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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 172 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO JEDDAH KUWAIT BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT AMMAN MODUK (FOR  
DMAO)

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON PARIS

**GULF SECURITY SITUATION**

1. WHEN I CALLED ON THE AMIR ON 22 NOVEMBER FOR A GENERAL TALK, HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AND THE IRANIAN INTERNAL SITUATION. HE FEARED THAT THE FIGHTING COULD SPREAD, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON KUWAIT, ON WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TELEPHONED HIS SYMPATHIES TO THE KUWAITIS. HE THOUGHT HE HAD SEEN AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD BEEN THREE SUCH ATTACKS.

2. HE SAW LITTLE HOPE OF AN EARLY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, GIVEN THE IRANIANS' INTRANSIGENT RESPONSE TO OLOF PALME AND OTHER POTENTIAL MEDIATORS, THEIR TOTAL DENIGRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS EFFORTS FOR PEACE, AND THE AMORPHOUS NATURE OF THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME. YASSER ARAFAT, WHO PASSED THROUGH HERE BRIEFLY LAST WEEK, HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD LOST ALL HIS EARLIER ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IRANIANS: INSTEAD OF HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH A GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, ONE QUOTE HAD TO TALK TO A HUNDRED PEOPLE UNQUOTE.

3. WE DISCUSSED QATAR'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS, AND HM GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO THE QATAR ARMED FORCES. THE AMIR WAS CLEARLY STILL WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR ATTACKS ON QATAR'S OIL INSTALLATIONS - WHICH HE CHARACTERISED WITH A LAUGH AS BEING QUOTE YOUR UNQUOTE (IE THE UK'S) RESPONSIBILITY: AND HE QUESTIONED ME ON THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES OF OUR SQUADRON NOW IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. I SAID THAT ROCKETS WERE THE ONLY ANSWER TO LOW-LEVEL AIR ATTACK (SO LEAVING AN OPENING FOR MAJOR REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM ON BEHALF OF RAPIER).

4. HE SAID HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO MORE THAN READ HIS MINISTER OF STATE'S REPORT ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONFERENCE IN AMMAN, THOUGH HE HAD SUMMONED HIM BACK FOR THAT EVENING TO REPORT TO HIM PERSONALLY. HE WAS SORRY THAT KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WOULD NOT BE AT THE SUMMIT, AS A PROPONENT OF MODERATION.

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/5. MY FRENCH



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5. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE FOLLOWED ME IN TO SEE THE AMIR, WITH A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO HIM FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD.

6. SIGNIFICANTLY ALSO, - AND CONTRARY TO THE SENSE OF HIS REMARKS TO LORD STRATHCONA EARLIER THIS MONTH - KHALIFA EXPRESSED

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SATISFACTION AND RELIEF OVER THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE US, NOW THAT HE HAD SEEN THE CALIBRE OF THE ADVISERS WHOM GOVERNOR REAGAN WAS ENLISTING, HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S VACILLATIONS AND U-TURNS IN POLICY HAD ALWAYS DISQUIETED HIM. HE WAS GLAD THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THE VAN, WERE NOW IN CONTACT WITH REAGAN. HE ASSUMED THAT THE PM WOULD BE SEEING HIM SHORTLY.

FCO PASS SAVING WASHINGTON PARIS

BRANT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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NENAD TRED  
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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

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