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TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW AND AMMAN.

IRAQ/IRAN.

M.

WHEN THE AMIR RECEIVED MOBERLY THIS MORNING, HE QUESTIONED HIM CLOSELY ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE EXPRESSED HIS WARM APPRECIATION OF THE GENERAL MESSAGE OF REASSURANCE AND SUPPORT WHICH MOBERLY GAVE HIM DRAWING ON PARA 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 220 TO ABU DHABI. HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE BRIEFING HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING ON A REGULAR BASIS FROM THE EMBASSY, AND CONFIRMED HIS WISH TO STAY IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR REQUESTS TO PUT TO US AT PRESENT BUT THAT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. WITH REGARD TO MEDIATION HE HAD FEW EXPECTATIONS FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE BUT HE SAW SOME HOPE OF PROGRESS THROUGH THE U.N. HE THOUGHT THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS NOW FOR THE IRANIAN CASE TO BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT MARK A SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. HE WAS SCEPTICAL, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP WERE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING A CONSISTENT AND LOGICAL COURSE AND AGREED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT DISCERN WHERE THE REAL POWER IN IRAN NOW LAY. SHAIKH KHALIFA AGREED THAT IN THE MEANTIME OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS CONTAINING THE CONFLICT AND THAT WE SHOULD ALL MOVE ONLY WITH THE GREATEST CAUTION.

2. UNUSUALLY AS WE LEFT SHAIKH KHALIFA, SHAIKH HAMAD, THE HEIR APPARENT, ASKED US TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION WITH HIM. HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF QATAR, LIKE THE OTHER SMALLER STATES IN THE GULF, IN THE LIGHT OF IRANIAN THREATS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM SHOULD THEY BE PERCEIVED AS HELPING IRAQ. IN THIS CONTEXT HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHAT WE THOUGHT QATAR'S REACTION SHOULD BE TO IRAQI REQUESTS FOR EITHER MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. MOBERLY SAID THAT THOUGH WE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT QATARI SYMPATHIES COULD BE WITH THE IRAQIS AS FELLOW ARABS, ANY DEPARTURE FROM QATAR'S STATED POLICY OF NEUTRALITY WOULD BE MOST UNWISE. THOUGH SMALL AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC AID MIGHT BE LESS PROVOCATIVE TO THE IRANIANS, HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE TO STEAR CLEAR OF ANY INVOLVEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THIS VIEW.

3. SHAIKH HAMAD SEEMED ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH US ABOUT THE REACTION TO ANY ATTACK: IT WOULD BE TOO LATE, HE SAID, TO CONCERT MEASURES AFTER THE EVENT. ON THE OTHER HAND HE SEEMED AS ANXIOUS AS THE KUWAITIS AND THE BAHRAINIS TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BE SEEN, AS MILITARY COOPERATION WITH

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US (AND A FORTIORI (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) THE AMERICANS) E.G. HE MADE HIS VIEW CLEAR THAT THE NAVAL VISIT PLANNED FOR MID-NOVEMBER MIGHT NOW BE IN OPPORTUNE FOR THIS REASON, THOUGH HE PROMISED A FIRM DECISION ON THIS LATER.

4. IN CONCLUSION SHAIKH HAMAD UNCONSCIOUSLY ECHOED THE BAHRAINI FOREIGN MINISTER'S LANGUAGE IN STRESSING THAT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE WEST CONTINUED TO BE BEDEVILLED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN LARGELY FORGOTTEN AFTER A MONTH FOR THIS REASON. HASSAN KAMEL, THE AMIR'S ADVISER, DEVELOPED THE SAME THEME AT LENGTH AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

5. THOUGH SHAIKH KHALIFA REMAINS RESILIENT IN HIS APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS, HE AND SHAIKH HAMAD ARE CLEARLY VERY WORRIED BY QATAR'S DEFENCELESSNESS AND BY THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESSURES UPON THEM.

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THIS TELEGRAM
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