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FM UKDEL NATO 161005Z JUN 81
 TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 244 OF 16 JUNE 1981,
 INFO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL MADRID,
 INFO SAVING BONN, PARIS.

Foreign
RT
LS
Paul

BREZHNEV LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

1. LUNS CALLED A PRIVATE MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES YESTERDAY AT THE REQUEST OF BENNETT (US). THE LATTER BRIEFED US ON BREZHNEV'S REPLY TO REAGAN'S LETTER OF 24 APRIL. HE DESCRIBED THE LETTER AS FRANK AND CORRECT IN TONE BUT BREAKING NO NEW SUBSTANTIVE GROUND.
2. IN THE LETTER BREZHNEV DENIED SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR INCREASED TENSION OR THAT THE RUSSIANS SOUGHT MILITARY SUPERIORITY. THEIR FORCES WERE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR DEFENCE AND REPRESENTED NO THREAT TO ANYONE ELSE. HE CRITICISED AMERICAN INSISTENCE ON QUOTE RESCINDING UNQUOTE EARLIER ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS, INCREASED AMERICAN DEFENCE SPENDING, AND REVISION OF ITS MILITARY DOCTRINE TO CONTEMPLATE THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. HE DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT UNILATERAL REGIONAL ADVANTAGE AND REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THE 1972 BILATERAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND THE UN CHARTER.
3. ON TNF THE LETTER REPEATED THE SOVIET POSITION IN STANDARD TERMS. BREZHNEV REGRETTED REJECTION OF HIS MORATORIUM PROPOSAL. ROUGH PARITY ALREADY EXISTED IN EUROPEAN TNF SYSTEMS, HIS PROPOSAL WOULD FREEZE THAT PARITY, THEREBY PROVIDING A BASELINE FOR SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT. ON CSCE, HE ACCUSED THE WEST OF EVADING A RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER ON THE AREA OF APPLICATION, AND HOPED FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH ON A POST MADRID SECURITY CONFERENCE AND ON UNSPECIFIED OTHER ISSUES. ON POLAND BREZHNEV ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO SINISTER PLANS AND WANRED THE U S AGAINST INTERFERENCE. ON AFGHANISTAN HE REPEATED THE STANDARD SOVIET POSITION WITH NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY AND CRITICISED THE AMERICANS FOR DISCOURAGING THE PAKISTANIS FROM NEGOTIATING WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.
4. BENNETT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ASSESSED THE LETTER, WITH THE TBILISI SPEECH, AS PART OF THE RUSSIANS' SO CALLED PEACE OFFENSIVE DESIGNED TO WEAKEN ALLIED RESOLVE. IN VIEW OF THE LETTER'S INFLEXIBILITY, THE U S HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO RESPOND, THOUGH FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE AT HEAD OF STATE LEVEL WAS NOT EXCLUDED. IN THE MEANTIME THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO SEEK A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH

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AND TO GUARD AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE SOVIET MISCALCULATION OR MISPERCEPTION. HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WOULD TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TO PUBLISH THE LETTER. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION IN THE ALLIANCE, AND OF SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE, IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT GREATER FLEXIBILITY.

5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION I COMMENTED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT YET ISSUED AN AUTHORITATIVE REBUTTAL OF THE SOVIET CLAIMS THAT ROUGH PARITY EXISTED AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TNF DECISION WOULD RESULT IN A RATIO OF 1.5 TO 1 IN MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN FAVOUR OF NATO. DRAWING ON DISCUSSION AT THE ASPEN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE WHICH I ATTENDED IN BERLIN LAST WEEK, I UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR UNCLASSIFIED AND USEABLE MATERIAL ABOUT THE SOVIET MISSILE BUILD-UP TO HELP TO COUNTER THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TNF PROGRAMME. GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANS AND OFFICIAL AT THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN GLOOMY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF MAKING PROGRESS IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE ABSENCE OF FIGURES AND PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH THEY COULD USE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THEREFORE TO FOLLOW UP SOON THE EXPRESSED U S WILLINGNESS TO DECLASSIFY ELEMENTS OF THE NPC AND DPC BRIEFING AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC USE. LUNS AND MY BELGIUM, DUTCH, GERMAN AND CANADIAN COLLEAGUES SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS. VON USSEL (BELGIUM) SAID THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT POINT FOR THE SCG AT ITS MEETING LATER THIS WEEK AND EAGLEBURGER SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO IT IN THE ALLIANCE.

6. VIBE (NORWAY) REFERRED TO REPORTS THAT ARBATOV, IN SPEAKING TO MEMBERS OF THE PALME COMMISSION IN MOSCOW, HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT NEED NOT PRECLUDE THE ALLIANCE FROM GOING AHEAD WITH PREPARATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TNF MODERNISATION PROGRAMME. BENNETT SAID THAT THE BREZHNEV LETTER GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL COULD BE INTERPRETED IN THIS WAY. IN HIS VIEW ARBATOV HAD USED THE PALME COMMISSION'S PRESENCE AS A PROPAGANDA PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SOW FURTHER UNCERTAINTY IN WESTERN MINDS: HE WAS PERSONALLY SOMEWHAT CRITICAL OF WESTERN POLITICAL FIGURES WHO WERE PREPARED TO LEND THEMSELVES TO THIS KIND OF EXERCISE. VIBE COMMENTED THAT THIS MADE IT IMPORTANT THAT THIS MISLEADING IMPRESSION OF THE SOVIET POSITION BE CORRECT. BENNETT AGREED THAT THE ARBATOV REPORT NEEDED TO BE INVESTIGATED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BONN, PARIS.

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THE NUCLEAR BALANCE



DEFENCE FACT SHEET 4

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April 1981

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The table opposite gives a comparison of the nuclear strengths of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries on the basis of nuclear weapon systems.

There is a great deal of argument about the best way of presenting this kind of comparison. The truth is that there is no ideal way of doing it. Most comparisons – like the one opposite – show the number of weapon systems (missiles, aircraft and artillery) which can deliver nuclear warheads. But this does not take account of the fact that many systems can deliver more than one warhead. If you try to show the number of warheads, however, you run into other problems. For example, with many systems the number of warheads can vary, and we do not know precisely how many warheads the Russians have altogether.

There are many aspects which just cannot be covered in a table of figures. These include the reliability, size and accuracy of the weapon system, the skill of the operating personnel and where the weapons are situated.

The table of nuclear balance is therefore necessarily limited and simplified. The figures should be taken as approximate, but with all their limitations they do provide a useful broad picture.

We have included French nuclear systems on the NATO side, although unlike UK and US systems they are not committed to the Alliance.

The figures show that in Strategic Forces there is very roughly an equality between the Soviet Union and NATO. But in Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact Allies have a substantial advantage. The gap has steadily widened in recent years as the Russians have introduced new systems.

STRATEGIC FORCES

	Warsaw Pact	NATO
Land-based Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)	1400	1050
Submarine Launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)	950	700
Heavy Bombers	160	570

DEFINITIONS

Strategic forces comprise broadly very long range, intercontinental weapon systems, including land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers.

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF) IN EUROPE

Longer Range TNF		
Land-based (aircraft and missiles)	900	280
Shorter Range TNF		
Missiles and artillery	about 1600	about 1400
Aircraft	about 2000	about 700

All nuclear weapons which are not strategic are called theatre nuclear forces. The table divides them into longer and shorter ranges. Systems in the former category are those with a maximum range over about 1000 kms; they can thus reach the Soviet Union from bases in Western Europe and vice-versa.

Shorter range theatre nuclear forces have a range of less than 1000 kms. There are many types of these, including missiles, aircraft, and artillery. Many of these can deliver non nuclear as well as nuclear warheads.

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FM WASHINGTON 111743Z NOV 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 4542 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO MOSCOW, WARSAW, PRAGUE, EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST,
BELGRADE, SOFIA, PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,
UKDEL VIENNA

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, MODUK (FOR DUS(P))

MIPT: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S LIKELY APPROACH TOWARDS EAST/WEST
RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. IN HIS IMMEDIATE POST-ELECTION STATEMENTS REAGAN HAS AVOIDED DETAILED POLICY COMMITMENTS. AT THE TIME OF WRITING, HIS CABINET OFFICERS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE HAVE YET TO BE NOMINATED, AND HIS INTERIM FOREIGN POLICY BOARD AND ADVISERS CONTAIN A WIDE SPECTRUM OF OPINION. NOR ARE WE AWARE OF ANY SERIOUS PUBLISHED PAPERS CHARTING DIRECTIONS FOR PARTICULAR AREAS OF FOREIGN POLICY (SUCH AS THE BROOKINGS PAPER ON THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE PRESIDENT CARTER CAME TO OFFICE IN 1976). WHAT FOLLOWS MUST THEREFORE BE LARGELY SPECULATIVE.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM

2. THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM PREPARED FOR THE GOP ELECTORAL CONVENTION PROVIDES ONE TEXT WITH SOME CLAIM TO AUTHORITY. WHAT IT HAS TO SAY ABOUT UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN RESPECT OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE ALLIANCE IS SUMMARISED AT ANNEX A, WHICH SHOULD BE READ IN FULL TO GET THE FLAVOUR OF THE PROGRAMME. AFTER MAKING DUE ALLOWANCE FOR THE HYPERBOLE ASSOCIATED WITH CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, THERE ARE SOME IDENTIFIABLE THEMES THERE WHICH WILL PROBABLY FIND ECHOES IN THE ACTUAL FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF POLICY - AS THEY HAVE ALREADY IN REAGAN'S EARLY POST-ELECTION PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS.

GENERAL APPROACH

3. REAGAN WILL WISH AT THE OUTSET TO STRIKE A DISTINCTIVE NOTE IN HIS CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE PROFESSING BELIEF IN BIPARTISANSHIP. FIRMNESS, CONSISTENCY AND THE AVOIDANCE OF A PIECE-MEAL APPROACH WILL BE THE AIM. THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP WILL BE RESTORED AS THE CENTRAL PREOCCUPATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY FROM WHICH THE EARLY CARTER PERIOD SOUGHT TO DOWNGRADE IT. WIDER GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES WILL BE VIEWED MORE INTENTLY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION. THE UNITED STATES WILL WANT TO BACK ITS FOREIGN POLICY WITH INCREASED MILITARY STRENGTH: THE COMMITMENT TO REGAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY IS AN IMPORTANT, IF HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL, FEATURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY NOW HOW IT WILL BE PURSUED IN PRACTICE.

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY

4. IN PRINCIPLE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO FIND A PLACE FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HOW MUCH THIS COUNTS FOR IN PRACTICE DURING REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE WILL DEPEND ON THE BALANCE OF INTERNAL DEBATE HERE ABOUT THE TREATY, THE WIDER PICTURE OF SOVIET POLITICAL, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC BEHAVIOUR GLOBALLY (REAGAN'S CONCEPT OF LINKAGE), AND THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY MOSCOW ON THE ARMS CONTROL FRONT.

5. ONCE IN OFFICE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS LIKELY TO REVIEW THE WHOLE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AND ITS PLACE IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. MEANWHILE, ON-GOING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS (CTB, MBFR, TNF, CSCE/CDE) WILL ESSENTIALLY BE IN SUSPENSE, WHETHER OR NOT FORMAL TALKS CONTINUE. WITH A MORE CONSERVATIVE CONGRESS, THERE WILL BE NO DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO BRING THE SALT II TREATY OUT OF LIMBO. BUT REAGAN ALREADY SEEMS TO BE LEANING TOWARD SALVAGING WHAT IS USABLE FROM SALT II WITH A VIEW TO SOME INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS, AS PEOPLE LIKE KISSINGER AND MUNN ADVOCATE, RATHER THAN DISCARDING THE PRESENT TREATY COMPLETELY. IT IS UNCLEAR FOR THE MOMENT HOW SUCH AN EXERCISE WOULD RELATE PRECISELY TO THE LONGER TERM QUESTION OF SALT III WHICH REAGAN SEES AS PART OF A WIDER POLITICAL NEGOTIATION WITH MOSCOW. ONE POSSIBLE ROUTE TO SUCH A NEGOTIATION WOULD BE TO PROPOSE A REVIEW OF THE 1972 NIXON/BREZHNEV DECLARATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR.

OTHER ASPECTS OF US/SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS

6. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK TO TIGHTEN AND WIDEN CONTROLS ON SUCH CIVIL TECHNOLOGIES AS COULD BE USED TO ENHANCE THE SOVIET MILITARY MACHINE. ELECTION PLEDGES TO LIFT THE GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION MAY COME TO BE QUALIFIED IN PRACTICE, BUT FOR SALES OF ALL OTHER US AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS TO THE EAST THE FREE MARKET IS LIKELY TO PREVAIL. A REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF OTHER BILATERAL FIELDS OF COOPERATION IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS IS ON THE CARDS, TO ENSURE STRICT RECIPROCITY OF BENEFITS.

THE ALLIANCE

7. THERE IS MARKED IMPATIENCE WITH THE ALLIES IN THE REPUBLICAN CAMP. THIS COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY IF THE ADMINISTRATION IS MISLED INTO BELIEVING THAT SUBSTANTIVE ALLIANCE PROBLEMS ARE ONLY A RELIC OF UNCERTAIN CARTER LEADERSHIP AND CAN THEREFORE BE EXPECTED TO VANISH OVERNIGHT ONCE THE FIRM SMACK OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION MAKES ITSELF FELT. REPUBLICANS MAY NOURISH EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE NAME OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO PROBLEMS OUTSIDE NATO'S AREA OF COMPETENCE (E.G. THE MIDDLE EAST) WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. EQUITABLE BURDEN-SHARING OF NATO'S DEFENCE EFFORT AND A WISH TO SEE EUROPE TAKE UP MORE OF THE SLACK AS AMERICA MOVES TO PROTECT VITAL INTERESTS IN SW ASIA WILL CONTINUE (AS THEY WOULD HAVE DONE UNDER A SECOND CARTER TERM) TO BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA.

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/CHINA

CHINA

8. EARLY REAGAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA MAY BE COMPLICATED BY RHETORICAL COMMITMENTS TO THE TAIWAN LOBBY. BUT IF MEN LIKE BUSH AND JACKSON HAVE A SAY, THE WIDER STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES FOR A SOLID US/CHINA RELATIONSHIP ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL. ALREADY THE TAIWAN ELEMENT SEEMS LESS PROMINENT. INDEED IN THE LONGER TERM A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MAY EVEN BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN THE DEFENCE FIELD, IF THIS MAKES SENSE IN TERMS OF A "A STRATEGY OF GLOBAL MANOEUVRE" VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. MORE GENERALLY IN EAST ASIA, A POLICY OF REGIONAL SECURITY INVOLVING JAPAN, KOREA, ASEAN, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND ALONG ROUGHLY THE SAME LINES SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE, WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF CONTAINING SOVIET POWER IN THE FAR EAST.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

9. ALTHOUGH IN THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT IT IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO MAKE A PROGNOSIS UNDER THIS HEADING, REAGAN'S VIEW OF THE NEED TO REASSERT AMERICAN POWER AND INFLUENCE WORLDWIDE SUGGESTS A MORE ABRASIVE APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL TURBULENCE PARTICULARLY WHERE AMERICANS INTERESTS, PROPERTY, OR LIVES ARE DEEMED TO BE AT STAKE. THERE WILL BE A PREDISPOSITION TO LOOK FOR A SOVIET OR SOVIET-SURROGATE HAND AT WORK BEHIND THE SCENES. WHILE THERE IS NO INHERENT REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT REAGAN'S RESPONSES IN SUCH SITUATIONS WOULD BE TRIGGER-HAPPY OR UNDULY ESCALATORY, THERE WILL BE A PREMIUM ON SPEED AND FIRMFNESS OF AMERICAN ACTION: AND, IN CASES WHERE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IS SUSPECTED, A READINESS TO CONSIDER RIPOSTE AT OTHER POINTS OF SOVIET VULNERABILITY. INsofar AS A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SETS HIGH STORE BY ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY THIS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MECHANICS OF ALLIED CONSULTATION.

10. IN THIS CONTEXT POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND COULD PROVE A PARTICULARLY AWKWARD EARLY TEST CASE. IT IS FOR HM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW TO SAY WHETHER THIS IN ITSELF AFFECTS THE ODDS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD RISK SUCH AN INTERVENTION. IF IT WERE TO HAPPEN DURING REAGAN'S FIRST SIX MONTHS IN OFFICE, THE TEMPTATION FOR HIM TO RESPOND DRAMATICALLY WOULD SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY STRONG.

FCO PASS SAVING TO ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE MODUK (FOR DUS(P)).

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FM MOSCOW 290820Z NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 747 OF 29TH NOVEMBER
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO AND
INFO ROUTINE PARIS AND BONN.

Prime Minister

This was obviously an important visit: there are significant points in virtually every paragraph of his telegram.

SENATOR PERCY'S VISIT.

1. SENATOR PERCY BRIEFED MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES AND MYSELF OVER BREADFAST THIS MORNING. IT WAS A RUSHED AND NOT ALWAYS COHERENT ACCOUNT. WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED FULL RECORDS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS BUT THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY WILL AT LEAST INDICATE THOSE POINTS WHICH ARE UPPER MOST IN HIS MIVGUND AND CONSEQUENTLY LIKELY TO RECUR IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION.

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2. PERCY INDICATED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE RATHER THAN AS A PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY, BUT IN PRACTICE HE WAS I THINK, GIVING THE RUSSIANS WHAT HE BELIEVED WAS A FAIR ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICIES OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THEY DEALT WITH HIM ON THAT BASIS. BREZHNEV, GROMYKO AND USTINOV HAD ALL TAKEN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME LINE AND WHEN HE HAD SPOKEN TO USTINOV ABOUT DIVERGENT VIEWS HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THERE WAS COMPLETE UNANIMITY IN THE POLITBURO.

3. ARMS CONTROL. PERCY ASSURED THE SOVIET UNION THAT AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED WITH REAGAN COULD BE CARRIED THROUGH THE SENATE. IT WAS A PRIORITY TASK TO SECURE A FAIR BALANCED EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT. IN REPLY THE RUSSIANS HAD CONSISTENTLY SAID THAT WHAT WAS NECESSARY WAS RATIFICATION OF THE PRESENT SALT II TREATY. THIS PERCY SAID WAS "DEAD AS A DOOR NAIL". AFGHANISTAN HAD KILLED IT. LINKAGE HAD TO BE ACCEPTED AS FACT. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO START ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WITH INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS DESIGNED TO LEAD UP TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW TREATY. SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 23 RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE SENATE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. AFTER THE RUSSIANS HAD SPENT THE GREATER PART OF TWO DAYS REPEATING THE NEED FOR RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY AS IT STOOD, PERCY HAD SECURED WHAT HE CALLED "AN ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL IMMEDIATELY". ALTHOUGH IN SUBSTANCE THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINED THAT SALT II MUST BE RATIFIED THEY WOULD NOT INSIST ON RATIFICATION PRIOR TO NEGOTIATION (WATSON INTERVENED TO SUGGEST THAT THE COMMITMENT MAY HAVE BEEN LESS PRECISE THAN PERCY THOUGHT, BUT THAT AT LEAST THERE WAS A READINESS FOR SOME INFORMAL DISCUSSION).

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4. THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE MUCH OF THE NATO, TNF MODERNISATION PROGRAMMED. PERCY HAD REPLIED IN STANDARD TERMS ABOUT THE SS20 AND HAD COMMENTED THAT THE NATO PROGRAMME "SCARES THE LIFE OUT OF THEM". HE WENT ON TO STRESS TO US THE ESSENTIAL NEED TO SUSTAIN NATO UNITY AND WAS PARTICULARLY COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT THE BRITISH POSITION. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS HAVING BEEN A DOVE OVER VIETNAM BUT A HAWK NOW OVER TNF MODERNISATION. HE REFERRED AT ONE POINT TO TNF "AS A BARGAINING CHIP" BUT DID NOT COMMENT ON THE GENEVA TALKS AND DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE FOCUSED ON THEM. PERCY DID NOT SEE A PROSPECT OF PROGRESS ON CTB, WHERE HE REGARDED THE BRITISH POSITION AS THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK, BUT SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED TO THE RUSSIANS THAT HE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO SECURE RATIFICATION OF THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN AGREEMENT AND THE 1976 AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

5. AFGHANISTAN. THE US HAD STUMBLER INTO VIETNAM. THEY HAD EXTRICATED THEMSELVES. TSCY WOULD MAKE THE SOVIET EXIT FROM AFGHANISTAN AS EASY AS POSSIBLE, BUT COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE PRESENT AFGHANISTAN REGIME. TO THIS THE SOVIET REPLY WAS MERELY THAT THE US SHOULD STOP THE HARRASSMENT AND THEN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE POSSIBLE, BUT OVER DINNER MIKOYAN, OF THE LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE, HAD OPENLY ADMITTED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN A TERRIBLE MISTAKE. PERCY COMMENTED THAT THE AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD PLAYED A PART IN BRINGING ABOUT THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION AND THE RUSSIANS HAS SEEMED TO WELCOME BY CONTRAST REAGAN'S CLARITY OF PURPOSE. THE CLIMATE IN THE US ABOUT AFGHANISTAN WAS NOW "NOT NEARLY SO BAD" AND HE THOUGHT A NEW SALT TREATY COULD BE RATIFIED WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN PROVIDED THERE WAS A PLANNED SCHEDULE FOR WITHDRAWAL.)

6. POLAND. PERCY HAD "REALLY BORNE DOWN ON THEM" ABOUT POLAND. IT WAS ON SCHMIDT'S ADVICE THAT HE HAD PRESSED TO SEE USTINOV ON THIS. ANY SOVIET USE OF FORCE WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE. IT WOULD CHANGE THE FACE OF THE GLOBE. HE HAD 800,000 POLES IN CHICAGO. "IN MY LIFETIME AND YOURS WE SHALL NEVER NEGOTIATE ANOTHER AGREEMENT IF YOU MOVE INTO POLAND". HE HAD PLEADED FOR JOINT ACTION TO HELP THE POLES OUT FO THEIR DEBT PROBLEMS AND AVOID A DEFAULT, BUT THE SOVIET REPLY HAD BEEN SIMPLY THAT IT WAS THE WEST THAT HAD GOT POLAND INTO THIS STATE. (IN PASSING, PERCY MENTIONED TO US SENATOR JACKSON'S RESOLUTE OPPOSITION TO ANY HELP FOR POLAND). PERCY SAID THAT AS "AN ULTIMATE WEAPON" HE HAD PUT DELICATELY, BUT HE THOUGHT EFFECWNTIVELY, THE IMPLICATION THAT A SOVIET MOVE INTO POLAND WOULD CAUSE A COMPLETE RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ALLIANCE.

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/7. GRAIN.

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7. GRAIN. THE RUSSIANS HAD DISMISSED ALL THE POST-AFGHANISTAN MEASURES AS DAMAGING ONLY THEIR ORIGINATORS. (PERCY COMMENTED TO US THAT HE THOUGHT THE GRAIN EMBARGO HAD BEEN USEFUL AND ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING IT. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT COULD BE A USEFUL BARGAINING COUNTER, AT LEAST UNTIL THE NEXT SOVIET HARVEST, AND IT WOULD BE A PITY TO THROW IT AWAY).

8. CSCE. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF MADRID. SUDHODREV HAD REMARKED AT DINNER THAT BREZHNEV HAD BEEN AMAZED AND PLEASED AT DA

THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS. PERCY COMMENTED TO US THAT THIS HAD BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION BUT FOR REAGAN OTHER THINGS WERE MORE IMPORTANT. THERE WOULD BE NO MORALISING AND NO ATTEMPTS TO CURE ALL THE WORLD'S ILLS.

9. MIDDLE EAST. PERCY HAD SAID TO THE RUSSIANS THAT ANY EFFORT TO MOVE THROUGH BALUCHISTAN TO THE GULF WOULD BE AS DISASTROUS AS A MOVE INTO POLAND. VIETNAM HAD NOT BEEN VITAL TO THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST BUT THE GULF WAS A LIFE LINE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AND THE US WOULD DO ANYTHING TO PROTECT IT. IN REPLY THE RUSSIANS HAD GIVEN AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND SUCH A MOVE BUT PERCY HAD SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. IT WAS THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT MATTERED. (HE WENT ON TO COMMENT TO US ABOUT THE PRESSURE WHICH WITH HIS HELP WAS BEING PUT ON THE JAPANESE TO MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY DEVELOPMENT COSTS IN KENYA, SOMALIA AND QMAN AND ALSO REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR A "JAPANESE PL 480 PROGRAMME".)

10. CUBA. PERCY COMMENTED TO US THAT THE SOVIET BRIGADE WAS NOT INTENDED TO INVAD E THE US OR SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY BUT RATHER TO GIVE CASTRO A FEELING OF SUPPORT, (LIKE AMERICAN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA) SO)7 HE WOULD FEEL FREE FOR OPERATIONS LIKE THOSE IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA . IN THIS CONTEXT. HE HAD WARNED THE RUSSIANS THAT THE US WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED, FOR INSTANCE ABOUT NAMIBIA AND IF THE SOVIET UNION INDERTOOK MISCHIEVOUS ACTIVITIES IT COULD NOT EXPECT COOPERATION IN OTHER AREAS.

11. PERCY IS RETURNING HOME TODAY VIA BRUSSELS, WHERE HE WILL SEE GENERAL ROGERS.

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TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 640 OF 17 OCTOBER

INFO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA, UKMIS GENEVA,

CTB DELEGATION GENEVA, BONN, PARIS

Read in full.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. IN HIS TELEGRAM NO 26 (NOT TO ALL) MR EDMONDS SUGGESTS THAT THE HARD LINE TAKEN BY THE RUSSIANS MAY REFLECT POLICY DECISIONS GOING BEYOND THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS. I THINK IT DOES. IN HIS SPEECH AT ALMA ATA ON 29 AUGUST BREZHNEV SET THE TONE FOR THE CURRENT LINE. AFTER SAYING THAT "THOSE WHO DETERMINED AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY EITHER DID NOT SEE OR DID NOT WANT TO SEE HISTORIC CHANGES IN THE WORLD AREN, THE NEW BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE WORLD" HE ATTACKED US NUCLEAR STRATEGIC POLICY AND REFERRED TO "ATTEMPTS AT BURYING DETENTE AND AT PLUNGING THE WORLD INTO ANOTHER COLD WAR". HE TOOK THE SAME THEME FOR HIS SPEECH AT A DINNER FOR BABRAK KARMAL ON 16 OCTOBER, REFERRING TO "FEVERISH MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND UNRESTRAINED PROPAGANDA.... EVEN EULOGY OF NUCLEAR WAR" BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND (MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO CARTER) CONCLUDING "IN A WORD US IMPERIALISM IS AGAIN APPARENTLY EMBARKING ON THE PATH OF A NEW COLD WAR AND CREATING A SITUATION THREATENING UNIVERSAL PEACE AND SECURITY OF ALL PEOPLES. WHATEVER THE TIME SERVING CALCULATIONS AND SUBJECTIVE INTENTION OF SOME OR OTHER STATESMAN OF THE USA AND THEIR ALLIES MAY BE, THE GAME WHICH THEY ARE PLAYING IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND THEY MAY THEMSELVES FALL ITS FIRST VICTIMS".

2. AN INTERVIEW WITH ARMAND HAMMER ON 14 OCTOBER WAS USED AS THE VEHICLE FOR A STATEMENT BY BREZHNEV THAT AMERICAN POLICY WAS "LEADING TO AN INCREASED DANGER OF WAR". IZVESTIA ON 16 OCTOBER FOLLOWED UP WITH AN ARTICLE ARGUING THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ONE THING WAS CLEAR. UNDER THE OLD PRESIDENT OR A NEW ONE THE UNITED STATES WOULD INCREASE MILITARY EXPENDITURE, STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY MUSCLES AND DISPLAY THEM IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE CAUSE OF THIS NEW "WAVE OF MILITARISM" WHICH WAS SWAMPING THOSE WHO UNDERSTOOD ITS DANGER, WAS THAT AMERICA HAD LOST ITS MILITARY SUPREMACY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THERE WERE MANY WHO DREAMED OF REGAINING IT AND THEY HAD TO BE CONVINCED THAT NO GOOD WOULD COME OF THIS.

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3. THE PUBLIC LINE WAS REINFORCED BY GROMYKO WHEN MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE SAW HIM TO FOLLOW UP RECENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN DOBRYNIN AND MUSKIE. HE FOUND GROMYKO COLDER AND BLEAKER THAN EVER AND AT TIMES VERGING ON THE DOWNRIGHT OFFENSIVE.
4. WE MUST EXPECT MORE OF THE SAME. THE RUSSIANS ARE JITTERY ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY AND WORRIED ABOUT EASTERN EUROPE (MY TEL NO 632). MUCH THOUGH THEY MAY DISMISS REFERENCES TO AFGHANISTAN, THEY ARE NOW HAVING TO START COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE DAMAGE THEIR ACTION HAS DONE TO THE INTERNATIONAL FABRIC. THEY ARE DETERMINED TO SHOW THAT THEY WILL NOT YIELD TO PRESSURE. NEVERTHELESS ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT HOSTILE LINE HAS ITS DANGERS, THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL TACTICAL ELEMENT IN IT. I WOULD NOT YET CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT IN MY DESPATCH OF 8 FEBRUARY THAT, WHILE THERE CAN BE NO EXPECTATION OF GENUINE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE NEXT US PRESIDENT WILL BE DEALT WITH REALISTICALLY ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF HIS STRENGTH OF PURPOSE AND THAT THE CONFRONTATION CAN BE CONTROLLED.

KEEBLE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

[C T B NEGOTIATIONS]

LIMITED
ACDD
ES & SD
NAD
EESD
DEF D
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
PS

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PS/MR HURD
PS/MR BLAKER
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~~Extract~~ from a Record of Conversation between
Prime Minister and Sec / General of the
United Nations - House of Commons
Tuesday 12 May at 1530hrs

Subject copy: United Nations, May 79,
Visits by Sec General

East/West Relations

Dr. Waldheim described the talks he had had with Mr. Brezhnev during his recent visit to Moscow. Brezhnev had seemed fit and mentally alert (more so than in 1977) and had spoken fluently. He had emphasised the Soviet desire for dialogue with the United States while expressing resentment of provocative American statements and the abandonment of positions taken by the previous Administration. Dr. Waldheim had told Mr. Brezhnev that President Reagan had told him that he was interested in a dialogue but was gravely concerned about Soviet expansionism. Mr. Brezhnev had "exploded" at the word 'expansionism'.