

IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

20

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR B YOUNG~~
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J O'BRYEN~~ & A A CLAND
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/MENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDAH 081133Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 728 OF 8TH OCTOBER 1980

REPEATED PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, AMMAN, ABU DHABI,
BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT, TRIPOLI.

YR TELNO 535: IRAQ/IRAN

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON THE DIRECTOR OF ARAB
AFFAIRS IN THE MFA THIS MORNING TO HAND OVER A
DOCTORED VERSION OF TUR. SHURA WAS AS GRATEFUL AS EVER
FOR THIS INFORMATION.

2. SHURA WAS CLEARLY WORRIED THAT THE WAR MIGHT
SPILL OVER INTO THE ARAB GULF STATES. HE THOUGHT THAT
IF IRAN BEGAN TO LOSE HEAVILY, OR IF IT INTERPRETED
ANY JORDANIAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR AS THE BEGINNING OF
A GENERAL ARAB LINE-UP AGAINST IRAN, THEN IT MIGHT
SEEK TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND ATTACK KUWAIT,
WHOSE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ WAS PUBLICLY
KNOWN. GRAY ASKED WHETHER IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY
SAUDI ARABIA WOULD, AS INDICATED BY PRINCE SAUD,
INTERVENE TO SUPPORT KUWAIT SEMI COLON SHURA THOUGHT SUCH
ASSISTANCE WOULD STOP SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION.

INTERVENE TO SUPPORT KUWAIT SEMI COLON SHURA THOUGHT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD STOP SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. GRAY SUGGESTED THAT CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS MIGHT ALSO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE US ADMINISTRATION TO INTERVENE WITH NAVAL FORCES TO ENSURE FREE NAVIGATION SEMI COLON SHURA DID NOT COMMENT, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THAT WOULD BRING IN THE USSR TOO.

3. GRAY REFERRED TO SHURA'S STATEMENT WHEN LAST THEY MET THAT IRAQ HAD PLANNED A LONG WAR SEMI COLON ON WHAT WAS THIS BASED? SHURA SAID IT WAS HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF IRAQI ACTIONS IN DISPERSING THEIR AIRCRAFT AROUND THE PENINSULA AND DIVERTING THEIR SHIPS TO AQABA. HE SEEMED SURPRISED THAT IRAQI TROOPS WERE STILL ADVANCING.

4. ON SYRIAN ATTITUDES, SHURA SAID HE EXPECTED ASSAD TO SIGN A FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN MOSCOW; THE REASON WAS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. HE THOUGHT THE TREATY WOULD BE ON PDRY RATHER THAN IRAQI LINES. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT SYRIA (AND EVEN LESS LIBYA) TO BE DRAWN MILITARILY INTO THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR, THOUGH THEY WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE HELP WITH WAR MATERIEL.

5. SHURA ASKED WHAT CHANCES THERE WERE OF A CHANGE OF REGIME IN TEHRAN. GRAY REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF TUR: (WE HAD DELETED LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 8) SHURA SEEMED DISAPPOINTED.

6. SHURA CAME FROM AND WAS RETURNING TO A MEETING WITH HIS DEPUTY MINISTER ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE HAJJ. HE TOLD GRAY THAT THE SAUDIS EXPECTED TROUBLE BETWEEN THE IRAQIS AND IRANIANS EVEN WITH THE REDUCED NUMBERS NOW ARRIVING SEMI COLON AND ALSO A MARCH BY THE LIBYANS ON THEIR EMBASSY TO DEMAND ITS CONVERSION TO A PEOPLE'S BUREAU.

CRAIG

NNNN