

S E C R E T



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1983

Prime Minister.

Dear John,

MK

A.J.C. 6/12

Grenada

In your letter of 29 November you enclosed documents relating to Grenada which were forwarded with the Jamaican Deputy Prime Minister's letter to the Prime Minister. These documents are among those referred to by Mr Dam in his conversation with the Prime Minister on 7 November. After Mr Dam's visit, we received a bundle of documents * Some are still incomplete but we have started to analyse them. They may shed some light on how Communist regimes are established in small countries and possibly provide pointers as to how to avoid such an outcome in the future.

Our preliminary comments on their significance are as follows:

Minutes of New Jewel Movement (NJM) Central Committee Meetings

- (i) The initial impression is of parish pump politics larded with Communist jargon which is barely understood by the participants. Before seeing these documents however we knew of the existence but not the depth of the personal and ideological clash between on the one hand Bishop and his supporters who were regarded as soft left or, in the jargon, 'right opportunists' and petty bourgeois and, on the other, the small hardline group of power-hungry ideologues led by Coard. The inexorable build-up of pressure on Bishop to relinquish hold on real power or to see it wrested from him is striking.
- (ii) The claims of Bishop and Coard to be operating an advanced democracy were clearly a sham. All the decisions were made by a small caucus of people. No democratic control was evident or intended for the future.
- (iii) The papers illustrate the vulnerability of small states to a determined and unscrupulous group, especially when the previous regime has been discredited through its corruption.

/((iv)

~ Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.

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Off Wayland, 4 June 2013



- (iv) The influence of Cuba and USSR does not appear to have been very direct in the Party deliberations. The Cubans apparently were not conscious of what was going on. At one point, Bishop expressed reluctance to tell them. There are some critical references to Cuba.

The Agreements

- (i) Neither we nor the US knew about the existence of these Agreements with the Grenada Government. But there had been reports that unidentified arms had arrived at various times from Cuba. These reports which were unconfirmed were not enough for an assessment of the types and quantities to be formed.
- (ii) It is premature to make a judgement as to whether onward delivery from Cuba was a deliberate ploy to deceive international opinion about Soviet involvement or whether it was simply for convenience. But the latter seems more likely, especially when taken together with the fact that Soviet policy has been to let Cuba take the lead in that area.
- (iii) The arms found by the US on the island fit in roughly with those specified in the Agreements. It is not possible to say, at least at this stage, whether they were intended only for the Grenadians, the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Army, or for export elsewhere. The latter seems unlikely. The amounts to be provided (not specified in the papers sent to the Prime Minister) could, when all delivered, arm 6-10,000 men out of a population of about 100,000. (The wide range is due largely to the difficulty of deducing from the quantity of arms the amount of equipment intended to be kept as a reserve to cover the needs of servicing and spares.) They are comparable in type and quantity to those provided for in the Soviet/Mozambique Military Agreement of 1979.
- (iv) The agreements with the USSR provide for an unspecified number of Grenadian military to be trained in the USSR. We do not know how many went to the USSR under these provisions. Our Embassy in Moscow believes there are at present 100 Grenadians there, mainly students.

/(v)

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(v) The agreement with Cuba provides not for the supply of arms but for the attachment of 27 'military specialists' to the Grenadian armed forces. This accords roughly with US estimates of the number of the Cuban military group on Grenada at the time of the intervention. Although there is provision in the 1982 agreement with the Soviet Union for Soviet specialists to be sent to Grenada to set up training and military repair facilities, the Russians have denied they had any Soviet military personnel on Grenada and we and the US have no evidence that they maintained such personnel there.

We understand that the JIC intend to undertake a retrospective look at the Bishop regime which will also draw out the implications of these documents.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

S E C R E T

KEY

CC	-	Central Committee
PB	-	Political Bureau (Polit Buro)
JL	-	Joint Leadership
MB	-	Maurice Bishop
Cde. B	-	Bernard Coard
Cde.	-	Comrade
HA	-	Hudson Austin
GL	-	George Louison
SD	-	Socialist Democrat
ML	-	Marxist / Leninist
NJM	-	New Jewel Movement
NYO	-	National Youth Organization
NWO	-	National Women's Organization
Pb	-	Petty Bourgeois
Rt. Opp.	-	Right (wing) Opportunist
GM	-	General Meeting
CM	-	Council Member
PRAF	-	People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
RMC	-	Revolutionary Military Council
Union of SSR	-	Soviet Union
SOC	-	Socialism
Com / Comm	-	Communism
Revo	-	Revolution
O.C.	-	Organizing Committee
RFG	-	Radio Free Grenada

SUMMARY - MINUTES - EXTRAORDINARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING AUGUST 26, 1983,

SEPTEMBER 14 - 17

" WHY THE MEETING

This meeting was as a result of feedback of dissatisfaction from Party Members in relation to the conclusion of the July Plenary among other things. The Membership criticised the conclusions as being politically directionless and opportunist in content."

...."At the August meeting the C.C. took the decision to recall all C.C. Members to the Country and commence a special Plenary Session on September 13 - 15. In fact the meeting commenced on September 14th and concluded on September 17th."

" WORST AND MOST DANGEROUS CRISIS

At present the Revolution is facing its worst crisis ever, and most serious in 4½ years. The mood of the masses is characterised at worst by open dissatisfaction and cynicism, and at best by serious demoralisation. Overall the mood is 1-2 on a scale of 5.

The mass organizations are in their worst state ever. The Women's Committee which leads the NWO has seriously declined and is faced with possible disintegration in 2 - 3 months since. Some of the best Party women had to be removed from that area of work, the best women outside the Party are refusing to join the Party and a numbers of sisters are contemplating resigning. "

...."The NYO is in a state of virtual collapse ."

...."Amongst the working class, persistent ideological backwardness and economism exist. At the same time we witness stepped up ideological infiltration amongst the working class by Church."

" The militia is now almost a thing of the past.....Today also we are witnessing widespread and over expanding activities by the Church. "

"POSSIBLE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PARTY

Together with all of this Comrades, we face the possibility of the disintegration of our Party which will surely come about within 3 - 6 months if we don't take steps to remedy the situation."

..." Today it is the lowest level ever in the history of the Party. All of this has only made it more difficult for the C.C. to lead the Party and already signs of Party disintegration have appeared. It is the C.C's objective appreciation of all this that led it to conclude that disintegration will be a total reality in 3-6 months unless things are corrected."

"THE REVOLUTION FACES THE DANGER OF BEING OVERTHROWN

What we face is not just simply the disintegration of the Party, but the total loss of State power because IN A SITUATION OF WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION, DEMORALISATION AMONGST OUR BEST SUPPORTERS AND NO PARTY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD ON TO STATE POWER FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE C.C. THAT IF STEPS ARE NOT TAKEN NOW, NOT ONLY WILL THERE BE NO PARTY IN SIX MONTHS, BUT THE REVOLUTION WILL BE OVERTHROWN WITHIN A YEAR."

"THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM: CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Central Committee concluded that the main problem, the main reason for this most dangerous crisis that we face lies within the Central Committee."

... "The C.C. considered these views and arrived at the conclusion that the problem of the O.C. and D.C. are only symptoms of the real problem and that the real underlying problem lies within the C.C."

"RIGHT OPPORTUNIST PATH OF THE C.C."

The C.C. further concluded that the conclusion from the July Plenary to the membership that the work of the C.C. and P.B. had improved marginally is a lie and a manifestation of the Right Opportunist path that the C.C. has been on for more than a year now, hiding from the membership the truth and absolving itself of criticism from the membership, while pretending all is well."

"WHY COMRADE COARD RESIGNED"

Comrade Coard emphasized as to the reasons for his resignation from the C.C. and P.B. the slack and weak functioning of C.C. and P.B., the vacillation and lack of collective leadership manifested in the fact that P.B. and C.C. Members will come to meetings, hands and minds swinging."

"OCTOBER 1982 PLENARY"

.... The C.C. Plenary at the time stated "The Party stood at the crossroads two routes are open to the Party. The first route is the petty bourgeois route which would seek to make Cde. Bernard's resignation the issue."

.... "The second route is the communist route. The route of the Leninist standards and functioning. The route of criticism and collective leadership. The Central Committee reaffirmed the position taken by the general meeting of September 12th and 13th. The Party must be put on a Leninist footing."

"PROBLEMS IN THE C.C. "

.... The C.C. concluded the following: The Central Committee is the source of the crisis in the Party and Revolution. All members of the C.C. must be criticised for weaknesses and failure, in the form of low levels of discipline, organisation and ideological development and in particular for the failure to put the Party on Leninist Path."

"MAIN PROBLEMS"

The C.C. further concluded that the main problem in the C.C. for some time now has been the quality of the leadership of the Party and Central Committee provided by Comrade Maurice Bishop.

The C.C. is of the view that the Comrade has tremendous strengths, his ability to inspire and instill confidence in the people, his ability to unite the masses and hold so high the banner and prestige of the Revolution regionally and internationally."

... "For what the four and a half years, in particular has proved is that Cde. Maurice lacks the precise qualities and strengths that are particularly required to carry the process forward in these most difficult times today and to transform the Party into a Leninist one, namely:

- 1) A Leninist level of organisation and discipline.
- 2) Great depth in ideological clarity.
- 3) Brilliance in strategy and tactics.
- 4) The capacity to exercise Leninist supervision, control and guidance of all areas of work of the Party.

"KEY TASK; WAY FORWARD

The C.C. went on to conclude that the Key Task facing the Party today is to marry the strengths of Cdes. Maurice and Bernard in the model of Joint Leadership of the Party."

"EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NJM14 - 16 SEPTEMBER, 1983COMRADES PRESENT

Maurice Bishop
 Selwyn Strachan
 George Louison
 Unison Whiteman
 Liam James
 Chalkie Ventour
 Ewart Layne

Phyllis Coard
 Leon Cornwall
 Kamau Mc Barnette
 Tan Bartholomew
 Fitzroy Bain
 Chris Deriggs

COMRADES ABSENT

Hudson Austin	-	(Out of Country)
Ian St. Bernard	-	(Sick)

"ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PARTY AND REVOLUTION "

....." The situation is that the Revolution now faces the greatest danger since 1979. There is great dispiritiveness and dissatisfaction among the people."

....." Militarily, to organise the defence of the Revolution in the face of a qualitatively stepped up aggression from imperialism."....."The small Caribbean Islands are being drawn into an alliance against Grenada and all the left organisations in the region."

....." There is a serious drift away from the Party by the key supporters of the Revolution, the vocal Cdes are now passive, they are not prepared to fight the reactionary lines on the ground. Community work is not going as expected, he graded it as poor to fair. The militia is non-existent."

....." The Party has not yet developed a policy for dealing with the Church."

....." The Revolution is suffering from a serious fall of its active supporters. The Party must seek to consolidate. The Church has capitalise on our weaknesses using the tactics and strategies of the Party."

....." All programmes of the Revolution are in a very weak condition, while propaganda work is still very bad."

....." The militia is non-existent, the army is demoralise the Cdes have genuine complaints, growth in militarisation and deep economic problems."

....." The question of the ideological development of the C.C. is an issue that we need to make a decision on. If this is allowed to continue the Party will disintegrate in a matter of 5 - 6 months..."

....." the Party will collapse and the Revolution cannot continue without the Party. The Revolution can be turned back within one year."

....." The C.C. has not been able to rise to the challenge of the increasing complexity this has led it to take a number of unrealistic decisions."

.... "There is a serious crisis in the Party. There are signs of the beginning of disintegration, in the Party, drop in confidence and prestige of the C.C. If the situation is not rescued there will be no hope for the future of the Party and its ability to hold state power."

....." The C.C. will have to take an honest cold blooded and scientific approach to save the Party and Revolution."

....." It is clear that a rebellion has started, it can burst out if it is not solved in a serious way. This is because the C.C. have not lived up to expectations."

....." If we agree that the role of the Party is to build the Revolution and if we believe that an ML Party can build what we want then we have to put the Party on a ML footing."

"BROAD CONCLUSIONS PROPOSED BY CDE. MAURICE BISHOP

There is a state of deep crisis in the Party and Revolution.

The main reason for these weaknesses is the functioning of the C.C.

The crisis has also become a major contributing factor to the crisis in the Country and Revolution and the low mood of the masses."

"COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS OF THE C.C."

....." The way forward is to take an honest, cold blooded, objective and scientific approach to the situation."

....." the most fundamental problem is the quality of leadership of the Central Committee and the Party provided by Cde, Maurice Bishop." "The qualities he lacks is what is needed to push the Revolution forward at this time:

- (1) A Leninist level of organisation and discipline.
- (2) Great depth in ideological clarity.
- (3) Brilliance in strategy and tactics."

....." The salvation of the Revolution calls for us to take a mature proletarian decision to save and carry the Revolution forward."

....." If we fail to transform the Party we will lose state power, lives will be lost, history has placed a great responsibility on our shoulders which we must seek to deal with in the correct and scientific way."

....." On the question of crisis and problems it is correct as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities. He needs time to think of his own role and to give a more precise response to the problem addressed which he thinks is a correct approach."

"THE ROLE OF THE C.C. "

....." the struggle for socialism is won, lost or divided in the army. The Party must now be organise in the work places. Cdes with state post must be prepared to carry out the lines of the Party in the work places. We have experience in mobilising the masses but we do not know how to build the Party. We have to lay the basis for taking a strategic approach for the building of a M.L. Party learning from the experience of other Parties."

....." made the following proposals:-

1. The C.C. must become fully accountable to the members.....
2. All C.C. Cdes must be based in the Country at this time.
3. The C.C. and Party must study Brutens.
4. Recall the conclusions of the July Plenary.
5. Proposed a modle of joint leadership marrying the strengths of Cdes. Bishop and Coard....."

....." On the armed forces he said that no one can deny that Cuba is the most important Country to the Grenadian process...."

Comrade Maurice Bishop states -

....." He has never had any problem with sharing power, or even a bad attitude to criticisms."..... "His position is that he or anybody has the right to be leader for life, he favours cooperation over competition...."

The following positions were voted on:

Formalisation of Joint Leadership:

For	-	9
Opposed	-	1
Abstain	-	3

Cde. Austin abstained because he was not present for the full discussion for the greater part of the meeting.

How to Inform the Membership:

Tell Members only through Minutes

For	-	10
Against	-	1
Abstain	-	2 "

....." that we use a break to ask Cde. Coard to come to the meeting for decision to be put to him."

....." Cde. Maurice opposed it because of the fact that he has to make a personal reflection on the issue. He proposed that the C.C. meet with Cde. Coard in his absence. He felt that modle (sic model) would be counter productive. He suggested that the C.C. meet Cde. Bernard tomorrow while he will be leaving for St. Kitts. He think that this will be in the interest of the C.C."

....." Cde. Bishop said it is difficult for him to understand the question of joint leadership and his own role and function in this modle (sic model)."

"SATURDAY 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1983

Cdes Present

Selwyn Strachan
Hudson Austin
Liam James
Ewart Layne
Chalkie Ventour

Phyllis Coard
Kamau Mc Barnette
Chris De Riggs
Leon Cornwall

Cdes Absent

Maurice Bishop	-	Out of Country
George Lousion	-	Out of Country
Unison Whiteman	-	Out of Country
Tan Bartholomew	-	Sick
Fitzroy Bain	-	Sick
Ian St. Bernard	-	Sick

....." that the C.C. have been meeting to look at the state of the Party and Revolution and to look at the way the process have been developing over the past four years. It is quite clear that there are great concerns from the G.M. of the Party."

....." The Revolution is in deep crisis, it faces the dangers of being turned back, while the C.C. is not operating in a (blank) Leninist way."....."The reason is the weak leadership exercise by Cde. Maurice Bishop. In trying to find concrete ways of reviving the situation and to put the Party of a firm M.L. base,.."
....."these qualities exists in Cde. Bernard Coard the C.C. felt that Cde. Coard was the only Cde. who had demonstrated practice these qualities over the years."

"As a result a proposal for merging these two strengths through joint leadership between Cdes Bishop and Coard was put forward...." "This proposal was voted with a majority in favour."

"Four options for leadership were identified in the earlier proceedings:-

- (1) Remove Cde. Bishop
- (2) Joint Leadership
- (3) Have a deputy to play the role that is required.
- (4) Remove Cdes. from the C.C. "

"Cde. Coard said (sic said) that his feelings of the present situation are that within six months the Party will disintegrate totally unless a fundamental package of measures are done. He had thought it would take 12 months (blank) given the (blank) of disgust, the (blank) disintegration of the Party masses that the loss of state power (sic power) is only a few months away. While all of this is happening imperialism has stepped up its range of attacks laying the basis for direct intervention in Central America. They have set up their troops and using the Korean incident as a basis. American troops are meters away from Nicaragua.

This is happening at a time when the militia is dis-integrated the Army is demoralised, we don't have the capacity of defending the Revolution.

The Party has never had such weak links and low (blank) with the masses. The image of the Party has deteriorated in the eyes of the masses."

..... "Unless the C.C. is prepared to meet all petit bourgeois response he will withdraw."

..... "The issue is to start collective leadership of the C.C. The lack of frank bluntness has seriously affected the Party."

"SIXTH SITTING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY DATED TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1983"PRESENT

Cdes:- Bernard Coard
 Selwyn Strachan
 Hudson Austin
 Liam James
 John Ventour
 Ewart Layne
 Phyllis Coard
 Kamau McBarnette
 Fitzroy Bain
 Tan Bartholomew
 Leon Cornwall
 Unison Whiteman

ABSCENT (SIC ABSENT)

Cdes.:- Maurice Bishop
 George Louison
 Chris Deriggs
 Ian St. Bernard

..."Stated....support for the proposals fo Cde. Bernard and other comrades."

..."that criticism and self criticism had broken down in the Party - thus the C.C. needs to take sanctions against comrades who show hostility to criticism."

..."that cadres and C.C. members must be sent to the overseas training courses since it is our experience that most junior comrades don't benefit much from them."

..."Austin stated his agreement with Cde. Bernard's proposals and further stated that that was the richest C.C. session in the Party's history and we are seeing a new awakening on serious questions and wide areas."

..."The Party School is urgently needed because study circles are not enough. We should not delay. We can start using one of ths buildings the Party has under control and asks fraternal socialist countries for assistance in tutors."

...".....stated that the party must have a system for supervision and control.... the example of the WJC of Cuba where in their secretariat there is a room with maps, charts and telephones so that constant supervision over all the work can take place."

"SEVENTH SITTING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY DATED WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21ST, 1983"PRESENT

Cdes: - Bernard Coard
 Selwyn Strachan
 Hudson Austin
 Leon James
 Ewart Layne
 John Ventour
 Unison Whiteman
 Phyllis Coard
 Kamau McBarnette
 Fitzroy Bain
 Tan Bartholomew
 Leon Cornwall

ABSENT

(Three names illegible)

...".....there is a need for a committee,...that can do research for the PB and C.C..... and put its conclusions forward to the P.B. or C.C. for decision of a policy nature."

..."For the party school we should select 5 comrades to be sent in USSR to train as professors for a period of 3 to 5 years."

..." We need to rapidly and urgently raise the ideological level of the C.C."

..." That the C.C. must constitute itself as quickly as possible as a planning commission and draw on other members of the party where required so we can draw up a realistic 15 month plan for the party work."

EIGHT SITTING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY DATED THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22ND, 1983"

PRESENT

Cdes.:- Bernard Coard
Selwyn Strachan
Unison Whiteman
Leon James
Ewart Layne
Phyllis Coard
Kamau McBarnette
Tan Bartholomew
Fitzroy Bain
Ian St. Bernard
Leon Cornwall

ABSCENT (SIC ABSENT)

Cdes.:- Maurice Bishop
George Louison
Chris Deriggs
Hudson Austin
John Ventour - Sick

..."....principles we used in the past for forging links with the masses. They are:

- Identifying key supporters
- The Party used unorthodox methods of organisation
- The Party developed a network of Party support groups. The fall off of these are now creating a vacuum.
- This method helped the Party to have organised links with the masses. "

"REPORT ON THE MEETING OF P.B. AND C.C. HELD ON OCTOBER 12TH"

"The PB/CC were very concerned about the situation in the Party. He referred to the C.C. decision on JL and the basis for this. However, following this Cde. M.B. felt that he could not give a position on the C.C. decision and he wanted time to reflect."

..." a blood shed could have taken place last night it was the rumour that caused it. They said that the Country can have only one P.M. because B (Bernard Coard) is a communist".

(1) ..."GL right wing opp. F. Bain has shown emotionalism..."

..."On M.B. he would have to be expelled from the Party. It won't be easy to explain to the masses. We have allowed cultism in the Party. The harsh reality of the rumours is shocking. "

..." We have to be cold blooded and cast all emotions aside, we have to be determined. M.B. is mainly responsible for the crisis in the Party. We have to see things as they are and not as we want them. This is not irreversible. It would take the Party about 5-10 yrs to come out of the crisis. This is not to scare Cdes."

..."There seems to be a mood in the Party for blood, Afghanistan. Lines being carried against him that he is ⁽²⁾SD, cultism, allegations that some C.C. members were involved."

..." H.A. (Hudson Austin)

He confessed to the GM that this present situation make him feel uncomfortable....
(3) the AF would never be used against the ⁽⁴⁾REVO or Party (appl).....when the Party makes decisions they must be carried out (appl)."

..."He told M.B. about rumours of bloodshed. PEBONG told him last week that there was an Afghanistan line M.B. said he picked it up too..... he checked HA on the matter. He asked him about the sit (sic situation) in AF."

..."The security forces has adopted a number of measures to secure the lives of C.C. and pty cdes.

Confine MB indefinitely (long applause)

Phones of MB cut off (applause)

Disarmed for his own safety by PS cdes to guarantee him safety (app)

The people spreading the rumours being called in for strict warning (others for indefinite detention) (applause)

The situation demands bolshevik staunchness (applause, chants.) The leadership of AF shares this view..... we must be ⁽⁵⁾comm in practice cause only comm can rescue the sit (sic situation) (applause)

COMM. WITHOUT BELLY BETTER HOP THE NEXT PLANE."

..." In the coming days we would not be talking of whether you are a Party member or not we will be talking about whether you are a communist or not (applause)".

(1) George Louison right wing opportunist

(2) Social Democrat

(3) Armed Forces

(4) Revolution

(5) Communists

19th October, 1983

"REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS AND MEN OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES"

" Today our People's Revolutionary Army has gain victory over the right opportunist and reactionary forces which attacked the Headquarters of our Ministry of Defence."

....."....the leadership of the counter-revolutionary elements, headed by Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman and Vincent Noel, knowing that we did not want to harm the people disarmed the Officers and Chiefs and soldiers and began arming people who represented their own minority class interest."

....."...because of the prompt action of the reserve force, guided by the Central Committee of the N.J.M. - these betrayers of the masses were crushed. The timely move of our Motorised Units dealt a devastating blow to these criminals,, those opportunist elements who did not want to see socialism built in our country...."

...." Comrades, today Wednesday 19th October, history was made again. All patriots and revolutionaries will never forget this day when counter-revolution, the friends of imperialism were crushed. This victory today will ensure that our glorious Party the N.J.M. will live on and grow from strength to strength leading and guiding the Armed Forces and the Revolution.

This victory is one for progress and for socialism."

...." Let our comrades death be an inspiration to us, let it be a sign of staunchness of our revolutionary Armed Forces and let us use it to strengthen our resolve to defend the Revolution and to build socialism.

Let this moment be proof to counter-revolution of our firmness, discipline and staunchness to the Party, the N.J.M., the working class, working people and to socialism. Let this be testimony of our unity behind our Party and Revolution.

We have won a victory comrades, but let us stand and be united to ensure that we achieve other victories.

LONG LIVE OUR PARTU, (Sic PARTY) The N.J.M. ! !

LONG LIVE THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES ! !

LONG LIVE THE GRENADA REVOLUTION ! !

FORWARD EVER ! ! BACKWARD NEVER ! ! !

SOCIALISM OR DEATH ! ! !

" BULLETIN FROM THE MAIN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 20/10/83 "

THEIR HEROISM IS AN EXAMPLE FOR US

" Comrade soldiers, yesterday 19th October, the masses of people led by Unison Whiteman broke into the home of Maurice Bishop in defiance of warning shots fired in the air by the soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces. They then took Maurice Bishop into the streets of St. George's. They wanted to hear Maurice Bishop speak."

".....Einstein Louison started distributing the weapons, Vincent Noel asked who were the trained militia in the crowd order them to step forward because there were some men that had 'to be (illegible) ssed out'."

"Comrades, the masses had no intention to cause bloodshed (illegible)
their confusion they were led by Maurice Bishop and his petty bourgeois and bourgeois friends as cannon fodder to cause bloodshed. Comrades it is very important to recognize the heroism of our People's Revolutionary Armed Forces."

" Comrades, the deaths of OC Conrad Mayers, WO2 Rapheal Mason, Sgt. Dorset Peters and L/Cpl. Martin Simon have not gone in vain but have further manured the struggle of our Grenadian people. Long live the Memory of our fallen comrades.

Long live the Grenada Revolution.

Forward ever, Backward Never.

Death to Imperialism. "

"Emergency Economic Programme""Economic Report No.1"

" A) First and foremost we need an Emergency Economic Commission with the following properties:-

- A political leader/Minister responsible
- A second leader who had day-to-day responsibility
- Other technical personnel
- An office with support staff..... this staff would have to be selected for their reliability
- Telephone lines should be made available for enterprises - public or private - to report any economic difficulty
- A trouble shooter
- Daily reports..... to coordinators for all areas
- Different persons in the State Sector would be given responsibility to report to the Commission members, but would be given only limited information
- This Commission would be low profile. "

(2)

It is recommended that there be two levels of responsibility - a broad Commission and a narrower Council which would be more manageable. The recommended members of the Council and of the Commission as well as their areas of responsibility are identified below:-

COUNCIL	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	COMMISSION MEMBER RESPONSIBLE
V. Naz Burke (Chairperson)	(Acts for DW until his return)	
C. Hinton (Deputy)	Investment & Capital projects	C.K.
	Production	C.K.
	Audit of Key Enterprise needs	C.K.
	Energy	Foulon/Stanislaw
A. Smith	Finance	A.S.
B. LaCorbiniers	International & Regional Orgs.	Merle Collins
	Budget	B. LeC.
D. Wilk's	International transport (air/sea)	Sawney
	Exports	D.W.
	Supplies	D.W./Antoine/Draton
	TRADE	L. Nelson
L. Fraser	Transport & Distribution	Fraser/Leard LYNCH
Lana McPhail	Administration of Commission	L. McP.
R. Roopmanine	Money & Banking	R.P.
M. Figueroa	Coordination of Statistics	Al Dragon
	Communications	Jimmy Lashley
	Foreign Exchange	K.F.
	Employment and LABOR	Chester Humphrey "

"ENERGY""Task to be completed in three (3) days"

- verify existing requirements for fuel
- monitor daily consumption
- examine carefully existing agreements
- examine the Algerian swap arrangement
- ascertain existing storage capacity - including completed Airport tanks
- obtain specification range for tankers which can enter St. Georges
- Audit all personnel involved in the process of fuel import, transport, retail, storage. Identify all personnel with skills in this field."

.....

"Tasks to be completed in seven (7) days"

- Identify who has these types of tankers within reach - including charter shipping firms available as well as alternative ship to shire arrangements with larger tankers - (SEE #17)
- Identify countries willing to supply fuel or act as a transshipment point.
- Identify refineries in terms of proximity to Grenada, who can supply fuel
- Work out load shedding contingency - including which enterprises to close first.
- Work out gas rationing contingency."

.....

"Task to be completed in ten (10) days"

- investigate fully the possibility of using small ships, trawlers, schooners etc. to bring fuel legally or illegally from near by islands or Venezuela.
- ascertain stock of batteries in country."

.....

"RATIONING""Tasks to be completed in three (3) days"

- Determine the number of registered vehicles by class - personal, private (commercial) or State.
- determine average consumption
- Study any available material on rationing experience
- Identify any personnel who have experience with rationing (including Cubans) and identify who will be responsible. "

.....

"Tasks to be completed in ten (10) days"

- set up for printing of rationing cards - establish time required to print.
- Work out main lines of propaganda and public education programme
- Examine legal basis and promulgate any laws (sic laws) or regulations necessary.

"Essential serves (sic services) to receive electricity (standby) if necessary to shut down.....precise power and fuel required with range of specifications to be identified.

- Military installations
- Cold storage
- Essential communications
- R.F.G.
- vital security areas such as food storage....if lighting is essential for security
- only vital local production areas
- hospital
- St. Georges University - some areas if necessary."

.....

"SHUT DOWN AND CONSERVATION"

"Tasks to be completed in ten (10) days

- Establish clear guidelines for public education and propaganda programme
- programme of bringing various areas of private property under Martial Law. "

.....

"COMMUNICATIONS"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Assess our independent ability to communicate internationally ; to what extent do we depend on Trinidad, Barbados Cable & Wireless or any other country or enterprise which may be unfriendly."

.....

"Tasks to be completed in seven (7) days

- Investigate whether we are protected in this regard by any international conventions - if so make contact with these organisations and call on them to ensure that treaties are observed.
- Assess existing radio capacity and the attitude of the operators
- Assess requirements to keep mail system going and determine level of dependence on Barbados - and how we can be protected from any sabotage by them."

.....

"INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Where we understand that these organisations may be moving to take sanctions against Grenada especially where these are illegal, as a priority we must get in touch with these organisations and insist on our right to be informed of any meeting and to be heard, in keeping with whatever treaty or charter which governs the organisation.

"INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Contact countries on whom we can hope to depend in the coming period. As soon as is possible we must contact them. At whatever stage our emergency programme has reached we must inform them of our needs and seek assistance.
- Contact and bring home most reliable students. "

.....

"ECCB, LIAT, OECS, CARICOM"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- Apply for money on Monday in the normal way
- If there is any hitch, we should send a submission based on the articles of agreement. (SEE ATTACHED NOTES ON ARTICLES)
- The Governor should be called upon to carry through his scheduled visit. He should be spoken to on Sunday 2nd.
- Make direct communication with LIAT Management and hold discussions with local management.
- Make direct contact with OECS & CARICOM Secretariat."

"INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT"

"Tasks to be completed in three (3) days

- All aeroplanes which can be used by the State should be identified - including doing what is necessary to put Russian plane in full operation."

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NOTICE FROM THE E.M.C.

All persons who have State own vehicles in their possession, in particular Trucks and Jeeps are informed that they must deliver these vehicles by 1200 hrs today October 22nd, 1983. These vehicles must be delivered to the following Stations:

1. Vehicles in St. George's and St. David's - Tantean Pasture.
2. Vehicles in Grenville to the Grenville Police Station.
3. Vehicles in Santeurs, St. John's and St. Mark's to the Santeurs Police Station.

The safety of the Drivers carrying these vehicles to the delivery points will be guaranteed, and transport will be provided to drop back the comrades to their homes.

Any one who resist in any way on another this directive of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) will be dealt with in the strictest manner.

REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL
(R.M.C.)

Albinwell
Major

" A G R E E M E N T "

between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment "

"proceeding from the desire to promote strengthening the independence of Grenada

and in connection with the request of the Government of Grenada

have agreed upon the following:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure in 1980-1981 free of charge the delivery to the Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to the Annex to the present Agreement to the amount of 4.400.000 Roubles."

"The delivery.....shall be effected by the Soviet Party by sea, at the port of the Republic of Cuba."

"The Government of the Union of SSR....shall ensure rendering technical assistance in mastering of the equipment delivered...by receiving Grenadian servicemen for training in the USSR."

"The Grenadian servicemen shall be deputed for training in the USSR without their families."

"The expenses connected with the Grenadian servicemen's training.....shall be borne by the Soviet Party."

"The Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of SSR shall take all necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all the correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present Agreement."

"The present Agreement comes into force on the date it is signed on.

The Annex is an integral part of the present Agreement."

"Done in Havana on October "27", 1980 in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid."

" FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA"

FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS"

(Signature) HUDSON AUSTIN"

(Signature: indecipherable)"

"Top Secret"

"P R O T O C O L"

" to the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment"

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure free of charge the delivery in 1981-1983 to the Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to the Annex to the present Agreement to the amount of 5.000.000 Roubles."

"In all other respects the Parties will be guided by the provisions of the Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the USSR of October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR to Grenada of special and other equipment."

"The present Protocol comes into force on the date of its signing.

The Annex is an integral part of the present Protocol.

Done in Havana on February "9", 1981 in two originals, each in English and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid."

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA"

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS"

(Signature) Basil H. Gahagan

(Signature: indecipherable)

A G R E E M E N T

between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR
to Grenada of special and other equipment"

- "have agreed upon the following:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall ensure in 1982-1985 free of charge the delivery to the Government of Grenada of special and civil equipment in nomenclature and quantity according to Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Agreement to the amount of 10.000.000 Roubles."

"The delivery of the equipment listed in Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Agreement shall be effected at the port of the Republic of Cuba.

The order of the further delivery of the above equipment from the Republic of Cuba shall be agreed upon between the Grenadian and Cuban Parties. "

"The Government of the Union of SSR at the request of the Government of Grenada shall ensure rendering technical assistance in mastering of the equipment under delivery by receiving in the USSR Grenadian servicemen for training in the operation, use and maintenance of the special equipment as well as by sending Soviet specialists to Grenada for these purposes."

"The Government of Grenada shall provide at its own expense the Soviet specialists and interpreters with comfortable furnished living accommodation with all the municipal utilities, medical service and transport facilities for the execution of their duties and shall ensure their having meals at reasonable prices at the places of their residence."

"The Soviet Party in periods to be agreed upon between the Parties shall depute a group of Soviet specialists to Grenada to determine expediency, opportunity and scope....."

"The Government of Grenada shall not without the consent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sell or transfer, formally or actually, the special equipment....."

"The Government of the Union of SSR and the Government of Grenada shall take all the necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all the correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present Agreement."

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA"

"FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS"

(Signature) LIAM JAMES "

(Signature: indecipherable)"

" A G R E E M E N T

between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea. "

- "... the free offer of military assistance to the People's Revolutionary
Government of Grenada by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

- "For the purposes of further cementing and developing the friendship and
solidarity between the peoples and armies of the two countries established
in the common struggle to oppose against imperialism, consolidate the
national sovereignty and safeguard independence, and strengthening the
national defence power of Grenada, the People's Revolutionary Government of
Grenada and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
have agreed as follows:"

- "The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall give, in
1983-1984, The free military assistance subject to weapons and ammunitions
covering US \$ 12,000,000. indicated in Annex to this Agreement."

- "Both sides shall strictly keep the secrecy of the military assistance
to be executed according to this Agreement and have an obligation not
to hand over any matters of this Agreement to the third country."

- "This Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signing."

- "This Agreement has been prepared in duplicate in the Korean and English
languages and signed in Pyongyang on April 14, 1983, two original equally
authentic."

"By the authority of the

People's Revolutionary

Government of Grenada."

(Signature) Maurice Bishop

"By the authority of the

Government of the

Democratic People's

Republic of Korea

(Signature: indecipherable)"

"P R O T O C O L""OF THE MILITARY COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT -
OF GRENADA"

- "The Government of the Republic of Cuba in agreement with the
- request formulated by the People's Revolutionary Government
of Grenada, will maintain Cuban Military specialists in that
country in quantities and specialists established in Annex No.
1 - of this document. (Protocol)."
- "The Military specialists from Cuba in behalf of strengthening
the military capacity of the Armed Forces will assist grenadian
military men on the questions of Organization of the Organic
structure, Organization of the Instruction and combative and
campaign training of the troops and staffs in the preparation
of cadres and minor specialists, and in the elaboration of the
operative and mobilization plans for the defense of the country."
- "The Government of the Republic of Cuba will grant scholarships
to military personnel of Grenada in the Military Training Centres
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces with the quantities - and
specialist with the requirements that will be established in
Annex No. 3 which will be elaborated afterwards."
- "In order to lead the activities of the Cuban Military Specialists,
the post of chief of the Cuban Military Specialists is established
who will develop functions in the Ministry of Defense."
- "The People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada will give facilities
to the Chief of the Cuban Military specialists in the work places and
for using the communication means existing in the country in order
to assure the direction of his activities of Technical Military assist-
ance to the Armed Forces."
- "The Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary
Government of Grenada, will take all measures depending on them in
order to assure the secrecy of the permanency of the military personnel
in both states and the character of the activities, as well as the
mail and information related to the present Protocol"

(Signature: indecipherable)
By the Government of the Republic
of Cuba

(signature: H. Austin)
By the People's Revolutionary
Government of Grenada.