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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 304 OF 26 OCTOBER

AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE INFO WASHINGTON

PRIORITY INFO BRIDGETOWN, GEORGETOWN, AND PORT OF SPAIN

Prime Minister

Would you be prepared
to ring Mr. Seaga?

A.J.C. 26/10

TELECON SMALLMAN/EDWARDS

GRENADA

1. A BITTER MR SEAGA SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING. IN ADVANCE OF A MEETING WITH ALL HEADS OF MISSION LATER IN THE DAY, HE WANTED TO TELL ME HOW DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED HE HAD BEEN BY THE TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPORTED INTERVENTION IN YESTERDAY'S (25TH) DEBATE ON THE GRENADA OPERATION. PERCEPTIONS MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FROM A DISTANCE, BUT HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE OECS DECLARATION SHOULD BE FULLY REASONED AND PERSUASIVE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL. HE HAD HOPED THIS WOULD BE TREATED SYMPATHETICALLY. BRITAIN'S REACTION HAD GREAT WEIGHT HERE. JAMAICA LOOKED TO BRITAIN FOR UNDERSTANDING. THEY HAD SUPPORTED US OVER THE FALKLANDS AND WERE STILL BEING ASKED TO DO SO. AND NOW THIS "UNKINDEST CUT OF ALL" WITHOUT AN ATTEMPT TO SEEK HIS VIEWS. HE HOPED SOME COMPENSATING COMMENT COULD BE MADE IN FURTHER DEBATE IN THE HOUSE TODAY AND IN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS FEELINGS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HOPED THAT HE COULD EXPECT SOME MESSAGE FROM HER.

2. I SAID I WAS SORRY HE FELT AS HE DID. I HAD NOT SEEN A TEXT OF WHAT HE CLAIMED THE PRIME MINISTER TO HAVE SAID, SO I COULD NOT COMMENT ON IT. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, NO QUESTION OF BRITAIN'S LACK OF SUPPORT FOR JAMAICA. OVER GRENADA OUR ENDS WERE THE SAME. MINISTERS HAD BEEN KEPT AS CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN OECS AND CARICOM MEETINGS AS THEY COULD HAVE BEEN. THEIR CONCLUSION IN THE LIGHT OF THIS AND IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL WAS THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TRY A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SOLUTION FIRST. I KNEW THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS HAD BEEN PUT TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY APPEARED TO HAVE GONE AHEAD WITH THEIR DECISION WITH A TIMING THAT HAD APPARENTLY RULED OUT FURTHER CONSULTATION (HE ACCEPTED THIS). I WAS SORRY HE FELT HIS VIEWS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN. HE HAD MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE AMERICANS BEFORE LEAVING AT SHORT NOTICE FOR THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. HE HAD NOT APPARENTLY THEN HOWEVER THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE ME. AS I SAID, WE HAD DONE OUR BEST IN A FAST MOVING SITUATION TO KEEP ABREAST OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS AND VIEWS. I WOULD, HOWEVER, FULLY REPORT HIS DEEP CONCERN.

3. SEAGA WILL NO DOUBT SIMMER DOWN, BUT HIS VERY REAL DISAPPOINTMENT WITH WHAT HE HAS CHOSEN TO SEE, HOWEVER UNJUSTIFIABLY, AS A CASUAL DISREGARD OF JAMAICA'S POSITION WILL, I FEAR, RUN DEEP FOR SOME TIME. (HIS HINT OVER FUTURE JAMAICAN FALKLANDS DEBATE SUPPORT WAS SIGNIFICANT.) HE IS NO DOUBT THE MORE SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF HIS FRONT RUNNING IN SUPPORT OF A MILITARY SOLUTION. NO DOUBT TOO HE WOULD HAVE WISHED NOT TO BE SEEN TO BE DEPENDING WHOLLY UPON THE U.S. FOR EXTERNAL HELP. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, SOME QUICK, IF COSMETIC, EVIDENCE OF UNDERSTANDING OF JAMAICA'S POSITION A PERHAPS BY WAY OF AN APPROPRIATE PASSAGE IN A MINISTERIAL SPEECH IN TODAY'S DEBATE - COULD HELP TO LIMIT DAMAGE. SOME MESSAGE IN RESPONSE WOULD ALSO HELP, PARTICULARLY IF I WERE AUTHORISED TO PASS IT TO HIM LATER TODAY.

4. ONLY INTERVENTION BY PRIME MINISTER THAT I HAVE SEEN ON MY RETURN FROM SEAGA IS IN RETRACT 044 OF 25 OCTOBER. WAS THERE ANY OTHER? IF SO, GRATEFUL TEXT EARLIEST.

SMALLMAN