

CONFIDENTIAL



*Iraq  
LHM*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 June 1982

IRAN/IRAQ

As I told you over the weekend, the Prime Minister commented, with reference to your telegram No. 218 of 31 May, that we must do all we can to help, particularly as King Hussein was especially helpful to us in connection with UN Security Council Resolution 502.

**A. J. COLES**

John Holmes Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*sg*

IRAN/IRAQ

26

ADVANCE COPIES

PS - 6

PS/AMB

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR J C KOBERLY

MR ADAMS

HD/MED

HD/RENAD

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

HE/ES & SD

HD/MAED

HD/DEF D

PUSD (2)

NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2)

CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

NO DISTRIBUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY NEWYORK 311300Z MAY

FM AMMAN 311300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 31 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 311300Z NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY 0800 (014), ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, PARIS, STOCKHOLM AND UKREP BRUSSELS

UKHIS NEW YORK TELNO 8931 IRAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME ON THE EVENING OF 30 MAY TO REQUEST OUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAW MY US AND SOVIET COLLEAGUES SEPARATELY, AND HAD INTENDED ALSO TO SEE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BUT HE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE KING SAID HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTING JORDAN'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 206) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING

*N.B. We can do help. King Hussein was especially helpful to us over this.*  
*Mr. Cohen informed. must do all*  
*Resolution 502*

*ms*

2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUNDS TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE STATED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (NY TELNO 226) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENCOURAGE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE TOO LONG. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 29 MAY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM THROUGH HIS HALF-BROTHER (PRESUMABLY BARZANI, WHOSE VISITS HERE ARE NOT PUBLICISED) URGING THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND HE FEARED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ACT WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CLEAR-CUT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND AN END TO BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL REMAINING IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THEIR HANDS. BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE FOR A FEW DAYS MORE, IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT WELL BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BASRA AND IT WOULD BY THEN BE TOO LATE FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE EFFECTIVE.

3. THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY APPROACHED US ON THIS MATTER. I CONFIRMED THIS, SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OVER THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR AND WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 321 TO BAGHDAD). WE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST IF ISLAMIC AND PARTICULARLY ARAB COUNTRIES COULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW, BUT NONETHELESS HOPED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR MOVES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. I SAID I FELT SURE WE WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN THE COUNCIL.

URVICK

BT