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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120030Z NOV 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1755 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN

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V. interesting. Read in full.

MS

MY TELNO 1732: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AFTER WHAT THE US MISSION DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING OF A STRUGGLE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MCHENRY GOT AUTHORITY TO TALK TO TROYANOVSKY (USSR). HE DID SO THIS AFTERNOON (11 NOV) AND BRIEFED ME AFTERWARDS.

2. MCHENRY SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO TROYANOVSKY THAT US AND SOVIET INTERESTS COINCIDED IN THE NEED TO END THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. IT HAD FOR THE MOMENT BEEN CONTAINED BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS A DANGER OF A FLARE UP RISKING INVOLVEMENT OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. HE DID NOT THINK THAT ACTION BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CROSS WIRES WITH WALDHEIM'S PROPOSED MISSION. THE FACT WAS THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD INFLUENCE WITH THE PARTIES AND SHOULD USE IT. TROYANOVSKY KNEW THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR ANY DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION IE CEASE FIRE, WITHDRAWAL, NON-INTERFERENCE, NEGOTIATIONS ETC. MCHENRY THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER WORKING TOWARDS A KIND OF RESOLUTION 242 RELATED TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.

3. TROYANOVSKY'S REACTION WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH HE NATURALLY SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT AND CONSULT MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE US BELIEVED THIS, THE SOVIET UNION WANTED AN END TO THE FIGHTING. THE CONFLICT WAS ONLY BENEFITING ISRAEL. IF THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS ACTED TOGETHER AND EFFECTIVELY, THIS WOULD REINTRODUCE THE US INTO THE MIDDLE EASTERN ACT IN A BIG WAY, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS MIGHT ARGUE THAT SUCH A COURSE HAD THE DISADVANTAGE OF DOING THE SAME FOR THE SOVIET UNION. TROYANOVSKY ALSO ASKED WHETHER MCHENRY THOUGHT THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD APPROVE OF SOVIET/AMERICAN CO-OPERATION AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE. MCHENRY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO WORSE THAN START OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT WITH A REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION. TROYANOVSKY AND MCHENRY AGREED THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT LIKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE AND TROYANOVSKY ADDED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT 'FOR THEIR OWN REASONS'.

4. THEY AGREED TO KEEP THEIR CONVERSATION VERY MUCH TO THEMSELVES. MCHENRY TOLD TROYANOVSKY THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE CONTACT TO ANYONE ELSE. HE DID NOT TELL TROYANOVSKY THAT HE WAS KEEPING ME INFORMED.

5. PETRIE OF THE US MISSION WARNED ME LATE ON 10 NOVEMBER THAT MCHENRY WAS GOING TO SEE TROYANOVSKY. HE ALSO GAVE ME A COPY OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.). THIS HAD BEEN PREPARED IN

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IT WAS OUTRAGIOUSLY BLUNT BUT ILLUSTRATED THE LINES ON WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE WORKING. THE AMERICANS SAY THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN IT TO ANYONE ELSE. THEY HAVE ASKED US NOT TO REVEAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT TO AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE.

6. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT, IF THEY WANT THEIR EXERCISE TO BE EFFECTIVE, THEY MUST ACT WITH COMPLETE DISCRETION. FIRST, THEY MUST LET WALDHEIM'S INITIATIVE, WHICH IS NOW IMMINENT (MY TELNO 1754), HAVE A CHANCE. SECONDLY THEY MUST KEEP THEIR DRAFT PAPER OUT OF THE PRESS LEST IT BE PUBLICLY DENOUNCED PREMATURELY BY BOTH OF THE PARTIES. I EMPHASISED THAT A CONCEPT IN MCHENRY'S MIND OF PRODUCING A RESOLUTION UNACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES IN THE HOPE OF EVENTUALLY DRAWING THEM TOWARDS IT WAS INVALID IN THE CASE OF IRAN/IRAQ. IF THE IRANIANS AND THE IRAQIS GOT WIND OF SOMETHING WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, THEIR PROBABLE REACTION WOULD BE PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE IT, THUS PAINTING THEMSELVES INTO CORNERS FROM WHICH THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES. THE ANALOGY OF 242 WAS IMPERFECT. IN THE JUNE WAR, THE ARABS HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY THRASHED AND WERE EAGER TO GRASP LIFE LINES. FOR THEM, 242 WAS A GODSEND BECAUSE, IN EFFECT, IT REQUIRED THE ISRAELIS TO SURRENDER TERRITORY AND THE ARABS ONLY TO SIGN BITS OF PAPER ABOUT PEACE. THE AMERICANS TOOK THESE POINTS WELL.

7. I THINK THAT THE ABOVE IS A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED THAT THE AMERICANS CAN AVOID LEAKING IT TO THE PRESS PREMATURELY EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY INFORMING TOO MANY MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD
MED MAED
NENAD TRED
NAD ERD
UND ECON D
EESD CONS D
ECD CONS EM UNIT
WED CABINET OFFICE
ES&SD
RID

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN