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FM WASHINGTON 182310Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4322 OF 18 OCTOBER 80.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT) AND  
HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN).

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN.

INFO SAVING UK MIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

M.I.P.T. : U.S. TALKS WITH GULF STATES ON NAVAL COORDINATION.

1. BARTHOLOMEW DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF RECENT U.S. APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 391 TO MUSCAT) IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS.

SAUDI ARABIA.

2. AS THE RESULT OF AMBASSADOR WEST'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FAHD, SULTAN AND ABDULLAH, THE SAUDIS HAD AGREED TO BEGIN BILATERAL PLANNING. THIS WOULD COVER JOINT SUPPLY MEASURES, INCLUDING COUNTER-OPERATIONS AGAINST MINING EXTENDING BEYOND SAUDI WATERS. THE U.S. NAVY TEAM WOULD BE PURSUING THESE TALKS TODAY WITH THE SAUDIS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON THREATS TO SHIPPING AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF. THE SAUDIS HAD THUS AGREED TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN IMPROVING THE DEFENCE SITUATION IN THE AREA.

OMAN.

3 FOLLOWING THE OMANI APPROACH IN WASHINGTON, WHICH HAD BEEN FOLLOWED UP IN MUSCAT, THE OMANIS HAD AGREED TO NAVAL TALKS WITH THE U.S. AND WERE CONSIDERING ALLOWING THE U.S. INCREASED ACCESS TO THEIR FACILITIES TO EASE COORDINATION. THEY HAD EMPHASISED THAT THEY WANTED THESE TALKS TO BE BILATERAL, AND WOULD PREFER THE U.S. TO HOLD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OTHER GULF STATES INVOLVED. THEY HAD ALSO NOTED THE LIMITED CAPABILITIES OF THE REST OF THE GULF STATES, AND THEIR OWN OPPOSITION TO THESE STATES BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE DEFENCE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

KUWAIT.

4 IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE RESPONSE TO MOBERLY THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE IN A SPECIAL POSITION AND WOULD NOT COOPERATE. THE U.S. WOULD NOT PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH THEM BUT WOULD KEEP THEM INFORMED ON A SPORADIC BASIS. IT WAS NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD WELCOMED THE ARRIVAL OF THE AWACS AND THE U.S. GUIDED-MISSILE CRUISER (USS LEAHY) IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA (PAKENHAM'S LETTER TO LOGAN OF 15 OCTOBER).

UAE.

5. UAE LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN THE U.S. APPROACH BUT HAD GIVEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE AND CONTENTED THEMSELVES WITH

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LISTENING CALMLY TO WHAT THE U.S. HAD TO SAY. THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION TO THE USS LEAHY'S ARRIVAL, AND NO ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. IT HAD HOWEVER BEEN VOLUNTEERED THAT IN A REAL EMERGENCY THE UAE WOULD ALLOW U.S. SHIPS TO USE THEIR PORTS FOR REPAIRS. THE QUESTION HAD BEEN POSED WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF IRAN ATTACKED THE SMALLER GULF STATES. THE U.S. RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT WASHINGTON'S CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE GULF STATES AND ITS OWN INTEREST IN THE AREA HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR. ANY REQUESTS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE WOULD RECEIVE EARLY AND HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY THE UAE LEADERS. THE MINIMUM U.S. REQUIREMENT FROM THE UAE WAS THEIR SILENT ASSENT TO WESTERN ACTIVITIES. THE U.S. WOULD NOT PUSH THE QUESTION WITH THEM AT THIS POINT BUT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE OTHER GULF STATES WERE TO LEARN OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE TOWARDS NAVAL COORDINATION. THIS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

6. REFERRING TO FRETWELL'S EARLIER BRIEFING ON OUR RECENT ACTIONS WITH THE UAE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1661, DURING WHICH FRETWELL ALSO DREW ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF MUSCAT TELEGRAM NO 298) BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE ALL WORKING ALONG THE SAME LINES. QATAR.

7 THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION OF SUBSTANCE, APART FROM GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MULTILATERAL PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES IN THE GULF WAS PRUDENT. SOME INTEREST HAD BEEN INDICATED IN THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. THE U.S. ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE QATAR POSITION AMOUNTED TO SILENT ASSENT. BAHRAIN.

8 AGAIN NO REACTION OF SUBSTANCE, AND NO RESPONSE TO THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. THE BAHRAINIS HAD SAID THAT IN THEIR VIEW NEITHER IRAN NOR IRAQ WOULD SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO INTERFERE WITH GULF SHIPPING. THE U.S. THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME LINGERING SUSPICION IN BAHRAIN THAT SOMETHING AS YET UNEXPLAINED LAY BEHIND THE ARRIVAL OF THE USS LEAHY.

9. BARTHOLOMEW'S CONCLUSION WAS "SO FAR SO GOOD", WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KUWAIT. PERSONALLY HE FELT THAT THE U.S. HAD RECEIVED A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE GULF STATES AS A WHOLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

10. SEE M. I. F. T.  
 ECO PLEASE PASS SAVING MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO  
 HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD  
 DEFENCE D

MEMD

NEWAD

NAD

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ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]