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SIR A ACLAND MR GILLMORE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 879 OF 13TH DSCEMBER 1981

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, 4RAMODUK, HQBAOR AND HQRAFG.

FRO MELHUISH.

OUS TEL 874: POLISH INTERNAL SITUATION.

- 1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CLECHOWSKI SUMMONED ME TO MFA THIS MORNING AND SAW ME ON MY OWN FOR ONE HOUR. OTHER AMBASSADORS I TALKED BRIEFLY TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN WERE BEING SEEN BY OTHER MINISTERS. HE WAS BY NO MEANS HIS USUAL SUAVE SELF AND WAS TALKING FROM PENCILLED NOTES ON ISSUES WHICH WERE STILL BEING THRASHED OUT IN A DIFFERENT PART OF THE BUILDING.
- 2. OLECHOWSKI BEGAN BY SAYING THAT WE WOULD HAVE STUDIED GENERAL

2. ULECHUNSKI BERAY BY WAYING THAT WE WOUNT HAVE JARUZELSKI'S SPEECH BY NOW. THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY CHANCE OF FINDING COMMON GROUND WITH SOLIDARITY, WHOSE DEMANDS AND GENERAL ATTITUDE HAD BECOME MORE INTRACTABLE OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. UNDER THE POLISH CONSTITUTION THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR A STATE OF EMERGENCY, ONLY FOR A "STATE OF WAR" AND FOR A "STATE OF WARLIKENESS" (STAN WOJENNY). THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOW PROCLAIMED THE SECOND STATE. BUT OLECHOWSKI STRESSED THAT POLAND'S LAWFUL GOVERNMENT WAS STILL OPERATING. I ASKED HOW THIS SQUARED WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A MILITARY COUNCIL AND OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT HE WAS NOT YET SURE HOW THIS WOULD WORK. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, EVERY CENTRAL ORGANISATION, AND PROBABLY EVERY VOIVODSHIP, WOULD HAVE A MILITARY COMMISSAR ATTACHED TO IT. AT THE SAME TIME CERTAIN LEGAL CASES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO MILITARY COURTS, PARTICULARLY IN TWO CASES, DANGEROUS OR HARMFUL ACTION TO COUNTERMAND THE STATE OF WAR-LIKENESS. AND CRIMES AGAINST THE ECONOMY. I ASKED WHETHER SOLIDA-RITY LEADERS DETAINED DURING THE NIGHT WOULD BE TRIED IN A MILITARY COURT. OLECHOWSKI CONFESSED HE DID NOT KNOW. HE THEN CONFIRMED THAT SOME SILIDARITY LEADERS HAD BEEN DETAINED IN GDANSK BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH. I ALSO ASKED WHETHER UNDER "HARMFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES" THE AUTHORITIES WOULD INCLUDE FOR EXAMPLE A STRIKE IN THE SILESIAN COAL FIELDS. GLECHOWKSI SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD. IN REPLY TO ANOTHER QUESTION OLECHOWSKI SAID HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVIL LAW WOULD APPLY IN SUCH COURTS.

- 3. OLECHOWKS! THEN SAID THAT THE MFA WAS CURRENTLY DRAFTING AN IMPORTANT NOTE WHICH WOULD BE PASSED TO ALL EMBASSIES. HE WANTED US TO HAVE ADVANCE WARNING. DURING THE PERIOD OF THE EMERGENCY EMBASSIES WERE ASKED:
- 1) TO LIMIT ARRIVALS OF ALL FOREIGNERS TO POLAND INCLUDING DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS, COMPERCIAL AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIVES AND TOURISTS.
- 2) TO CONFINE MOVEMENTS OF ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL TO THE CITY IN WHICH THEY LIVE. IN THE CASE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY THIS WOULD MEAN WARSAW. HE LATER EXPANDED THIS TO INCLUDE ALL OTHER FOREIGN RESIDENTS, INCLUDING JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN ETC.
- 3) TO KEEP ALL BRITISH SHIPS AWAY FROM POLISH PORTS. IF THERE WERE BRITISH SHIPS IN POLISH PORTS, THE SEAMEN WERE NOT PERMITTED TO GO ASHORE.

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- T THE AIRPORT. NONE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO ENTER POLAND.
 - 5) THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO FOREIGNERS LEAVING POLAND BY AIR OR BY TRAIN. IF FOREIGNERS WISHED TO LEAVE POLAND BY PRIVATE CAR, THEY HAD TO SECURE PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE AUTHORITIES OF THE VOLVODSHIP IN WHICH THEY FOUND THEMSELVES.
 - 6) TO CANCEL ANY LARGE GATHERING SUCH AS A NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, OLECHOWSKI CONFIRMED THAT ALL GATHERINGS OF POLES WOULD BE BANNED UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. HE DID NOT MENTION A CURFEW BUT I AM CHECKING ON THIS.
 - 4. TAKING UP OLECHKOWSKI ON THESE POINTS, I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE TOTALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT THE WISHES OF THE MEA SO LONG AS TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS WERE BROKEN. WE COULD NOT WARN THE REASONABLY LARGE NUMBERS OF BRITISH SUBJECTS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT POLAND ABOUT THE BAN ON MOVEMENT AND ON PRIVATE CARS UNLESS WE COULD SPEAK TO THEM, IT WAS QUITE LIKELY THAT MANY BRITISH TOURISTS IN THEIR CARS WERE ALREADY SETTING OFF FOR THE EAST GERMAN FRONTIER. OLECHKOWSKI THEN AGREED TO ALLOW A CONSULAR OFFICIAL TO TRAVEL TO WLOCLAWER AND GDANSK TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH COMMUNITIES THERE. I WILL ARRANGE THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MORE GENERALLY, I SAID THAT THE CURRENT COMPLETE BLANKET ON TELEPHONE AND TELEX FACILITIES DID NOT PERMIT THIS EMBASSY TO CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTIONS AND URGED HIM TO LIFT IT. I PROMISED TO PASS ON THE OTHER POINTS HE MADE. AS REGARDS POINT 3), I WAS NOT SURE THAT WE COULD STOP BRITISH SHIPS ON THEIR WAY TO POLAND. ON POINT 4). I ASKED WHETHER BRITISH AIRCRAFT COULD STILL COME FREELY TO POLISH AIRFIELDS. OLECHOWKSI SAID THEY COULD STILL COME BUT ONLY TO PICK UP OUTGOING PASSENGERS. I THEN ASKED ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC COURIER THAT WE ARE EXPECTING BY TOMORROW'S BA FLIGHT. OLECHOWSKI HAD CLEARLY NOT THOUGHT OF THIS BUT, AFTER CONSULTING BY TELEPHONE, HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY. WE MUST INFORM PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA OF FULL NAMES AND PASSPORT DETAILS. I ALSO ASKED WHETHER MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY WHO WERE ON LEAVE (EG BALMER) OR SCHOOL CHILDREN OF EMBASSY FAMILIES COMING TO POLAND FOR THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS WOULD ALSO BE BANNED. CLECHOWSKI SAID THEY COULD COME, PROVIDED WE GAVE THE MFA A LIST. (I AM RECOMMENDING SEPARATELY THAT WE SHOULD IN FACT NOW STOP CUR SCHOOLCHILDREN COUING OUT)

5. CLECHOWSKI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WANTED HMG TO KNOW THAT THEY HAD CHOSEN THE PATH OF DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AS THE LEAST VIOLENT OF A NUMBER OF ALTER-NADIVES. THEY COULD HAVE DONE MUCH. MORE. HE THEN SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE WAS UPSET BY WHAT HAD HAPPENED BUT THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO ALTERNATIVE. RETURNING TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHOSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS NOW KNEW POLAND WELL PERSONALLY, WOULD UNDERSTAND THE DILEMMA IN WHICH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT FOUND THEMSELVES AND WOULD LOOK UPON THE ACTIONS OF THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WITH AS MUCH SYMPATHY AS THEY COULD MUSTER.

6. I REPLIED BY SAYING THAT, AS OUR MINISTERS HAD SAID MANY TIMES, WE BELIEVED THAT THE POLES WHOULD BE LEFT TO THEMSELVES TO SORT OUT THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. I HAD TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE PATHTHE GOVERNMENT NOW SEEMED TO HAVE CHOSEN COULD ONLY SHARPEN THE FOCUS OF CONFRONTATION. IT LOOKED AS IF THE POLES HAD NOW TURNED THEIR BACK ON THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE. I WAS SURE THAT HMG WOULD BE WATCHING EVENTS IN POLAND ANXIOUSLY AND I THOUGHT THAT MINISTERS WOULD BE DISMAYED BY WHAT HAD HAPPENED DURING THE NIGHT. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT I THOUGHT THE EFFECT OF THE CRACK-DOWN ON SOLIDARITY WOULD BE LITTLE SHORT OF DISASTROUS SO FAR AS POLAND'S WESTERN CREDITORS WERE CONCERNED. I HAD BEEN SUMMONED TO CALL ON FINANCE MINISTER KRZAK THE FOLLOWING DAY AND I NOW WONDERED IF THERE WAS ANY POINT IN SUCH A MEETING. FINALLY, I PUT IN ANOTHER REQUEST FOR LIFTING OF THE TELE-COMMUNICATIONS BAN. I ALSO SAID I COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN BRITAIN MIGHT WISH TO CONFINE THE MOVEMENTS OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL IN THE SAME WAY THAT OUR MOVEMENTS WERE BEING CONFINED. AJAMES

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