

*I will see A do - Griffiths myself
first not.*

Prime Minister

You have sent an interim reply to Mr. Griffiths (attached). FLAG A //

SECRET

2. Do you want to have a meeting with Mr. Whitelaw and Mr. Pym (para. 17 below)

MR. COLES

- or would you like to postpone till next month?

AJC 29/4

A Research Group under Mr. Eldon Griffiths MP made proposals to the Prime Minister on 14th December for improving the United Kingdom's contribution to the countering of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, and to the projection of the Western case.

2. I am very sorry that it has taken me so long to follow up my preliminary comment (my minute of 22nd December 1981, Ref. A06998).

The Report of the Research Group

3. The introduction to the report (pages 1-4) analyses the problem: the volume of resources and the high degree of co-ordination of the Soviet propaganda effort, as against the "fragmented and feeble manner" in which the Western case is projected. The next sections describe the Soviet challenge (pages 4-7) and the Western response (pages 7-9). That section regrets the disbandment in 1977 of the Information Research Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (of which one member of the Group, Mr. Ray Whitney MP, was at one time the head). It suggests that our existing information services are on the defensive, where what is needed is a positive and sustained counter-offensive.

4. The Group's proposals (pages 9-23) envisage the establishment, preferably in the Cabinet Office rather than the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), of a new Information Projection Group (IPG), consisting of a Research Adviser (Under Secretary), about a dozen high-quality staff seconded from Whitehall, and some people from outside the Civil Service as non-executive directors. It would draw on governmental and non-governmental sources of information; it would supply helpful information to the domestic media; and it would collaborate both with non-governmental organisations in the United Kingdom and with comparable agencies in other Western countries, notably in the United States and West Germany.

5. Mr. Griffiths's Group reluctantly recognises that the existence of the IPG could not be kept secret, and therefore propose a low-key announcement of the setting up of the IPG "as part of a routine reorganisation of the information functions of the Cabinet Office machinery under the auspices of the Lord President of the Council".

SECRET

6. The proposal is followed by a discussion of targets:
 - (i) United Kingdom domestic institutions, notably the media.
 - (ii) Other Western countries.
 - (iii) Public opinion in the Eastern bloc and the Third World.

In the second and third of these targets the IPG would be in support and under control of the FCO.

7. There is a long discussion (pages 14-18) of the "information technology" which is or is becoming available and should be used. Finally, there is a discussion of themes: briefly to emphasise the philosophical and practical benefits of living in the West, and to demolish the tenets of Marxist doctrine and policy and counter Soviet propaganda in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

Comment on the Report

8. I have discussed these proposals with Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office officials. There is general agreement that the analysis of Soviet aims and methods is sensible and the objectives are commendable; the question is how much the Government can or should try to do in this regard.

9. The Griffiths Group dismisses too lightly what is already being done. The Information Research Department of the FCO was disbanded as such in 1977, but a lot of information work continues to be done, both at home and abroad, through Ministerial and diplomatic briefings, FCO background briefs and the BBC External Services (for the improvement of whose audibility there is, as the Prime Minister knows, a capital programme). The FCO and MOD are undertaking a comprehensive programme of briefings and publications on arms control and disarmament questions, aimed particularly at the "peace movements" and related organisations.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

SECRET

10. No doubt we could do more than we do, if the Government thought that radically increased effort of this kind was needed and would be a good use of public money, and was prepared to face the political criticism to which such an overtly propaganda effort would give rise. Even if funds were available, benefits could not be reaped quickly, since careful preparation of new outlets would be necessary.

11. As to finance, an IPG of the size and sort proposed would not come cheap. With a staff of about 12 high-quality civil servants, and a group of outside consultants and advisers, manpower costs could be upwards of £200,000; management costs - commissioning material and so on - and the exploitation of the instruments of information technology could easily take the total cost up to £1 million, even for a quite modest effort, and an effort on the scale envisaged by the Griffiths Group could cost substantially more than that. Unless the money were to come out of the Contingency Reserve, on which there are already plenty of competing claims, there would have to be counter-vailing reductions elsewhere in public expenditure. We certainly could not find sums of this order from the Cabinet Office vote; nor could the FCO find them from theirs.

12. As to political criticism, the old IRD was disbanded because, in the wake of the exposure of the operations of the CIA, some of the IRD's clandestine activities became the subject of probing by investigative journalists; because the resulting disclosures were embarrassing, and as part of the reductions in public expenditure which were then being enforced, the then Government decided to close down the IRD as such and discontinue much of its work. The resumption of work on the lines suggested would excite a great deal of critical political and journalistic interest and attention, particularly if the new IPG was operating in the domestic field more extensively than the old IRD did.

13. If such a Group were to be set up, careful consideration would be needed as to where to locate it. If in the FCO, it would have to be presented as aimed at overseas opinion. Any FCO work aimed at domestic opinion needs to be overt and low profile if it is to avoid sales resistance and the attention of investigative journalists. If it was in the Cabinet Office, it would

SECRET

be widely seen as linked to the Cabinet Office's intelligence and security interests, and that would intensify speculation and suspicion about the involvement of the intelligence and security agencies in collecting information for propaganda activities rather than for intelligence and security purposes.

Conclusions

14. There is (as the Griffiths Group expected) hesitation over this idea among officials. So far as the "home base" is concerned, there is room for doubt about the need for and value of a greatly increased effort by the Government: British public opinion and the media are not such gullible victims of Soviet propaganda as all that. So far as effort overseas is concerned, clearly it would be possible to do more, if the Government was so minded; but it is arguable that the combination of cost and political vulnerability makes this a relatively low priority for additional Government expenditure on the scale that would be implied.

15. The Prime Minister will want not to return a totally negative reply to the Griffiths Group. Mr. Griffiths's letter of 14th December asks her to let the Group come and see her to discuss the subject: I do not know whether she will wish to do so. Whether she responds orally or in writing, the Prime Minister might say that the Government agrees with a great deal of the Group's analysis and recognises the importance of the objectives, that (as the Group recognises) there is already a certain amount of effort in Government, which is not (as they imply) solely defensive, that the Government does not feel able to embark on a scheme so ambitious and expensive as the Group has proposed, but that she has asked the Ministers concerned to consider whether more can be done within what is budgetarily feasible to reinforce the Government's efforts both on the exposure of Soviet propaganda and on the presentation of the Western, and specifically the British, case.

16. If the Prime Minister decided to respond accordingly, this could be worked up either into a speaking brief (if she agreed to see the Group) or into a letter to be sent to Mr. Griffiths in reply.

SECRET



SECRET

17. The Prime Minister may like to discuss this with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to whose Private Secretaries this minute is being copied; and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could well be with the Prime Minister, if and when she decides to meet the Group.

18. As this minute has been so long delayed, for which I once again apologise, the Prime Minister may feel that she should send an interim reply to Mr. Griffiths. I attach a draft.

19. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

RA

Robert Armstrong

5th April 1982

Foreign Policy 13



Prime Minister
A useful summary of what
the F/C.O. is doing, and
could do, in this field.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH
No further action
as per ABC 20/1
B.U. 5 1/2

A.S.C. 30
7

28 July 1982

Dear Sir,

I will have to
consider further

Report of Research Group under Mr Eldon Griffiths MP
on the Projection of the Western Case

during the
recus. mtg

(attached)

Mr Pym has studied Mr Griffiths' Report and seen your minutes of 24 May and 15 July to Sir R Armstrong giving the Prime Minister's initial views and the result of her meeting on 13 July with Mr Griffiths. The following are our comments.

The Report's analysis of Soviet aims and methods is excellent. We agree with the description of the dangers of Soviet propaganda. While its success rate is far from perfect, we must acknowledge the vast resources used to promote it.

I attach at Annex A a summary of what we are already doing to combat this in the overt field, which must always be the main battleground. Within our existing resources we could if necessary concentrate even more on information work against the USSR, although this would have to be at the expense of other high priority work. We must clearly preserve the capability for dealing with other targets where the national interest is deeply involved: there will, for example, be a continuing need for a vigorous information effort in support of our fight against the IRA; and we need to be able to cope at short notice with new targets such as Argentina.

At Annex B I list some priorities for increased activity in the Information field if further resources were made available on the lines recommended in the Report. Taken together, these would enhance our capability in the area of most concern to Mr Griffiths and his group.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Mr Pym does not believe that a large new 'Information Projection Group' (IPG) in the Cabinet Office would be the

/best



best way of meeting the threat which the Griffiths Group describes. It might even be counter-productive. A more effective step might be to give the Lord President of the Council a special Adviser to help him coordinate the Government's information work in this field. It would be wrong for the FCO to take the lead in any anti-Soviet publicity aimed at the Report's main target, which is the UK domestic audience. The FCO's proper concern should be confined to the other targets mentioned - the West, the Warsaw Pact countries and the Third World. Our official information work can be particularly effective in the Third World. In the Warsaw Pact countries the BBC External Services have a major role to play.

Then why does the F.O. send people on year's sabbaticals?

The FCO's Information work has suffered more than most activities from manpower and public expenditure cuts. We believe that it was right to make economies in this area, given that other aspects of our work often enjoyed higher priority. For the future, we believe that it is more productive to continue to get our message across discreetly through the media, and without the creation of new machinery, which would be likely to become conspicuous. The proposals at Annex B require additional manpower and money. Neither can be found from our existing resources. If we were to proceed on the basis of these proposals new resources would have to be made available.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sir R Armstrong and John Halliday (Home Office).

Yours ever,
J.P.F.

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street

EXISTING INFORMATION WORK FOR WHICH FCO IS RESPONSIBLE

I. BBC External Services

Annual cost (1982/83) £68 million plus £13 million for Relay Stations operated by FCO = £81 million.

Total staff 3,180.

This is our main resource both in expenditure terms and in impact.

725 hours are broadcast weekly in English and 36 vernacular languages. The BBC Monitoring Service closely monitors Soviet and other broadcasts.

Though the Report speaks of 'recent cuts' in services to Western Europe, net expenditure on the External Services has substantially increased to improve audibility. Whilst the Report speaks of expanding services it also suggests the BBC has been infiltrated by 'committed denigrators of British and Western values', and says constant vigilance would be needed to combat this and to monitor the BBC's output. Given the BBC's fiercely guarded independence it would be likely to refuse to participate in any IPG in the way the Report hopes. Its reputation rests on its balanced reporting which is why the proportion of time given to our opponents' views sometimes seems excessive. The Report rightly stresses the BBC's obligation 'to plan programmes in the national interest', and in spite of its editorial freedom we could step up the briefing we offer on the Soviet threat and do more to monitor the BBC's output.

II. Central Office of Information (COI)

About £13 million of the COI's total budget is sponsored by FCO and some 500 of its staff are concerned in the overseas information effort. Roughly two-thirds of this effort is devoted to export promotion, a ratio which could only be changed with Department of Trade agreement. The COI is mainly a technical agency which distributes factual material, eg Ministerial statements, and arranges exhibitions, visits to the UK etc. Apart from its five London press service correspondents it has traditionally done little direct 'political' work. But in the last three years it has produced two successful films on Afghanistan and others on Northern Ireland and the Falklands. It has also helped produce material on arms control (drafted in FCO and MOD) for distribution to schools etc. It commissions features for publication overseas which have become more political of late.

Who is in charge of this in the FCO? i.e. what is the role?

P.D. referred - last deleted.

/III

WZ



III FCO Departments

Approximately 100 staff costing £1.2 million are directly involved in information work in FCO. The main work is done by News Department (12 staff), Information Department (80 staff) and Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU - 4 staff). News Department deals with the press, by holding a daily on the record Press Conference, and conducting regular intensive background briefings. In Information Department there are 15 staff in the Special Producer Unit (SPU) - see Annex C; 12 dealing with sponsored visitors; 33 involved in servicing overseas posts, BBC and COI finances and clerical support; and 20 providing guidance to Posts including about 80 'background briefs' per year for distribution at home and abroad and about 20 unattributable papers, for abroad only. The majority of these papers are designed to combat Soviet propaganda and cover the themes listed on pages 19 and 20 of the Report. Information Department has a budget of £1.1 million per annum which covers the FCO's subscription to Reuters, the inward sponsored visits programme, information equipment for Posts and Wilton Park (where conferences are held involving opinion formers from other Western countries). ACDRU services the MOD/FCO Ministerial information effort over arms control.

IV. FCO Posts Abroad

All Heads of Mission are personally engaged in Information work (viz Sir N Henderson's many TV appearances during the Falklands crisis). There are 37 full-time information officers (of whom two are DS4 rank), 30 who spend half or more of their time on information and 76 who spend less than half. They are supported by nearly 400 locally-engaged staff. The total cost is about £3.9 million. More than half the work involves export promotion. There is a continuing need to portray the UK as an economically sound partner and to dispel false impressions about race relations, strikes, riots etc. Much use is made of FCO material exposing Soviet imperialism. There is increasingly less of a formal division between information work and the other work of a Post abroad. Information staff abroad have declined by about two-thirds since 1969.

PROPOSALS FOR AN INCREASED OVERSEAS INFORMATION EFFORT

(corresponding proposals in Mr Griffiths' report in brackets)

Two DS4 Information Counsellors in Bonn and Brussels (NATO/Embassy) to supplement existing DS5 and DS6 for better projection of Western case in allied countries; the Report stressed the need to coordinate action with the US (who are active in NATO) and the FRG (A(x) p 11 and B, foot of p 13).

Five DS5 Information Officers to publicise Soviet threat in selected other posts where grading is lower or part time; this follows up the previous proposal and the objective of loosening the hold of Moscow's propaganda in the Third World (B, p 13 and 14).

One DS5 officer to join Information Department Visits Section and organise 'Outward Visits' to Third World (B, p 14).

One DS officer to help and supervise the COI's 'London Correspondents' Service' in their arrangements for overseas press correspondents in London and in provision of briefing; we agree it is vital to provide more information to London-based media (B, p 14).

A £300,000 pa 'Contingency Fund' for FCO to sponsor increases in BBC language services on a temporary basis when required, eg to Poland: the sum would finance about 12 extra hours per week of programmes which the Report calls 'a vital element in the information war' (C(i), p 15).

Bringing forward the BBC capital programme by £1.5 million pa in each of the next 4 years would enable the Hong Kong and Seychelles relay stations mentioned in the Report to be completed by 1986/87 instead of 1988/89 as planned (c(i), p 15).

One DS5S 'BBC Liaison Officer' to coordinate briefing of External Services and monitor their output so as to report to Ministers on the BBC's success 'in planning and preparing its programmes in the national interest' (C(i), p 16).

Increase the present FCO Sponsored Visits allocation of £300,000 pa to £400,000 to allow a rise in Category I (fares-paid) visitors from 250 pa to 300 and permit up to 10 outward speakers visits; the main target would be Third World journalists who would be shown the 'philosophical and practical benefits of living in the West' as opposed to the 'failures and duplicities in Soviet policy' (D, p 18).

(The staffing proposals would cost about £200,000 pa.)

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
Foreign
AD E/W

① N. G. G. M. 22/7.
② file

NOTE FOR THE FILE (WITH C.F.)

PROJECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE

Eldon Griffiths Secretary rang today to say that when he saw the Prime Minister she suggested that there should be a lunch during the recess with his Committee members. The Secretary wanted us to know that Mr. Griffiths would be in the States between 18 August and 15 September. He would then be abroad again between 2 October and 13 October. Could we please bear these dates in mind if we arrange a lunch.



27 July 1982



Foreign Ad ^{ATG}

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

REPORT OF RESEARCH GROUP UNDER MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS MP ON THE PRO-
JECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE

Would you please refer to my minute of 24 May.

The Prime Minister held a meeting with Mr. Eldon Griffiths on 13 July to discuss his Report. No conclusions were reached. The Prime Minister said she would wish to reflect further on the Group's recommendations during the holiday period, and that she might wish to hold a lunch for a small number of people to discuss how the recommendations could be carried forward.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Halliday (Home Office) and Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

15 July 1982

RESTRICTED AND PERSONAL



MISS STEPHENS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Carline

Mr. Coles.

June - to
30 minutes.

① How urgent is the meeting with Eldon?

MR 25/5

② How long had it last?

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

cl.

REPORT OF RESEARCH GROUP UNDER MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS, MP
ON THE PROJECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE

The Prime Minister has now been able to consider your minute of 5 April.

With regard to your paragraphs 15-17, the Prime Minister has decided that as a first step she will discuss the report with Mr. Eldon Griffiths. She may then wish to discuss it with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. In her comments on your minute the Prime Minister indicated that she was not altogether content with the line suggested in the last sentence of your paragraph 15.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Halliday (Home Office) and Mr. Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

24 May 1982

A. J. COLES

CF

arranged for 15.45 on June 22nd at H/C.

cl. 25/5



10 DOWNING STREET

July 1951

There was a minute from Sir R. Armstrong, suggesting a reply from the PM to Mr. E. J. Kelly - I submitted it to the P.M.

Pl. attach.

A.S.C. $\frac{13.}{5}$

2/11

The above was submitted to the PM on 30/4/51 and according to our records is still with him.

Caroline

Can you help pl?


Alan
13/5
AL $\frac{13.}{5}$

John Coles

THE PROJECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE -
PROFESSOR LORD THOMAS AND MR ELDON GRIFFITHS MP

- rpm*
1. The above Report ^{*rpm*} was sent to the Prime Minister in November or December 1981.
 2. I had the impression (I may be wrong about this) that you had asked the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence to comment on the Report.
 3. Would you be kind enough, please, to let me know the position?

13th May 1982


IAN GOW

John Could you let Iain
know about this?

Lesson 21/6

Thomas

Duty Clerk

Please attach previous

Mr. A. J. C. 21/6

John Coles

THE PROJECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE -
PROFESSOR LORD THOMAS AND MR ELDON GRIFFITHS MP

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13th May 1982

IAN GOW

Foreign Policy

MR. GOW

MR. HOWE

John Coles assures me that the attached letter is nothing to do with him. It has neither been replied to nor dealt with. Could whoever submitted the Study Group Paper from Hugh Thomas to the Prime Minister please cope?

CAROLINE STEPHENS

5 May 1982


G. R. Urban
18 Palmeira Court
14 Palmeira Square
Hove, Sussex
England
Tel. (0273) 773601

2nd May 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

Permit me to congratulate you on your superb leadership in the Falklands' crisis. Britain's readiness to stand up for freedom, self-determination and democracy has been challenged and not found wanting. Not since the Second World War has our reputation in the world stood so high. What defeatist rhetoric exists inside the country comes from the unrepresentative quarters of Anthony Wedgewood Benn and, on a different level, from BBC Television - as you did, I think, yourself experience in terms of the questions you were asked in last week's 'Panorama' interview.

Some weeks ago Hugh Thomas submitted to you, on behalf of our Study Group at the Centre for Policy Studies, a paper on Information Policy which I had originally drafted. When the present crisis is over, it would be a privilege to have your reactions, if any, and perhaps to explore with you whether we could be of any further assistance.

Yours sincerely


(George Urban)

The Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP, PC,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.



Foreign Policy
cc 69
H0
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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 April 1982

Dear Eldon,

I am sorry that it has taken me so long to reply to the letter which you wrote to me on 14 December, enclosing the report of a Research Group under your chairmanship on the projection of the Western case.

I am very grateful to you and your colleagues on the Group for all the work that has gone into the report and I have read it with much interest. You will not be surprised to hear that there is much in the analysis with which I agree. The specific proposals you have made are not so straightforward, however, and require careful thought. We are still studying them, and I will get in touch with you again, I hope before too long, when I am able to give you a considered comment on them.

Yours
Lester

Raymond

Eldon Griffiths, Esq., M.P.

—

JK



mk

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I think you have the paper from
Dr. George Hoban.

2. You saw the earlier one from
Eldon Griffiths over Christmas. We are
awaiting Sir Robert Armstrong's considered
advice on it.

A. J. C. $\frac{12}{3}$

~~Caroline~~
C. W. 13

A. J. C. $\frac{15}{3}$



Mar. 10, 1982.

My dear Caroline,

I wonder if you could arrange to
give the enclosed minute to
the Prime Minister.

Yours ever
Hugh

Prime Minister



Information policy; countering Soviet propaganda etc

You have received, I think, a paper from Dr. George Urban about the desirability of a sustained new look at information policy, principally in consequence of increased investment in this zone of operations by the Soviet Union.

Dr. Urban's paper, written after consultation with our group at the Centre (Leonard Schapiro et al.), echoes the recommendations of the study group of the Research Dept., which was chaired by Eldon Griffiths, & whose report you also saw.

All concerned, in both these cases, look on something along these lines as really important.

We must anticipate a new wave of "peace" propaganda from Easter onwards, deriving from those who are the unconscious or willing tools of Soviet policy.

President Reagan's visit will obviously be a target for demonstrations.

As you know, US opinion can be excessively influenced by televised showings of European rows - e.g. the riots against Secretary of State Haig.

I do hope that you will tell me if I can help any further in the development of the ideas contained in these two papers.

Hugh Thomas
March 10, 1982.

010

IN CONFIDENCE

Foreign Policy



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~938 7022~~ 218 6169

D/S of S/20/82

29th January 1982

A.S.C. 2/2
f.a.

Dear Mike,

I enclose a copy an exchange of correspondence which my Secretary of State has had with Eldon Griffiths MP who had sent Mr Nott a copy of the report of the committee he chaired to consider ways of improving the presentation of the Western case. My Secretary of State did not, of course, comment on the report which has been submitted formally to the Prime Minister but has asked me nonetheless to draw your attention to this personal exchange.

I understand that the Secretary of the Cabinet has been asked to advise the Prime Minister on the form of reply she should send to Mr Griffiths, and I am, therefore, copying this letter and enclosures to David Wright.

Yours ever,
Alec Phipps

(D T PIPER)

M A Pattison Esq

IN CONFIDENCE

PERSONAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000 6169
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218

D/S of S/20/82

27th January 1982

Dear Eldon .

Thank you so much for sending me a copy of the report prepared under your chairmanship into ways of better projecting the Western case.

I entirely agree with you that this is a vitally important subject and, for my part, I welcome much of what you have said. Your report quite rightly goes well beyond purely defence issues but of particular concern to me - and your report mentions this - has been the re-emergence of the CND with the implication that it and it alone is out to promote peace and that everything we and our Allies have been doing is designed to promote war. Peter Elaker has, as you know, made considerable headway in countering the CND fallacies, and we have produced some, I think, very valuable information fact sheets and brochures. I expect you have seen many of them but I attach a complete set. The Central Office of Information are also close to finishing an audio-visual presentation, which we commissioned and which our supporters up and down the country could use when speaking to groups about our nuclear defence policy. We are also hard at work on a film which would explain our policy in a way which the ordinary man in the street would readily understand.

1

Eldon Griffiths Esq MP

PERSONAL

PERSONAL



I note that you have formally submitted your report to the Prime Minister and I must, of course, leave it to her to comment on it and the recommendations it makes. I am, however, showing your report to Peter Blaker and my other Ministers here in case we can learn something from it ourselves.

Yours ever

John

John Nott

FROM: Eldon Griffiths, M.P.



Liberal

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Dear John

January, 1982.

Last March, Research Department asked me to form a Research Group to report to the Prime Minister on why the Soviet Union appears to be doing so much better than the NATO countries in the propaganda war, and to make proposals as to how Britain can improve its "projection of the Western case".

This work has now been completed and sent to Number 10. I attach a copy of our Report and Recommendations, together with a number of technical annexes, background papers etc. for your information.

My Research Group included military, diplomatic, industrial and technical experts, as well as academics and politicians. I believe the subject is vital and I hope you may feel able to read our paper through.

[Handwritten signature]

The Rt. Hon. John Nott, M.P.
Secretary of State,
Department of Defence,
Main Building,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

IN FEB 1961

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

CONFIDENTIAL

VLB

FILE

MR. WRIGHT
CABINET OFFICE

Proposal for a New "Information Projection Group"

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to John Coles of 22 December, reference A06998. She notes that Sir Robert will be discussing Mr. Eldon Griffiths' letter with the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and that he will submit considered advice and a draft reply to Mr. Griffiths after that discussion.

w f s rickett

24 December 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

9.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

" Information Projection Group "

The letter from Mr. Eldon

Siffitts at Flag A asks you to
look at the report prepared by his
group on improving the presentation of
the Western case in the propaganda
war with the Soviet Union.

2. As the report is long, the recess
may be your best opportunity.

3. I attach at Flag B a
preliminary comment by the Cabinet
Secretary. We will let you have a
fuller comment and a reply to Mr.
Siffitts in the New Year.

A.S.C. $\frac{23}{12}$

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A06998

MR. COLES

Proposal for a New "Information Projection Group"

Thank you for your minute of 17th December, enclosing a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Eldon Griffiths MP together with an accompanying report.

2. It will not have escaped your notice that what the report recommends is in fact the reconstitution of the old Information Research Department in the Foreign Office. That did very much the job now proposed for the Information Projection Group. As the report indicates, that particular aspect of the Information Research Department was virtually disbanded in the mid-1970s because, following the exposures of the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States following Watergate, there was unwelcome attention from certain elements in the media and elsewhere which persuaded the then Government that the activities in question had become a liability and should be largely discontinued. There has recently been a revival of that interest, as you will have seen from articles in last Sunday's Observer and in The Guardian of 18th December (copy attached), about which Mr. Fall wrote to you on 18th December.

3. As the report suggests, any activity of this kind, and the existence of a Group to undertake it, is best kept secret. It is something of a tribute to the measures that have been taken by this Government to reinstate some of this activity that it has not come to the attention of any of the members of this Group. But of course the measures taken have been on a relatively small scale.

4. It would no doubt be possible to do more. The limitations are twofold: financial and manpower, and political. Is the Government prepared to find the additional resources required for this kind of activity - which is not cheap - if necessary at the expense of other things? And is the Government prepared to run the political risks of being seen to engage in this kind of activity?

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5. As to the next steps, I propose to show Mr. Griffiths's letter and the accompanying report to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In the light of that I will discuss the matter with him; and I will see that, in the light of that discussion, considered advice both on the substance and on a reply to Mr. Griffiths is submitted.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22nd December, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

How the secret service shaped the news

Few issues of press freedom have aroused so much dissent in the West as UNESCO's current efforts towards a World Information Order. But, at least in the past, there have been instances of Western governments intervening in the running (and in the foundation) of supposedly independent news organisations.

One such instance—involving the British government after the second world war—is reported here by RICHARD FLETCHER who is carrying out research on the media at the North East London Polytechnic. His study was commissioned by UNESCO and submitted to the organisation in an as yet unpublished report.

The Guardian now presents Mr Fletcher's findings, not because it considers the events he chronicles an amazing scandal (many of the people involved believe with reason that they acted patriotically and honourably) but because the story of the British secret intelligence service's involvement in news coverage over three decades, casts light on the UNESCO debate.

Guardian 18/12/81.



Bickham Sweet-Escott "left skeletons in every country"




Maurice Macmillan "thought they were rather a good idea"



Christopher Chancellor "terminated as a matter of principle"



Gerald Long "a perfectly normal contract"



Edward Hulton "agreed lend his name"

FOR MORE than 30 years the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, otherwise known as MI6) controlled a world-wide network of news agencies which, at their peak, had some 250 employees. For 15 years one of these agencies acted as sole agents for Reuters in the Middle East. The whole operation was funded from the Secret Vote, and was latterly controlled by the Information and Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office. It must have cost many millions of pounds, and overshadows any comparable CIA propaganda activities so far revealed. Most of the agencies had been closed by the time the IRD itself was shut down in 1977.

While SIS may occasionally have used the network for its own purposes, it is not claimed that the agencies deliberately distorted the news they put out. But secret government support enabled the British point of view to be heard in areas of the world from which it might otherwise have been absent.

The story — as told for the first time by many of those involved — begins in 1938 when a Daily Mirror journalist, Leslie Sheridan, joined the newly-formed D-Section (D for destruction) of SIS to organise its press operations against the Nazis. Later he was transferred to the organisation set up by Churchill to create havoc behind enemy lines — the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and is credited by Philby and other writers on the subject with recruiting Kim Philby to SIS in 1940.

Starting in the Balkans — according to the late Bickham Sweet-Escott (with Sheridan a deputy head of SOE) and other sources — Sheridan built up a network of agents in the principal neutral cities. By 1941 these included Stockholm, Lisbon, New York and Istanbul. He used old Fleet Street contacts — either given cover by British newspapers or accredited to a bogus news agency, Britanova Ltd. The same sources say that Britanova itself was launched by Sheridan, using secret government funds. Sir Edward Hulton, then editor of Picture Post, told us that he agreed to lend his name as chairman of the agency.

It was an axiom of British propaganda always to tell the truth — but the truth was presented to give the British point of view. Sheridan's agents were primarily journalists — often working 10 or 12 hours a day — and only occasionally were they required to pass on intelligence or plant so-called "sibs." These were strategic rumours cleared at the highest level in London to deceive the Axis powers.

To cover the Middle East and Central Europe, Britanova established the Arab News Agency (ANA) as a branch office in Cairo. Later, the ANA was to grow into one of the largest and most effective news organisations in the Middle East.

The company secretary who filed ANA's annual returns from 1943 to 1970 was Sheridan's secretary at SOE, Adelaide Maturin, whom he married. Nearly all SOE secretaries were demobilised at the end of the war but, according to senior SOE officers, Adelaide Maturin was among those who stayed on and subsequently acted as company secretary of all the news agencies associated with ANA.

Former ANA journalists and directors say that in this capacity she attended board meetings of the news companies, and supervised the preparation and auditing of their accounts for filing at Companies House. She approved budgets for offices at home and in the field and sanctioned expenditure. She arranged senior appointments

and was present at some staff interviews, dealing with the contracts of new and retiring employees, and occasionally arranging for the transfer of staff from government departments. An ANA manager in the field said "in money matters Adelaide Maturin was the boss."

At the end of the war, Bickham Sweet-Escott (who died in November 1981) was given the job of winding up SOE operations in the Middle East. This "thankless task," he said, took him two years, during which time he was attached to MI6 "for pay and rations." He went on to say that, acting on instructions, he left "a skeleton in the cupboard" in every country of the Middle East.

These "skeletons" were handed over to SIS and included the Arab News Agency and Sharq al Adna, one of the most powerful radio stations in the area. Renamed the Near East Arab Broadcasting Station, it beat a hasty retreat from Palestine to Cyprus in 1948. It was a leading instrument of anti-Nasser propaganda in the months before the Suez invasion in 1956 (immediately after which it was wound up).

Sharq al Adna was not part of the news agency network, though it was a subscriber to ANA. It was described recently by a former ANA journalist in Beirut as "a very dirty operation."

Between 1948 and 1953 (as documents at Companies House indicate) the news agency companies were reconstructed. A number of new ones were formed under the umbrella of an organisation called the Near and Far East News Ltd (NAFEN). The secretary of NAFEN was Adelaide Maturin, and the chairman was Tom Clarke, a former editor of the News Chronicle and the deputy director of the news division of the Ministry of Information in 1939-40. Adelaide Maturin is still alive, but Tom Clarke died in 1957.

From 1948 on, the companies' legal papers were

filed by Victor Cannon Brookes, a solicitor who had worked with SOE during the war. With Leslie Sheridan, he was also a director of Ampersand Ltd which specialised in publishing cheap books for the Third World. Ampersand is now known also to have been funded from the Secret Vote through IRD. According to one of Sheridan's fellow directors in Ampersand, IRD's operations were funded by the Secret Vote so as to prevent their being discussed in Parliament.

According to SOE sources, both the Britanova office in Istanbul as well as the Globe News Agency (an offshoot in India) were taken into the NAFEN group. After the partition of India in 1948, the group went on to set up the Star News Agency in Pakistan. This is confirmed by a detailed account of the NAFEN group published in a Unesco survey of the news agencies in 1953. By that time these companies performed the more innocent role of gathering and distributing news.

Unlike Reuters, which was struggling to establish itself in the Middle East after the war, the ANA "skeleton" expanded rapidly. By 1953 the entire NAFEN group (which included the ANA) had some 250 employees. The great majority of them were local nationals, with a handful of Britons in controlling positions. Most employees had no reason to doubt that they were working for bona fide news organisations.

All of these organisations had corporate structures and their records are available at Companies House. Some of the directors and shareholders were well-known public figures. They included Maurice Macmillan (1948-1971), Conservative MP and son of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan; Alan Hare (1948-1969) who worked for the Foreign Office 1947-1961 and is now Chairman of the Financial Times; Conservative and Labour MPs, Cranley Onslow (to 1972) and

Woodrow Wyatt (1952) and R. P. Gibson (1952)—now Lord Gibson, Chairman of the huge holding company, Pearson Longman Ltd.

How were the news agencies funded? The accounts for the various companies—which are available only after 1966—show that total losses up to 1970 amounted to over £100,000 and this was about equal to the total share capital—on which no dividends were ever paid.

But the total amount spent over thirty years must have been very much greater than

Agencies	Estab-lished	Dis-solved
Britanova	1940	1965
Arab News Agency	1943	1972
Near and Far East News Agency (NAFEN)	1948	*
NAFEN (Asia) — including Globe and Star	1949	1978
Arab News Agency (Cairo)	1952	*
Regional News Services (Middle East)	1963	1972
International News, Rights and Royalties	1963	1972
Regional News Services (Latin America)	1964	1973
World Feature Service	1971	*
Africa Features	1970	*

* Date unknown.

this. The accounts show that in some years individual companies spent nearly £50,000 each—for example, on teleprinter equipment alone.

Asked about his shareholding in NAFEN, which had been increased to 21,500 before the group ceased operations about 1970, Maurice Macmillan said he had put up only a small part of the money himself, adding "why should I pry into who chose to provide it."

Commenting on the role of news agencies Mr Macmillan said that he had always

thought that they were in line with government policy. He had thought they were "rather a good idea and would help to get news about Britain into the Middle East."

Nearly every director we spoke to said that he did not pay for his shares. Some said they thought the money had been put up by IRD, others by SIS.

ANA operated the most comprehensive service in English and Arabic available in the Middle East. It had branch offices in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jerusalem and Amman, and representatives in some 15 other cities, including Paris and New York. It was taken by nearly every Arabic newspaper, as well as Sharq al Adna, All-India Radio and the BBC. NAFEN (Asia) had about 100 employees, with a central news office in Bombay, sub-offices in Delhi, Calcutta and Madras and correspondents throughout the Far East. The Star News Agency had a similar spread within Pakistan.

Tom McFadden an American diplomat writing in *Journalism Quarterly* in 1953 says that ANA charged very little for its service and frequently gave it away free. It is not surprising that Reuters found it difficult to compete.

Christopher Chancellor, then General Manager of Reuters, told the Royal Commission on the Press in 1948 that Reuters had received a "disguised subsidy" from the British Government during World War II. This had been terminated as a matter of principle by the board after the war, he said, and Reuters received no preferential treatment from the government.

By 1954 Reuters had made little headway in the Middle East and its losses were mounting. According to Gerald Long (until recently, Reuters Chief Executive, and now Managing Director of Times Newspapers Ltd), Christopher Chancellor negotiated an arrangement with the Foreign Office whereby

ANA was appointed sole agent for distribution of the Reuter service in the Middle East. ANA initially paid Reuters a fee of about £28,000 per annum, which increased over the years.

In addition to the fee, there were further advantages to Reuters. They were spared the costs of distribution in the region. They were also able to draw on ANA staff for the collection of news to be sent to London. The total savings, therefore, were substantial.

Some Reuters staff were transferred to ANA which was then run by Tom Little, an experienced Middle East journalist who was a personal friend of Nasser and other leading personalities in the region. Little was credited with setting up the first teleprinter news service in Arabic.

In 1956, just before the Suez invasion, the ANA office manager in Cairo, James Swinburn was arrested on charges of spying for the British on Egyptian troop movements. He admitted his involvement and was subsequently gaol. One of his Egyptian accomplices was given life imprisonment. Tom Little was able to persuade President Nasser that ANA itself was not involved, and it was allowed to function in Egypt for some years longer. But its head office moved that year to Beirut.

After Suez, ANA changed its name to Regional News Service (Middle East) to avoid difficulties with the Arab League which was considering setting up a truly Arab news service. At the same time the NAFEN group moved their head offices to an annexe of the Reuter building in Fleet Street, and three further news companies were launched by Adelaide Maturin and Victor Cannon Brookes.

Gerald Long said recently (when still at Reuters) that he only became aware of the arrangement with the British Government when he became general manager in 1963. "I didn't like it," he said, "and

determined to put an end to it as soon as possible." But Reuters needed the money so he did not terminate the contract until six years later.

"We weren't in a particularly brilliant financial position in those years," Long recalled, "as any reference to the public record of our finances will show you."

"It was a contract," Mr Long went on, "and, as far as I was concerned, a perfectly normal business contract, and we earned money from it." The reason why he didn't like the arrangement was, he said, a simple one. "There was in it no element of subsidy. There was no attempt or suggestion of an attempt at influence on Reuters. However—and we sell to governments all over the world—I think that since our main headquarters is in London, and given our history as a whole, contracts with the British Government are a little more sensitive than contracts with other governments."

Finally, in July 1969, as a result of negotiations between Long himself and officials at the IRD, Reuters abandoned the link with the Arab News Agency and resumed direct trading in the Middle East. It took over some key ANA personnel, the principal ANA offices in the region, and the teleprinter equipment which had been paid for by the British Government. Reuters also received a sum of money from the Foreign Office, but Gerald Long has not revealed how much. "We relieved the British Government of a heavy loss-making operation," he said.

Tom Little opposed the transfer. He claimed that he had built up a successful service in the Middle East where Reuters had failed, and he did not trust them to maintain his full network. He took no part in the negotiations and resigned soon after saying that ANA had got a very poor deal.

After the Reuter contract ended in 1969 the NAFEN group collapsed and most of its staff were sacked, though some small companies registered by Cannon Brookes lingered on until 1979. These operated primarily in India and Africa.

Reuters and the IRD over the Arab News Agency took place in a grey area of government responsibility. The IRD itself, which by this time had for long controlled the operations of the news agencies, was originally set up by Christopher Mayhew (then a junior minister at the Foreign Office) in 1948. As a result of the Philby affair and other similar incidents, the Foreign Office had lost confidence in the SIS administration which had previously run the news agencies and had begun increasingly to rely on the IRD.

As can now be discovered from many official documents now available (both British and American), the IRD was engaged in covert press and publishing operations throughout the world. And its work, as a note from the British Embassy in Singapore to the State Department in January 1949 makes clear, was from the start "very largely the collecting of anti-communist material and such propaganda and psychological warfare items as have bearing on the Communist effort."

IRD used some of the secret methods of World War Two to fight the Cold War. With Britain's decline as a world power and the growth of detente, IRD's brand of militant anti-communism became increasingly inappropriate. Its operations and its news agencies were gradually run down and it was officially closed by Foreign Secretary David Owen in 1977.

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vb

Foreign Policy

17 December 1981

I write to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 14 December to the Prime Minister. The Report and Recommendations on "Projection of the Western Case" will be brought to the Prime Minister's attention, together with your letter. I am sure that the Prime Minister will want to send you a substantive reply in due course.

AJC

Eldon Griffiths, Esq., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. WRIGHT
CABINET OFFICE

Proposal for a new "Information Projection Group"

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Eldon Griffiths, MP. I also enclose a copy of the report and recommendations and other papers to which he refers.

You will see that the main proposal in this report is contained in the paragraph at the end of page 9. It is that an "Information Projection Group" should be established, perhaps under the aegis of the Cabinet Office.

I have acknowledged Mr. Griffiths' letter. I propose to suggest to the Prime Minister that she looks at the report during the Christmas recess. But I think it would be helpful if it could be accompanied by at least a preliminary comment from the Cabinet Office (which I should need to receive by close of play on 22 December).

It would then be helpful to receive a more considered comment in early January so that the Prime Minister can write to Mr. Griffiths and comment on his suggestion that he should bring the members of the Group to discuss the report with the Prime Minister.

May I leave it to you, in the light of such preliminary advice as the Cabinet Office may wish to offer, to decide when to bring the document to the attention of the Departments concerned.

ATC

17 December 1981

JB

CONFIDENTIAL

Covering: SECRET

FROM: Eldon Griffiths, M.P.

9



1. I.C.

2. AJC

Wa you like to handle?

MAP 16/11/81

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Dear Margaret

14th December, 1981.

Last March, Alan Howarth and Hugh Thomas asked me to form a Research Group to study why the Soviet Union appears to be doing so much better than the NATO countries in the propaganda war, and to make proposals to you as to how Britain can improve its "projection of the Western case".

This work has now been completed. I attach our Report and Recommendations, together with a number of technical annexes, background papers etc. My Research Group included military, diplomatic, industrial and technical experts, as well as academics and politicians.

I hope you may have time, possibly during the recess, to read these proposals. The subject is vital and I hope you may feel able to let us come and see you to discuss it.

Yours
Eldon Griffiths

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
House of Commons,
LONDON, S.W.1.

James Mackenzie
Cockfield

E.C.

K.J.

Robt H

High T

Myer S.

~~William G.~~

Leif Parkins

Anthony Gordon

Douglas Wood

Peter Blaker

Sub.
Targets
Non-targets

THE PROJECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE

- Proposals for a new Information Projection Group -

Members of the Group

Eldon Griffiths, Esq., MP (Chairman)

Michael Clark, Esq., CBE
Professor William Gosling
Norman Reddaway, Esq., CBE
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton
General Sir Harry Tuzo, GCB, OBE, MC
Ray Whitney, Esq., OBE, MP

Robin Turner, Esq. (Secretary)
(Lord Chalfont also advised)

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Table of Contents

1) Introduction	Page 1
2) The Soviet Challenge	Page 4
3) The Western Response	Page 7
<u>- Proposals for Improvement</u>	
A) Organization	Page 9
B) Targets	Page 12
C) Techniques	Page 14
D) Themes	Page 18
4) Conclusion	Page 22

Appendix A - International Communist Front Organizations

Appendix B - Soviet Disinformation Operations

Appendix C - The Contribution of the IRD

Appendix D - The Information Projection Group

Appendix E - The Information Battle and the new technology

THE PROJECTION OF THE WESTERN CASE

"Upon my tongues continued slanders ride,
The which in every language I pronounce,
Stuffing the ears of men with false reports.
I speak of peace while covert enmity
Under the smile of safety wounds the world."
Rumour. Henry IV. Part II

(1) INTRODUCTION

The Western world is losing the propaganda war inside as well as outside the frontiers of most Western nations. The United States and NATO are being projected by Soviet propagandists as the aggressive forces in international affairs, even though the Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan and is massing its forces to intimidate the Poles.

A quarter of a million Germans demonstrate in Bonn against cruise missiles, two years before they are due to be deployed. Yet they appear to be largely unmoved by the Soviet SS20s, which already have been deployed against the West for several years.

The CND assemble 150,000 people in London ostensibly to promote peace and disarmament. Yet their demonstration, or large parts of it, turns out in practice to be almost wholly anti-NATO and anti-American.

Cuban forces in Angola attract little attention. By contrast, the handful of American advisers in El Salvador are represented not only by the Soviet but by the Western media, as a major "imperialist" intervention, thanks to skilful Cuban-inspired disinformation.

.../These

These double standards of perception and portrayal by no means are accidental. They are a measure of the success of Soviet propaganda and its adeptness at exploiting Western society's proclivity to believe the worst of itself. So while the facts of international life are that the Russians talk peace but make war, the impression too often created - and accepted by wide sections of the population of Western Europe and the Third World - is that it is U.S. arms, Western policies, and free market economics that constitute the biggest obstacle to peace, disarmament and the progress of the Third World.

A major reason for this disparity is the disproportionate amount of effort and skill deployed by the Western allies and the Soviet bloc in the battle of ideas and information. The Western case is projected in a fragmented and feeble manner. The propaganda of the Communist powers deploying vastly greater resources and inspired by an unremitting political and ideological will, too often is able to prevail, if only by the West's default.

The Soviet Union enjoys major advantages in the battle of ideas. In spite of its vast territorial annexations during the 19th Century and its surrogate imperialism after the Second World War, it is not associated with a colonialist past in Africa or South Asia, nor with economic dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean. It enjoys a primacy, even among those Marxists who dissent from Soviet policies, as the first - pioneering - revolutionary state. Many leaders of developing countries were attracted in their student days by the ideological appeal of Marxism and now, as political managers anxious to maintain themselves in power, are impressed by the organizational advantages they see in Leninism.

Soviet propaganda similarly benefits from the nature of a Communist society. Because they can suppress dissent, the Soviets are able to present an unambiguous and single minded set of policies, doctrines and ideals. The Western case, by comparison, is at best a kaleidoscope and, more often, a cacophony. The ideological basis of the Communist party provides an evangelical, missionary zeal which, despite the manifest failures of the Soviet system, continues to have a wide appeal, especially to young people and emerging nations. By contrast, the Western world's diverse and sceptical free society inevitably (and properly!) makes it impossible for Western governments to match the relentless quality and ruthless methods of Soviet propaganda. Western parliaments and public opinion tend to regard any Western "propaganda" effort as, at best, of small importance and at worst, as not quite cricket. No such inhibitions restrain the Soviet Union's Agitprop.

The authors of this paper believe that the West, if it is to stay free, must not go on losing the propaganda battle. Unless the contest of ideas is more vigorously fought and won, no amount of armaments and industrial power will save us.

This paper therefore examines first the Soviet propaganda machine and some of its successes, contrasting this with the limits placed by a free society on the Western response.

Secondly, it puts forward recommendations for improvement of the current British effort, specifically by the establishment of a compact and highly professional Information Projection Group (IPG).

.../Thirdly,

Thirdly, it defines the targets to which our revitalised effort should be directed; identifies a number of new developments in information technology which we suggest be mobilised to assist the better projection of the Western case; and finally suggests a number of themes which should be given precedence in the battle of East/West ideas.

(2) THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

The strength of Soviet propaganda is based on two simple premises.

First, that it is preaching revolution against the entrenched privilege of classes or bourgeois States, in the interest of the masses.

Second, that Marx and Lenin between them discovered "the laws of history" and that these make capitalist collapse and Communist triumph inevitable.

Recently, these doctrines have been supplemented by a propaganda offensive designed to appeal to the desire of most people for peace. Though the Soviet Union is the nation most actively increasing its war potential, its propagandists successfully project the peace-loving democracies as brutal and hawkish. Simultaneously by generating hatred of the United States, Soviet propaganda justifies the Kremlin's own policies and shields its own regime from criticism.

.../Mechanics:

Mechanics: From the earliest days of the Russian Revolution the Communist leadership has given the highest priority to propaganda. Policies are determined with an eye to their propaganda impact. Those responsible for Agitprop hold senior positions in the appropriate ministries and are involved in key decisions from the start. The principal instrument of overt Soviet propaganda is the International Information Department of the Communist Party Central Committee. This consists of several units, each responsible for a specific sector of the media. The IID's main purpose is to decide what aspects of Soviet policy should be discussed openly and to plan the presentation of these policies to the various international audiences. (See Footnote.)

Since IID was established in 1978, Soviet propaganda campaigns have been better co-ordinated; its reactions to world events have been faster. Its principal direct public instruments are Soviet radio, the extensive foreign language Soviet press and the TASS and Novosti newsagencies. Radio Moscow broadcasts over 2,000 hours a week, more than any other country, in 84 languages. Moscow Radio's English language service is now on the air 24 hours a day. Novosti's role in placing Soviet propaganda in the western and third world media is no less significant.

A second and sinister layer of Soviet propaganda consists
.../of covert

*Footnote. The Head of the Department is Leonid Zamyatin, a diplomat, whose last job was Director General of TASS. His Deputy is Valentin Falin, a former ambassador. They both travel widely in the Western world, explaining the reasonableness and peaceful objectives of Soviet policy.

of covert propaganda and disinformation orchestrated by Service A of the KGB. This frequently makes use of people with influence in reputable sections of the Western media and non-Communist political parties. Such agents no doubt operate within the present day Labour Party. Universities continue to be a focus for propaganda, agitation and probably Communist talent-spotting.

A third layer of propaganda is provided by a network of Communist front organizations, who receive money from the Soviet Union. There are about a dozen principal front organizations (of which the World Peace Council is the most well-known) and about fifty subsidiary organizations, linked to one of the principal groups. Among these are such disparate bodies as the World Federation of Teachers Unions, the Interpress Graphic Club, and the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces. For a full list of these front organizations, see Appendix A.

Western Susceptibilities: Soviet propaganda is adept at making use of the rich veins of guilt, fear, naivety and Christian idealism that permeate western society. Communist propaganda has tapped these for all they are worth, for example over Vietnam, Chile, South Africa and Zionism. But the softest underbelly in the West is the yearning of its people for peace, their widespread fear of war. Hence Soviet propaganda's heavy concentration on the West's military forces, especially on its nuclear weapons.

In this field one great achievement of Soviet propaganda was to pressurize President Carter into suspending production of the neutron bomb in 1978. Since then, President Reagan's decision to resume development and to stockpile neutron weapons in the

.../United

United States has obliged Moscow to start its campaign all over again. Simultaneously, every organ of Soviet propaganda is now beamed against NATO's decision to deploy cruise missiles in Europe. This campaign could well succeed in preventing these missiles from being installed in Belgium, the Netherlands and possibly in West Germany. Should the Labour Party win the next General Election the same could happen in Britain.

The Soviets have invested huge sums in these anti-weapon campaigns. The CIA estimates the total Soviet budget for propaganda and covert action at not less than \$3,000 million per year, and that in 1979, \$200 million were spent in special propaganda campaigns, including opposition to NATO theatre nuclear force modernisation.

The Soviet Union is also constantly seeking to manipulate Western public opinion and to undermine confidence in the institutions and traditions of the Free World. The Soviet Union has exploited books and plays designed to denigrate such pillars of Western society as the Pope, the Royal Navy, Winston Churchill etc. Forgeries are regularly produced as a means of influencing opinion in favour of Soviet policies; for example, when the Kremlin was seeking to prevent German accession to NATO, the staff working in East Germany on the forging and dissemination of documents designed to alarm the rest of Europe was estimated at 1,000. For some examples of such Soviet efforts to subvert Western opinion, see Appendix B.

(3) THE WESTERN RESPONSE

Inevitably, the United States with its vastly greater resources, including USICA and a reformed CIA, is bound to play the largest part

.../in the

in the West's response to Soviet propaganda. But Britain has long enjoyed a high reputation among its allies for projecting the Western case in an effective manner, and the authors believe that we can, and should, play a more active role in doing this.

One of the main obstacles is that there no longer exists in Whitehall any structure capable of supplementing our existing mainly responsive set-up. This has been the case since the disbandment of the Information Research Department of the FCO (see Appendix C for details of the contribution of IRD).

To project the British and the western case we seem to rely almost exclusively on traditional methods - diplomatic briefings and contacts, COI publications, cultural activities and the BBC External Services. Supplementing these there is the hope that the British Council and our UK aid programme also help our cause. Our European partners, who in the past regarded us as the unrivalled specialists in the sphere of unorthodox information, do little more. Soviet Agitprop therefore enjoys a more or less clear field.

We do not in any way wish to decry the valuable defensive work performed by our existing information services. It may be that special information operations are still mounted on particular occasions, and that, sometimes, these efforts can bring valuable results. But such ventures are no substitute for methodical and sustained work by specialists in the face of the Soviets' increasingly successful efforts to force the West onto the defensive, and to suborn the people of Western Europe as well as those in the Third World. The present British effort simply does not measure up to the scale of the challenge, let alone to the needs of the hour. The Western case needs to be, and in our view can be, projected in a much more

.../effective

effective manner - by a positive, sustained and selectively hardhitting counter-offensive.

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT

A) Organization

The first need is for the Government to accept that when Soviet leaders say that during detente "the ideological struggle must continue", they mean it. It follows, in our view, that Ministers should commit themselves to providing the willpower and the resources to revive and maintain a positive counter-attack - against the Soviets, in favour of Western values.

The basis for any sustained projection of the western position by the United Kingdom must be a specialist group in Whitehall. We see no need to re-establish the large research element of the former IRD; but the thirty years experience of that body provides valuable evidence of the organization that is required, and which ought to be brought back into use.

Accordingly we recommend:

i) That a new Information Projection Group (IPG) be established. Since its activities would have to be inter-departmental, it would be preferable for the new group to be placed under the aegis of the Cabinet Office, rather than the Foreign Office, particularly as its work must extend to the home base.

.../ii)

ii) An official with a proven track record in this sort of work and with considerable experience of Whitehall should be appointed to take charge. He should be an Assistant Under Secretary and might be known as the Research Adviser.

iii) The Research Adviser would need the patronage of a senior Minister (presumably the Minister responsible for Information) and the continuing interest, stimulus and support of a suitable junior minister. He would maintain close contact with the No. 10 Press Office.

iv) About a dozen staff should initially be assembled by secondment of existing personnel in Whitehall at minimal additional cost.

v) Some personnel from outside the Civil Service should be co-opted as helpers in association with relevant organizations. For convenience we describe these as non-executive directors. Where possible these should be under 35 and not marked by the failures of recent years. They should be knowledgeable about the peace movements, arms control/weapons, Soviet propaganda methods, public relations and the new communications technology (see below).

vi) The IPG must consist of high quality personnel. It is essential to avoid mistakes which would discredit the operation at any early stage.

vii) The IPG would need authority to draw on research and information facilities within different ministries and from outside bodies.

.../viii)

viii) Apart from working for ministers the IPG would have the task of ensuring that the right information reached the right publicists in the right form at the right speed. Particularly, we have in mind the need to ensure that helpful information reaches our domestic media and hence is reflected abroad.

ix) The IPG would collaborate with individual and non-governmental organizations anxious to act in the public interest - foundations, business associations, research institutes and other groups.

x) The IPG would seek to co-ordinate joint action with relevant agencies in those Western countries, prepared to act in this field - notably the United States (which has shown a much greater concern with countering Soviet propaganda in recent months) and West Germany.

xi) Ideally, it would be best if the existence of this group were kept secret, but this is probably impractical. Therefore we suggest an initial low-key announcement, preferably in connection with other changes in Whitehall organization, presenting the new appointments as part of a routine reorganization of the information functions of the Cabinet Office machinery under the auspices of the Lord President of the Council. (These proposals are further set out in Appendix D.)

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There is some precedent for these proposals. During the 'Approach to Europe' from June 1970 to October 1971, Mr. Whitelaw and Sir Anthony Royle provided the political authority for a highly

.../successful

successful effort on behalf of EEC membership. The proposal for a Research Adviser in the Cabinet Office was ministerially approved in late 1973. But it was discarded when the election of February 1974 was announced.

We expect that there will be hesitation over this idea from those who believe that what is now being done in the propaganda field is adequate. Even the suggestion of stepping up, or institutionalizing our effort may well provoke opposition. There will be attacks on the project, organized by fellow travellers to whom something about it, sooner or later, is almost bound to be leaked. But in our view the necessity for action is acute and should be overriding. Moreover, there is nothing inherently difficult or costly about reviving or recasting arrangements which have proved effective in the past. If ministers are prepared first to establish a Research Adviser and a small team and second to ensure that Ministries co-operate, the IPG could be assembled within three months of a decision being taken. Specific and beneficial results would begin to be felt both internationally and domestically within 6 months to a year.

B) Targets

Given the right organization the task of the IPG would be to support Ministers in two related fields of information projection. One of these necessarily would be defensive - to help secure our home base against propaganda and intellectual subversion. We must be able to counter-punch - to feed to the appropriate communications media crisp, well-argued, and, above all, evocative material which will rebut lies and distortions - quickly. But this defensive work must be supplemented - by an information offensive, aimed

.../mainly

mainly at the outside world. This offensive campaign should primarily be directed at the weak points of the Soviet bloc.

Dealing first with the home base, IPG's main target should be those parts of our domestic institutions, notably the media, the professions, voluntary organizations and industrial groupings, which most influence the opinions of the large mass of the British public. Because they too often are bewildered by claim and counter-claim, large numbers of British people, in our view, are falling prey to the propaganda we seek to defeat; they will continue to do so unless we can provide much more firm factual and demonstrably believable reassurance. Hence the need for IPG to project detailed information (most of which can only be assembled from within Government) that will:

- a) attract the attention; and
- b) command the confidence of the opinion formers.

Among these are the Press, radio and television; the advertising and public relations industry; universities and the teaching profession; professional associations covering such groups as civil servants and journalists; leaders of industry and trade unions. The Research Adviser and his staff, including the "non-executive directors" from outside Government would need to develop links with all these "target" figures. The IPG's approach would not in all cases be direct; we see advantage in its information, in many cases, being filtered through other bodies e.g. the British Chapter of the Committee for a Free World.

A second set of targets is to be found in other Western countries. Here we should need to work with our allies, not

.../only

only in projecting the overall Western case but in underlining the particularly British aspects of it. Counter-propaganda vis à vis the IRA plainly comes into this category. The IPG's work, in other Western countries, would necessarily take the form of support to Foreign Office Ministers.

A third target is public opinion in the Eastern bloc and the Third World. Here again IPG's services would be available only at the discretion of the FCO whose own Information Department, needless to say, would be invited to serve on IPG. The objective would be to loosen the hold of Moscow's propaganda within both the Eastern bloc and the Third World.

In our view it is vital that IPG should be able to provide more and better information to the London-based media, not least because what is printed or broadcast here is frequently picked up, and widely disseminated to the rest of the world. IPG should assist in preparing background papers - as distinct from daily press briefings - for Ministers and officials who deal with the large corps of foreign journalists and opinion formers who make their headquarters in London.

C) Techniques

A more effective projection of our case will need to make use of all types of public persuasion - Press, radio and television; books, pamphlets and plays; video cassettes; professional and business organizations. The techniques in each case are well-known but special attention henceforth needs to be paid to broadcasting and to a number of new developments in information technology.

i) Broadcasting. We believe that the BBC and to some extent our other broadcasting agencies have experienced a small measure of infiltration, if not of apologists for the Soviet regime at least of committed denigrators of British and Western values and institutions. We think it best to elaborate this orally; for the moment it is enough to say that those in the television industry who wish stoutly to defend the "Western case" are less well-organised, and certainly less inclined to pursue their cause unrelentingly. Frequently the friends of freedom in our broadcasting media appear to lack clear, coherent and immediately relevant information that would encourage and assist them to maintain a broadly pro-Western posture against those who wish to demolish it.

So far as the BBC's External Services are concerned, we regret the recent cuts. While broadcasts to Western Europe are of less importance in propaganda terms, the BBC's programmes to Third World and Eastern bloc countries are a vital element in the information war. These are areas where Britain enjoys a unique advantage, largely because of the BBC's international reputation for truth and integrity.

The plan to improve the audibility of the External Services is welcome. As soon as funds are available, we recommend the construction of new relay stations in the Seychelles and Hong Kong. Masirah, Ascension and Singapore should also be considered. If necessary this money should come from the contingency reserve. Improvements in audibility need to be combined with increases in broadcasting hours to countries in areas of tension (e.g. Southern Africa and the Near East).

The IPG should try to make better use of the External Services. This is a sensitive matter. We recommend that the IPG should actively cultivate links with the Head of the External Services, who should be asked to advise on improving co-operation with other Allied radio services. Conceivably, the Head of the External Services could serve as one of the Group's "non-executive directors".

Constant vigilance would also be needed to ensure that the External Services are not penetrated by anti-Western elements. IPG should occasionally monitor selected portions of its overseas broadcasts so as to be able to report to Ministers on the BBC's success, or otherwise, "in planning and preparing its programmes ... in the national interest". These are the words of the Licence and Agreement of the BBC.

ii) New Information Technology. The IPG must be ready to exploit recent breakthroughs in communications systems. The latter should be given a very high priority since developments in satellite and optical fibre broadcasting offer opportunities which the Soviets are bound to exploit. We must be prepared to match their efforts.

Satellite broadcasting. Technical breakthroughs in this field could transform the East/West Information battle. It is now technically possible to broadcast directly from the satellite to the individual home, which will receive good television signals with an aerial dish only a metre across, linked to an appropriate television. It is possible for governments to aim such programmes, not only at neighbouring countries, but even at countries in different continents. Authoritarian regimes will probably wish

.../to use

to use the new medium outside their own borders for propaganda on behalf of their ideology.

Direct satellite television could be a boon to poorer countries, enabling them to establish nationwide television services at lower cost than otherwise possible. However, the Soviet bloc countries could offer to provide "education and cultural" television services by satellite to their poorer neighbours. To accept such an offer could spell the end of all cultural, and perhaps in the end political, independence.

The Optical Fibre. A different and still more revolutionary means of communication is the optical fibre, a long filament of special glass of hair-like thickness, which traps and conveys pulses of light. It is possible for a single fibre to bring into the home a dozen television programmes, the entire telephone service and a computer data channel.

The 'wired city' with all the information, communications and entertainments services brought to each house over a single fibre would have an obvious attraction to authoritarian regimes, enabling them to regulate precisely what information their populations received, access to the fibre network being strictly controlled. However, it would be an expensive system to establish on a wide scale, hence probably only suitable for urban use.

The new technology offers us a choice between closed television broadcasting systems using optical fibre, and unprecedentedly open ones based on the technology of space. Those who regard the media as weapons to be deployed in an ideological struggle will probably

.../not scruple

not scruple to use both, in the situations and ways that best suit their purposes. It is essential that we do not concede dominance of international satellite broadcasting to the Communist bloc. The developments in Communication technology are described in detail in Appendix E.

D) Themes

The authors emphasize that IPG on no account should become involved in Party politics. It will be sufficient to provide material for home front consumption that clearly demonstrates the failures and tyranny of the Soviet system - for example by keeping in the forefront of opinion details of such episodes as Russian aggression in Afghanistan, Communist collapse in Poland, Soviet brutalities against the Sakharovs etc. The more these failures are driven home to the British public the more effectively we shall be countering Soviet propaganda in this country.

The external aims of IPG should be both positive and negative. Positive in the sense that we emphasize the overwhelming philosophical and practical benefits of living in the West. This can be represented by some simple and unanswerable slogans. For example, the West provides Food and Freedom; the East provides Hunger and Prisons.

The "negative" aim should be to demolish the fundamental tenets of Marxist doctrine and policy as practised in the Soviet bloc; and point to failures and duplicities in Soviet policy. One objective of this activity would be to oblige the Politburo to attend increasingly to pressure and strains within their home structure and, however unwillingly, to modify its present dangerous policies.

Events in Poland over the last 18 months have probably already had this effect on Moscow and this advantage should be followed up.

There never was a time when the Soviet Union was more potentially vulnerable to such counter-action than it is today. Russia's internal difficulties, the growing restiveness of its Warsaw Pact allies, notably Poland, the increasing realism in many parts of the Third World about Communist pretensions, all combine to present the West with a chance to maximise its overseas information effort. In particular we should counter-attack in the key field of defence and weapons, exposing the gaps in Moscow's credibility in this area. President Reagan's 'zero option' speech has enabled the West to regain the initiative in this field. This opportunity needs to be systematically exploited.

The main themes we suggest are as follows:

Group 1 - General - Soviet Union

a) Hammer home the fundamental point that the Soviet Union talks peace, but makes war.

b) Underline the naked imperialism and moral and legal invalidity of the Brezhnev doctrine; likewise the "illegitimacy" of the Communist system of government.

c) Highlight the links between the Soviet bloc and terrorism.

.../d)

d) Repeatedly draw attention to the incompetence of Soviet agriculture and their need to import food from the West. Communism has diminished the world's food supply. After 60 years of absolute control, the Soviet leadership still cannot feed, clothe or house its people decently.

e) Publicize the puniness of the Soviet aid programme in comparison with those of the West. Russian "aid" has concentrated on weapons and showpiece projects; Russian goods often go wrong because of bad quality, lack of durability, delay in shipment; Russian aid frequently involves bullying at the points of delivery.

f) Stress the continuing Soviet hostility to religious groups inside the USSR. This includes persecution of certain Christian groups, the barriers against Jewish emigration and repressive measures against the Muslims. In the latter context, we need to demonstrate that the Soviet threat - not the Israeli - is the principal long-term menace to the Islamic world.

g) Illustrate racial discrimination against black students in the Soviet Union, and other 'reactionary' attitudes, e.g. to the status of women and pollution of the environment.

h) Point out, neverendingly, the elaborate system of privileges which exist for the Communist Party elite - how does this accord with Communist theory?

i) Highlight the completely subservient role of trade unions in Soviet society.

Group 2 - Disarmament and East/West Relations

a) The Cold War has not come to an end. The Russians will not let it.

b) The Red Army has been unilaterally deploying SS20s for years; the future deployment of cruise missiles is only a defensive reaction.

c) MBFR was a western initiative. Progress on the subject has been blocked at Vienna by the Russians for the last 8 years. In the light of the current debate on a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe, we could suggest that this might be acceptable - provided the Kola peninsula was included in it.

d) Whereas western countries have lived up to the CSCE accords, the Russians have flagrantly abused the provisions on human rights.

Group 3 - Positive Western arguments

a) Contrast benefits of life in the West with the grimness of that in Russia. Our system works; theirs is breaking down (e.g. Poland).

b) Keep on reasserting that democracy provides choice in government; there is no such choice in Russia.

c) Insist that the West, especially in the UK, values truth and fair dealing. Can that be said of the Soviets?

.../d)

d) Underline the fact that in Britain the Rule of Law is fundamental. The inhabitants of the Soviet bloc can count on no such thing.

(4) CONCLUSION

The fact that we now have a Government that is firmly committed to resisting Soviet encroachment, provides an opportunity that may not recur, to put our information efforts, in the years to come, onto a new and more decisive footing, which we hope would survive any future changes of government. The United States, too, has shown a heightened awareness of the need to counter Soviet propaganda since the Reagan administration has been in office. Provided we work together, the authors of this paper have no doubt that our democratic values can be - as they need to be - far more effectively projected than the stale and brittle theories of Soviet Marxism.

It is difficult to overemphasize the urgency of tackling this issue boldly. There is no need for the West to lose the propaganda battle. For all its imperfections, the cause of the Free World is overwhelmingly strong, and can be no less persuasive, when objectively compared with the Communist alternative.

But we must not allow ourselves any longer to be persistently wrong-footed by the Soviet Union: Britain, in particular, ought to stop apologizing and denigrating itself for real or imagined sins in the past. Instead, the West needs to demonstrate its belief in its own values: its pride in its own accomplishments; its

.../faith

faith in its own future. There has never been a better time,
nor more pressing reasons, for doing this than NOW!

11th December, 1981

Appendix A

MAIN INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANISATIONS

- WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC)
- INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE (IIP)
- WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU)
- WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (WFDY)
- INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (IUS)
- WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION (WIDF)
- INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS (IADL)
- WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS (WFSW)
- INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF JOURNALISTS (IOJ)
- CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE (CPC)
- INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE FIGHTERS (FIR)
- AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION (AAPSO)

ORGANISATIONS CONNECTED WITH
THE MAIN FRONT ORGANISATIONS.

African Workers University, Conakry	WFTU
Agricultural, Forestry and Plantation Workers Trade Union International (TUI)	WFTU
Building, Wood and Building Materials' Industries TUI	WFTU
Centre for Professional Education of Journalists	IOJ
Committee for Engineers, Managerial Staffs and Technicians	WFTU
Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Status with ECOSOC	WPC
Continuing Liaison Council of the World Congress of Peace Forces	WPC
Chemical, Oil and Allied Workers TUI	WFTU
Commercial, Office and Bank Workers TUI	WFTU
Food, Tobacco, Hotel and Allied Industries TUI	WFTU
Fritz Heckert Trade Union College, Bernau	WFTU
Georgi Dimitrov Trade Union School, Sofia	WFTU
International Bureau of Tourism and Exchanges of Youth (BITEJ)	WFDY
International Campaign for a Just Peace in the Middle East	WPC
International Club of Agricultural Journalists	IOJ
International Club of Science and Technology	IOJ
International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Chilean Junta	WPC
International Commission of Enquiry into Israeli Treatment of Arab People	WPC
International Commission of Children's and Adolescents' Movements (CIMEA)	WFDY
International Commission for the Investigation of American War Crimes in Vietnam	IADL
International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Racist Regimes in Southern Africa	AAPSO
International Committee of Solidarity with Cyprus	WPC
International Committee for European Security and Cooperation	WPC
International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA)	WPC and AAPSO
International Committee of Lawyers for Democracy and Human Rights in South Korea	IADL

International Committee for the UN Decade for Women	WIDF
International Committee for the Cooperation of Journalists	IOJ
International Federation of Women in Legal Careers	
International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces	WPC
International School of Journalism and Agency Techniques, Prague	IOJ
International School of Solidarity for Journalists, Havana	IOJ
International Trade Union College, Moscow	WFTU
International Trade Union Committee for Social Tourism and Leisure	WFTU
International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the People and Workers of Africa	WFTU
International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the People and Workers of Chile	WFTU
International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the People and Workers of Korea	WFTU
International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the People and Workers of Palestine	WFTU
International Voluntary Service for Friendship and Solidarity of Youth (SIVSAJ)	WFDY
Interpress Graphic Club	IOJ
Interpress Motoring Club	IOJ
Journalists School of Solidarity, Bucharest	IOJ
Journalists School of Solidarity, Sofia	IOJ
Latin American Federation of Journalists	IOJ
Latin American Information Centre, Lima	IOJ
Metal and Engineering Industries TUI	WFTU
Miners TUI	WFTU
Public and Allied Employees TUI	WFTU
School of Solidarity of the GDR Journalists Union, East Berlin	IOJ
Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers TUI	WFTU
Transport, Port and Fishery Workers TUI	WFTU
World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE)	WFTU

Soviet Disinformation Operations

The Soviet Union is constantly striving to manipulate western public opinion and to undermine confidence in the institutions and traditions of the Free World. For decades the Kremlin has used communist news media, communist parties, Front Organizations and fellow travellers to this end.

Forgeries. These have long been regularly produced as a means of enhancing the Kremlin's efforts to influence opinion in favour of its policies. Defectors and the evidence of our own eyes have revealed the massive scale on which forgeries have been produced and circulated. For example, when the Kremlin was opposing German rearmament and accession to NATO in the fifties, the staff working in East Germany on these sophisticated techniques was estimated at 1,000. A 1980 CIA estimate of the cost to the Kremlin of propaganda and covert action etc. was put at three thousand million dollars per year (House of Representatives document on Soviet Covert Action dated February 1980).

The forgeries change their subjects as the Kremlin's preoccupations change. In the fifties thousands of forgeries attacked West German rearmament etc. In the late fifties and early sixties 'neo-Colonialism' became a main theme, with Britain and America as main targets. The star turns were forgeries in 1960/1 of a British Cabinet paper describing the value of our trade unions in preserving British influence in emerging countries, and a thirteen page letter, ostensibly from Duncan Sandys to a friend in Rhodesia describing subtle British tactics to preserve our dominance while apparently reducing it.

In the 70's the main thrust of Soviet propaganda including forgeries was against America and NATO (less in the mid 70's when detente was the fashion), particularly in the nuclear field. Dozens of these forgeries are reproduced in the House of Representatives document mentioned above.

The main outlets for these forgeries were East Germany, India and Egypt, with Tass and notional or actual Front Organizations playing a major role.

Recently forgeries have been produced in the context of the anti-Neutron bomb and anti-cruise missile campaigns, designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of the public, and especially the public of the smaller NATO countries, notably Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. One set of forgeries uses US Defence Department papers, operational contingency plans drafted 18 years ago and obtained by the KGB then, which have been altered to look like up-to-date "war plans", showing targets for attack by US nuclear weapons. The original documents on which these forgeries are based were obtained by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s through an American KGB agent based in Paris, US Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson. Some attempts were made by the Russians in the late 1960s to exploit the information in their publicity, but these were not pursued in the event.

The first serious attempt to use KGB forgeries based on these originals was in London in June 1980. This was then reported by the British Press. Although most Western Press accounts made their dubious origins clear, the Soviet media reported the case as if the Press had uncovered genuine secret US military documents.

After a gap of several months, another spate of KGB forgeries based on these same original documents began to surface in Western Europe. First, in December 1980, packages of documents were posted from Guildford in Surrey to addresses in the Netherlands. Similar documents were sent to British MP's and newspapers in the first week of 1981. At least one British newspaper carried the story at the time.

Yet another forgery based on the same documents has also been sent to Denmark, in the form of a cheaply printed book entitled "Top Secret Documents on the American forces' headquarters in Europe". A report in the Danish Press said that the book had been received by several politicians, editors and other prominent persons, in envelopes postmarked Birmingham, England.

A more recent example occurred, when, according to Die Welt of 12th October last, a German newspaper received a photocopy of a letter allegedly written by the Secretary-General of NATO, Joseph Luns, to the American Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. Dr. Luns identified this as a forgery. The aim of the letter, written on the official notepaper of the Secretary-General, was to publicise the untrue suggestion that Dr. Luns had told Haig that there was to be no discussion in public about the Federal Government's plan to go ahead with the first phase of the deployment of Pershing II medium-range cruise missiles.

Front Organizations. A technique often used in major campaigns is for events to be staged by subsidiary organizations, or "fronts for fronts" whose links with Moscow are once further removed. One such body is the Brussels-based International Committee for European Security and Co-operation (ICESC). This body sounds as if it has something to do with the official inter-governmental Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) which led to the Helsinki Agreement in 1975. As such it endeavours to attract a wider spectrum of opinion than is usually present at a WPC gathering. Another such "front of a front" is the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces. This is also WPC controlled, and holds annual meetings in Vienna. In recent years these have gone under the title "Dialogue on Disarmament and Detente". The next one planned for 29 January - 1 February 1982, is expected to be a fairly large-scale event, for which there have
.../already

already been three preparatory meetings this year.

Western Groups. As well as using international front organizations, the Soviet experts in covert operations seek to use the non-Communist "peace movements" in Western Europe, and especially in the smaller NATO member countries. Recent expulsions of Soviet personnel from the Netherlands and Denmark have highlighted this.

In April a Tass correspondent Vadim Leonov was expelled after the Dutch authorities had discovered his extensive links with anti-nuclear groups such as Christians for Socialism (CVS) (and through them with the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV)), and the initiative group "Stop the Neutron Bomb/Stop the Nuclear Arms Race" led by Nico Schouten, a Dutch Communist. Schouten is known to have received funds from Moscow.

Similarly, in early November, the Danish authorities expelled Vladimir Merkulov, a Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen. He had been in close touch with peace groups in Denmark who, among other things, organized two lecture tours last year of Danish schools and colleges by Soviet "disarmament experts".

Denigration. The Soviet Union has exploited books and plays designed to undermine pillars of Western society (the Pope, Winston Churchill, The Royal Navy, etc.) The playwright Hochhuth, for example, produced plays attacking the wartime Pope (for condoning the murder of Jews), Winston Churchill (for murdering General Sikorski) while his collaborator Irving attacked the Navy in 'PQ17'. The anti-Churchill play was based on alleged documents conveniently committed to a Swiss Bank for fifty years!

The contribution of the Information Research Department

By 1946, Mr. Bevin appreciated that the Soviet Union was using a vast armoury, of media, front organizations and fellow travellers to undermine the West. Being a tough minded anti-Communist, he was disposed to take firm counter-action. His task was made easier by the fact that members of the war-time Political Welfare Executive (and associated bodies) were available, and that, in official circles, there was familiarity with (and approval) of their techniques.

Accordingly, Mr. Bevin set up the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office. Officers of the Foreign Service were put in charge, but most of the staff were recruited from journalists and people who had worked in the Political Warfare Executive. IRD had access to the information available throughout the Government machine and had the duty of supplementing the normal information effort. It specialised in supplying Ministers with well researched material designed to promote British interests and to counter hostile propaganda. Most of IRD's work was concerned with overseas affairs. A capability was also developed to deal with communists, fascists and front organizations working in Britain.

IRD helped Ministers and publicists to expose Soviet Imperialism, deportations and forced labour. It also developed expertise in supporting a range of activities relevant to the international ideological arguments of the time but not provided for by the existing Information set-up. It encouraged the

.../publication

publication of suitable books, provided support for "good" organizations, and provided research material for responsible people willing to write well informed letters, articles and speeches.

The Soviet Government paid IRD the compliment of emulating its successful activities by setting up the semi-official Novosti newsagency and by stepping up efforts to make the best of the western media by supplying information and support. Encouraged by the success of exposing American unattributable cultural efforts (e.g. the "Ramparts Scandal" of late 1966), the Russians sought steadily to erode the credibility of IRD. Under left wing and liberal pressure, and in the anti-cold war atmosphere pertaining in the mid-seventies, it was virtually disbanded by the Labour Government in 1977.

INFORMATION PROJECTION GROUP

a) The nature of the existing and developing threat to the national interest requires a much more co-ordinated information effort and one which operates both overseas and in the United Kingdom and is able to focus on all areas of government activity. Much of the information which is currently available either within Whitehall or from non-governmental sources and which should be brought into play is at present used ineffectively or not used at all. There is an urgent need for it to be more efficiently collated and more purposefully disseminated.

b) This work should be carried out by an Information Projection Group (IPG), operating under the Cabinet Minister charged with overall responsibility for the Government's information effort. In order to ensure that the IPG works under clear political direction and is given the necessary support in its inter-departmental relations, it should be under the day to day control of a junior minister. Arguments could be deployed in favour of giving this responsibility to a minister at either the Foreign Office or the Home Office or the Ministry of Defence. But a possible and original alternative would be to give this task to the Minister of State responsible for Information Technology.

c) The IPG would be headed by an Assistant Under Secretary and comprise a small team (about a dozen people) of experienced and trained officers who could be seconded from existing staffs. New recruitment would probably be unnecessary or minimal. In addition to the full-time officials, however, the IPG would have on call a few specialist helpers. Where possible, these should be young and not marked by the scar tissue of recent years. They could include experts on peace movements, arms control, Soviet propaganda methods, public relations and the new communications technology.

d) There would be regular meetings (probably weekly), attended by the two information ministers, the advisers, the Head of IPG, the Director of the BBC External Services, the Chief Press Officer at No. 10 and (possibly), the Director of COI. This might be called the Information Committee.

e) Working under the guidance of the Information Committee, the tasks of the IPG would be to:

- i) make medium and longer-term plans for information work based on assessments of threats to the national interest at home or abroad and on the need to support national policies;
- ii) arrange for the production of the necessary research-based information material from inside or outside the government machine; where necessary IPG would task and co-ordinate the work of government departments and other agencies;
- iii) arrange for the most effective dissemination of the Information produced;
- iv) collaborate with individuals and non-governmental organizations anxious to act in the public interest - foundations, business associations, research institutes and groups.

f) For operational purposes, the IPG would be part of the Cabinet Office staff.

THE INFORMATION BATTLE AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY

In the battle of wills today being fought out between the competing ideologies, it is now the electronic media - radio and television - which are the favourite weapons. Because they reach larger audiences and communicate to the least sophisticated, they have pushed film and the printed word into a subordinate place. The radio receiver is far and away the commonest electronic equipment, available alike to the urban dweller and the poorest peasant. Television, once the prerogative of wealthy nations, is now spreading to the poorest, even if only on the basis of one receiver per village. No need to apologise, then, for concentrating attention on likely further developments in the information revolution which the new electronics is driving forward - for the majority of human kind these are the dominant communication media of our time.

SATELLITE BROADCASTING

Already the communications satellite has made a major impact on sound and vision broadcasting. Stationary each over its own unique spot on the equator and distant twenty three thousand miles from the earth, the communication satellites receive signals from a ground station in one continent and instantaneously retransmit them to a receiving station in another. Thus our present capacity for immediate world wide diffusion of sound and television programmes is achieved.

To date, however, the terrestrial vision broadcasting network has always intervened between the transmissions from space and the viewer. The satellite signals from far away are captured by the expensive and complex earth stations, and then passed by cable or microwave to the network of conventional transmission sites. All this is changing, because it is becoming technically possible to broadcast directly from the satellite to the individual home.

It will be appreciated that the geostationary satellite is necessarily placed in an orbit remote from Earth. The laws of celestial mechanics dictate that if it were nearer it could not hang over a fixed point on the earth's surface (as it must to serve its function) but would move across the sky. However the remoteness of the satellite means that the beam of radio energy it directs towards the earth is spread over a wide area. If a satellite of the first generation were to direct its signals at Britain, for example, they would be distributed from Reykjavik to Naples.

What is more, energy available on the satellite to power radio transmissions is strictly limited, being derived from solar cells, the dimensions of which are constrained by practical considerations. It necessarily follows that because the radio power radiated is not large yet is distributed over such an extensive part of the earth's surface, the power falling on any particular area is exceedingly small. For this reason, the existing earth stations are equipped with very large "dish" aerial systems, up to ten metres in diameter, to "catch" as much incident radio energy as possible. The need for aerials of this kind has so far prevented domestic use of satellite reception.

Now all is changing. Improvements in satellite design make it possible greatly to reduce the width of the beam of radio waves passing to earth, so that the area of the earth irradiated is confined to no more than one country or even a smaller geographical region. The energy is spread over far less total area, and this, together with improvements in the power output of the satellite, makes it possible to receive good television signals with an aerial dish only a metre in diameter. The home installation becomes immediately practicable.

To receive direct satellite broadcasts all that is needed is one of these aerials and a television receiver designed to the correct standard - different from that for terrestrial television - or a conventional receiver preceded by an inexpensive converter. The total cost of a colour television installation would be pushed up by no more than about a half, and in real terms the cost of any kind of television is certain to continue to fall, as it has done for some years. Thus few who receive television in their homes today will not be able to afford satellite television in the future. France and West Germany are already well ahead with plans for direct broadcast satellite television. HMG recently outlined proposals for a service, and a joint UK company has been established to this end by British Aerospace and N M Rothschild.

There is, however, no technical reason limiting countries to beaming transmissions to their own territory, and they could aim their programmes at neighbouring countries or even those in the next continent. World wide television entirely outside the control of authorities in the receiving country constitutes an entirely new component in the spectrum of information media. In some free world countries it is likely that commercial interests may establish advertising stations beamed at other countries. By contrast, authoritarian regimes will find irresistible the temptation to use the new medium both within and, more significantly, outside their own borders for propaganda on behalf of their chosen ideology.

Direct satellite television has been described as a boon to poorer countries, because it could enable them to establish nation-wide television services at lower cost than would be possible using a terrestrial service. As well as providing a medium of information and entertainment, such a service could also give an invaluable boost to education in the many countries where facilities are limited by the supply of suitably trained teachers. The potential for good is undeniable. Alongside it, though, there is a no less important hazard. The real probability exists that television equipments meant to give access to a national service will also make available programmes originating far beyond the national boundaries. It is also entirely possible that the more ideologically aggressive powers could offer to provide "educational and cultural" television services by satellite to their poorer neighbours. To accept such an offer would spell the end of all cultural, and perhaps in the end even political, independence.

THE OPTICAL FIBRE

Alongside the evolution of satellite television broadcasting, which can be regarded as the natural extension of radio broadcasting, equally revolutionary developments are in train in what could fairly be described as the next development along the technical path of the telegraph and telephone cable.

One of the things which gives electronics technology great power is its immense versatility. It is, for example, quite easy to convert the sound of a human voice or a television picture into a series of binary numerical codes, which are the native language of the computer. These zeros and ones can be represented in our equipments in any two contrasting ways and notably by the presence or absence of light. Thus, if the programme to be sent out is converted into digital form in this way, it can be transmitted as a sequence of inconceivably fleeting pulses of light, at a rate of perhaps a hundred million per second.

To turn this into a practicable information medium, two things are needed: a source of light which can emit flashes of this duration and rate, and some means for conveying the pulses of light from point of origin to that of destination without them becoming so enfeebled that they fall below the level at which photoelectric devices can reliably detect them. To both of these problems solutions have now been found. The light source used is a semiconductor light emitting diode, and the means of guiding the light pulses is the optical fibre.

It has long been known that under certain circumstances it is possible for light to be trapped within a glass medium through which it is passing. In the optical fibre a long filament of special glass of hair-like thickness traps within it pulses of light and conveys them to their destination, virtually without loss. Transmission over distances of tens of kilometres is now possible, and competent authorities agree that a hundred kilometres range may be confidently expected. As remarkable as the distance over which the optical fibres are effective is their message carrying capacity. A single fibre into the home could easily carry a dozen television programmes,

the entire telephone service and, if desired, a computer data channel as well. The concept of the "Wired City" with all the information, communication and entertainment services brought to each house or workplace over a single optical fibre has grown from the perception of this possibility. Such an idea obviously provides a complete alternative to both present day television broadcasting and also to the promise held out by the satellite. Rarely has technology been so clearly at the crossroads. A choice must be made between conflicting possible futures which lead us in manifestly different directions.

Optical fibre broadcasting, which could be seen as the logical next step from the cable television services already established commercially in the United States, is relatively more expensive than terrestrial or satellite broadcast television. However, it can give a more varied service, is even more reliable, and is capable of literally total coverage of the whole population. If the same fibres are also used to provide telephone services and for other purposes, such as remote reading of gas and electricity meters, the overall economics looks promising, and this is what is generally proposed. Even so, the wired city concept is, as its name suggests, best suited to the sophisticated urban environment, where it can economically serve complex needs in a closely packed population. In this respect it is quite different from the satellite, which cannot give so elaborate a service, but gives it equally cheaply in town or country.

The other significant distinguishing feature of fibre dissemination of radio and television is that it is not an "open" system as conventional broadcasting is. Access to the fibre network can be strictly controlled, and a subscriber does not have the facility to receive programmes from outside his own network, it cannot therefore easily be "penetrated" from outside by elements unsympathetic to the network proprietors, except perhaps by subversion.

It seems plausible to suppose that authoritarian governments may prefer that the broadcasting services they provide should be by fibre distribution, since this will enable them to regulate precisely what their population is exposed to. It will be ironic if at the same time they use satellite broadcasting in the attempt to achieve subversion of their neighbours.

VIDEO RECORDINGS: TAPE AND DISC

There are a number of other developments which we can foresee in parallel with the two already discussed. Perhaps the most important is the advance in television recording, particularly the video disc.

A full colour television programme can now be recorded either on a magnetic tape cassette or on a simple plastic disc, not too different from the conventional sound record with which we are all familiar, except that it has very many more, and much finer, grooves. These are "read" by a fine beam of laser light rather than a mechanical stylus.

Widely diffused and presenting professionally pre-recorded material, video recordings could replace films, books and magazines in the electronic age. Books and films have probably played a diminishing role in the propaganda struggle, however, since the new technology began to exert its full impact. There is no obvious reason why video recordings should change this position. Tentatively, therefore, they must be assigned a significant but secondary role.

SOUND BROADCASTING

Despite all the other developments, the transistor radio will remain the commonest means of access to the electronic media, and for the very poorest people perhaps the only one. Although in the sophisticated areas there is a tendency today towards VHF-FM broadcasting, for the less developed world it is the long, medium and short wave AM bands which will continue to be used. These are strictly terrestrial services, because the layers of electrically charged gas in the upper atmosphere - the ionosphere - would prevent any satellite radio signals at those wave lengths from reaching the earth.

The principal recent development in these bands stems from the falling size and, above all, cost of transmitting equipments, as a result of the advance of electronics technology. It is now economic for small local radio transmitters to be set up. In some cases this has been with official sanction, but in many countries the new broadcasters have appeared as "pirates". Indeed, in places control of the radio spectrum by law has become unenforceable, as in Italy for a time.

A proliferation of small unregulated radio stations has resulted, in some cases radiating propaganda for extremism of the political right or left. The wise use of radio is such an important social resource that this evidence of the breakdown of law has to be taken very seriously. In the UK, pirate broadcasting has been largely suppressed since an outburst in the sixties, but we have no grounds for complacency. Illegal use of citizens' band radio and the spread of illegal two-way radios and cordless telephones demonstrates that the law in this area is under pressure which it is not wholly able to withstand.

CONCLUSIONS

The new electronics technology gives us a choice between relatively closed television broadcasting systems using optical fibres, and unprecedentedly open ones based on the technology of space. Those who regard the media as weapons to be deployed in an ideological struggle will probably not scruple to use both, in the situations and ways that best suit their purposes.

From open communication the free world surely has nothing to fear, provided that it is as accessible to us as to our opponents. The great campaign by the West to present its case fairly through the medium of radio over the last few decades may well have to continue and be matched, in the years to come, by an equally determined new effort. Our task will be to ensure that we do not concede dominance of international satellite television broadcasting to those whose publicly announced intention is to bury us.

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