



MO 25/2/24/2

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD AT 0830 ON 30TH NOVEMBER WITH THE GERMAN
DEFENCE SECRETARY AT THE UK DELEGATION NATO HQ

Present:

The Rt Hon John Nott MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Herr Woerner
German Secretary of State
for Defence

Mr Blelloch
Deputy Under Secretary (Policy and
Programmes)

Dr Ruhl
State Secretary, Ministry
of Defence

The Secretary of State thanked Herr Woerner warmly for his help over securing a decision on RB 199 sales to India. Herr Woerner said that it had not been easy and had required the support of the Chancellor. There could be no question of any further decision on sales of Tornado itself until after the FRG elections in March 1983. The Secretary of State acknowledged the reasons for this.

2. The Secretary of State asked Herr Woerner for an account of his discussions with the US Administration in Washington. Herr Woerner said that he had made two main points about INF deployment as the FRG saw it:-

a. The 1979 decision related only to 108 Pershings and warheads, plus as many missiles as might be required purely for maintenance backing. The Americans had appeared to be contemplating much larger numbers in support of the original deployment.

b. It was most important that deployment in the basing countries should be closely synchronized, within a period of about 4 weeks and that so far as the Germans were concerned this should not be before September 1983. They remained committed to the target date for I.O.C. of December 1983.

He had also discussed out of area issues, pointing out to the Americans the very significant steps the FRG had already taken to increase manpower, the impossibility of going beyond this to finding the 93,000 additional men which on certain assumptions about RDJTF deployment might be required and drawing the Americans attention to the acute manpower difficulties the FRG would face in the late 1980s when the number of young men becoming available for the draft might be cut by nearly a half.



3. The Secretary of State asked how the UK might help the FRG Government on nuclear issues in the period leading up to the March 1983 election. Herr Woerner said that help might best be provided by the UK stressing, in public, its determination to go ahead with deployment plus its firm commitment to arms control. In private it would also be helpful if we could continue to urge on the US the need to use every opportunity to develop and maintain strong public negotiating positions in Geneva.
4. The Secretary of State then asked about battlefield nuclear weapons and the contribution that progress in this area might make towards winning public opinion. Herr Woerner said that, for the FRG, the less said about this in public before the election the better. As regards the role of these weapons the Germans strongly favoured a shift from the shortest to the longer range classes of weapons given the importance they placed on them as a contribution to deterrence rather than to war fighting. Herr Woerner however agreed that it was important for the work of the HLG to be pressed forward.
5. The Secretary of State asked Herr Woerner if he would develop further his account of German thinking about the timing of INF deployment. Herr Woerner confirmed that in the German view deployment beginning as early as May 1983 as currently planned for the UK, would be represented by the Russians as pre-empting the outcome of arms control negotiations. The Russians would no doubt also exploit the fact that Herr Schmidt and Herr Genscher were on the record as having acknowledged that a key time in the negotiations would be the summer of 1983. On these grounds deployment before September would raise very great difficulty for the Germans and he had said so to the Americans in Washington. Among officials the reception had been hostile: Mr Weinberger himself had appeared non-committal.
6. The Secretary of State said that in the UK public opinion would attach less importance to the question of synchronized delivery and its link with arms control negotiations. What was less satisfactory about present plans was the fact that they provided for delivery of equipments over an extended period from May (launch control vehicles) through July (the launchers) to September (missiles). It would be far better either for deliveries, including missiles, to be completed by, say, July or for them to be postponed until November. Herr Woerner said that November would be perfectly satisfactory for the FRG.
7. The Secretary of State asked how matters might now be taken forward. He wished to be helpful but felt that it would be much better for the Germans to continue to take the initiative. Herr Woerner said that he would be seeing Mr Weinberger later in the morning and would raise the question of synchronisation with him. The Secretary of State agreed with this proposal and said he himself would touch on the matter when he saw Mr Weinberger later in the day. Whether or not there would be advantage in a tri-partite meeting could be left for later decision.
8. The Ministers touched on two other matters:-
 - a. Herr Woerner confirmed German agreement to more infra structure funds but noted that, the agreement having been given, the US Administration was already pressing for more.

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b. Herr Woerner said that the Portuguese had told him that the British were committed to helping them over frigates. The Secretary of State said that this was not so but that we were prepared to repeat our offer of Rolls Royce engines on favourable credit terms. The Ministers agreed to keep in touch.

9. The meeting ended at 0920.

Ministry of Defence

2nd December 1982

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