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DESKBY NEWYORK 311300Z MAY

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FM AMMAN 311000Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 31 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE DEKSBY 311300Z NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, PARIS, STOCKHOLM AND UKREP BRUSSELS

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 893: IRAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME ON THE EVENING OF 30 MAY TO REQUEST OUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAW MY US AND SOVIET COLLEAGUES SEPARATELY, AND HAD INTENDED ALSO TO SEE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BUT HE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE KING SAID HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTING JORDAN'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 206) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENCOURAGE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE TOO LONG. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 29 MAY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM THROUGH HIS HALF-BROTHER (PRESUMABLY BARZAN, WHOSE VISITS HERE ARE NOT PUBLICISED) URGING THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND HE FEARED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ACT WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CLEAR-CUT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND AN END TO BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL REMAINING IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THEIR HANDS. BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE FOR A FEW DAYS MORE, IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT WELL BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BASRA AND IT WOULD BY THEN BE TOO LATE FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE EFFECTIVE.
3. THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY APPROACHED US ON THIS MATTER. I CONFIRMED THIS, SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OVER THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR AND WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 321 TO BAGHDAD). WE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST IF ISLAMIC AND PARTICULARLY ARAB COUNTRIES COULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAID

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HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW, BUT NONETHELESS HOPED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR MOVES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. I SAID I FELT SURE WE WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN THE COUNCIL.

URWICK

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IRAQ/IRAN

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