO  
3

10. After this the Prime Minister might move on to make points of specific concern to the UK, making it clear that we regard this as part of a united Community approach. Such points include:

- (a) existing voluntary restraint understandings, particularly for vehicles, must be made to work effectively;
- (b) barriers to UK exports should be removed (eg by reducing tariffs on whisky and confectionery);
- (c) the Japanese government should take

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direct action to increase imports through public procurement (eg defence equipment from the UK).

The Prime Minister will also wish to welcome Japanese investment, co-operation in high technology industries and collaboration in third markets.

BRIEF NO  
4

11. Suzuki will probably wish to have a general discussion of the Ottawa Summit and relations with developing countries. If the question has not arisen earlier, the Prime Minister may have to put down a marker about the need for discussion of Japan's trading role at Ottawa.

BRIEF NO  
5

12. In discussion of other international issues the Prime Minister will want to show interest in Japan's regional concerns, though Suzuki is unlikely to have anything new to say. She could ask how he sees the Soviet threat and the general strategic environment in the Far East and South East Asia. In doing so, she could leave Suzuki with the thought that we would welcome a greater Japanese defence effort, but in view of Japanese sensitivities it would be best not to press this point. The Japanese see their contribution to the protection of Western interests more in the direction of aid to strategically important countries eg Pakistan and Thailand. The Prime Minister might show appreciation for this contribution, and in particular for Japan's increased aid for Zimbabwe (details in Brief No 4).

13. If time allows, or over lunch, Suzuki might be asked for his assessment of developments in China.

BRIEF NO  
7

14. Finally, the Prime Minister might welcome Japan's support for the European approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute and look forward to keeping closely in touch, particularly during our Presidency. She could explain our condemnation of the recent Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installation. If time allowed, Suzuki might welcome an account of her talks with King Khalid.