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FM AMMAN 131205Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 407 OF 13 OCT

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BONN, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK
AND WASHINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ: JORDANIAN INTEREST IN POSSIBLE EUROPEAN MOVE.

1. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE SAW MARWAN QASEM, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON 11 OCTOBER, THE DAY AFTER THE LATTER'S RETRUN FROM NEW YORK, AND CONVEYED TO HIM A FORMAL DENIAL THAT WEST GERMANY WAS SENDING MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN (MY TELNO 397 OF 10 OCTOBER NOT TO ALL REFERS).
2. QASEM (WHO SHOWED NONE OF THE OPTIMISM JORDANIANS HAVE EVINCED HITHERTO ABOUT THE IRAQIS' ABILITY TO END THE WAR ON THEIR TERMS) EMPHASISED THE NEED TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WAS NOT IN ANY POSITION TO STOP IT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TRYING TO DO SO. QASEM THOUGHT THAT THE TIMING FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE WAS NOW MORE PROPITIOUS, AS THE CONFLICT HAD INCREASED THE AUTHORITY WIELDED WITHIN IRAN BY THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT: FOR EXAMPLE, HE ATTRIBUTED IRAN'S AGREEMENT TO TAKE PART IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO BANI-SADR'S GREATER SAY IN THE DIRECTION OF IRANIAN AFFAIRS. QASEM WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE MIGHT BE BASED ON TRYING TO CONVINCE THE IRANIANS TO ACCEPT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE EMPHASISED THAT IRAQ HAD NO CLAIM WHATEVER TO KHUZESTAN (NOT QUITE WHAT THE IRAQIS WERE SAYING TO THE JORDANIANS EARLIER ON) AND THAT ADHERENCE TO THE 1975 TREATY MIGHT OFFER A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR BOTH SIDES. QASEM SUGGESTED THAT A SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVE BY THE EUROPEANS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA, WHEREAS CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT MIGHT WELL HAVE VERY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES: HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE DANGER THAT ISRAEL MIGHT TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.
3. QASEM ALSO SAW MY FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES ON 12 OCTOBER. I UNDERSTAND HE PUT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WITH THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE THAT WHEN SPEAKING TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR HE HAD SEEMED IN A CONSIDERABLE HURRY TO SEE A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE LAUNCHED WHEREAS WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THE FOLLOWING

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DAY HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR HASTE. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE IS FAR FROM CLEAR WHETHER QASEM'S PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A THOUGHT-OUT JORDANIAN POSITION OR WHETHER QASEM, WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY REPORTS THAT THE WAR WAS GOING BADLY FOR THE IRAQIS, WAS MERELY FLOATING AN IDEA IN ORDER TO SEE WHAT REACTION HE GOT.

4. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE QASEM MYSELF TOMORROW MORNING AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH HOW FAR PARAZ ABOVE REPRESENTS CONSIDERED JORDANIAN THINKING. I ALSO HOPE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

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