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FM WASHINGTON 161730Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4288 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN), PARIS (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR),
BONN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), UKDEL NATO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR),

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

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MY TELNO 4276

IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATION

1. MUSKIE'S REMARKS, MADE TO ME WITHIN HOURS OF A VERY DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT EXPRESSED TO ME BY KOMER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REFLECT THE DISARRAY THAT EXISTS HERE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY.

2. MUSKIE'S APPROACH REMAINS CAUTIOUS, HIS TECHNIQUE SOCRATIC. HE WANTS TO FEEL HIS WAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IMPOSE IT. HE IS WARY OF LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS THAT COULD INVOLVE FAR-REACHING MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS AND EVENTUALLY ALSO MAKE THE U.S. MORE UNPOPULAR IN THE REGION AND NOT NECESSARILY MORE ABLE TO SECURE OIL. HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH A PRETEXT FOR INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN THE REGION.

3. THE OTHER MAIN SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, LED BY BRZEZINSKI, HAROLD BROWN AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERALLY, FAVOURS USING THE PRESENT CRISIS TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT DEFENCE POSITION FOR THE U S A IN THE GULF. THEY WISH TO SEIZE UPON CURRENT SAUDI FEAR, PARTICULARLY OF AIR RAIDS FROM IRAN, TO CREATE THE FORWARD FACILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES, SO THAT THEY COULD IN THE LAST RESORT ESTABLISH A THIN RED LINE TO TRY TO DETER OR BLOCK A SOVIET MILITARY ADVANCE INTO THE AREA. THEY SEE THE INITIAL SAUDI INVITATION TO THEM AS THE LONG-SOUGHT CARD OF ENTRY SEMICLN AND NOW THAT THEY HAVE THEIR FOOT IN THE DOOR, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE PERSUADED EASILY TO TAKE IT OUT. THEY PERCEIVE A LINK BETWEEN THEIR GROWING CONNECTION WITH EGYPT AND THEIR NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SAUDIS, THE ONE HELPING THE OTHER AND BOTH HELPING TO OVERCOME THE HANDICAP IMPOSED ON THEIR MIDDLE EAST POLICY BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL.

4. THAT PUTS IT VERY BALDLY BUT IT IS THE BASIC LINE-UP AT THE MOMENT AND THE SUBJECT OF OPEN PRESS SPECULATION. THERE WILL OF COURSE BE NO RECONCILIATION AND NO CLEAR-CUT POLICY UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SEMICLN AND EVEN THEN IT MAY TAKE TIME.

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5. YOU MIGHT WELL ASK WHAT AMERICA'S ALLIES ARE MEANT TO DO IN THIS UNTIDY SITUATION. THE ANSWER INEVITABLY IS THAT WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TRY TO MUDDLE THROUGH UNTIL NOVEMBER, BEARING IN MIND THE NOT ALTOGETHER HEARTENING THOUGHT THAT EVEN THEN, THE HOUSE HERE MAY NOT BE PUT IN ORDER QUICKLY: THE REPUBLICANS, IF THEY WIN, WILL TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS TO SETTLE IN SEMICLN THE DEMOCRATS, IF THEY ARE RETURNED, ARE EXPECTED TO GO IN FOR A CONSIDERABLE SHAKE-UP SEMI-CLN AND, HOWEVER LIBERATED FROM IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PRESSURES HE MAY BE, I DO NOT SEE CARTER SUDDENLY BECOMING A DYNAMIC LEADER. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN DRAW ANY USEFUL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR DEALINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS EITHER OF POLICY OR TACTICS UNTIL WE KNOW THE ELECTION RESULTS AND WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN PLACE. AMERICA'S CONFUSION SHOULD BE EUROPE'S CHANCE BUT, SEEN FROM HERE, EUROPE DOES NOT SEEM ABLE TO HARNESS ITSELF TO FILL THE VACUUM. WHAT IS GALLING AND DISTURBING ARE THE CONTINUING SIGNS THAT, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC POLEMICS AND THE DAMPER IMPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION ON TALK OF DISARRAY IN THE ALLIANCE, EUROPE IS STILL CONSIDERED HERE BY IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF THE CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO BE WAYWARD, SELFISH AND PREPARED NEITHER TO HELP THEMSELVES NOR THE ALLIED CAUSE GENERALLY. IT MAY BE WRONG TO RAISE THE SPECTRE OF MANSFIELDISM BUT IT WOULD BE EQUALLY WRONG TO DISCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD OF TROUBLE FOR EUROPE IN THE NEXT CONGRESS.

HENDERSON

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