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FM WASHINGTON 191958Z SEP

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2749 OF 19 SEP 79.

INFORMATION MOD UK (DS17), MOSCOW, AND UK MIS GENEVA (FOR CTB DELEGATION).

*Prime Minister**1/2**mt*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2721 : C T B.

1. ROBINSON TOOK ACTION WITH BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT) ACCORDINGLY THIS MORNING.

2. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HOPED THAT IF WE COULD HAVE MOVED EVEN A VERY LITTLE WAY FROM ONE NSS, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO THE APPEARANCE THAT THE SOVIETS HELD THE HIGH GROUND IN THE NEGOTIATION, AND WOULD HAVE PUT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AND TESTED THEIR GENUINENESS ON THIS ISSUE, PUTTING THE WEST IN A BETTER POSITION. COMMENTING ON THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT, DESPITE OUR DISAPPOINTING DECISION, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOW WANT TO MAKE A SOLID FRONT WITH US TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS HARD ON THE BASIS OF OUR DECISION. HE NOTED THAT WE WANTED TO MAKE OUR POSITION KNOWN TO THE RUSSIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT HOPED THAT, WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD JOIN WITH US IN PRESSING THE RUSSIANS, WE WOULD ALLOW THE AMERICANS TIME TO CONSIDER HOW BEST THIS SHOULD BE DONE. YORK WOULD NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT TOMORROW. BARTHOLOMEW THOUGHT NOTHING WOULD NECESSARILY BE LOST IF OUR POSITION WERE NOT MADE KNOWN TO THE RUSSIANS UNTIL A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE REOPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON 24 SEPTEMBER. BUT IN ANY CASE HE UNDERTOOK TO COME BACK TO US WITH US IDEAS AS SOON AS OUR DECISION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY VANCE. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT IF IT LATER CAME TO THE POINT AT WHICH WE CONTEMPLATED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO US FURTHER BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WAS TAKEN.

3. AS REGARDS RUSSIAN MOTIVES AND PROSPECTS FOR A C T B TREATY ON THE PRESENT BASIS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE REAL WEIGHT WHICH THE RUSSIANS GAVE TO THE QUESTION OF NSS IN UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES.

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(INDEED IT WAS TO SMOKE THEM OUT ON THIS POINT THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED WE WOULD MAKE A SMALL ADVANCE ON ONE). THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO FEELING IN WASHINGTON THAT AGREEMENT ON NSS WOULD BY ITSELF OPEN THE WAY TO A QUICK C T B AGREEMENT. IT WOULD SIMPLY HAVE ALLOWED THE NEGOTIATORS TO PROCEED WITH THE LONG AND DETAILED GRIND THAT LAY AHEAD. NOR WAS THERE ANYONE IN WASHINGTON IN A SENIOR POSITION WHO FELT THAT A C T B TREATY COULD BE FULLY AND FINALLY WRAPPED UP BY THE TIME OF THE N P T REVIEW CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR. BUT THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE AS WELL POSITIONED AS POSSIBLE AT THE TIME OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND THAT PROGRESS IN CONTINUING C T B NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HELP WITH THIS, PERHAPS BY ALLOWING THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT DECLARATION CALLING ATTENTION TO WHAT HAD SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED.

4. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, AFTER HIS NOTE-TAKER HAD LEFT, (PLEASE PROTECT) BARTHOLOMEW TOLD ROBINSON THAT HE FELT THAT THE US HAD PRESSED THE UK RATHER TOO HARD AND RATHER TOO LONG ON THIS ISSUE. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF THE US BREAKING RANKS WITH THE UK IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DECISION. HE WAS CLEARLY ABLE TO CONTAIN HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR DECISION.

HENDERSON

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