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*Would Alan come in to see me. We could*

15 December 1981

Prime Minister

ALAN WALTERS

*Alan argues that we cannot*

*Possibly correct Howard's work but that in no way lets matters to take their*

PRIME MINISTER

*and should not keep Howard's study under wraps - content to allow*

FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S STUDY OF MONETARY AGGREGATES IN THE UK

*course? or would*

1. I am concerned at the annotations which you put on my memorandum of 10 December.

*you like us to*

2. Let me try to set out the facts as I understand them.

*Keep the UK*

a. Howard's study is merely one among a very large number that have concluded that £M3 has been a misleading indicator during recent years. Examples are numerous and ubiquitous; they include Niehans, Budd and Christopher Johnson. (Terry Burns and Peter Middleton are now quite convinced that £M3 was and is a misleading indicator.)

*distribution to the minimum (we can't affect the US distribution)?*

*But they are not recommending that we leave it until they are clear about what we do.*

*MCS 16/12*

b. By our actions in November 1980 and subsequently we have pursued policies which were inconsistent with our announced targets for £M3. Commentators have observed this deviation - and in general they have, rightly in my view, applauded it. It has been observed, again rightly, that our monetary policy in 1980 was restrictive in spite of the overshoot of the £M3 target.

c. I believe that it was to the Government's great credit that the severity of the monetary squeeze of 1980 was relaxed in November of that year. This adjustment of policy, together with the further relaxation in March 1981, was seen by the vast majority of commentators, as entirely justified. (The only exceptions were Brian Griffiths and his group at City University.) Of course it was possible for our enemies to say that we were wildly overshooting our £M3 monetary targets. But those critics wanted us to overshoot them even more! Such critics have little intellectual integrity and should be discredited or ignored.

/3. Opinions differ

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3. Opinions differ on what will be the best guide for monetary policy. However, considering M1 and £M3, I believe that the vast majority of commentators would prefer M1 (or M0 or retail M1).
4. You raise also once again the experience in 1971-74. Indeed, I used M3 in 1971-2 to predict the inflation which ensued in 1974. Although I had worked mostly with M1, for example in my "Money in Boom and Slump" (1968), I believed that "competition and credit control" would render M1 quite unreliable in this period. The changes brought about by the CCC regime were bound to channel monetary growth into interest-bearing deposits during the period in which the banks were adjusting their portfolios. I believe that I was correct in interpreting £M3, or as it was in those days M3, as the most reliable aggregate during the years after the CCC regime was brought into effect. My judgement at the time has been confirmed by another study by David Howard called "Inflation, Indexation and the Oil-Price Shock: The British Experience", July 1981. After an extensive discussion of monetary aggregates over the period 1970-79, he concludes:
- "Thus it is probably the case that during this period the behaviour of the £M3 aggregate was the more appropriate measure of underlying monetary growth."
- What I believed were the good reasons for using M3 during the CCC period have not been discredited by subsequent research and reflection.
- But this is a complicated argument to explain*
5. Using similar arguments since 1980, I am convinced that the M3 figures have been severely distorted, primarily by the corset and the aftermath. During these recent years the narrower aggregates have been the appropriate indicators of monetary stringency. (I have also argued that all the other measures, real interest rates, the exchange rate and other "real" effects are consistent with this interpretation.)
6. Finally, I think it is quite impossible to suppress or even effectively to discourage views of this kind being expressed. And even if it were possible, I believe it would be undesirable. We have nothing to fear from the truth. Apart from being a shade too severe in 1980, our policies have been entirely right and can be easily defended.

*AW*

ALAN WALTERS

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