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Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NOT very satisfactory: but it
seems to me more or less unavoidable
in these circumstances that we stay
in line with France & Germany. Agree?

London SW1A 2AH

9 November 1981

Dear Michael,

Ans 9/x

Ottawa Summit Statement on Terrorism

We last wrote on this subject in August when the Prime Minister gave her agreement to our attempting to persuade the Seven to deliver an ultimatum to Afghanistan in spite of French resistance (Willie Rickett's letter of 28 August to me). This initiative on our part unfortunately led nowhere; the Germans would not commit themselves until there had been a definite statement of the French position. Only recently have the French finally declared their decision to limit their action to denouncing their Air Services Agreement (ASA) with Afghanistan, effective in a year's time (this was contained in a letter from President Mitterrand replying to a message from Prime Minister Trudeau, a copy of which is attached). The Germans have since decided to follow the same course of action as the French, in spite of a message of encouragement from Mr Haig to Herr Genscher and bilateral discussions with FCO officials held with them in Bonn.

We have therefore reached the point referred to in Willie Rickett's letter in which Lord Carrington would consult the Prime Minister on the next step. The Secretary of State for Trade also indicated in the same correspondence that in this situation he would like to give further thought to our position. The United Kingdom now has three options, none of them entirely satisfactory:

- (a) Unilateral action. We could go ahead forthwith, after suitable notification to the Afghans, with the suspension of the Afghan Airline's service to London simply by terminating its temporary operating permit.
- (b) Parallel action on the same time-scale as the French and Germans: ie we would announce that we would suspend Afghan Airline's service to London at one year's notice. (We would, of course, not denounce our ASA with Afghanistan since we do not have one.)
- (c) We could argue that since so much time has passed since the PIA hijacking (in March) few people would notice if the Seven took no further action whereas action by the Seven along the lines now envisaged would merely draw attention to the Seven's lack of determination.

The Secretary of State considers that option (c) is unacceptable, because the Ottawa Declaration promised definite action. He considers that there are a number of disadvantages to

/option (a)

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option (a). It would expose us to retaliation by the Karmal regime against our mission in Kabul (and they have recently been making some threats); and it would make it harder for the Seven to claim publicly that they were acting in a united fashion. Unilateral action would have the advantages of consistency with our approach hitherto and of demonstrating solidarity with Pakistan, but in Lord Carrington's view these do not outweigh the disadvantages of breaking ranks with our partners.


He therefore considers that to preserve what we can of the unity of the Seven, and to make a real if belated move against Afghan interests, the right course is for us to fall in with the French and the Germans and suspend air services at a year's notice. If the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Trade agree, our officials would be instructed to emphasise that in view of our strong views on the subject our preference would have been to suspend the Afghan services immediately even if that meant acting unilaterally; but that in order to keep a united front with our partners we were prepared to fall into line with the French and Germans. We nevertheless regarded this as an unsatisfactory outcome of the Ottawa decision. In public, of course, our common action would need to be presented positively in order to have the maximum deterrent effect both against the Afghans and against would-be hijackers in the future.

Lord Carrington believes in addition that the Seven should look again at the principle and mechanisms of the Bonn Declaration. In conception, the Bonn Declaration was intended to ensure an automatic response by the Seven to incidents of international terrorism and hijacking. Our experience has shown that, whatever the intentions of those who signed the Declaration, it is not in practice possible to bind political leaders in advance in this way.

There is likely to be a meeting of the officials from the Seven countries in New York on 10 November. Subject to the Prime Minister's views and those of Mr Biffen, Lord Carrington therefore proposes that at that meeting our officials should be instructed:

- (a) to tell their colleagues that we will now fall in (under protest) with the Franco/German line, and
- (b) propose that the experts of the Seven should conduct a realistic review, as soon as possible, about practical measures based on the Bonn Declaration for the future.

Yours ever,


(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

Handwritten marks in a box: a grid with 'D' and '21' and some scribbles.

M.A.E. DEPT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT ZSPEJ481 23OCT81

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INFO GENEV ISBAD PRMNY PCOOTT/CARLSON/WHITE

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SOLGENOTT/CLOUTIER DE OTT

REGAM:ICAOMTL/BOYD DE OTT

DISTR MIN AEG DMM PEB ZSP ZSI FLP FLO JHT WTD GPS GPO JMT

GEB GNG ECR

---APPLICATION CF BONN DECLARATION TO AFGEANISTAN:FRENCH

REPLY

FRENCH EMB DELIVERED TODAY COPY OF MITTERANDS LETTER TO PM

TRUDEAU:QUOTE

BEGINS MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

.VOUS AVEZ BIEN VOULU M ENTRETENIR PAR VOTRE LETTRE DU 20SEP DE LA DECISION QUE NOUS AVIONS ADOPTEE EN COMMUN LORS DU SOMMET D OTT EN VUE DE L APPLICATION DE LA DECLARATION DE BONN A L AFGHANISTAN.

LA FRANCE ENTEND BIEN EVIDEMMENT APPLIQUER CETTE DECISION MAIS NE SAURAIT LE FAIRE QUE DANS LES CONDITIONS PREVUES PAR LE DROIT INNATL.OR, COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, NOUS SOMMES LIES AVEC L AFGHANISTAN PAR UN ACCORD AERIEN QUI DONNE A LA COMPAGNIE ARIANA LE DROIT DE DESSERVIR PARIS. NOUS NE POUVONS LUI RETIRER

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PA TWO ZSPE2491 CONF

CE DROIT EN RECONNAISSANCE DU TEXTE QUI NOUS LIE. IL NOUS
FAUT DONC POUR ABOUTIR A LA SOLUTION CONVENUE, DENONCER NOTRE
ACCORD AVEC L'AFGHANISTAN ET CETTE DENONCIATION NE PEUT PORTER
EFFET QU'AU BOUT D'UN AN.

AINSI QUE M. CHEYSSON L'AVAIT PRECISE A OTT A M. MACGUIGAN ET
A SES COLLEGUES, NOUS DEMEURONS DISPOSES A TOUT MOMENT A PROCEDER
A UNE TELLE DENONCIATION. AINSI QUE VOUS EN AVEZ ETE INFORME
PAR LA VOIE DIPLOMATIQUE, NOUS SOMMES PRETS A COORDONNER NOTRE
ACTION EN CE DOMAINE AVEC NOS PARTENAIRES, EN PARTICULIER AVEC
LE ROYAUME-UNI ET LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE QUI SONT
LES SEULS PARMIS LES SEPT A AVOIR, COMME NOUS-MEMES, DES
RELATIONS AERIENNES AVEC L'AFGHANISTAN.

JE VOUS PRIE D'AGREER, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, L'ASSURANCE
DE MA HAUTE CONSIDERATION. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND. ENDS.

2. AS YOU WILL NOTE, LETTER CONTAINS NO/NO SURPRISE. FRENCH WILL
INFORM US OCT 26 WHETHER THEY WISH CDA AS CFMNL TO GIVE TEXT
OF LET TO REMAINING MEMBERS OF SEVEN OR WHETHER THEY WISH TO
DO THIS THEMSELVES AS ORIGINATORS. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE
NOT/NOT DISCUSS CONTENTS OF LET WITH YOUR INTERLOCUTORS UNTIL
THIS POINT IS RESOLVED. YOU WILL NOTE THAT FRENCH SUGGEST
THAT THREE COUNTRIES ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ACTION AGAINST
AFGHANISTAN SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR ACTION. WE ASSUME THAT
THIS WILL BE DONE THROUGH A MTG OF THREE AND THAT IT WILL

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PAGE THREE ZSPE0431 CONF

NOT/NOT BE NECESSARY TO BRING IN THE FOUR PARTNERS THAT ARE
NOT/NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

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