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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1055 OF 31 MARCH  
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DUS(P) AND DS 17), BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW,  
UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV (FOR S OF S PARTY), ROUTINE UKDEL VIENNA,  
UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS  
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, PEKING, TOKYO

M I P T (NOT TO ALL): REAGAN STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY  
AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. THE PRESIDENT OPENED TONIGHT'S PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

'TWICE IN MY LIFETIME I HAVE SEEN THE WORLD PLUNGED BLINDLY INTO GLOBAL WAR THAT INFLICTED UNTOLD SUFFERING UPON MILLIONS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. I SHARE THE DETERMINATION OF TODAY'S YOUNG PEOPLE THAT SUCH A TRAGEDY, WHICH WOULD BE RENDERED EVEN MORE TERRIBLE BY THE MONSTROUS INHUMANE WEAPONS IN THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR ARSENALS, MUST NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN. MY GOAL IS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRAMATICALLY, ASSURING LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY.

LAST NOVEMBER I STRESSED OUR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH FOR THE REDUCTION OF BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. I MADE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ENTIRELY INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THOSE GOALS. IN GENEVA WE HAVE PROPOSED A TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH EMBODIES OUR PROPOSALS. IN VIENNA, ALONG WITH OUR ALLIES, WE ARE NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. AND HERE IN WASHINGTON WE ARE COMPLETING PREPARATIONS FOR TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS REDUCTIONS. WE KNOW ALL TOO WELL FROM PAST EXPERIENCE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE CAREFULLY PREPARED. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO REPEAT PAST MISTAKES, TO ARRIVE HASTILY AT AN ARMS CONTROL PROCESS WHICH SENDS HOPES SOARING ONLY TO END IN DASHED EXPECTATIONS.

LAST WEEK A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE CALLING FOR MAJOR, VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO EQUAL FORCE LEVELS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, AND THESE POINTS ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A TRULY EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, ELEMENTS WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. I COMMEND SENATORS JACKSON AND WARNER AND CONGRESSMAN CARNEY AND ALL THOSE WHO JOINED WITH THEM IN THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE.

I HAVE AND I WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK REALISTIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. I WANT AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT REDUCES THE RISK OF WAR, LOWERS THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS, AND ENHANCES GLOBAL SECURITY. WE CAN ACCEPT NO LESS. AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IS BASED ON ENDURING

/ PRINCIPLES.

PRINCIPLES. OUR LEADERS AND OUR ALLIES HAVE LONG UNDERSTOOD THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR DEFENCE EFFORTS HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO DETER CONFLICT AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR, CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR. TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE EVERY PRESIDENT IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD HAS FOLLOWED THIS STRATEGY AND IT HAS WORKED. IT HAS EARNED THE OVERWHELMING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND THE COUNTRY AT LARGE AND IT HAS KEPT WORLD PEACE.

YESTERDAY WITH THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE COLUMBIA SPACE SHUTTLE'S LATEST MISSION I THINK WE WERE ALL REMINDED OF THE GREAT THINGS THE HUMAN RACE CAN ACHIEVE, WHEN IT HARNESSSES ITS BEST MINDS AND EFFORTS TO A POSITIVE GOAL. BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE WRITTEN PROUD CHAPTERS IN THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE.

SO I INVITE THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN WITH US NOW TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MAKE AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH FOR LASTING PEACE ON EARTH. THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR WARS IN MY LIFETIME. I BELIEVE THE PEOPLE WANT TO RETURN TO A LEVEL OF CIVILISED BEHAVIOUR WE ONCE KNEW. MOST OF ALL THEY WANT PEACE. AND SO DO I."

2. IN ANSWER TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS THE PRESIDENT MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. ASKED WHY HE DID NOT FAVOUR A FREEZE NOW, TO BE FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS AT A LATER STAGE, HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD A DEFINITE MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY, WHICH PRODUCED A WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY FOR THE US. A FREEZE WOULD NOT ONLY BE DANGEROUS FOR THE US, IT WOULD MILITATE AGAINST ANY NEGOTIATION FOR REDUCTIONS, SINCE THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE NO INCENTIVE (AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE HISTORY OF INF) TO NEGOTIATE. US VULNERABILITY TO A SOVIET ATTACK, WITHOUT THE CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE, WAS POSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT STATE OF THE US TRIAD. THE MAIN SOVIET ADVANTAGE LAY IN THEIR ABILITY TO ABSORB A RETALIATORY BLOW FROM THE US AND STRIKE AGAIN. HOWEVER, IN A NUCLEAR WAR THERE WOULD BE NO WINNERS. EVERYBODY WOULD BE A LOSER.

3. THE US WOULD BE READY TO OPEN START WITH THE RUSSIANS THIS SUMMER. SETTING THE PRECISE DATE WOULD DEPEND ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, BUT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO THIS SUMMER. HE HAD NOT CHANGED HIS BASIC VIEWS (AS EXPRESSED AT HIS FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE) ABOUT THE RUSSIANS BUT HE NOTED THAT THEY WERE NOW IN DESPARATE ECONOMIC STRAITS, AS A RESULT OF THEIR MILITARY BUILD-UP.

THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE PROPOSED CUT-OFF OF CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR EVENTS IN POLAND. THE US WERE WORKING WITH THE ALLIES ON SUCH A CUT-OFF, BUT WERE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO HELP THE POLISH PEOPLE. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT "THERE COULD BE A CARROT ALONG WITH THE STICK IF THEY STRAIGHTEN UP AND FLY RIGHT".

4. THE US WERE STILL ANALYSING BREZHNEV'S LATEST STATEMENT ON INF. PERSONALLY THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT IT WAS PART OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE THEIR PEACEFUL IMAGE, WHICH WAS BELIED BY THE FACTS. ASKED ABOUT THE US RESPONSE TO A POSSIBLE SOVIET THREAT TO STATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, REAGAN NOTED THAT AT THE MOMENT THIS COULD ONLY MEAN IN CUBA, ALTHOUGH LATER IT MIGHT MEAN IN NICARAGUA. SUCH AN ACTION WOULD BE A TOTAL VIOLATION OF THE 1962 AGREEMENT. OPTIONS WOULD BE OPEN TO THE US WHICH HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN PUBLIC.

FCO PASS SAVING: ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN, PEKING, TOKYO

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL

NAD



JS  
cc 729  
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your minute of 11 December about your conversation with Herr Lahnstein.

I am sending copies of this minute to Brian Fall (FCO) and David Omand (MOD)

A. J. COLES

14 December 1981

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MR. COLES

Neill Mitchell  
(Duty Clerk) 11/12/81

As the Prime Minister knows, I had a visit today from Herr Lahnstein, the State Secretary in the Federal Chancellor's Office.

2. What was said about NATO infrastructure funding is being reported separately.

3. Amongst the other subjects about which Mr. Lahnstein talked was Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn. He said that one of Mr. Brezhnev's objectives was to try to find out more about the general posture of the United States Administration. It was apparent from what Mr. Brezhnev had said that the Russians were irritated with the United States Administration - more irritated than with any of its predecessors. Herr Lahnstein thought that the Federal Chancellor had convinced Mr. Brezhnev that President Reagan's readiness to negotiate on arms control was genuine.

4. Herr Lahnstein thought that Mr. Brezhnev's visit had provided the Federal Chancellor with a useful opportunity to improve Mr. Brezhnev's understanding of the reality of the international situation and prospect, and of the positions of the American and other Western Administrations. Mr. Brezhnev depended very much on contacts of this kind for that purpose; and the Leaders of some of the satellite countries in Eastern Europe looked to Bonn for guidance as to what they should be saying to Mr. Brezhnev about international events. These contacts were an important corrective to the partial and distorted picture which it was thought Mr. Brezhnev probably got from inside the Soviet Administration.

5. Herr Lahnstein said that it was very clear from the discussions on arms control that the Russians were including British and French submarine-based nuclear missiles (and their own submarine-based nuclear missiles in the Baltic) in their calculations on "balance" in Europe.

6. The Federal Chancellor had the impression that Mr. Brezhnev's physical condition was, if anything, better than two years ago. But he was under heavy medical treatment, and his "mental" presence was only partial.



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

He dealt only in very simple and basic concepts, and constantly deferred to the advice and judgment of Mr. Gromyko or whatever adviser was with him. It appeared that Mr. Gromyko had never been stronger, and there was no sign whatever of any diminution of his powers or his influence.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Fall and Mr. Omand.

RAA

Robert Armstrong

CONQUEROR

11th December 1981

*Faeyn Policy*



PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

2 December 1981

*NBPA*

*Print*

*Dear Willie*

... John Nott and Peter Carrington have agreed that it would be helpful to circulate to colleagues the attached guidance note on President Reagan's arms reduction initiative. A copy goes to our other Cabinet colleagues with the request that they draw it to the attention of other Ministers in their Departments, to the Chief Whip, and to John Nott and Peter Carrington for information. A copy has been sent separately to Central Office.

*Mr L...  
J...  
...*

FRANCIS PYM

The Rt Hon William Whitelaw CH MC MP

## PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS

### Line to Take

Speaking in the House of Commons on the 18th November the Prime Minister said:

"I welcome the great initiative by President Reagan in proposing that there should be not merely a limitation of nuclear arms but a reduction of nuclear arms and of conventional forces. He has seized the initiative and I hope we shall find a response from the Soviet Union ..... we unreservedly welcome this initiative and sincerely hope a response will be forthcoming."

### If Further Guidance Required

Proposals have full support of the UK and Alliance. UK has played a major role in agreeing the negotiating position for the 30th November talks. Following the reference to the zero option by NATO Defence Ministers at the Gleneagles meeting last month and President Reagan's speech on 18th November, the Allies unanimously agreed that the zero option should be the main objective of the negotiations. Formal Russian response awaited. Initial Tass comment condemned initiative out of hand as propaganda. Their response will demonstrate how serious their commitment to meaningful negotiations is, and their desire for peace.

### BACKGROUND

In his address to the National Press Club in Washington on 18th November, President Reagan announced that he had proposed to President Brezhnev a plan aimed at increasing peace and security by restricting both conventional and nuclear forces.

These are the four points of the plan:

- i. At the forthcoming negotiations in Geneva on theatre nuclear forces in Europe, the United States would be prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (agreed by NATO in 1979) if the Soviets dismantle their long range SS4, SS5 and SS20 missiles. (This is the so-called zero option).



ii. The United States intends to open negotiations on strategic arms with the Soviet Union as soon as possible next year. The talks would be known as START (Strategic Arms Reductions Talks) rather than SALT, to signify a desire to achieve substantial reductions, as opposed to limitations, in strategic weapons.

iii. A call for equality at a lower level of conventional forces in Europe.

iv. A renewal of the proposal for a conference to develop effective measures to reduce the risks of surprise attack, and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation.

All these proposals were based on the same principles: substantial, militarily significant reductions in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provision for verification.

Speaking about his first point (the so-called "zero-option") President Reagan said: "This would be a historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over Europe. This would be a giant step for mankind".

Initial Soviet reaction has been unfavourable and Russia has claimed that an approximate parity already exists in theatre nuclear forces in Europe. This is not the case - a balance can only be arrived at by very selective inclusion of NATO forces and exclusion of comparable Warsaw Pact systems. A more objective comparison shows a considerable Warsaw Pact superiority (see attached Ministry of Defence Fact Sheet).

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

Without this ind. receptive enough -

and we must give more attention to the situation. Have you got the

It is now almost 35 years since the independence of India marked the beginning of the modern Commonwealth.

In that period the number of members of the United Nations has risen from 51 to 155 and of the Commonwealth itself from 5 to 45. The world and our Commonwealth association have been transformed. So have the range and complexity of the problems which face the international community.

now for Lee's meeting here so that we may remind ourselves

One of the greatest virtues of the Commonwealth

is that it permits us to discuss these world problems dispassionately and realistically. Rhetoric can be set aside. We can examine issues with the seriousness that they deserve.

Have made a list

Suggestions. N.B. Are the 'brains' in the F.O. on leave or are they back in. How serious? If so can they be mobilised, not

The Threats to Peace

Today, I see three main kinds of threat to peace.

① Ideological conflict, E-W

(a) Deep-seated crises.

First, there are a small number of long-running problems whose origins are historical, and whose resolution will take time, perseverance and restraint.

② This is a major on right of non-aligned to determine own destiny. U.N. conf. protest - then.

Of greatest concern to many in the Commonwealth is the situation in Southern Africa. The crisis has

③ Conflicts within communist world Vietnam / Cambodia. Poland. China / Vietnam. Bad people from Vietnam

/ two aspects:

two aspects: how to achieve a negotiated settlement which will bring independence to Namibia and how to contribute to the emergence of a just society in South Africa itself. In the case of Namibia, Britain remains convinced that the Contact Group of Five must continue to play a central role in progress towards a solution on the basis of the agreed UN Plan. As regards South Africa itself, our abhorrence of apartheid is clear. So is that of the international community as a whole. We must all continue to press for peaceful change, for a Government based on the consent of the South African people as a whole. I shall say more on this subject when we reach it later in our agenda.

The origins of the Arab-Israeli dispute are also historical. Both Israelis and Palestinians point to the past to justify their present views and policies. It is not the responsibility of the international community to adjudicate on these conflicting claims. Our aim must be to help to find a way forward which will enable all the peoples of the area to achieve justice and security.

Britain and the other members of the European Community have set out some principles on which we believe a lasting settlement could be based. The essence of these principles is two-fold: first, the acceptance of the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to existence and security; and, second, the acceptance of

- ④ Terrorism movements helping in helping to be another.
- ⑤ Regional conflict Middle-East Southern Africa.
- ⑥ Modernism with some = hybridizing of others. (Arabism / Israeli) Yemen large / Arab.
- ⑦ Historical look political stability - S. American context - linked by links.
- ⑧ Religious conflicts. Islam. (N without Ireland) between.

- ⑨ Territorial claims - Aim to enlarge use of stability with independence / the legitimate
- ⑩ Impotence of U.N. in emergencies.

the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to self-determination. We believe that an approach on this basis, in which neither side attempts to deny to the other the rights it claims for itself, offers a prospect of real progress towards the comprehensive settlement which is so urgently needed. We are working for acceptance of these principles, not only by the parties directly involved but by the rest of the world as well. This may not be an issue of direct concern to the Commonwealth as such, but I hope that the countries represented here will accept that these are the basic principles on which a negotiated settlement can be built.

The problems of Cyprus have frequently been discussed at our meetings. Over the past few months there have been encouraging signs, which suggest that it may be possible, with determination and goodwill, to make progress towards a just settlement. I do not wish to trespass on ground which President Kyprianou will wish to cover. But I would hope that we could all agree to offer those involved in the intercommunal talks our support in their efforts.

(b) East-West tension.

The second danger to peace arises from the deterioration of relations between East and West. The situation in Eastern Europe has been giving rise to much

/ concern.

concern. It would, of course, become much more acute if there were to be a military intervention to extinguish the internal Renewal in Poland. So long as the Soviet Union continues to amass armaments, we in the West must maintain the strength to deter aggression. But we are also working to reduce the dangers of conflict through the pursuit of balanced limits and reductions in nuclear and conventional arms. We want communication with the Soviet Union, to explain our foreign policies and to ask about theirs. We are willing to exercise restraint and shall try to impress the need for this upon the Soviet Union.

That restraint was not in evidence when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has shown no inclination to withdraw. Only continued pressure from the world as a whole has any chance of achieving Soviet withdrawal and the restoration of Afghanistan to independent and non-aligned status. The European proposal for a two-stage Conference is designed to facilitate such an outcome while satisfying any genuine security concerns felt by the Soviet Union. We are grateful for the support so many of you have already expressed, and hope you will continue to back our efforts for a just solution.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is paralleled by the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

/Each reflects

Each reflects ambition on the part of one country to control its neighbours. The countries of ASEAN, represented here by Malaysia and Singapore, have been making great efforts to promote a negotiated settlement. Britain will continue to support these efforts. I am sure that they deserve support from the Commonwealth as a whole.

(c) Local conflicts.

The third threat to peace arises from local conflicts between neighbouring states. The world is learning to cope with these somewhat better than in the past. There is general acceptance of the need first to isolate such conflicts and prevent them spreading, and then to put in hand the necessary machinery for mediation and peace-making. The war between Iran and Iraq remains regrettable and dangerous; but it is satisfactory that it has not spread. Likewise a number of conflicts in Africa have been rendered less dangerous through the efforts of the Organisation of African Unity.

4) Furthering ties and cooperation by large - scale  
and collaboration between terrorist movements. Their  
conclusion  
anti - authority in the middle to  
national power

Inevitably a brief survey of this kind has to concentrate on trouble spots. But there are other important and positive trends. There is the continuing emergence of China and Japan on the world political scene. There is the growing importance of the Pacific area generally, as exemplified by the roles of various Commonwealth countries there. In other parts of the

developing world, new powers are rising to positions of importance and responsibility. Several of them are members of the Commonwealth. These are welcome developments.

The world is troubled and dangerous. But the problems I have mentioned do not seem to me to be insuperable. Time and determination will be needed: moderation rather than extremism. On that basis there is hope. And the contribution of the Commonwealth can be considerable. The Rhodesia settlement was proof of this. The range of our experience and the ease of communication among us make our capacity for analysis unique. In some cases there will be a direct contribution which the Commonwealth either generally or regionally can make. In others the Commonwealth's very existence as a channel of contact and a forum for reason is itself a sign of hope, just as its history is a demonstration that progress can come through discussion and co-operation without conflict.

MADBA

I presume you have  
seen this

18 NOV 1981



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With the compliments of

fa  
Punt

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Mike Pothison.

MAD

With R6 from Francis Richards.

see

18.11.81.

G. Suter.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH



*Foreign Rel*

SECRET  
DESKBY 171900Z  
FROM UKREP BRUSSELS 171711Z NOV 1981  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4313 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1981  
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN WASHINGTON  
PRIORITY THE HAGUE ROME UKDEL NATO

MIPT: TNF

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR HAIGS LETTER TO YOU OF 16 NOVEMBER.

DEAR PETER:

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. THIS WILL BE AN EVENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MY COUNTRY, AS I KNOW IT IS TO YOURS, AND TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. OVER THE PAST TEN MONTHS OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY TO FORMULATE AN APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN THIS TASK, OWING LARGELY TO THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

THE BASIC US APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED THROUGH AN INTENSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE PROCESS OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. IN THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP (SCG) WE HAVE REFINED AND STRENGTHENED THE BASIC ARMS CONTROL APPROACH OF THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS MY GOVERNMENT HAS REVIEWED AND REAFFIRMED THAT APPROACH AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND HAS REACHED CONCLUSIONS ON THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF ALLIED COMMENTS.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER NOTED AT THE LAST SCG THAT TWO MAJOR ISSUES WERE STILL UNDER STUDY. THE FIRST WAS HOW TO FORMULATE A PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS. THE SECOND WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH SHORTER RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS.

IN CONSIDERING THE FIRST OF THESE POINTS, WE HAVE GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT TO THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BROADLY BY THE ALLIES REGARDING THE CRITICAL NEED TO SECURE PUBLIC SUPPORT BY ADVANCING A POSITION WHICH DRAMATIZES THE FACT THAT OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET BUILD-UP. ACCORDINGLY, WE INTEND TO PROPOSE, IN THE FIRST ROUND OF TNF NEGOTIATIONS, THE DISMANTLING OF THE SS-20'S, AND THE RETIREMENT OF THE SS-4'S AND SS-5'S, IN EXCHANGE FOR WHICH WE SHOULD CANCEL PLANS TO DEPLOY GLCM AND PERSHING II MISSILES.

SECRET

/THE

THE RIGHT HONORABLE                      SECRET  
LORD CARRINGTON KCMG MC PC MP  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT  
LONDON

REGARDING SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, RECENT SCG MEETINGS HAVE PRODUCED A CONSENSUS THAT THESE SYSTEMS COULD SUBSTITUTE FOR LONGER-RANGE MISSILES AND COVER MANY OF THE SAME TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE LIMITED SOMEHOW BY ANY AGREEMENT WHICH CONSTRAINED LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS. THE ALLIES FELT STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO LIMIT THESE SYSTEMS WITH THE AGGREGATE LIMITS ON LONGER-RANGE MISSILES. WE HAVE OURSELVES NOW CONCLUDED THAT IT IS BEST TO SEEK SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS ON THESE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS.

WE BELIEVE THAT, WITH THESE ELEMENTS, OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IS STRONG AND CONVINCING. I WANT TO STRESS, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT WE WILL APPROACH THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH. THUS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE ANY CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS TO ELABORATE OUR OWN. AS THE NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOP, WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE THE INTENSE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE FORMULATED OUR POSITION TO DATE.

IN ADDITION TO OFFERING THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE, THE CONDUCT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE A PART OF A BROADER EFFORT TO SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE IS COMMITTED TO ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND IS ACTIVELY PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOUR AND MILITARY PROGRAMS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL MAKE A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. HE WILL PRESENT OUR BASIC AIMS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO OUR OFFER TO CANCEL OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IF THE SOVIETS ELIMINATE THEIR CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES, AS I HAVE EXPLAINED ABOVE. HE WILL EMPHASIZE THE US COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, AND OUR GENUINE DESIRE FOR PROGRESS. THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH HIS PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE, WILL PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE EMBARK UPON THIS ENDEAVOR.

-2-  
SECRET

/I HAVE

SECRET

I HAVE ASKED LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER AND RICHARD BURT TO MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE TO YOU TO LAY OUT IN GREATER DETAIL OUR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESPOND TO ANY INQUIRIES YOU MAY HAVE. I TRUST YOU WILL FIND THAT THE CONCLUSIONS WE HAVE REACHED ARE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR VIEWS AND WILL EARN YOUR FULL SUPPORT. THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF WE HAVE SOLID ALLIANCE BACKING FROM START TO FINISH. NO LESS CRITICAL FOR SUCCESS WILL BE THE CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, WHICH WE MUST ALL MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR CAN BE ALTERED ONLY AS THE RESULT OF A CONCRETE AGREEMENT.

THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NO DOUBT TEST OUR RESOLVE AS WELL AS OUR INGENUITY. WITH YOUR SUPPORT I AM SURE THE CHALLENGE WILL BE MET.

SINCERELY

ALEXANDER M HAIG JR

BUTLER

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DEF D  
PS  
PS/PUS.  
SIR A ACLAND  
MR GILLMORE

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SECRET

Foreign Ad

GPS 240

SECRET

S E C R E T

DESKBY 171900Z

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 171710Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 4312 OF 17 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BONN PRIORITY BRUSSELS THE HAGUE ROME

LKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 926 (NOT TO ALL): TNE

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF MR HAIG'S LETTER TO YOU DATED 16 NOVEMBER, GIVEN TO YOU IN BRUSSELS TODAY BY EAGLEBURGER.
2. EAGLEBURGER EXPLAINED THAT THE SAME LETTER HAD BEEN GIVEN TO GENSCHER IN BONN AND WAS BEING PASSED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH TOMORROW WOULD CONTAIN A PASSAGE ON THE SAME THEME, AFTER WHICH THE UNITED STATES HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FROM ITS ALLIES. GENSCHER, AFTER CONSULTING SCHMIDT, HAD TOLD EAGLEBURGER THAT THE FRG COULD ACCEPT AND BACK THE POSITION WHICH THE UNITED STATES WAS NOW TAKING UP.
3. YOU SAID THAT YOU RECOGNISED THE STRONG POLITICAL CASE FOR THE "ZERO OPTION" APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD LEAD TO DISAPPOINTMENT IF PUBLIC HOPES WERE NOT REALISED. THERE WERE ALSO CERTAIN OBJECTIONS OF SUBSTANCE. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THESE POINTS WERE WELL UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON, NOT LEAST BY HAIG. AGAINST THIS, THERE WAS THE RISK OF A DEFEAT FOR THE DECISION TO DEPLOY A NEW LRTNF ON THE NATO SIDE. THE UNITED STATES TOOK THIS RISK SO SERIOUSLY THAT IT HAD DECIDED TO MAKE THE MOVE OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

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SIR A ACLAND  
MR GILLMORE

SECRET