

OR 1100

SECRET

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 030553Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3332 OF 4 NOVEMBER 1963

INFO UNKIS NEW YORK, BRIDGETOWN.

RIPT: THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KENNETH BAN

GRENADA

1. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS REGRET ABOUT THE LACK OF ANY ADEQUATE CONSULTATION, THOUGH THEY DO NOT CONSIDER THAT MATTERS HAD ADVANCED TO A POINT AT WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE WARNED US UNTIL VERY LATE IN THE DAY. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE IMPROVISED. THE DIFFICULTY IN OVERCOMING CUBAN RESISTANCE WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT, IN THE HASTE WITH WHICH THE OPERATION WAS MOUNTED, THE AMERICANS WERE OBLIGED TO CONDUCT LANDINGS WITHOUT RECONNAISSANCE.

2. NOR DO THE AMERICANS ACCEPT THAT THEY WERE WRONG TO TAKE THE ACTION THEY DID. THE SUBSEQUENT FRAGAS HAS LEFT BRUISES ON BOTH SIDES, GIVEN THE PARLIAMENTARY REACTIONS IN BRITAIN AND THE FACT THAT HERE, WITH THE DEMOCRATS EVASIVE AND THE OTHER EUROPEANS SHOWING A LOWER PROFILE, WE HAVE BEEN DEPICTED OVER THE LAST WEEK AS THE PRESIDENT'S LEADING CRITIC. THIS HAS PRODUCED QUITE A STRONG REACTION, BOTH ON THE REPUBLICAN SIDE AND FROM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, WHO FELT SURPRISED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO STRONGLY OPPOSED AND THAT THE DISAGREEMENT HAS BEEN SO PUBLIC. WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT. I HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE EMPHASIS YOU AND OTHER MINISTERS HAVE PLACED IN PARLIAMENT ON THE REALITY OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE, THE CHARACTER OF THE GRENADIAN REGIME AND THE POSITIVE STEPS WE ARE NOW TAKING TO TRY TO HELP. I HAVE EMPHASISED THE DETERMINATION DISPLAYED BY YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO ENSURE THAT THE DISAGREEMENT ABOUT GRENADA DOES NOT SPILL OVER ON TO OTHER ISSUES, THE VERY FIRM LINE TAKEN ON JMF DEPLOYMENT ETC. WHAT IS NOW REQUIRED IS TO PUT THE PAST BEHIND US AND CONCENTRATE ON THE FUTURE. YOUR SPEECH IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE STRUCK EXACTLY THE RIGHT NOTE AND HAS BEEN WELCOMED HERE.

3. ON PEACE-KEEPING, THE AMERICANS WILL WANT TO GET THEIR TROOPS OFF THE ISLAND WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. THOUGH THERE ARE STILL SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRA, AND IT WILL TAKE TIME TO ROUND THEM UP. THEY HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SOMEWHAT WIDER PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, PARTICULARLY FROM WITHIN THIS HEMISPHERE (EG CONTINGENTS FROM CANADA AND TRINIDAD). BUT THEY WOULD OBJECT STRONGLY TO RANPHAL'S IDEA THAT THE EAST CARIBBEAN CONTINGENTS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND THEY WILL NOT WANT THE WHOLE OPERATION TAKEN OVER BY RANPHAL. IT IS FOR THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO DECIDE WHO HE WANTS TO HELP; AND HE WILL NO DOUBT FORM HIS JUDGEMENT IN CONSULTATION WITH THE DECS.

SECRET

SECRET

4. THE AMERICANS ARE BEGINNING TO REALISE THAT WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED WHEN THEY WITHDRAW MAY NOT BE A VERY LARGE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, BUT RATHER A REALLY EFFECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL POLICING OPERATION. DEPENDING ALSO ON THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S WISHES AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE DECS, THE AMERICANS SEE A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR US IN HELPING TO RE-ORGANISE THE POLICE AND PERHAPS ALSO IN HELPING TO ORGANISE THE ELECTION. THEY NOTED YOUR POSITIVE REMARKS ON THIS IN THE HOUSE. IT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTERESTS THAT THE US INTERVENTION SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY AN ELECTION WHICH DEMONSTRABLY IS FREE AND FAIR AND NOT TOO LONG DELAYED. WITH ALL OUR EXPERIENCE, THERE IS NO-ONE BETTER QUALIFIED TO HELP. THE AMERICANS REALISE THAT THE ELECTIONS, WHEN HELD, WILL ATTRACT A HOST OF OBSERVERS INCLUDING, NO DOUBT, COMMONWEALTH AND UN TEAMS.

MIDDLE EAST

5. ON LEBANON AND THE MRF, SHULTZ REGARDED AS VERY POSITIVE HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE AND ITALY IN PARIS ON 27 OCTOBER. THE PRESIDENT HAS RE-AFFIRMED HIS DETERMINATION NOT TO BE RUN OUT OF BEIRUT. THE AMERICANS WOULD AGREE ON DIS-ENGAGEMENT AS A LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE, BUT DO NOT WANT TO LEAVE BEHIND ANARCHY OR A COMPLETELY SYRIAN-DOMINATED REGIME. THEY ARE PREPARED TO PUT PRESSURE ON GENAVAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

6. ON THE BEIRUT BOMBINGS, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE EVIDENCE POINTS TOWARDS MUSAVI AND THE IRANIAN HEZBULLAH GROUP BASED AT BAALBEK. THEY BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS OFFICIAL IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT, AND THAT MUSAVI AND HIS GROUP COULD NOT OPERATE FROM BAALBEK WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYRIANS. THE AMERICANS ARE COMMITTED TO RETALIATE, THOUGH THEY MAY NOT WISH TO DO SO WHILE THE GENEVA TALKS ARE CONTINUING. YOU WILL WANT TO PRESS HARD ON WHAT PRECISELY THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING I HAVE LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT WE MUST BE CONSULTED. ANOTHER POINT TO BE WATCHED CLOSELY IS THE FEELING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT (THOUGH LESS SO ON THE PART OF WEINBERGER) THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD SOMEHOW BE CALLED TO REDRESS THE BALANCE VIS A VIS SYRIA, WHOSE CONTINUING INTRANSIGENCE IS SEEN HERE AS THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO ASK THE AMERICANS HOW THEY PROPOSE TO DEAL WITH GENAVAL'S APPARENT INTENTION TO TRY TO RE-NEGOTIATE THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT.

7. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN CARRYING FORWARD THEIR CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN RELATION TO IRAN/IRAQ. HERE TOO WE MUST INSIST ON THE NEED FOR FULLY ADEQUATE CONSULTATIONS. BUT IF WE WISH TO BE CONSULTED, WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE IF WE ARE OURSELVES CONVINCED THAT HELP WOULD BE JUSTIFIED. THE AMERICANS ARE NOT HANKERING AFTER INTERVENTION IN THE GULF.

SECRET

(THY)

THEY REALISE ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD CAUSE AND HAVE MORE THAN ENOUGH ON THEIR HANDS ALREADY. BUT, REALISTICALLY, THEY HAVE TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION WHICH COULD LEAD DANBAIN OR OHAN ACTIVELY TO REQUEST THEIR HELP. IF THEY DID, THE AMERICANS WOULD CONSIDER THEMSELVES BOUNDED TO RESPOND, PARTICULARLY IF THE SAUDIS WANTED THEM TO. THE OTHER SCENARIO IN WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE TO BECOME INVOLVED IS OF COURSE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. WHILE IMPRESSING ON THEM OUR CONCERN THAT THEY SHOULD EXERCISE THE GREATEST CAUTION BEFORE CONSIDERING INVOLVING THEMSELVES DIRECTLY, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO INDICATE WHETHER WE COULD HELP EG WITH MINE-CLEARING OPERATIONS, IF THIS SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY AND WE SHOULD OURSELVES BELIEVE SUCH INVOLVEMENT TO BE JUSTIFIED.

ARGENTINA

8. ON ARGENTINA AND CERTIFICATION, THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE CONDUCT OF THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS AND WILL WANT TO MOVE FAST TO GET ON TERMS WITH ALFONSIN. WE HAVE IMPRESSED ON THEM THE FACT THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR INTENTION TO CERTIFY ARGENTINA FOR THE RESUMPTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES WILL PROVOKE PARLIAMENTARY CRITICISM IN BRITAIN; AND THAT, AS A MINIMUM, THEY WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO DELAY THIS UNTIL CIVILIAN RULE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. ONCE THEY DO CERTIFY, WE MUST TAKE STEPS TO SPECIFY TO THEM IMMEDIATELY THOSE ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IT WOULD CAUSE US PARTICULAR CONCERN IF THEY DID SUPPLY. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT AND THEY HAVE WORK IN HAND ON THIS.

9. BEYOND THAT, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT WE MIGHT TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OURSELVES TO TRY TO GET BACK ON TERMS WITH ARGENTINA. FAILING THAT, THEY CONTEND, A FRESH START IS UNLIKELY TO BE POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. WHAT THEY MEAN BY THIS OF COURSE IS THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GO BACK TO DISCUSSING EVERYTHING WITH THE ARGENTINIANS, INCLUDING THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE AMERICANS THAT WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR MONTHS FOR A RESUMPTION OF FULL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND COOPERATION GENERALLY; AND FOR THE ARGENTINIANS TO RENOUCE THE USE OF FORCE. BUT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS ON ANY BASIS CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. DAN IS UNLIKELY TO PRESS THIS POINT; BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT IT IS IN AMERICAN MINDS.

10. FOR US THINKING ON INF, PLEASE SEE NIFT.

11. PLEASE PASS TO NO 10.

WRIGHT

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

(COPIES SENT TO NO 10 BOWLING ST)

GHENADA LIMITED

- WLD
- HAD
- S AM D
- MCAD
- UND
- FUSD
- DEFENCE D
- NEWS D
- INFO D
- PROTOCOL D
- RED'S
- PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

- CCD
- CURS D
- SOY D
- IND
- IND
- IND
- IND
- IND
- IND
- LEGAL ADVS
- PLANNING STAFF
- PS

- PM/LADY YOUNG
- PM/MR WITNEY
- PM/FUS
- SIR J HULLARD
- MR GIFFARD
- MR WRIGHT
- MR UKE
- MR CARLETON
- MR HANNAY
- MR ADAMS
- CABINET OFFICE

- COPIES TO:
- MR ANNING LACPD/ODA
 - RED (DI 4)

SECRET