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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1732 OF 7 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN.

MY TELNO 1722 (NOT TO AMMAN): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KAISER (BANGLADESH) TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING (7 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION. HIS PRIVATE OPINION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE TWO OR THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE TO SURFACE IT.

2. KAISER HAD HAD AN INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH TROYANOVSKY (USSR). THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NO ONE BELIEVED IT, THE FACT WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED URGENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO STOP THE WAR AND BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THIS DOES NOT SURPRISE ME. DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS I HAVE DETECTED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION HERE, AWAY FROM THEIR ORIGINAL PRO-IRAQI STANCE. THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO BE MORE EVEN HANDED AND THERE IS ON THE FACE OF IT MORE AFFINITY BETWEEN THEIR ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. I MADE THIS POINT TO VANDEN HEUVEL (US) AT DINNER LAST NIGHT AND I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM OF KAISER'S CONVERSATION WITH TROYANOVSKY. I SAID TO VANDEN HEUVEL THAT, ALTHOUGH LONG TERM SOVIET AND AMERICAN OBJECTIVES WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT, I HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, IN THE SHORT TERM, THEY BOTH WANTED THE SAME THING IE AN END OF THE WAR AND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE DISPUTES. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ACTIVITY BY PERIPHERAL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE. IT SEEMED A PITY THAT SOVIET/US RELATIONS WERE NOW SO DISTANT THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO COME TOGETHER AND ACT FIRMLY EVEN WHEN THEIR INTERESTS COINCIDED. IF THEY WERE TO GIVE A LEAD, THE COUNCIL WOULD FOLLOW AND WE MIGHT GET SOMEWHERE. HAD THEY BEEN SPEAKING BILATERALLY TO THE RUSSIANS EITHER IN NEW YORK OR ELSEWHERE?

5. VANDEN HEUVEL TOOK MY POINT VERY READILY AND SAID THAT HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH MY THESIS. THERE HAD, SO FAR AS HE KNEW, BEEN NO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE AND I REALISED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET ANYTHING POSITIVE DONE ON THE UNITED STATES SIDE IN THE WAKE OF THE ELECTIONS. BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY FEED THIS THOUGHT INTO THE MACHINE.

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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