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FM WASHINGTON 182305Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4321 OF 18 OCTOBER 1980,

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS(D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS 5, DNOT), H M Y
BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN)

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT,

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 1658: IRAN/IRAQ - DEFENCE ISSUES

1. FRETWELL ACTED TODAY ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT), WHO WORKS VERY CLOSELY WITH THE PENTAGON ON THESE MATTERS.

2. BARTHOLOMEW WAS GLAD TO HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE NAVAL TALKS IN LONDON WERE NOW MAKING BETTER PROGRESS, RECOGNISING THAT OWING TO THE URGENCY OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION THE U S HAD GOT OFF TO A ROCKY START WITH INCOMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS. OUR EARLIER EXPRESSION OF DISSATISFACTION HAD BEEN USEFUL.

3. HE NOTED THAT THE TWO NAVIES SEEMED TO BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE U S SECTOR CONCEPT AND OUR OWN IDEAS WHICH APPEARED MORE AKIN TO CONVOYING. CONVOYING IMPLIED A GREATER DEGREE OF INTEGRATION IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE U S PREFERENCE FOR THE SECTOR CONCEPT HAD BEEN PARTLY INFLUENCED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THEY HAD FORESEEN A MORE INTEGRATED STRUCTURE LEADING TO PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE GULF STATES AND PERHAPS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, WHOSE REACTION COULD BE HOSTILE.

4. BARTHOLOMEW UNDERTOOK TO LET US HAVE CONSIDERED U S COMMENTS NEXT WEEK. HE ASSUMED (AND FRETWELL CONFIRMED) THAT WE WOULD WANT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THESE POINTS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AS WELL AS IN THE NAVAL TALKS. HIS PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR T U R WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE U S WOULD AGREE, AS LONG AS THE OMANIS WOULD CO-OPERATE:

(B) THE U S HAD ALREADY DONE SOME THINKING ABOUT EXTENDING AIR COVER, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF SAUDI FACILITIES AND PERHAPS THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES TAKING UP SOME OF THE AIR-DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR F 5'S:

(C) THE U S HAD THOUGHT IN TERMS OF A LESS INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE) (IN ANY CASE THEY PREFERRED TO TALK ABOUT A "CO-ORDINATING NETWORK" RATHER THAN A "COMMAND STRUCTURE"):

(D) NO COMMENT:

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(E) U S CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH LOCALLY HAD BEEN GOOD. METHODS AND CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION AND CO-ORDINATION HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY ARRANGED. THE EXERCISE EVIDENTLY HAD A POLITICAL GREEN LIGHT FROM PARIS, SO LONG AS IT WAS CONDUCTED IN A LOW KEY ON THE SPOT. THE FRENCH HAD NOT COMMENTED SO RESTRICTIVELY ABOUT ACTIVE NAVAL COOPERATION TO THE U S AS TO US ALTHOUGH THEY INSISTED ON PRESERVING THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN DECISION-MAKING:

(F) THIS IS COVERED IN MY 2 I F T'S:

(G) AS EARLIER REPORTED (MY TELNO 4309), THE U S HAD ALREADY FOCUSED ON THE MINING THREAT, THEY WERE STEPPING UP THEIR OWN ANTI-MINING CAPABILITY, AND WOULD WANT TO EXPLORE THAT OF OTHERS. PROPOSALS WERE SHORTLY TO BE PUT TO THE SAUDIS.

5. BARTHOLOMEW THEN GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT U S APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES (YOUR TELNO 391 TO MUSCAT), WHICH HAD COVERED BOTH THE CO-ORDINATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND AIR-DEFENCE. SEE MY 2 I F T'S.

F C O PASS SAVING , MOSCOW. UKDEL NATO.

HENDERSON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

DEF D
MEM

MAED

NEWAD

MEMD

NAD

MEM

UND

ECOM D

RESD

CONS D

BCD

CONS EM UNIT

RID

CABINET OFFICE

WED

ES-SD

ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

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