

CONFIDENTIAL

30320 - 1

OO UKREP BRUSSELS

GRS 525

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 291600Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 29 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WEST BANK: ARAB REPRESENTATIONS

1. THE JORDANIAN AND LEBANESE AMBASSADORS CALLED ON MR HURD THIS MORNING ON BEHALF OF ALL THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN LONDON. THEIR MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO URGE THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO RECONSIDER HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. MR HURD EXPLAINED WHY THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONSIDERED THAT THE VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD, BUT UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THEIR REPRESENTATIONS.
2. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND URGED THE TEN TO TRANSLATE THEIR WORDS INTO ACTION. THE ARAB AMBASSADORS HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR LORD CARRINGTON, BUT HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL AT THIS TIME WOULD HAVE A VERY ADVERSE EFFECT. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO RECONSIDER IT. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR SUPPORTED THIS, NOTING THAT ISRAEL SEEMED ON THE PATH TO ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD POSTPONED HIS VISIT FOLLOWING THE ANNEXATION OF GOLAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE ARRIVING IN ISRAEL ON THE DAY OF AN ARAB GENERAL STRIKE.
3. THE AMBASSADORS ALSO ASKED FOR BRITISH AND EUROPEAN SUPPORT AT THE UN, AND FOR CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI ACTION.
4. MR HURD SAID THAT RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE WEST BANK HAD CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION WHICH WE DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS SHOWED THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD GIVEN CAREFUL THOUGHT TO HIS VISIT. ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN TAKING FORWARD THE EUROPEAN ROLE WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS REJECTED THE VENICE DECLARATION AND WERE SUSPICIOUS OF LORD CARRINGTON. WE WISHED TO PUT THIS RIGHT. LORD CARRINGTON WOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR

1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20320 - 1

VIEWS TO THE ISRAELIS. IF HE CANCELLED HIS VISIT, HIS CREDIBILITY PARTICULARLY WITH THE US WOULD BE MARKEDLY DIMINISHED. HE HAD THEREFORE DECIDED THAT THE VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. MR HURD ADDED IN CONFIDENCE THAT WE WERE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO MAKE CONTACTS ON THE WEST BANK TO DEMONSTRATE OUR GROWING INTEREST IN THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS: IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WEST BANK LEADERS SHOULD FORM A PART OF THE VISIT.

5. ON ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MR HURD POINTED OUT THAT SIR A PARSONS HAD BEEN ASKED TO RETURN TO NEW YORK AND WAS CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE CONSULTATIONS PRESENTLY UNDER WAY. OUR LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION REMAINED A POSSIBILITY, AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE WORKING FOR THIS.

6. THE AMBASSADORS DID NOT PRESS THEIR CASE ON CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT. MR HURD UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THEIR VIEWS, AND TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE BRIEFED PROMPTLY AFTER THE VISIT TO ISRAEL.

7. THERE WAS ALSO A SHORT DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR MENTIONED M. TINDEMANS' COMMENT THAT THE TEN WOULD ELABORATE VENICE. MR HURD SAID THAT THE TEN WERE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER THEIR ROLE AFTER APRIL. THE AMBASSADORS POINTED OUT THAT THE RECENT EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PLO TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.

CARRINGTON

STANDARD

NENAD
MED
NAD
UND
EESD
ECD
WED
RID

MAED
ES & SD
ERD
ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

2

CONFIDENTIAL