

RESTRICTED

Mr White/Andre

SAPU(82)2

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

---

Attached is the second paper in this series. This was approved by the Prime Minister at 2100 hours on 11 April.

The paper contains suggested lines for Ministers to take in public on:

- the exclusion zone deadline;
- possible diplomatic compromises;
- the Haig mission;
- British Task Force and Argentine military activities.

It draws on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's remarks today on BBC radio's "World This Weekend" and ITV's "Weekend World".

Cabinet Office  
11 April 1982

RESTRICTED

LINE TO TAKE

(1) The Exclusion Zone Deadline

Does Mr Nott's statement that ships will be sunk after the deadline still hold?

- That is the position; but we certainly hope there will be no Argentine vessels in the exclusion zone tomorrow morning. Most Argentine ships are now in mainland ports.

(2) Mr Haig's discussions with the Argentinians

- We have no details of these but Mr Haig is expected back in London tomorrow for further discussions with the Prime Minister.

(3) Possible diplomatic compromises

- Our position continues to conform to the terms of the mandatory Security Council resolution; viz that there must be:

- (1) a cessation of hostilities;
- (2) a withdrawal of all Argentine forces;
- (3) a search for a diplomatic solution.

There can be no negotiation about the future status of the Falkland Islands until the Argentine forces have withdrawn. Then in any subsequent negotiations with Britain the wishes of the Falklanders will remain paramount.

### Specific Questions

Would you agree to an Argentinian civilian administration remaining on the Islands after military withdrawal?

- No. We mean that all Argentinians, officials and military, must withdraw.

Longer term solutions: Condominium? Lease back? Temporary UN administration?

- One step at a time. No longer term solutions can be considered before Argentinians have withdrawn. After that a range of possibilities can be discussed. The wishes of the islanders will remain paramount in any decision on future status. Cannot predict the islanders' wishes once British administration has been restored. Their attitudes may or may not have changed.

#### (4) Task Force Activities

Can only say that it is on course and on time and has not encountered any difficulties.

Russian spy ship?

- Can confirm that a Soviet intelligence-gathering ship is shadowing Canberra. The Russians always take an interest in our naval movements and we would expect Russian surveillance of an operation of this sort.

Where is HMS Endurance? (allegations that it has been sunk)

- Cannot give details of whereabouts but can confirm that we are and have been in contact throughout.

(5) Argentine Military Activity

Details of remaining Argentine warships; naval auxiliaries / is there anything in the 200 mile zone?

- We are keeping a close watch but cannot give details.

Argentinian strength on the Falklands? (Reports of massive build up)

- Cannot give you details of our assessment but stories from Argentine sources may need a pinch of salt.

News film of Argentine patrol boats off the Falklands?

- Believed to be old film shot off the mainland. Unlikely that Argentinian patrol boats could operate in Falklands' waters in present weather conditions.

Transcript by  
JAMES LEE of:

INTERVIEW ON "WEEKEND WORLD" (ITV)  
BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR. FRANCIS PYM,  
ON SUNDAY, 11 APRIL 1982  
-----

QUESTION (first few words not recorded)

.....that Britain does not want to use force if, in fact, this dispute can be solved satisfactorily by peaceful means; but you also made it quite clear that a precondition for negotiations is that the Argentinians should withdraw from the Islands. Now, some problems are starting to come up about this word "withdraw", and what exactly it implies. Some people have suggested that the Argentinians might take their military forces out, but they might leave some administrators in. Now, would you find that form of withdrawal acceptable?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

The British Government has no complication about withdrawal. Withdrawal is withdrawal. They have illegally and wrongfully aggressed and invaded the Falkland Islands and the condition for us is that they withdraw first before anything else can happen.

QUESTION

All of them? Bag and baggage - the lot - military men and civilians?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

All of them!

QUESTION

None of this business of they might leave somebody behind to run up the Argentinian flag every Thursday; you do not want that?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

No! Withdrawal is withdrawal, and that is backed by the Resolution of the Security Council, which had an overwhelming majority, and I think everybody all round the world wants to see it carried out, because if it is not so, then other countries, the weaker countries, may feel themselves threatened by larger countries; so withdrawal is withdrawal.

QUESTION

I understand. Another idea that has been suggested by those who are looking for some sort of compromise now is that the Argentinians may suggest that they are prepared to withdraw - to take everybody out - if our naval task force turns back. Now, is that something that the Government would consider?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

No! Withdrawal must happen first, before anything else is done. There has been no suggestion about any effect

on the task force or anything else and, as I say, it is not just Britain who is asking for that, it is the United Nations who are asking for that.

QUESTION

Well, I will just get that again, Mr. Pym, because I think it is very important. You know yourself that a lot of strange ideas are stirring in the undergrowth. There is no warrant whatsoever for anybody saying, I take it, that the British Government is prepared to allow any Argentinians to remain there as Argentinian representatives, nor that we will turn the task force back - until they withdraw completely from the Islands?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Well, of course, if they withdraw from the Islands, then the task force will not be required to be used in any way and its future, of course, must be determined at that time and an undertaking to withdraw makes a very major transformation in the entire scene, so of course that would have to be considered at that time, but withdrawal is the first thing.

QUESTION

Let me now bring up something else which is causing a great deal of discussion and on which you could perform a most valuable service of clarification, and that is the

question of British administration. It has been said that Britain has never so far said that after an Argentinian withdrawal, it expects immediately to resume its own administration of the Islands, and some people see this as a possible way of getting a compromise which would save the Argentinians' faces. So let me ask you: are you prepared, if the Argentinians withdraw, to see a United Nations peace-keeping force put in there for an interim period?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

We have not considered that possibility because there has so far been no suggestion of withdrawal. The objective that we have had, made clear by the Prime Minister, and repeated by myself - as came up earlier in the programme - was the restoration of British administration. It is true that there was no actual time scale there, but we visualized, of course, that withdrawal would be followed by the return of a British administration, which is what the Islanders have always had and what they have indicated, so far, they have always wanted.

QUESTION

And yet, I see in that answer - all your original answers have been quite unequivocal, and indeed that answer was unequivocal - but you did say that it is an issue that the British Government had not considered - possibly not considered at any length, because the position has not arisen yet -



and I notice that you have not excluded the possibility that if the Argentinians withdrew, Britain might be prepared to see a United Nations peace-keeping force there for a brief period before we resumed our administration.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Let me remind you what the Security Council Resolution said:

Cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of Argentinian forces; all of them; and a search for a diplomatic solution and it is very necessary that we use every effort - which we are using - to try to secure that peaceful solution, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, is heavily engaged in that now and he is coming back to London tomorrow, with what plans or proposals I have no idea at the moment, no indication what they may be. But he is trying to make a contribution - a big one - to the possibility of a diplomatic solution which every one wants. So those are the three things. We are following the United Nations Resolution: cessation of hostilities, withdrawal and the search for a diplomatic solution.

QUESTION

Now, obviously, cessation of hostilities and withdrawal is just what we want. We want the Argentinians out of the Falkland Islands, but you are very rightly stressing that the United Nations would also like to see maximum diplomatic activity and so, I presume, would most British people, and certainly so

would the British Government, so I put it to you again, clearly as a more direct question this time: if we could them out, if we could get hostilities not likely to proceed any further, would we be prepared to pay, as a price for that, a United Nations peace-keeping force there, at least for a brief period?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

One step at a time! There is no sign yet, no indication whatever, following Mr. Haig's visit to Buenos Aires, that there is going to be any withdrawal, but that is the first condition and that has to be fulfilled first of all and it may be that if that withdrawal does come, no doubt there would be diplomatic discussion, but the point is we must stick to the position that they have aggressed against us, they have invaded the Falkland Islands, they have taken them over. They have got to withdraw from that first. We want British administration to go back and then, in the longer term, <sup>of course,</sup> there could - after that - be discussions. Now, in the course of the withdrawal and so forth, it may be that that diplomatic initiative could conceivably contain other elements in it, but we are not there yet! One step at a time!

QUESTION

Then I wonder if I may, so sum up this point - because you know yourself how very important all of these things are - put back to you what I take your attitude to be: that

certainly, there can be no question of our doing anything until the Argentinians have withdrawn from the Falkland Islands.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

That is correct.

QUESTION

That is absolutely clear, but that though we want British administration restored, in the diplomatic discussions that might follow such a withdrawal, the British Government does not close its mind by any means, as a gesture towards the United Nations desire and our own desire that there should be no bloodshed if we could avoid it, the British Government does not close its mind to the possibility of a United Nations peace-keeping force for a period.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Let us not close minds to that or any other possibilities, but let me say again that our objective is to restore British administration, because that is what the Islanders have always wanted and what they have always had - at any rate for 150 years.

QUESTION

Let me now move on! Let us suppose, and we all profound hope it - at least we all do in this country - that

the Argentinians do withdraw, that British administration is restored and that, therefore, the immediate crisis is settled. Very obviously, there will then be - maybe after a certain interim period, a cooling-off period as it were - but eventually we will have to get round the negotiating table and start negotiating. Now, I want to put to you - and I stress this is long term; you have made it quite clear there can be no negotiations of this kind until the Argentinians have withdrawn - but long-term, let us look at some of the ideas that have been suggested.

For instance, are you in any way attracted by the suggestion of a condominium.

#### FOREIGN SECRETARY

Let me remind you that negotiations with the Argentine have been going on for 15 years, perhaps a bit longer than that, trying to resolve this problem. They have always regarded it as a problem, and we have had to take account of that and we have been talking with them, and only a few months ago we were negotiating with them, and on that occasion, there were representatives of the Falkland Islands Council present at those talks, because we have always said that their right to have determination about their future was a very important element in this and, of course, that is a democratic right of all countries. It is what we went to war in the last War about. So that has got to be taken into

account, but it is not a question of ending this thing now and starting negotiations; they have been going on for 15 years and, actually, there are more ideas afloat now, I think, as to the possibilities for the future, that no doubt could be considered because in negotiations in the past nothing has been excluded except that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders have got to be taken fully into account and that must remain like that. But now, what is going to happen after withdrawal, restoration of British administration? What are the views of the Falkland Islanders going to be? We do not know. One would imagine that after this experience they have said: "Good Heavens! We were virtually 100% British before and wanted to remain British - even more so now!" but we do not know that until the whole issue is over. They are in a very difficult position. They have been invaded; they must be at risk and in danger; they must be acutely aware of that, extremely uncomfortable and obviously not having anything like the happy life that they want, so what effect that will have we do not know. We would have to find that out, but in the context of what they would then think, of course we can negotiate and discuss, but we must have the three elements in it: our responsibility for the islands, the attitude of the Argentine Government which must come into it, and the wishes of the people.

QUESTION

Let me take that very last point up, in the context for the moment of condominium - there are other things I want to come back to. Do I take it that you are saying that if

the Falklanders made it quite clear that they did not want a condominium, they did not want a sharing of sovereignty and administration between Britain and the Argentine, we would then have to rule that argument right out?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I do not think one can be definite about a situation so far into the future. When you think what has got to happen before we can arrive at a position - which everybody wants - where we are sitting round the table saying "Now what are we going to do?" An awful lot has got to happen and it is impossible to prejudge at this range what the attitude of the Falkland Islanders would be about condominium or whether they perhaps do not like it and perhaps a certain proportion of them think it is a less undesirable form for the future than other forms. I think they will want to stay British, but we really cannot judge that at this stage.

QUESTION

I accept that. What I am keen to get at is if they did not like the idea of a condominium, what would our attitude be? Would we accept: "Ah well! That is their view and there is nothing we can do to change that!" or would we say "Well now, come on chaps! Condominium may be the way out of this!"?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I would visualise at that stage - a lot is going to happen before that - a range of possibilities which would have to be discussed with the people of the Falkland Islands and the advantages and disadvantages of each would have to be thought about by them and it may be that they had, you know, a more open mind in a change in one direction rather than another. I cannot anticipate what that would be, but I certainly would not dream of giving a positive view about one particular solution - condominium - nor ought it to be looked at like that. I think it would be a range of possibilities. As I say, I would anticipate myself that they would still want to be very British but I think <sup>we</sup> they/would all have to think about it very carefully, granted that we had arrived at a position where, with good sense and with good will all round, we can actually talk sensibly about the long-term future.

QUESTION

I see that, and I want to put you, by the way, certain other possibilities besides condominium, but before I do, you seem to be saying - and I just want to be sure that this is right - you seem to be saying that the Falklanders' wishes, their desire for self-determination, will be the dominant factor here and that if they say: "No, we are very sorry, we do not want any condominium, we want British administration",

as far as this Government is concerned, that would be the decisive factor?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Yes, I think it must be the dominant factor. After all, they are the people who live there and what they will feel like after this awful experience, who can tell? As I say, I would have thought they would be very much more pro-British. I mean, for all I know, some of them may want to perhaps change their way of living and move somewhere else, for all we know. I think it is very difficult to say that, but the idea of imposing on them something, you know, which most of them did not really want, does not seem a very happy future for them, so you have got to take it into account.

QUESTION

Let me point out what may be or at least some people may think it is, a consequence of this, which is not a question of our imposing anything on them - rather the reverse. That once they are told: "All right, the British Government in fact will give you what you want in this situation" from what we know of them at least in the past, most Falklanders will say: "Right! That's it then! What we want is British sovereignty and British administration and end of the matter!" Is that not slightly worrying to you?



FOREIGN SECRETARY

They have, of course, so far had what they wanted. We are now thinking about a context which no doubt is a little way into the future - I hope not too long - but after a terrible experience, with what effect upon their outlook and attitude I cannot predict. I have never been there. I have never been anywhere near the Falkland Islands. I have got no personal knowledge of it and I think, if I may say so, that at this stage it is a mistake to go too far in this direction, but the idea, as I say, of imposing something on them does not seem a very happy future for them, but attitudes may have changed for all I know, and at that point we shall be in a mood of great relief to everybody when that situation arises, that is to say when we can talk meaningfully round a negotiating table, it may be that attitudes will have changed; I do not know.

QUESTION

Let me put another idea to you on which the attitude of the Falklanders in the past has always been clear. If you anticipating some possibility of change now, it will be interesting to have your view on this one, and it is an idea that has always appealed to the F.O. which you are now running, and that is the idea of lease-back; namely that we grant the Argentinians what one might call "nominal sovereignty" but they lease the Falkland Islands back to us and we continue to

administer them for a long period, or perhaps for ever. Now, when it was put to the Falkland Islanders in the past, they did not like it. However, is it still an option on the table as far as you are concerned in the future negotiations?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Well, do you think the Falkland Islanders might think it was a workable option after this experience? I think that is the first question one has to ask. It is not a new idea that. It has been thought about for quite some time, but the Falkland Islanders did not want it and there the matter left, so I do not think one can exclude any of these possible solutions because everybody wants to resolve the problem long-term in the best way we can, taking all the interests into account.

QUESTION

You see, I think one of the difficulties is going to be, one can quite understand why we place such great emphasis - rightly - on the self-determination of the Falklanders - but it could well be that when the Secretary of State gets off his plane here and nips round to see you tomorrow, he will take a very different view of this and will say: "Well now, look! The trouble is Mr. Pym, if you are going to let it all rest on the self-determination of the Falklanders, most of the ideas that can produce a settlement are going to be ruled out by the Falklanders, so you have got to give a bit on this. You must not, in fact, completely shut off possibilities of another

kind of settlement that might be slightly less welcome to the Falkland Islanders!" Now, what will you say to Mr. Haig if he says that?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

The British Government adheres to the Security Council Resolution - cessation, withdrawal and a diplomatic solution - and the vital thing is to get those conditions fulfilled and a British administration returning to the Islands and then, after that, I think longer term, we could consider, but we have made it clear that the wishes of the Islanders are the dominant - was the word you used - consideration, and that must be so, and that is what democracy is all about. That is what freedom is all about. That is what we have been to war in this country through the centuries to preserve and the whole free world has an interest in it. Look at the support we have got for our line! The 10 countries of the European Community have taken a solid line with us; the Commonwealth; all our friends round the world! They understand, as well as you and I do, that freedom under the law is the only civilised kind of life to lead and if invaders and dictators and aggressors annex territory, strong countries overrunning weak countries, that is the way to anarchy throughout the world and nobody want it, so the first thing we have got to do is to make sure that law and order is restored there and after that I say, of course, the interests of the people must be dominant, of course that is so, but let us then at that point - and there will be a sense of great relief at that stage after this tension - let us

sit down at that stage and then let us talk with everybody and see what we can achieve.

QUESTION

Well that is a very clear statement of national aspiration which I would imagine overwhelmingly the British people agree with. However, it does tend to make one thing very clear doesn't it? That if Mr. Haig is coming back here with the idea that he can cobble together some very quick settlement on terms that Argentina has suggested to him, which President Galtieri himself does not seem to have much confidence in, let us face it, though no doubt you will listen to him with very great courtesy, Mr. Haig has not got much of a chance, has he, of cobbling up a quick deal on the basis of what we know so far?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

We have no idea what happened in the conversations in Buenos Aires, nor should we have. We have no idea what proposals he is going to come with. You suggest he may be coming with some long-term condominium proposal. Well, I have no idea whether that is so. Even if he is, withdrawal and all the other things we talked about have got to happen first. We just do not know. My goodness me! Of course, we will listen to him. Any area of diplomatic action that we can take, any effort we can make we shall make to try and end this by peaceful means but we must not let a free country be overrun.

QUESTION

Quite! Well now, if vital principles are involved and we cannot accommodate it may well be - and the Government has foreseen this sad possibility all along - that hostilities will have to commence. In a way, I regret having to put this question to you, but it has been a long time since we have done any serious fighting. Let me ask you straight out, do you think the British have got the stomach for the sacrifices and casualties that might be involved if the worst comes to the worst?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Provided they are confident and convinced that the way in which we have used it, the manner in which we have exercised that power, in the very unhappy event of it becoming necessary, I think they will. I think they must be convinced that it has not been rashly done or ill-advisedly done or unnecessarily done. If they have confidence in us and in the way we have managed it, I think they will, but they look very carefully and very properly at how these things are carried out, and so on that basis, I think they would.

INTERVIEWER

Mr. Pym, thank you very much indeed!

-----