

SECRET

8

SECRET

DESKBY 110500Z

FM F.C.O. 102250Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 10 OCTOBER

AND TO DUBAI, MODUK, PRIORITY DOHA, BAHRAIN,
INFO JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT.*fg*
Reed

YOUR TELNO 322: SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. I WISH TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF JOHN MOBERLY'S VISIT TO THE U.A.E. TO CONVEY ASSURANCES TO U.A.E. LEADERS OF MY PERSONAL CONCERN AND INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF THE GULF AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME.

2. IN SPEAKING TO U.A.E. LEADERS YOU AND HE SHOULD SAY THAT HE IS TRAVELLING WITH MY PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THAT I SHALL BE TAKING A CLOSE INTEREST IN HIS REPORT UPON HIS RETURN. THE FOLLOWING POINTS COULD BE MADE:
 - A. WE ALL HAVE THE STRONGEST INTEREST IN NOT SEEING THE CONFLICT SPREAD. THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGHOUT THE GULF ARE OF VITAL INTEREST TO US ALL:
 - B. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE BALANCED AND WISE JUDGMENT OF GULF GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAS PREVENTED THEM FROM BECOMING EMBROILED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT:
 - C. I SHARE THE CONCERN OF THOSE IN THE GULF WHO SAY THAT THE WEST, IN MAKING CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR E.G. SHIPPING SHOULD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE REFRAIN FROM TAKING ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT THE BEGINNING OF SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA:
 - D. ON SECURITY QUESTIONS OF THIS NATURE WE WISH TO ACT ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF, AND INDEED AT THE INVITATION OF, GULF STATES - AS THE AMERICANS HAVE OVER A.W.A.C.S. TO SAUDI ARABIA:
 - E. WE WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GULF ON THEIR SECURITY NEEDS AS WELL AS ON WIDER QUESTIONS SUCH AS ENERGY. WE HOPE THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO CONSULT US IF THEY THINK WE CAN HELP:
 - F. THE DECISION BY SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES TO INCREASE THEIR OIL PRODUCTION HAS BEEN EXTREMELY WELCOME TO THE WHOLE WEST.

3. ON BRITISH ASSURANCES TO THE U.A.E. OF A MILITARY NATURE (SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH ARE REPORTED TO HAVE OFFERED), YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR FRIENDSHIP TREATY, WE STAND READY IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE IF ASKED. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WHILE MINISTERS ARE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY MIGHT DO TO HELP IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM, MAINLY FROM THE M.O.D., TO CONSULT WITH THE RULERS ON THE U.A.E.'S LIKELY NEEDS, AND ON WHAT THE LOCAL FACILITIES ARE. IN THIS WAY EFFECTIVE CONTINGENCY PLANS COULD BE LAID. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF SUCH A VISIT. YOU SHOULD AVOID BEING DRAWN AT THIS STAGE ON THE EXACT FORM OUR ASSISTANCE MIGHT TAKE, THOUGH YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.

SECRET

/4.

SECRET

4. (FOR BAHRAIN AND DOHA).

WE DO NOT WISH TO GENERATE SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM OTHER GULF STATES. IF H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN BAHRAIN AND DOHA RECEIVE ENQUIRIES ABOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE THEY SHOULD SIMPLY TAKE NOTE, AND REPORT BACK, WITHOUT COMMITMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD IN PRACTICE BE ABLE TO DEPLOY CERTAIN TYPES OF ASSISTANCE TO MORE THAN ONE PLACE AT A TIME.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD
MED RID
 MAED
NENAD TRED
NAD ERD
UND ECON D
EESD CONS D
ECD CONS EM UNIT
WED CABINET OFFICE
ES45D

ADDITIONAL DISTR.
IRAQ/IRAN

2
SECRET