

SECRET



MO 25/2/24/2

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DEFENCE SECRETARY  
AND THE US DEFENSE SECRETARY AT THE US MISSION TO NATO  
ON 30TH NOVEMBER AT 1740

Present:

The Rt Hon John Nott MP  
Secretary of State for Defence

The Hon Caspar W Weinberger  
US Defense Secretary

Mr R C Mottram  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Defence

Major General Carl R Smith USAF  
Military Assistant to the  
Defense Secretary

(from Item 2 onwards) The Hon W Tapley Bennett Jr  
Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary, US Mission to  
NATO

The Hon R N Perle  
Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
International Security Policy,  
Department of Defense

Brigadier General J R Lasater USAF  
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for European and NATO Policy,  
International Security Policy,  
Department of Defense

INF Basing

1. The Secretary of State enquired whether Herr Wörner had raised with Mr Weinberger, during their meeting earlier in the day, the question of synchronisation of INF deployments. Mr Weinberger at first said this subject had not been raised but Major General Smith confirmed that it had been mentioned. The Secretary of State said he wished to explain very privately the British position. We remained fully committed to the deployment of GLCMs within the agreed timetable of December 1983. The present delivery programme as explained by US experts envisaged the equipment being delivered over an extended period next summer beginning with the control vans, followed by the transport/erector/launchers, with the missiles arriving in September. Missiles arriving in the early Autumn could cause controversy if a British general election campaign was then underway and such controversy would do no good for INF deployments in Europe generally. The British Government would be happy to proceed on the existing basis but with the deliveries speeded up so that all of the equipment was at Greenham Common by July but





was conscious that this would not meet German concerns. If it were felt that the deliveries should be synchronised, the September date envisaged by the Germans would not suit us and it would be necessary to look to the equipment arriving in the UK in November or December. Mr Weinberger said that he was not sure that he understood the basis of German concerns. At present deliveries were being programmed essentially in accordance with the manufacturing schedule and logistic considerations. Alternatives could certainly be looked at. He was not sure whether deliveries in say November would be compatible with a planned initial operational capability of December. Experts might look at the problem together.

2. The Secretary of State said that regardless of when the main equipment was delivered, it should all be taken direct by air to Greenham Common. It would not be sensible for these very large vehicles to move there by road. Off-base training should be avoided until after the Autumn. He also wondered whether some British personnel might be given familiarisation training on how the cruise missile flights were to be operated. In Britain cruise missiles were perceived as American weapons outside British control and general references to the understandings over the use of UK bases were not sufficient to meet such concern. Some form of joint training would give the impression of closer British involvement and help to diffuse criticism. Mr Weinberger indicated that he thought none of these points would present problems for the US Government. In conclusion, the Secretary of State emphasised that his concern was to minimise political controversy over the deployment of GLCMs: our commitment to the deployment programme itself was firm.

### Belize

3. The Secretary of State said that he hoped the US Government appreciated that our garrison in Belize could not remain there indefinitely. We had small armed forces and a large number of commitments: moreover we did not normally, and should not, maintain British forces in an independent country. Mr Weinberger commented that our force level in Belize was itself fairly small but made a most important contribution. He hoped that we would stay there as long as we possibly could.

### Falkland Islands Report

4. The Secretary of State said that he wished briefly to mention his concern over the risk of controversy arising from the report being prepared by General Shutler about the Falkland Islands campaign which would draw upon British information. He wondered if we might have a sight of the report before it was finalised to ensure that the information we had supplied was properly reflected





and that the report was factually correct. Mr Weinberger, who seemed unaware of the Shutler Report, said he felt this would cause no problem.

### Technology Transfer

5. The Secretary of State said that he was concerned that the US Administration's efforts to limit technology transfer to the Soviet Union could be very divisive within the Alliance and that US companies were using the issue as an excuse for limiting industrial co-operation. We did not want another row like that over the Soviet pipeline. UK industrialists were representing to him that the attitude of US companies towards co-operation was hardening. Mr Perle said that any change in attitudes had not been influenced by the Department of Defense. If we had specific complaints, he would be happy to look at them. It would be helpful if the British Government would take a more positive attitude to the reform of the COCOM machinery and particularly to the need for a military sub-committee. As presently constituted, COCOM was a joke - its total budget was only \$400,000 a year. The Secretary of State said that his experts doubted the value of a military sub-committee but he would certainly look at it again. He wondered whether sufficient attention was being given to technology acquired by the Soviet Union from Japanese civil industry. Mr Weinberger said that he was certainly conscious of this.

### Out of Area Planning

6. Mr Weinberger said that he hoped that the British Government would back the proposed revised language on out of area planning in the DPC Communique. It was most important that this was not watered down. The US Government remained committed to the forward defence of NATO and its reinforcement. They believed that it was only sensible that NATO planning should take account of the possible use of US forces in other areas in support of the interests of the West as a whole. He found it difficult to understand why European countries were not prepared to support this when they would be the primary beneficiaries from any US action - the US, and indeed Britain, could do without Middle East oil but European countries certainly could not. The Secretary of State said that the European countries were unlikely to give in advance the sort of assurances and backing which the Americans seemed to want: but, on the day, he was confident that any deployment of the RDJTF would have their support. It would be better not to try to define in detail now what could be involved. Mr Weinberger commented that any deployment would be far more effective if it had been properly planned in advance and the implications for NATO recognised and allowed for. The support of NATO countries was also needed in relation to the US Congress. There was a strong feeling there that the US had global responsibilities and its forces had been over-committed to the European theatre. The willingness of the





Europeans to be flexible over US deployments would assist greatly in responding to this sort of criticism. There was nothing in the proposed language in the Communique which could be objected to. The Secretary of State said that we were certainly prepared to back the Americans over the revised proposed wording for the Communique.

### Lebanon

7. Mr Weinberger asked whether there was any possibility that we could assist in the Lebanon - he understood that we might provide a training team which would be very helpful. The Secretary of State said that the Director of our Military Assistance Office was about to submit a report on the training option. He would look at where matters stood on his return to London.

8. The meeting closed at 1810.

Ministry of Defence

3rd December 1982

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