

RR MADRID

GRS 1398

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO PRIORITY MADRID

TELEGRAM NUMBER 266 OF 21 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR), MCDUK (DS12)

GIBRALTAR

1. I AM NOT ENCOURAGED BY THE LINE WHICH OREJA TOOK ON GIBRALTAR WHEN ADDRESSING THE SENATE EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMISSION ON 6 DECEMBER. BUT I REALISE THAT OREJA HAS GENUINE DIFFICULTIES WITH SPANISH PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION, AS WELL AS WITH ENTRENCHED VIEWS IN HIS OWN MINISTRY. I AM THEREFORE PREPARED, ALBEIT WITHOUT GREAT EXPECTANCY OF SUCCESS, TO TRY TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD.

2. THE FIRST ESSENTIAL IS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE IDEAS ADVANCED BY SR OREJA IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME

ON 24 SEPTEMBER WERE GENUINELY INTENDED  
TO ENABLE THE SPANIARDS TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS AND EMBARK ON A NEW POLICY INVOLVING FRIENDLY DEALINGS WITH GIBRALTAR, OR WHETHER THE OLD SPANISH TACTICS WERE MERELY BEING EMPLOYED IN A NEW GUISE. THIS IS THE POINT ON WHICH THE CHIEF MINISTER AND THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION AT GIBRALTAR UNDERSTANDABLY HAVE MISGIVINGS (GIBRALTAR TELEGRAMS NOS 89 AND 91).

3. THE TEST MAY BE THE ELABORATION OF SR OREJA'S IDEAS ON JOINT USE OF THE AIRFIELD AND MOVING THE FRONTIER FENCE. AN OFFER FOR USE OF THE AIRFIELD BY SPANISH CIVIL AIRCRAFT WAS MADE IN 1976 AND REMAINS ON THE TABLE: THE WORKING GROUPS SET UP IN 1978 WERE INTENDED TO FOSTER CONTACTS OVER PRACTICAL MATTERS. IN NEITHER CASE WERE THE SPANIARDS EVENTUALLY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS. SR OREJA'S REPETITION OF GENERAL IDEAS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THIS BACKGROUND MAY INDICATE THAT THE SPANIARDS WILL AGAIN WISH TO SECURE A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE AIRFIELD AND CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE BRITISH LEGAL AND PHYSICAL POSITION OVER THE ISTHMUS.



4. IF THE SPANISH INTENTION IS TO WIN CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO PUT BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISTHMUS AT QUESTION, THERE WILL BE NO MEETING OF MINDS. I HAVE NO INTENTION OF RISKING PREJUDICE TO BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE FIRM ASSURANCE GIVEN TO GIBRALTAR IN 1969 AND FREQUENTLY REITERATED SINCE THEN. NOR AM I PREPARED TO ALLOW THE SPANIARDS TO GET CONTROL OF FACILITIES (SUCH AS THE FRESH WATER WELLS) ESSENTIAL TO GIBRALTAR'S WELL-BEING. WHAT IS ON OFFER IS BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE COURSE WITHOUT UNDUE LOSS OF FACE. IF THAT TURNS OUT TO BE THEIR AIM, WE ON OUR SIDE MUST PLAY OUR PART.

5. PLEASE SPEAK TO SR OREJA ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 6 TO 16 BELOW, WHICH SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN A SPEAKING NOTE, A COPY OF WHICH YOU MAY LEAVE WITH HIM.

6. I REGARD AS HELPFUL THE IDEA OF SEPARATE DECLARATIONS BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. AT LEAST OUTLINE AGREEMENT ON BOTH TIMING AND TEXTS WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE BRITISH TEXT WOULD NATURALLY HAVE TO BE CLEARED WITH GIBRALTARIAN LEADERS.

7. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PRESUMABLY PREFER AS SHORT A GAP AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE ISSUE OF THE TWO STATEMENTS. BUT CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN A BRITISH DECLARATION ABOUT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS POSES DIFFICULTIES: IT HAS LONG BEEN CONTENDED THAT NO CONCESSION SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN RETURN FOR SUCH A MOVE. THAT REMAINS MY VIEW BUT THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE HOLD-UP SINCE MY TALKS WITH SR OREJA ON 24 SEPTEMBER AND I AM ANXIOUS TO PRESS AHEAD WITHOUT ANY AVOIDABLE DELAY. I SUGGEST THAT THE SORT OF TIMING TO AIM AT IS A SPANISH ANNOUNCEMENT THAT RESTRICTIONS ARE TO BE LIFTED FORTHWITH, TO BE FOLLOWED WITHIN SEVEN DAYS BY A BRITISH STATEMENT WELCOMING THAT DEVELOPMENT AND ANNOUNCING FRESH TALKS.

8. THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE URGENCY BUT I HOPE IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO MAKE THESE MOVES DURING THE SUMMER.

9. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE PRECISE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE



BRITISH STATEMENT WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT WOULD BE SAID FROM THE SPANISH SIDE IN ADDITION TO ANNOUNCING THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL CONDITIONS OVER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SPAIN AND GIBRALTAR. I ASSUME THAT THE SPANISH SIDE WOULD INTER ALIA REFER TO ITS WISH TO PROMOTE SPAIN'S FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND PAY ALL DUE REGARD TO THE RIGHTS, INTERESTS AND IDENTITY OF THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR: SPECIFIC MENTION OF RESPECT FOR THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR, ON THE LINES ENDORSED LAST YEAR B) THE UCD, WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE BRITISH SIDE MIGHT REASONABLY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

(A) A WARM WELCOME FOR THE ACTION ANNOUNCED BY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASINGLY CLOSE RELATIONS AND BRITISH SUPPORT FOR SPAIN'S ACCESSION TO THE EEC.

(B) THE WISH THAT THE SPANISH ACTION WILL OPEN THE WAY TO CLOSER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF SPAIN AND GIBRALTAR AND CONTRIBUTE TO SOLVING THE LONG STANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SPAIN OVER GIBRALTAR.

(C) BRITISH AGREEMENT TO FRESH TALKS WITH SPAIN OVER THE GIBRALTAR PROBLEM, AT WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE OTHER MAY WISH TO MAKE, INCLUDING CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASED COOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA.

(D) REAFFIRMATION OF THE BRITISH COMMITMENT OF 1969 TO THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR: CHANGES WILL NOT BE MADE WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT.

10. THE GENERAL IDEAS ADVANCED BY SENOR OREJA ON 24 SEPTEMBER AND 1 NOVEMBER FOR INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN SPAIN AND GIBRALTAR ONCE THE LINKS BETWEEN THEM ARE RESTORED ALSO STRUCK ME AS HELPFUL. SUCH COOPERATION COULD PLAY A MAJOR PART IN LEADING TO BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WERE TO MAKE DETAILED PROPOSALS IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMENT IN PARAGRAPHS 12-16 BELOW.

11. TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION - AND IN THE SPIRIT



OF SR OREJA'S OWN REMARKS AT OUR NEW YORK MEETING ON THE BARREN NATURE OF LEGALISTIC ARGUMENTS - IT WOULD SEEM BEST TO AGREE TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT DISCUSSION AND ANY RESULTING ACTION WOULD BE AGREED TO BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EITHER SIDE'S LEGAL POSITION AND CLAIMS, WHICH WOULD REMAIN UNAFFECTED.

12. THE IDEA OF SHARED USE OF GIBRALTAR AIRPORT COMPATIBLE WITH THE OPERATING REQUIREMENTS OF A MILITARY AIRFIELD IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH SIDE. I AGREE WITH SR OREJA THAT, SO FAR AS CIVIL USE OF THE AIRPORT IS CONCERNED, THE REGIME GOVERNING SWISS AIRPORTS ADJOINING FRANCE, NOTABLY AT GENEVA (COINTRIN) CONSTITUTES A USEFUL EXAMPLE WHICH MIGHT WITH THE NECESSARY MODIFICATION BE APPLIED TO GIBRALTAR.

13. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE NATURE AND POSITION OF THE FRONTIER FENCE COULD BE CONSIDERED. THERE COULD BE SCOPE FOR MINOR REPOSITIONING, ALTERING SOME FEATURES OF THE PRESENT FENCE (EG REDUCTIONS IN HEIGHT) AND RENAMING FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES (EG AIRPORT PERIMETER FENCE, RATHER THAN THE TERM 'FRONTIER FENCE' WHICH HAS COME TO BE GENERALLY EMPLOYED). THE NEED FOR AN AIRPORT PERIMETER FENCE WOULD REMAIN: THE SCOPE FOR REPOSITIONING THE FENCE WOULD BE SMALL. PUBLIC HEALTH REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEED TO PREVENT THE UNAUTHORISED MOVEMENT OF GOODS ARE ALSO RELEVANT. IF SIGNIFICANT AIRPORT FACILITIES WERE TO BE INSTALLED ON THE SPANISH SIDE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD BE REQUIRED.

14. THE SUGGESTION THAT SPAIN MIGHT MAKE CIVIL USE OF THE PORT IS WELCOME IN PRINCIPLE. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE A NATURAL COROLLARY OF DIRECT LINKS BETWEEN GIBRALTAR AND SPAIN: IT COULD BE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN THE CONTEXT OF WIDER COOPERATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON THE LINES SKETCHED BY SR OREJA ON 1 NOVEMBER.

15. SHOULD THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WISH TO PROPOSE MILITARY USE OF THE AIRFIELD AND NAVAL BASE (INCLUDING THE DOCKYARD) ON AN OCCASIONAL COURTESY BASIS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE. MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF MILITARY FACILITIES MIGHT BEST BE CONTEMPLATED IN THE CONTEXT OF SPANISH PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC



TREATY ORGANISATION, TO WHOSE REQUIREMENTS THE FACILITIES ARE PRIMARILY DEVOTED. THERE COULD BE SCOPE FOR PARALLEL MOVEMENT OVER THE TWO DEVELOPMENTS.

16. AS REGARDS WIDER CO-OPERATION OVER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE BRITISH SIDE IS ENTIRELY IN FAVOUR AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT.

17. YOU SHOULD ADD ORALLY THAT I HAVE TRIED TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE IN RESPONDING TO THE GENERAL IDEAS ADVANCED FROM THE SPANISH SIDE. I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE TIME CONSTRAINTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE EEC CONTEXT. I SUGGEST THAT SR OREJA SHOULD NOW REFLECT ON HOW I PROPOSE THAT HIS ORIGINAL IDEAS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. THEREAFTER I SUGGEST THAT WE MIGHT MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH NEXT YEAR. I MIGHT WISH TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY GIBRALTARIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT SUCH A MEETING.

CARRINGTON

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FILES

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DEFENCE D

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LEGAL ADVISERS

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PUSD

SAMD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

MR MOBERLY

*PS / No 1085*

*PS. Chancellor of Exchequer*

*PS / Lord President*

*PS / Lord Chancellor*

*PS / Home Secretary*

*PS / Defence Secretary*

*PS / Trade Secretary*

*PS / Sir Robert Armstrong*



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GPS 370A

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FM MADRID 071045Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO. 357 OF 7 DECEMBER 1979.

INFO ROUTINE GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

*Prime Minister*

*11.12.*

*mb*

KIPT

GIBRALTAR

1. OREJA TOLD ME RECENTLY THAT HE DID NOT WELCOME HAVING TO MAKE A SPEECH ON GIBRALTAR AT THIS MOMENT. HE REMINDED ME OF HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT INCREASING PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE HERE AND SAID THAT, WITH NO PROGRESS TO REPORT SINCE HIS MEETING WITH YOU LAST SEPTEMBER, HE COULD ONLY SET OUT THE HISTORY OF THE CASE IN TERMS WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO US UNHELPFUL. HE WAS HOWEVER AS KEEN AS EVER TO GET MOVEMENT INTO THE SITUATION AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH YOU.

2. HIS SPEECH IS LARGELY A TOUGH REHEARSAL OF THE STANDARD SPANISH DEFENCE FOR CLOSING AND KEEPING CLOSED THE FRONTIER, AND FOLLOWS THE OLD CASTIELLA LINE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE ALSO NUMEROUS SIGNALS OF OREJA'S PERSONAL READINESS TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM NOW WITH AN OPEN MIND, AND A POINTED REFERENCE TO THE FLEXIBILITY, IMAGINATION AND NEGOTIATING ABILITY BRITAIN HAS SHOWN OVER RHODESIA, AS WELL AS THE ADMISSION THAT THE GIBRALTARIANS HAVE INTERESTS WHICH MUST BE APPROPRIATELY SAFEGUARDED. THERE IS ALSO PUBLIC RECOGNITION THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TOO APPROACHES THE GIBRALTAR ISSUE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND IS WILLING TO MAKE PROGRESS.

3. MY READING OF THIS SPEECH, THEREFORE, IS THAT IT WAS PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR THE DOMESTIC GALLERY WITH THE AIM OF GUARDING THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AGAINST CHARGES OF INACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE APPEASEMENT. IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS HERE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SAY LESS. I DO NOT THINK IT REPRESENTS ANY CHANGE IN OREJA'S BASIC POSITION OF WANTING TO FIND A WAY OF EASING THE PROBLEM.



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4. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO GET HOLD OF THE TEXT OF SUPPLEMENTARIES PREPARED FOR CREJA (TRANSLATION BY BAG) WHICH GIVE THE SPANISH GROUNDS FOR CLAIMING THAT THE BORDER RESTRICTIONS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH BOTH THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THE TREATY OF ROME, CITING MEMBER STATES' RIGHT TO CONTROL AND DESIGNATE THE POINTS OF ENTRY INTO THEIR TERRITORY (5 THOUSAND GIBRALTARIANS ARE SAID TO SPEND THEIR SUMMER HOLIDAYS IN SPAIN). A FURTHER PREPARED SUPPLEMENTARY CLAIMS THAT GIBRALTARIAN ATTENDANCE ANNUALLY AT THE ALGECIRAS FAIR PROVES THAT SPAIN IS NOT IN BREACH OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

ACLAND

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN.

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COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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Gibraltar

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FM MADRID 011705Z NOV 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 307 OF 1 NOVEMBER 1979

REPEATED INFO GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL)

*Prime Minister*

②

*507 Duty Clerk  
17 MODBA  
6.11.79*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 213: GIBRALTAR.

1. I SAW OREJA ALONE THIS MORNING AND WE TALKED FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR.
2. I SAID THAT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT YOU ENVISAGED SOME DELAY BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING ON GIBRALTAR BUT THAT YOU HAD WANTED ME TO EXPLAIN TO HIM PERSONALLY THE PROBLEM IN RELATION TO THE GIBRALTAR ELECTIONS AND TO YOUR OWN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE. I MADE ALL THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR.
3. OREJA REPLIED THAT THE SPANISH SIDE HAD WAITED A LONG TIME TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THE GIBRALTAR PROBLEM IN DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH US AND COULD WAIT A BIT LONGER. HE WAS HOWEVER BECOMING INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE. IN THIS RESPECT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN FAIRLY QUIET DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS BUT PRESSURE WAS MOUNTING AGAIN. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE WAS HAVING TO SCHEDULE A DEBATE ON GIBRALTAR BEFORE TOO LONG AND IT COULD PROBABLY NOT BE PUT OFF BEYOND DECEMBER. THE MAYOR OF SAN ROQUE HAD RECENTLY BEEN TO SEE HIM (OREJA) TO URGE ACTION TO EASE THE PROBLEM. THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN ANDALUSIA (ESPECIALLY PSA AND PSOE) WERE ALSO ACTIVE. ALL THIS PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND IF NOTHING WAS SEEN TO BE HAPPENING LED TO ACCUSATIONS THAT THEY HAD NO POLICY. OREJA WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED TO YOU IN NEW YORK AND DID NOT WANT TO BE PUT UNDER PRESSURE TO CHANGE COURSE.
4. OREJA THEN REPEATED HIS IDEAS FOR PROGRESS UNDER THREE AREAS:
  - A) PRACTICAL COOPERATION OVER THE AIRPORT, PORT, DOCKYARD AND BASE. DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THESE PRACTICAL MATTERS SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE INTENSIFIED.



B) JOINT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA. HE HAD ASKED A GREAT FRIEND OF HIS PEDRO SCHWARTZ (WELL KNOWN TO THIS EMBASSY AND CONNECTED WITH THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS) TO MAKE STUDIES FOR HIM.

C) PATTERNS OF AUTONOMY. HE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR IDEAS WHICH WE COULD PERHAPS FLOAT WITH THE GIBRALTARIANS AND WHICH THEY COULD PUT BACK TO THE SPANIARDS AS THEIR OWN PROPOSALS. THE EXTENT OF AUTONOMY SHOULD BE AS WIDE AND GENEROUS AS POSSIBLE. THE IDENTITY OF THE GIBRALTARIANS MUST BE RESPECTED.

5. OREJA SAID THAT THIS LEFT THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL STATUS. FOR HIS PART HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD ALWAYS HAVE TO ASK THE GIBRALTARIANS BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY CHANGE THOUGH HE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SAY SO PUBLICLY OR QUITE SO SPECIFICALLY.

6. TO GET PROGRESS RUNNING IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A PUBLIC DECLARATION OR PERHAPS TWO PARALLEL DECLARATIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS FOR EXAMPLE IN RELATION TO THE AIRPORT. HE REALISED THAT THESE DECLARATIONS COULD NOT MENTION SOVEREIGNTY.

7. THE FORGOING APPEARS VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT HE SAID TO YOU IN NEW YORK. BUT IT SEEMED WORTH REPORTING IT IN DETAIL AS CONFIRMATION OF OREJA'S OWN POSITION.

8. OREJA THEN SAID THAT HE GREATLY HOPED THAT WE COULD PROCEED ON THIS BASIS. IT WOULD BE EASY, FOR EXAMPLE FOR THE SPANIARDS TO CHANGE TACTICS AND TO START A PROPAGANDA ATTACK AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF THE BASE IN GIBRALTAR. HE COULD WELL COME UNDER PRESSURE TO DO THIS. BUT THIS WOULD COMPLICATE THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE US/SPANISH DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND POSSIBLY SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO. HE HIMSELF WAS IN FAVOUR OF BASES INCLUDING THE PRESENT AMERICAN ONES ON SPANISH TERRITORY. IT WAS ALSO HIS FIRM POLICY THAT SPAIN SHOULD ENTER NATO AFTER



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● THE 1987 CSCE CONFERENCE BUT DURING THE LIFE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. HE AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAD RECENTLY HAD A MEETING WITH SPANISH ARMY OFFICERS AND HE HAD BEEN ASTONISHED BY THEIR VERY FIRM POSITION. THEY HAD SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SPAIN TO CONTEMPLATE NATO MEMBERSHIP IF THE GIBRALTAR PROBLEM WAS NOT (NOT) ON THE WAY TO SOLUTION. OREJA FELT THAT A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT STRANDS OF SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY WERE THUS COMING TOGETHER (HE REFERRED ALSO TO EEC MEMBERSHIP) AND HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD SEE IT IN THIS LIGHT TOO. GIBRALTAR WAS NO LONGER AN ISSUE OF RELATIVELY MINOR IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION OR IN TERMS OF ITS RELEVANCE TO SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AS A WHOLE.

9. I SAID THAT YOU DEFINITELY WANTED TO FIND A WAY FORWARD (OREJA HAD PREVIOUSLY REPEATED HIS FREQUENT QUERY AS TO WHETHER BRITAIN REALLY WANTED TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OR NOT). WE WERE NOT WASTING TIME BUT STUDIES OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS RAISED BY HIM IN NEW YORK WERE BEING CARRIED OUT.

10. OREJA THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT THERE COULD BE SOME FURTHER PREPARATION DURING THE NEXT TWO MONTHS BEFORE I LEFT MADRID. COULD I, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM WITH SAY DURAN, CUENCA AND CARRILLO. THE LATTER'S INVOLVEMENT DID NOT IMPLY A JURIDICAL APPROACH. HE WAS IN FACT ONE OF OREJA'S OLDEST FRIENDS AND HIS SPEECH WRITER RATHER THAN LEGAL ADVISER. I SAID THAT THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING THE GIBRALTARIANS ALONG. WE DID NOT WANT TO MISLEAD THE SPANISH SIDE AND NEEDED TO CONSULT THE GIBRALTARIANS BEFORE WE COULD PUT MORE PRECISE SUGGESTIONS. I WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE DURING THE RUN UP TO THE GIBRALTARIAN ELECTIONS. YOUR IDEA WAS TO HAVE A MEETING QUOTE AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR UNQUOTE, THAT I SHOULD FEED IN SOME IDEAS FIRST AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE GIBRALTARIANS IN ADVANCE. THE TIMING OF ALL THIS DEPENDED TO SOME EXTENT ON THE DATE OF THE GIBRALTARIAN ELECTIONS AND CAMPAIGN: BUT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE SAID.

11. AS REGARDS THE STATE VISIT AND FOR MY GENERAL COMMENTS SEE MY TWO MIFTS.

ACLAND

FILES

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EID (6)

1987/001: PS/PS

REGS.D

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PS/PVS

SIA S GRHAM

MR GULLARD

MR FERGUSON

S/S Home Office e.g. P.M.

Lord Chancellor

S/S Trade

PS Defence



CONFIDENTIAL

Gibraltar

GR 720

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AMENDED DISTRIBUTION: 25/9/79

FM UMIS NEW YORK 242345Z SEP

TO PRIORITY FCOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1102 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MADRID GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)

(2)

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

GIBRALTAR

*ans* *Prime Minister* *Ans - 26/9*

1. I SAW THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER FOR 45 MINUTES TODAY. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A LEGAL EXPERT DR CARVILLO, AND BY SR CUERIA HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY. AFTER PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON OTHER SUBJECTS (SEE MY TWO IFTS) OREJA EXPLAINED THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT AND PARTY WERE RESOLVED TO BRING SPAIN INTO THE COMMUNITY BY 1 JANUARY 1983 AND INTO NATO IN ROUGHLY THE SAME TIME FRAME. I SAID THAT IN MY VIEW THIS WAS SPAIN'S RIGHTFUL PLACE AND WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO HELP HER ASSUME IT.

2. TURNING TO GIBRALTAR, I SAID THAT WE WERE BOTH IN DIFFICULT POSITIONS. FOR BRITAIN THE STARTING POINT WAS THE WISHES OF THE GIBRALTARIANS, AND THESE WERE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE SO LONG AS THE SITUATION ON THE BORDER REMAINED AS IT WAS: THE KEY THUS RESTED IN OUR EYES WITH SPAIN. FOR SPAIN, I GATHERED, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REMOVE THE RESTRICTIONS WITHOUT SOME POLITICAL ADVANCE. SPAIN'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY MADE IT NECESSARY TO SEEK A WAY OUT: BUT AT THE MOMENT I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THIS COULD BE. I ASKED WHETHER OREJA HAD ANY IDEAS.

3. OREJA REPLIED THAT THE SAME IMAGINATION SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THIS SUBJECT AS HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO BEAR ON EG THE PROBLEMS OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND RHODESIA. THE APPROACH SHOULD BE POLITICAL, NOT JURIDICAL. MISTAKES HAD PERHAPS BEEN MADE IN THE PAST, BUT THE CLOCK COULD NOT BE PUT BACK. OREJA SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PARALLEL BUT NOT NECESSARILY SIMULTANEOUS DECLARATIONS. SPAIN WOULD DECLARE ITS INTENTION TO PUT AN END TO WHAT BRITAIN CALLED THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE BORDER WITH GIBRALTAR. BRITAIN WOULD DECLARE HER WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH GIBRALTAR AND ALSO ON, FOR EXAMPLE, QUOTE TERRITORIAL STATUS UNQUOTE. (OREJA REALISED THAT THE WORD QUOTE SOVEREIGNTY UNQUOTE COULD NOT BE USED). BRITAIN COULD ALSO, IF WE

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/WISHED



WISHED, DECLARE THAT SHE COULD MAKE NO CHANGE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR.

4. AS OREJA SAW IT, THESE DECLARATIONS WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO A BREAK-THROUGH. SPAIN WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON THE BORDER, PROVIDED THAT BRITAIN ALSO REMOVED THE FENCE. BRITAIN AND SPAIN COULD PERHAPS SHARE USE OF THE AIRPORT, OR ESTABLISH A REGIME LIKE THAT GOVERNING THE SWISS AIRPORTS ADJOINING FRENCH TERRITORY. THERE COULD BE JOINT USE OF THE GIBRALTAR BASE, PORT AND DOCKYARD. OREJA EMPHASISED THAT SPAIN RESPECTED THE IDENTITY OF GIBRALTAR AND HAD NO WISH TO DAMAGE IT: AS THE BASQUE AND CATALAN EXAMPLES HAD SHOWN, THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION MADE IT PERFECTLY POSSIBLE TO RECOGNISE REGIONAL IDENTITIES AND EVEN NATIONALITIES.

5. AS TO PROCEDURE, OREJA SAID IT WAS EASY ENOUGH FOR US TO MEET LIKE THIS IN NEW YORK, BUT ANY SPECIAL MEETING, WITH ATTENDANT PUBLICITY, MIGHT MERELY DO HARM. HE SUGGESTED A MEETING AT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON 22 NOVEMBER.

6. I SAID THAT I WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT OREJA'S SUGGESTIONS AND BUILD ON THEM. I EMPHASISED THE BRITISH DESIRE TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM IN AN AMICABLE WAY. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED FOR BRITAIN TO ANNOUNCE TALKS WITH SPAIN WHICH INCLUDED SOVEREIGNTY AS SUCH: NOT ONLY THE GIBRALTARIANS, BUT MANY IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, WOULD CALL THIS A SELL-OUT. WE COULD PERHAPS DEVISE A FORMULA WHICH EXCLUDED SOVEREIGNTY, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST. OREJA SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A FORMULA WHICH NEITHER EXCLUDED SOVEREIGNTY NOR INCLUDED IT.

7. I SAID THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF TALKING TO SPAIN BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE GIBRALTARIANS, I ASKED ABOUT SPANISH CONTACTS WITH GIBRALTAR: IT WAS A QUESTION NOT JUST OF SPAIN SPEAKING TO SIR J HASSAN, WHICH OREJA INDICATED HE HAD IN MIND, BUT OF SPAIN FINDING WAYS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN GIBRALTAR IN SUCH A WAY THAT HASSAN WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF IT.

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8. THE CONVERSATION ENDED ON THE NOTE THAT CONTACT COULD BE CONTINUED BETWEEN OFFICIALS FROM THE TWO SIDES. I SAID THAT SO FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED THIS WOULD BE THROUGH SIR A ACLAND.

9. WE AGREED THAT IF QUESTIONED BY THE PRESS WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE LINE IN MY THIRD IFT.

PARSONS

FILES  
SED  
PUSD  
OJD  
NEWSD  
UND  
PS  
PS/HPS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A. DUFF  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERLUSSON  
LORD N. G. LENNOX

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PS/LORD CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE  
PS/THE HOME SECRETARY