

CONFIDENTIAL

Recd in fm.

ML

GRS 520

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 161225Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 419 OF 16 OCT 80

INFO PRIORITY ROME (FOR PS SECRETARY OF STATE) AND WASHINGTON
ROUTINE BAGHDAD JEDDA TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK
SAVING TO DAMASCUS

MY TELNO 413 OF 15 OCTOBER: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES WITH THE US AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF 14 OCTOBER. VELIOTES OBTAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM THE KING THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTED TO BE IN FULL CONTROL OF ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR BEFORE RESPONDING TO ANY PEACE INITIATIVE AND THAT THIS WAS ONE REASON WHY SADDAM WAS NOT IN AN IMMEDIATE HURRY TO RESPOND TO CURRENT MEDIATION EFFORTS. BUT VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT BOTH SADDAM AND KING HUSSEIN WERE WORRIED THAT THE ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION DESCRIBED IN PARAS 6 AND 7 OF MY TUR WOULD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THAT IRAQ MIGHT THEN COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM WORLD OPINION, AND EVEN FROM WITHIN IRAQ, TO DECLARE A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAW FROM THE IRANIAN TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED. HOWEVER VELIOTES ALSO THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS BEGINNING TO SEE THAT A PROLONGATION OF HOSTILITIES COULD HAVE UNFAVOURABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ: THE KING HAD HIMSELF ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM MIGHT BE IN FOR TROUBLE WITH THE IRAQI SHI'ITES IF THE CONFLICT CONTINUED.

2. IN SPEAKING ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABI, KING HUSSEIN HAD ADMITTED THAT "THE SAUDIS DID MORE LISTENING THAN TALKING". VELIOTES HAD ASKED THE KING IF THE SAUDIS HAD ANY IDEAS ON HOW THE CONFLICT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END. THE KING SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT, BUT REVEALED THAT THEY HAD SHOWN CONCERN LEAST IT SHOULD SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SAUDIS HAD ALSO APPARENTLY REVEALED UNEASE ABOUT IRAQ'S POSITION ON THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA: THE KING TOLD VELIOTES THAT HE HAD HAD TO EXPLAIN THIS AT SOME LENGTH.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. ACCORDING TO VELIOTES (PLEASE PROTECT), THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB WITH THE ISRAELIS REGARDING THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE PUBLIC WAR OF NERVES THE ISRAELIS HAD MOUNTED AGAINST JORDANIAN AID TO IRAQ (WHICH THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES HAD TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV WAS QUITE DELIBERATE). VELIOTES HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL THE KING THAT THE ISRAELIS, IN HAILING A SHIP IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND ASKING WHAT CARGO IT CARRIED, HAD NOT IN THE US VIEW ACTED CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: INDEED US COASTGUARDS DID THIS REGULARLY OFF THE AMERICAN COAST IN CHECKING ON DRUG SMUGGLING ETC. THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD DELIBERATELY TRY TO IMPEDE SHIPPING PASSING THROUGH THE GULF. IT WAS THE CLEAR US VIEW THAT THE GULF OF AQABA WAS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO RIGHT WHATEVER TO IMPEDE THE PASSAGE OF SHIPPING UNLESS IT WERE WITHIN ISRAELI TERRITORIAL WATERS (THIS MATTER IS NOT QUITE CLEAR, AS THE ISRAELIS CLAIM 6 MILES AND THE US DOES NOT RECOGNISE THEIR CLAIM TO AS MUSH AS THIS.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO DAMASCUS

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

URWICK

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

LIMITED
MED
NENAD
NAD
EESD
MAED
TRED
PS
PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J.C. MOBBLEY
CABINET OFFICE

2

CONFIDENTIAL