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3 June 1980

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, VENICE

12/13 JUNE 1980

POLITICAL COOPERATION

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Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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The following Briefing material is  
attached:

Annex A	Middle East
B	Iran
C	Afghanistan

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

3 June 1980

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EHG(V)(80)15

## MIDDLE EAST

(THIS BRIEF MAY BE SUBJECT TO REVISION IN THE LIGHT  
OF MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS)

## OBJECTIVE

1. To agree a Council statement and follow-up action.

## POINTS TO MAKE

2. Agree a move by the Nine is needed to avoid dangerous vacuum. Cannot repudiate autonomy talks but no prospect of progress from them. *No U.S.A. opinion*
3. Line proposed in report (A) broadly acceptable, as is draft statement (B) subject to following comments (see paragraph 9 below).
4. Options for Nine following soundings must remain open, including Security Council action, but soundings process itself a useful time-buyer.
5. Contacts must include the PLO but working, low-key meetings needed, not publicity jamboree; West Bankers should also be separately consulted.
6. Key is mutual acceptance of rights. Must concentrate on problem of how self-determination can be put into practice and reconciled with Israel's security needs.
7. Nine cannot aspire to play the dominant role in peace efforts. US goodwill must be retained as far as possible which means careful and co-ordinated presentation. Great care also needed to avoid alienating Israelis, with whom a settlement must ultimately be negotiated.



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BACKGROUND

References

A1.: Draft Foreign Ministers' report (not yet available).

A2.: Draft European Council statement.

A3.: Minute from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary covering the paper agreed at Chequers on 30 May (not yet available).

8. Paragraphs 11 and 12 below may be freely used. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are not for general disclosure in the Council.

9. General agreement has been reached at official level on the terms of the Foreign Ministers' report and statement.

Our partners' views coincide in general with our own. But the French remain inclined to push the Nine into as independent and far-reaching a role as possible, while the Germans ✓ and Dutch are reluctant to move beyond declaratory diplomacy. ✓

A few specific problems (some of which may be removed by the Foreign Ministers during the Council) remain on the statement.

10. No decisions have yet been taken on who should carry out the soundings proposed in the draft statement. At the request of the Political Directors we have suggested four possibilities:

(i) the Presidency alone, with the delegation headed by the Foreign Minister. Support could be provided by a small expert team drawn from the Nine as a whole;

(ii) the troika (ie in the next 6 months Luxembourg as Presidency, ie M. Thorn, and Italy and the Netherlands as the previous and future Presidencies);

(iii) a commission composed of, say, three members including at least one of the permanent members of the Security Council.



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(iv) a special emissary, again with a small team provided from the Nine as a whole. A figure of political stature and experience (eg Mr <sup>No.</sup> Brandt) would be required. Any of these alternatives would mean that none of the three major members of the Nine would be involved except perhaps through provision of an expert. This problem will need to be resolved in detail by officials and foreign ministers but a decision in principle from the Council is needed.

11. The details of the mandate of the mission and whom it should consult will also need to be worked out following the issue of the Council statement. Our assumption is that a mission should visit Israel, Egypt, the US, the important Arab states (ie at least Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia (on the Security Council) and perhaps Iraq and Kuwait, and also meet representatives of the PLO and West Bank opinion (presumably some of the mayors). The mission should concentrate on eliciting firm answers to questions on the lines of those referred to in the Foreign Ministers' report.

12. The Ambassadors of the Nine in Washington have recommended that particular thought should be given to presentation to the Americans of the Nine's move. This applies to Israel and the Arabs also. The Presidency may propose a common line to take.

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MIDDLE EAST

OBJECTIVE

1. To agree a Council statement and follow-up action.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. Agree a move by the Nine is needed to avoid dangerous vacuum. Cannot repudiate autonomy talks but no prospect of progress from them.
  3. Line proposed in report (A) broadly acceptable, as is draft statement (B). *mm*
  4. Options for Nine following soundings must remain open, including Security Council action, but soundings process itself a useful time-buyer.
  5. Key is mutual acceptance of rights. Must concentrate on problem of how self-determination can be put into practice and reconciled with Israel's security needs.
  6. Nine cannot aspire to play the dominant role in peace efforts. US and Israeli goodwill must be retained as far as possible which means careful and co-ordinated presentation.
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BACKGROUND

References

A: Draft Foreign Ministers' report.

B: Draft European Council statement and explanatory note.

C: Minute to OD from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

8. Paragraphs 10-12 below may be freely used. Paragraph 9 is not for general disclosure in the Council.

9. The Prime Minister is familiar with the general background. Copies of previous statements and essential documents have been provided separately. General agreement has been reached at official level on the terms of the Foreign Ministers' report and statement. Our partners' views coincide in general with our own. But the French remain inclined to push the Nine into as independent and far-reaching a role as possible, while the Germans and possibly Dutch seemed reluctant to move beyond declaratory diplomacy. A few specific problems (some of which may be removed by the Foreign Ministers) remain on the statement.

10. No decisions have yet been taken on who should carry out the soundings proposed in the draft statement. This will need to be resolved in detail by officials and Foreign Ministers after the Council but a decision in principle from the Council is needed. The best solution from our point of view would be a mission headed by the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Mr Thom, who could continue to exercise this function after the end of the Luxembourg Presidency if necessary. The details of the mandate of the mission and whom it should consult will also need to be worked out following the issue of the Council

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statement, but the general lines of the proposals set out in the Foreign Ministers' report are acceptable to us.

11. The Ambassadors of the Nine in Washington have recommended that particular thought should be given to presentation to the Americans of the Nine's move. This applies also to Israel and the Arabs, particularly Egypt.

12. The Lebanese have pressed for full attention to be devoted to Lebanon in any statement or other moves on the Middle East. This will be considered by Political Directors and Foreign Ministers during the Council.



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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DRAFT REPORT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. In accordance with the decision taken at the meeting of the European Council on 27 and 28 April last in Luxembourg, I have the honour to submit the report of the Foreign Ministers on the role which Europe can play at the present moment with a view to contributing to the conclusion of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement in the Middle East, which alone can bring real peace in the area.
2. Since the Camp David meeting the position of the Nine has been set out in their statements of the 19 September 1978 on the results achieved at that meeting, of the 26 March 1979 on the Washington agreements, of the 18 June 1979 on the actions or statements which might constitute an obstacle to the search for an overall settlement, as well as in the speech by the then President, the Irish Foreign Minister, at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25 September 1979.
3. A situation characterised by uncertainty over future developments in the Middle East persists after 25 May, and international public opinion is increasingly expecting a European initiative aimed in the first place at avoiding a deterioration of the situation. The Ministers consider that it is not appropriate for the Nine to resist such an expectation, given that the build up of other crises has shown that it has become urgent to make a start towards a solution and taking into account the wider context of international relations.
4. The Foreign Ministers stress that active European participation in the search for such a comprehensive solution has been made necessary in particular by the many traditional political and economic links which bind our countries to this region. It is also a fundamental interest of all peoples that rapid progress towards a solution of the Israel/Arab conflict should contribute to stability; this is particularly

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necessary in a region adjoining one in which at the present moment there are other serious crises.

5. In the light of these considerations the Foreign Ministers have examined the various initiatives which might be taken by the Nine with a view both to making clear their position and to concerting appropriate common actions.

6. In recent weeks the Foreign Ministers have taken advantage of all their contacts to collect, directly through qualified representatives of the interested parties, information on the present state of the problems in the Middle East. I myself have exchanged views with the United States Secretary of State, the Israeli Foreign Minister, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

7. As regards making clear the position of the Nine on the Middle East problems, the Foreign Ministers consider that it is necessary above all to restate the elements which were set out in the name of the Nine in the speech by the then presidency, the Irish Foreign Minister, at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25 September 1979. In this context it seems necessary that the Nine should make clear that it is through a process of self-determination that the right of the Palestinians to a homeland must be translated into fact and the Palestinian people must accordingly be a party to the negotiation as the Nine envisage it; this implies the participation of the PLO. On the question of Jerusalem, the Nine recognise the particularly important role which it possesses for all the parties concerned. In the speech of the then Presidency at the United Nations on 25 September 1979, the Nine stressed inter alia that they did not accept any unilateral move which aims to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee the right of free access for all to the Holy Places. The Nine have also stressed the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements represent a serious obstacle to the peace process

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in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements are illegal.

8. In considering the action which the Nine could take, the Foreign Ministers believe that it is important to work for acceptance by all the parties involved of the two fundamental principles accepted by the international community: the right to exist and to security of all the states in the area, including Israel, and justice for all peoples, which involves recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. To this end, various options have been worked out, notably eventual initiatives in the UN context, as well as contacts with the parties involved to establish the precise modalities of action by the Nine.

9. In practice, the Nine will probably soon find themselves confronted with the need to take up a position on the Middle East at the United Nations. In particular, it will be difficult in the short term to prevent the Arabs from calling a special session of the General Assembly, at which resolutions which the Nine cannot support will probably be tabled. The Foreign Ministers take note of the possibility of sponsoring for tactical reasons at such a General Assembly a resolution in conformity with the position of the Nine, but they point to the difficulty of achieving agreement on this resolution in this forum, given that it has already approved in the past positions not acceptable to the Nine.

10. The Foreign Ministers have considered the possibility of a new Security Council resolution complementing Resolution 242, with a view to providing a new basis for peace efforts. Such a resolution must be founded on the two essential elements, namely the re-affirmation of the principles of Resolution 242 and the affirmation of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination in the framework of a negotiated peace settlement. This could avoid more extreme moves. The chief aims would be to ensure approval of a text of this nature by the PLO and to guarantee the absence of a veto by the United States. The

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Foreign Ministers, however, consider that the achievement of the second objective is a remote possibility in present circumstances, and conclude that the Nine should not seek to table a resolution of this kind so long as these circumstances persist. This option should therefore be held in reserve in case new circumstances make it desirable in the future.

11. On the contacts to be undertaken by the Nine on the basis of the European Council decision to sound out the parties concerned on what action could be taken, the Foreign Ministers have considered aspects of both their modalities and their content.

12. The soundings should be carried out through a visible process of consultation of those concerned. A touring mission should make contact with at least Israel, Egypt, the US, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the Arab League, the PLO and representatives of the West Bankers and Gazans. As far as composition is concerned, a mission consisting of representatives of all members of the Nine would be unwieldy and unworkable. A small team headed by a figure of stature could more easily obtain the necessary access to senior political figures and carry political weight. Four possibilities suggest themselves:

(i) The Presidency alone. A mission might be headed by the Presidency represented at Foreign Minister level, with a small team of experts from the Nine. This has the advantage of simplicity.

(ii) The Troika. There would be advantage in associating the previous and future presidencies with action.

(iii) A specially appointed commission drawn from say three members of the Nine. There might be advantage in involving one or both of the Permanent Security Council members.

/(iv) A special



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(iv) A special emissary drawn from outside the governments of the Nine but acting on behalf of the Nine. He would need to be a senior political figure with appropriate experience if possible. He could be provided with a small team of experts from the Nine.

13. The outlines of the mandate of the touring mission, as far as the content of the soundings which it should carry out are concerned, would relate to three basic issues:

(i) Implementation of the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people and reconciliation of this principle with the interests of the other parties, notably Israel.

(ii) Meeting of Israel's fears for her long-term security to permit a lasting settlement.

(iii) Start of multilateral negotiations with the participation of all the parties directly concerned.

Questions on the different aspects of each of these three basic problems are contained in an Annex.

14. In the view of most of the Ministers, the Euro-Arab Dialogue could also offer the possibility of useful contacts towards the aims set out above. An effort could be made to develop not only the various areas where co-operation takes place, but also the political dimension, going as far as the holding of a meeting at the political level. In the view of others, prospects of this sort should be held in reserve for the progress of the Dialogue as such, but it would not be appropriate to allude to it in conjunction with contacts aimed at a comprehensive settlement, which must be carried out with all the parties concerned, since Egypt is not represented on the Arab side of the Dialogue.

/Annex



Annex

List of questions on the various aspects of each of the three basic problems on which a touring mission of the Nine should concentrate in contacts with the parties directly concerned.

(i) Implementation of Palestinian self-determination and its reconciliation with the interests of the other parties, notably Israel.

How are Palestinian views to be determined for the purposes of self-determination and which Palestinians are to be allowed to participate in this process? At what stage in a peace process would authoritative Palestinian views be sought? How are its results to be reconciled with the need to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel? Whatever political form a Palestinian land takes, what relationship is envisaged with Jordan and Israel, economically and politically? If a Palestinian homeland were established on the West Bank and Gaza, how many Palestinians could realistically return and live there, what arrangements would be needed to safeguard the interests of the existing inhabitants and what sort of international aid would be needed to make it viable?

(ii) Meeting of Israel's fears for her long-term security to permit a lasting settlement.

If a Palestinian homeland were established on the West Bank and Gaza, would the Palestinians be prepared to drop all claims to the territory held by Israel between 1948 and 1967 (subject to minor border rectifications)? If Palestinian aspirations can be met to the satisfaction of the Palestinians, would the Arab States be prepared to sign peace treaties with Israel and maintain normal relations with her? What guarantees of a peace settlement would be needed? What degree of demilitarisation of the West Bank and Gaza, coupled with safeguards for both sides, could be negotiated? How could irredentists on both sides be controlled?

/(iii) Start

(iii) Start of multilateral negotiations with the participation of all parties directly concerned.

At what stage would multilateral talks be possible/most useful? How can the problem of Palestinian representation be solved if both sides continue to refuse to accept the other's representatives? What preconditions, if any, would be set by both sides for a negotiation? Who else should be involved besides the parties most directly concerned?



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EUROPEAN COUNCIL: DRAFT STATEMENT OF THE NINE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The Heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers have exchanged views in depth on the situation in the Middle East [including the current state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979]. They agreed that the growing tensions [which affect this region constitute a growing danger] [which affect this region constitute a serious danger to peace] [affect seriously the security of this region] [and] make a comprehensive solution of the Arab/Israel conflict more than ever necessary and urgent.
2. The Nine countries of the European Community consider that the traditional links and common interests which bind Europe to the Middle East require them to play a special role and call upon them today to work towards peace in a more concrete manner.
3. [In their action] [in acting thus], the Nine countries of the Community base themselves on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council and the positions which they have expressed on numerous occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September last by the Irish Foreign Minister at the 34th UN General Assembly.
4. On the basis thus set out, the time has come to work for the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to exist and to security of all the states in the region including Israel, and justice for all the peoples which implies recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
5. All the countries of the region have the right to live in peace within secure recognised and guaranteed boundaries. The guarantees of the peace settlement should be provided by the United Nations by decision of the Security Council and, as appropriate, according to other mutually agreed procedures.

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The Nine once more declare themselves ready to participate in a system of international guarantees in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

6. The Palestinian problem, which is not simply a refugee problem, must at last find a just solution. The Palestinian people, who are conscious of their own existence as such, must be put in a position to exercise their right to self-determination [through an appropriate process] within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement. The exercise of this right involves the establishment of a homeland for the Palestinian people [organised by itself and, if it so desires, a Palestinian state on the territories which Israel should evacuate in Palestine].

7. The implementation of these aims requires the adherence and concurrence of all the parties involved in the peace settlement which the Nine are striving to promote on the basis of the principles set out in the declarations mentioned above. These principles are valid for all the parties concerned, including the Palestinian people, which [involves the participation] [necessitates the participation] [involves the association] of the PLO in the negotiation.

8. The Nine recognise the particularly important role which the question of Jerusalem possesses for all the parties concerned. In the speech of the then Presidency at the then United Nations on 25 September 1979, the Nine stressed inter alia that they did not accept any unilateral move which claimed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the status of the city should guarantee the right of free access for all to the Holy Places.

9. The Nine recall the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967. They are deeply convinced that the Israel settlements represent a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements [as well as demographic and property modifications in the occupied Arab territories] are contrary to international law.

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10. Concerned to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force and the threat of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the region, and constitutes a fundamental element for a comprehensive settlement on the Middle East conflict. [In this context, the Nine reaffirm their total solidarity with the friendly country of Lebanon whose stability remains dangerously threatened by confrontations in the area, and renew their urgent appeal to all the countries and parties concerned to put an end to all acts liable to infringe Lebanon's integrity and the authority of its government. The Nine will support any action and any initiative capable of ensuring the return of peace and stability in the Lebanon which constitutes an essential factor for stability in the area.]

11. The Nine have decided [to undertake the necessary soundings with] [to make the necessary contacts with] [all] the parties involved. In the light of the results of this consultation the Nine will decide the precise modalities of their future action [the precise methods and timetable for an initiative on their part]. [As they embark on these consultations, the Nine recall that the international community, and in particular the UN Security Council, must be called upon, in circumstances to be decided, to assume their responsibilities at the various stages of the negotiation and of the implementation of the peace settlement, particularly in regard to concrete guarantees.]

[12. The Nine also stressed the importance which they attach to the Euro/Arab Dialogue on all fronts and the need to develop its political dimension. They have accordingly agreed that a meeting at the political level between the two parts would be opportune. They intend thus to contribute to the development of co-operation and mutual understanding between Europe and the Arab world.]



Explanatory Note

Square brackets indicate disputed passages.

Paragraph 1: we have proposed the bracketed reference to Camp David in the first sentence. However it might be better to refer obliquely to the achievement of Camp David in paragraph 9 (see below). A reference in the second sentence to "a serious danger to peace" is close to UN charter language used to justify sanctions.

Paragraph 6: the French believe (obscurely) that reference to an "appropriate process" may be taken by some as endorsement of Camp David. The bracketed passage at the end of the paragraph is included at French insistence. We can expect considerable support in opposing it.

Paragraph 7: the Nine are agreed that reference to the PLO should avoid any suggestion that the Nine accord them exclusive or official status. The language proposed makes more explicit the reference to the PLO in the Irish Foreign Minister's UN speech last September.

Paragraph 9: we would prefer the first sentence to incorporate the achievement of Camp David in Sinai by referring to the need for Israel to complete the process of withdrawal from occupied territories. We are proposing this at Political Director level. The bracketed passage in the final sentence is a French suggestion. We have no objection to it in

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substance but it adds little.

(The Germans have proposed that paragraphs 8-10 should precede paragraph 7 since they incorporate aims of the Nine, referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 7. The French have resisted this on the grounds that the two basic principles mentioned in paragraph 4 should not be mixed with their concrete application to the problem.)

Paragraph 10: the bracketed section on Lebanon is a Belgian proposal. The Political Directors will be discussing how to deal with Lebanon during the Council.

Paragraph 11: the bracketed sections in the first sentence reflect confusion about whether the Nine should set up a special mission or use Embassies to intensify existing political contacts. The passage in brackets in the second sentence reflects the French view that the Nine should commit themselves firmly to future action. The last sentence is a French proposal to ensure that the action by the Nine is put in its proper context. The Germans have objected on grounds which are not clear.

Paragraph 12: the Italians have asked that this passage be put in brackets. They are concerned that the Dialogue should not be seen as a major forum for discussion of the Arab-Israel dispute since Egypt is currently absent from the Arab side (the Arab League).



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THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMO  
PS  
PS/PS  
PS/MA-HUND  
PS/PS  
Sir J. Mancini  
Mr. Sullord  
J.C. Moberly

Arab/Israel

1. As we approach the European Council meeting in Venice on 12/13 June, I am increasingly concerned about the situation in the Middle East.
2. Recent events on the West Bank illustrate the dangerous frustrations which are building up. It is clear that any real progress in the Israeli/Egyptian/US autonomy talks can now be ruled out, at least until after the American election and perhaps for as long as Mr Begin is Prime Minister - judging from some of his recent language. In the absence of any political progress, President Sadat may become more isolated internationally. The bomb attacks on the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah have produced the inevitable reaction in the Security Council. The Arabs and their supporters will have an opportunity to create more trouble at the Special Session of the General Assembly likely to be called in July and again at the regular Session starting in September. Tension may rise to a point where fundamental Western interests are at risk. There is an urgent need to assure Arab moderates that although the Americans are likely to be in baulk for many months, the path of negotiation is still the best.
3. Part of the difficulty is the vacuum created by American diplomatic impotence during the election period, that is, until early 1981. We are taking special pains to keep in touch with American thinking. President Carter and Mr Muskie have both made it clear that they will be very unhappy about any recourse by their friends to the Security Council and, indeed, would be obliged to use the veto. We had, in any case, been reaching the conclusion that this was not the path to follow.

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4. But this does not mean that Europe can and should do nothing. On the contrary, I believe some diplomatic activity by the Nine in the coming months is essential if the dangers described above are to be averted. We know that many senior American officials would privately accept this view. They are, or should be, as concerned as we are at the link between the deteriorating Arab/Israel situation and the other problems of the region, and at the opportunity offered to the Russians to recover lost ground by championing a 'just cause' during the period of the vacuum.

5. There is now agreement among the Nine at official level that the European Council on 12/13 June should issue a statement, the substance of which would stress commitment to Israel's security and elaborate on the need to take into account Palestinian political rights. I attach a copy of the latest draft which is broadly satisfactory. There are two points which might be construed as a move forward by the Nine, though both have been effectively covered in previous statements by the Nine as well as following closely positions we have adopted ourselves. These are the endorsement of Palestinian self-determination, always within the framework of a negotiated settlement, and acknowledgement that the PLO, among others, must be involved in negotiations. This is of course quite different from recognising them as a Government. We have for some time been taking the line that because of the support which the PLO enjoy on the West Bank they cannot be excluded indefinitely from negotiations.

6. The major proposal in the draft statement is that the Nine should begin to take soundings of the parties concerned. Those consulted should include the United States, Egypt and Israel, as well as the other Arab states most closely concerned, and also the PLO and Palestinian opinion on the West Bank and in Gaza. The soundings would be aimed at answering the following three questions:

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- (i) How can Israeli fears about long-term security be met to permit a lasting settlement?
- (ii) How is the principle of Palestinian self-determination to be put into practice and reconciled with the interests of the other parties, notably Israel; and in the light of these questions
- (iii) How could eventual multilateral negotiations be got under way?

In our view the soundings could take place over many months and continue in any case until the Americans are back in play after the Presidential election. One possibility is that they could be carried out by the Luxembourg Presidency: (M Thorn would be well capable of this). Another is a specially appointed Mission. There is no question, at any rate for the foreseeable future, of a British Minister playing a direct part.

7. I am copying this minute to members of OD Committee and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
6 June 1980

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## IRAN

OBJECTIVE: TO AVOID DISCUSSION ON THE SANCTIONS ADOPTED BY MEMBER STATES

## POINTS TO MAKE

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBER STATES' MEASURES

1. All member states have put their measures into force: the differences are less important than to avoid an appearance of lack of confidence in what is being done.

## FURTHER CONSULTATIONS

2. We should keep under review the way sanctions work out. It is only if a serious distortion of trade becomes apparent that any further consultations need be considered.

## PURPOSE OF SANCTIONS

3. We are not trying to bring the Iranian economy to its knees, but to demonstrate to Iran that it cannot expect to enjoy normal relations while continuing to hold the hostages.

## REACTION IN IRAN

4. The Iranians have made light of sanctions. However, there are indications that they are more concerned about the impact than they wish to admit.

## (DEFENSIVE) COVERAGE OF SANCTIONS

5. Discrepancy in our cut off date for exempted contracts will make little practical difference: the reason was parliamentary aversion to retrospection. We would be ready to implement other aspects of the Security Council Resolution (eg new service contracts in support of industrial projects) if our partners would make parallel orders.



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BACKGROUND

1. All other member states put their sanctions into effect on 22 May. However, although they all claim to be following the Naples agreement concerning the implementation of the Security Council Draft Resolution, there are considerable differences between their measures.
2. At the meeting of the Iran Working Group in Brussels on 30 May, the Commission, supported by some states, wished to prepare an analysis of the different measures. France and the UK saw no virtue in this.
3. Our introduction of sanctions has not affected our Embassy's relations with the Iranian Government. However, we know that Iran has been looking for alternative sources of supply in Korea and in Eastern Europe for goods which will be affected by the sanctions, and has made some arrangements for goods which have to come from Europe to be sent to an intermediate destination before being shipped on. These measures will at least cause additional inconvenience, and increase prices in Iran.

Power Struggle

4. The power struggle in Iran bedevils efforts by outsiders to contribute effectively to the release of the hostages. Some leading politicians, eg Bani Sadr and Qotbzadeh want to release the hostages but others, the 'students' and Beheshti group remain intransigent. Khomeini, too, seems obdurate, or at least fears the consequences of being seen to change his mind. Parliament (convened on 28 May) is to tackle hostage problem, but unlikely to do so before late July. Even then, Bani Sadr and 'moderates' may be overruled by hardliners, including Beheshti faction, who wish to exploit hostage issue in context of Iranian domestic politics.

Steps Forward

5. Best tactic for time being is to keep hostage issue off front pages as far as possible, while moderates try to work out scenario for favourable decision by Majles. This could include some international  
/'recognition'



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'recognition' of Iranian grievances, and/or reactivation of UN Commission of Enquiry (Daoudi, Waldheim's Syrian representative) still in Tehran.

6. Apparent US plans to ventilate ICJ decision in Security Council could cut across this process, stimulate enhanced press scrutiny of efforts to find a solution, and make it harder for Iranians to agree to a solution.

REFERENCES

1. UN Security Council Draft Resolution, 16 January.
2. Declaration by EC Foreign Ministers on Iran, Naples, 18 May.

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UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/13735  
10 January 1980

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979, and 461 (1979) of 31 December 1979,

Recalling also the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616) which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),

Having taken note of the letters dated 13 November 1979 and 1 December 1979 concerning the grievances and views of Iran (S/13626 and S/13671, respectively),

Having taken into account the Order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality, who are being held as hostages in Iran (S/13697) and also calling on the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that no action is taken by them which will aggravate the tension between the two countries,

Further recalling the letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646) stating that, in his opinion, the present crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America poses a serious threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind the adoption by the General Assembly by consensus on 17 December 1979 of the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,

Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered and, to that end, to respect the decision of the Security Council,

Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

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Affirming that the safe release and departure from Iran of all those being held hostage is an essential first step in resolving peacefully the issues between Iran and the United States and the other States members of the international community,

Reiterating that once the hostages have been safely released, the Government of Iran and the United States of America should take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Further taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of 6 January 1980 (S/13730) made pursuant to resolutions 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979 and 461 (1979) of 31 December 1979,

Bearing in mind that the continued detention of the hostages constitutes a continuing threat to international peace and security,

Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Urgently calls, once again, on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nationality being held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country;

2. Decides that, until such time as the hostages are released and have safely departed from Iran, all States Members of the United Nations:

(a) shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories, whether or not originating in their territories, to or destined for Iranian governmental entities in Iran, or any other person or body in Iran, or to or destined for any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran, of all items, commodities, or products, except food, medicine, and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(b) shall prevent the shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway, or other land transport of their registration or owned by or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage whether or not in bond by land transport facilities across their territories of any of the items, commodities, and products covered by subparagraph (a) which are consigned to or destined for Iranian governmental entities or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran;

(c) shall not make available to the Iranian authorities or to any person in Iran or to any enterprise controlled by any Iranian governmental entity any new credits or loans; shall not, with respect to such persons or enterprises, make available any new deposit facilities or allow substantial increases in existing non-dollar deposits or allow more favourable terms of payment than customarily used in international commercial transactions; and shall act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are

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not made on time and shall require any persons or entities within their jurisdiction to do likewise;

(d) shall prevent the shipment from their territories on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran of products and commodities covered by subparagraph (a) above;

(e) shall reduce to a minimum the personnel of Iranian diplomatic missions accredited to them;

(f) shall prevent their nationals, or firms located in their territories, from engaging in new service contracts in support of industrial projects in Iran, other than those concerned with medical care;

(g) shall prevent their nationals or any person or body in their territories from engaging in any activity which evades or has the purpose of evading any of the decisions set out in this resolution;

3. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect forthwith to the decisions set out in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

4. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter;

5. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the Charter, States not members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

6. Calls upon all other United Nations bodies and the specialized agencies of the United Nations and their members to conform their relations with Iran to the terms of this resolution;

7. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

8. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 February 1980 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1980.



DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE CONCERNING  
IRAN : NAPLES, 18 MAY 1980

1. At their meeting in Naples on 17 and 18 May 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine Member States of the European Community reconsidered, in accordance with their declaration of 22 April, the situation resulting from the detention of the American hostages in Iran, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.
2. The Ministers examined the information emanating from Iran. While noting that there were a number of developments which could be important for the release of the hostages, in particular the completion of the second round of Parliamentary elections and the forthcoming convening of the Majlis, they were obliged to recognise that no decisive progress leading to the release of the hostages had been made since 22 April last.
3. Consequently, they decided immediately to apply the measures provided for in the Security Council draft resolution of 10 January 1980, according to jointly agreed conditions and procedures. They agreed, in particular, that all contracts concluded after 4 November 1979 will be affected by these measures. They will continue to consult closely pursuant to Art 224 of the Treaty of Rome.
4. The sole purpose of these measures is to hasten the release of the hostages. At the same time, the Ministers reaffirmed their intention to respect the independence of Iran and the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future.



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5. The Ministers expressed great satisfaction at the decision of the UN Secretary-General to entrust to Mr Adib Daoudi, member of the UN Commission of Inquiry, the task of entering into contact with the Iranian Government in order to enable the Commission to resume its work and to secure the resolution of the crisis. They fully support the Secretary-General and will remain in constant touch with him in order to establish whether the progress of the UN mission is such as to enable them rapidly to suspend the measures taken in respect of Iran.

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## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

## OBJECTIVE

1. To stimulate a wide-ranging discussion

## POINTS TO MAKE

2. The Russians are anxious to divert attention from Afghanistan. The Warsaw Pact call on 15 May for a World Peace Summit "to remove hotbeds of tension" was a ploy in this sense. The Russians will also seek to promote and gain advantage from any signs of division between Western allies.
3. Close consultation and cooperation between European partners are vital. We should make it clear that we have a common appreciation of, and approach to, problems caused by the invasion of Afghanistan. We must convince the Russians that East/West relations will suffer continued damage whilst they remain in Afghanistan and that there will be no return to 'business as usual' until they withdraw.

## AFGHANISTAN

4. Meetings between Lord Carrington and Gromyko, and President Giscard and Brezhnev have brought little concrete evidence of Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously. But the Russians are feeling the pressure of world opinion and are trying to appear flexible. We should continue to probe their position, whilst maintaining pressure for an acceptable political solution.

## CSCE

5. The Russians are anxious for Madrid to take place, and to use it to promote an impression of 'business as usual'. They want agreement to a conference on Disarmament and Military détente. We must take a strong line at Madrid to show that détente cannot be broken down into packages to suit Soviet



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purposes and that negotiation of new proposals is meaningless if existing obligations continue to be disregarded.

OLYMPICS

6. Defensive : The decision of the British Olympic Association (BOA) to accept invitation to participate in Moscow Games was taken against strong Government advice. It is not binding on Governing Bodies of Olympic Sports or on individual sportsmen. BOA agreed to re-examine if circumstances change. We shall continue quietly but firmly to advise and urge non-participation.

BACKGROUND

AFGHANISTAN

7. The Soviet position on Afghanistan has not altered but recent proposals by the Kabul regime and high level contacts - Secretary of State/Gromyko on 17 May in Vienna and Giscard/Brezhnev on 19 May in Warsaw - suggest that the Russians have felt a need at least to appear willing to be reasonable. But they still attach unacceptable pre-conditions to any political settlement. In particular they wish to secure recognition of the Babrak Karmal regime, particularly by Pakistan and Iran.

8. There is, nevertheless, a certain ambiguity, perhaps intentional, in Soviet statements about withdrawal. Brezhnev hinted to Giscard that a Soviet withdrawal could start after bilateral negotiations had been completed between Afghanistan and Pakistan/Iran but before guarantees of non-intervention given by other countries. Brezhnev also said in a speech on 27 May that the timescale for beginning the withdrawal could be decided in the context of the proposed settlement and taking into account the appropriate national guarantees of the ending and non-resumption of all forms of outside intervention. We now intend to probe the Russians further to see if this indicates a possible willingness to move toward our insistence that

/guarantees



guarantees of non-intervention must go hand in hand with a Soviet withdrawal.

9. The attitude of non-aligned States has held up quite well. Neither Pakistan nor Iran reacted favourably to the Soviet-inspired Afghan proposals of 14 May for a political settlement. The Islamic Conference on 17 - 22 May repeated its condemnation of the Soviet invasion and set up a 3-man commission comprising the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Pakistan and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference to seek a solution by "appropriate consultations". This may get into difficulties if they are obliged to meet only representatives of the Babrak regime, but they are aware of the dangers.

#### GISCARD-BREZHNEV MEETING

10. Without any prior consultation with his allies President Giscard met Brezhnev on 19 May in Warsaw. He achieved little, though he claimed in response to press criticism in France and abroad, that Brezhnev had been left in no doubt about Western solidarity over Afghanistan. The Soviet press, however, claimed that the meeting had revealed "a growing tendency in Europe towards the continuation of contacts, the preservation and strengthening of détente and mutually advantageous cooperation ....."

#### CSCE

11. The next CSCE review meeting will begin in Madrid on 11 November and will be preceded by a preparatory meeting also in Madrid, beginning on 9 September. We want a balanced outcome covering all areas of the CSCE Final Act, and will emphasize the review of implementation. The Russians will attempt to concentrate on the military aspects of security including the idea of a disarmament conference. Lord Carrington made it clear to Gromyko on 17 May that the atmosphere at Madrid would be



"less warm", if there had been no solution to the problem of Afghanistan.

OLYMPICS

12. All EC National Olympic Committees (NOCs) except the Germans have decided to go to Moscow against the advice of their governments. Germans are feeling isolated. Herr Genscher has asked us to make efforts at a higher level to persuade sports bodies to change their minds. Lord Carrington commended him to the Prime Minister's four letters to BOA and said that further meetings with sports bodies were under consideration.

13. Hockey, yachting, equestrian and shooting bodies in UK are boycotting.