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FM FCO 061635 OCT 1980

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1598 OF 6 OCTOBER

INFO PARIS BONN JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI

MOSCOW BAHRAIN MUSCAT AMMAN DOHA TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 4202: IRAQ/IRAN - US INTENTIONS

1. THE FORECAST IN PARA 1(B)(I) OF YOUR TUR THAT THE AMERICANS WILL WISH TO INVOLVE WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND THE UK, IN TALKS ON NAVAL COOPERATION, AND THAT THEY MAY SUGGEST JOINT EXPLORATORY APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES, HAS BEEN FULFILLED. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE DELIVERED 2 PAPERS (TEXT BY BAG). THE PAPERS ASK WHETHER WE WOULD AGREE THAT THE GULF STATES SHOULD BE URGENTLY CONSULTED ABOUT 'A CO-ORDINATED NAVAL EFFORT IN THE GULF AND STRAITS AREA, WITH ACTIVE MILITARY PARTICIPATION BY OTHER CONCERNED STATES AND STATES IN THE GULF, TO ASSURE THE PROTECTION OF OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN PROTECTION OF NAVIGATION'. THIS WOULD INVOLVE JOINT PATROLLING WITH LOCAL NAVIES AND MORE FACILITIES FOR THE US IN BAHRAIN AND OMAN. A SIMILAR APPROACH HAS BEEN MAD IN PARIS.
2. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU (NOT TO ALL)FCO TELNO 392 TO PARIS OUTLINING OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION. WE BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE TO BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GULF STATES TO ACCEPT AND A FORTIORI TO COOPERATE IN SUCH A FORCE. A BETTER COURSE WOULD BE TO CARRY ON OUR PRESENT CONTACTS WITH THEM AND TO TRY IN THE COURSE OF THESE TO BRING OUT THE NEED FOR SUCH A FORCE, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL THEMSELVES ASK FOR PROTECTION OF THIS SORT, IF THE THREAT DEVELOPS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS COULD BE OMAN, WHERE THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO BE MORE WARMLY RECEIVED AND WHOSE ACTIVE COOPERATION IS MORE NECESSARY.
3. WHILE WE DO SHARE THE AMERICAN'S SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE

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NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF A TECHNICAL NATURE, WE DOUBT IF THERE IS SUCH URGENCY OVER THE APPROACHES. IN PARTICULAR WE QUESTION THEIR PERCEPTION, (PARA 1A OF YOUR TUR) THAT THEY ARE NOW 'NEEDED' IN THE GULF. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE (YOUR TUR NO 4200) THAT EVEN THE INVITATION TO SEND AWACS WAS CONTRIVED AND WE NOTED THE SAUDI HESITATIONS OVER PUBLICITY.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND ON OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. WE SHALL ALSO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER AND IF SO WHEN ANYTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO THE RUSSIANS.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ALL THESE CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

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