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TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 13 APRIL, 1981

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SAVING HAVANA MODUK (FOR DI4) WASHINGTON ISLAMABAD

WOGAN'S TELELETTER OF 9 APRIL TO GRAY: IRAQ/IRAN:

NON-ALIGNED GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE.

1. THE TEAM COMPOSED OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF INDIA, CUBA AND ZAMBIA, AND THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE PLO, DULY ARRIVED HERE ON 8 APRIL.
2. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THEY WERE RECEIVED BY TARIQ AZIZ, RCC MEMBER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, AND BY SAADUN HAMMADI, FOREIGN MINISTER, SITTING TOGETHER ON 9 APRIL. LATER THAT DAY THEY WERE SEEN BY IZZAT IBRAHIM, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC.
3. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS IXSAHIM REAFFIRMED IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES AND READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE MISSION. IRAN HAD TURNED DOWN IRAQ'S REPEATED OFFERS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WAS THEREFORE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR'S CONTINUATION. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT (NOT) WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY UNTIL IRAQI RIGHTS HAD BEEN SECURED AND A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT REACHED.
4. THE INDIAN EMBASSY, WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS A MEMBER OF THE MISSION, HAVE TOLD US THAT THE VISITS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN WAS ESSENTIALLY (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) PRISES DE CONTACT DESIGNED TO EXPLORE THE ATTITUDES OF BOTH SIDES. IN BAGHDAD THE MISSION HAD OBTAINED CLARIFICATION OF THE IRAQIS' ATTITUDE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE IRAQIS HAD AGAIN CONFIRMED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN PARA 06 OF THE DELHI NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECLARATION (WETHERELL'S TELELETTER OF 16 FEBRUACY TO WOODS AND PARA 1 (III) OF MY TELELETTER OF 24 MARCH TO MIERS). BUT THEY NOW SAID THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INSURANCE AGAINST FURTHER IRANIAN INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE IRAQIS WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD TERRITORY UNTIL INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AGAINST SUCH INTERFERENCE COULD BE PROVIDED, AND ADDITIONALLY AS INSURANCE FOR IRANIAN REPARATIONS FOR THE WAR SEMICOLON

(B) THE IRAQIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN AN EARLY AND (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) QUICK SETTLEMENT. THEY DID NOT WANT A LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION SEMICOLON HOWEVER

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(C) THEY HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES UNTIL A NEW FRONTIER (BY IMPLICATION BOTH LAND AND RIVERINE) HAD BEEN DEMARCATED AND INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED SEMICOLON

(D) THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND APPORTION BLAME FOR AGGRESSION SHOULD FORM PART OF THE PROCESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON

(E) THE IRAQIS HAD STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO IRAQ OF SOVEREIGNTY, INCLUDING FULL NAVIGATION RIGHTS, OVER THE WHOLE SHATT AL-ARAB.

5. THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) DISCUSSION WITH THE IRAQIS ABOUT TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE.

6. THE INDIAN EMBASSY'S VIEW IS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CLARIFICATIONS IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE MISSION WILL BE ABLE TO FIND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN TO JUSTIFY ANY HOPES FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE APPEAR TO BE NO (NO) PLANS FOR THE NAM MISSION TO RETURN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS SAID, IN ANY CASE, TO HAVE OTHER COMMITMENTS THAT WOULD PRECLUDE HIS PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND VISIT BEFORE THE END OF MAY.

7. COMMENT. THE PROFESSED IRAQI INTEREST IN AN EARLY SETTLEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE NAM 'PRINCIPLES' AT PARA 4 (A) AND (B) ABOVE IS CONTROVERTED BY THEIR STATED REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY MILITARY WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT HAVING ACHIEVED A SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB. A VIEW CURRENT HERE IS THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS YET BEEN BADLY ENOUGH HURT BY THE WAR TO HAVE MUCH INTEREST IN A CEASEFIRE ON TERMS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER. BOTH APPEAR

TO BE WAITING FOR SOMETHING TO TURN UP. IN ANY CASE THIS YEAR THE RAINS HAVE BEEN VERY HEAVY UNTIL RECENTLY, AND THERE IS AT LEAST ANAOTHER MONTH BEFORE THE TERRAIN IN KHUZISTAN DRIES OUT SUFDICIENTLY FOR MAJOR MOVEMENTS.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES
EGERTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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