



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 June 1982

Prime Minister

Dear John,

Yes

Agree with telegram at Flago

A & B?

A.S.C. 2/6

Iran/Iraq: King Hussein's Message to the Prime Minister

I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister may wish to send to King Hussein in reply to the message the King sent to her on 19 May along with a copy of a message to President Reagan. Since then the King has summoned Mr Urwick (Amman telno 218) and sought UK support for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The proposed message from the Prime Minister, along with the covering draft telegram to Amman, covers this latest request by the King. Copies of the relevant telegrams from Amman are enclosed.

Sir Anthony Parsons was informed, over the weekend, of King Hussein's initiative and of the Prime Minister's belief that we owed him a debt in the Security Council. The Council has already met for informal consultations at Jordanian prompting. But the initiative turned out to be ill-considered; the Iraqis themselves do not want a full Security Council meeting yet (and may not for some time) since they wish first to try to line up the necessary support in the non-aligned movement.

We and the Ten are keeping a close eye on developments. We are conscious that there is little that the Ten can usefully to encourage a diplomatic solution, but we stand ready to help if we can. A proposal to make representations in Baghdad and Tehran is under consideration by the Ten. I enclose a copy of a statement that was issued by the Foreign Ministers on 24 May. This was well received in Iraq; we have no record of Iranian reactions.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2-	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO JUNE 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
	10	INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA,
	11	KUWAIT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, PARIS, MOSCOW, STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS,
	12	ALGIERS, MUSCAT, UKREP BRUSSELS, TEL AVIV, MODUK (D14)
	13	INFO ROUTINE BIS TEHRAN
	14	YOUR TELNO ^{207 b} 218 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ WAR
	15	1. MIFT contains the text of the Prime Minister's
	16	acknowledgement of King Hussein's message. Original will follow
	17	by bag.
	18	2. In handing over the message you should refer to your
	19	audience with the King on 30 May and say that the Prime Minister
	20	wishes to respond sympathetically to the King's request for
	21	<u>support at the United Nations, not least because of the</u>
///	22	<u>magnificent Jordanian response over the adoption of Resolution</u>
//	23	502. You should therefore assure the King that we take seriously
/	24	the threat to the region posed by the conflict between Iran and
	25	Iraq, and that we intend to work for a constructive and

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword honourable	
File number		Dept Private Office	Distribution Standard:	
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES			MED	ESID
Telephone number 233 4641			NENAD	CONS Dept
Authorised for despatch			NAD	CONS EM Unit
Comcen reference		Time of despatch	UND	Cabinet Office
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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2.

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1 ZCZC

2 honourable outcome acceptable to both sides.

3 3. You should add that we understand that the Iraqis only
 4 want to bring the matter to the Council when they have obtained
 5 the necessary NAM support. We believe that it is likely to be
 6 necessary to give the Secretary General as much latitude as
 7 possible since the gulf between the two sides remains wide, and
 8 Iranian suspicions of the United Nations will need to be allayed
 9 if a constructive outcome is to be obtained. But we await the
 10 results of current discussions, particularly in Havana, and
 11 hope to remain in close touch with the Jordanians.

12 4. Strictly for your own information, like Sir A Parsons, we
 13 think the Jordanian approach to the Security Council ill-
 14 considered. It is difficult to understand why King Hussein
 15 should take an initiative which cuts across what the Iraqis
 16 themselves seem to want. We owe a debt in the Security Council
 17 to the King and we should therefore go along with him if at
 18 all possible (there might conceivably be advantage for us in
 19 diverting the Council from the Falklands though we have to be
 20 careful to avoid supporting language inconsistent with our
 21 current position in the council on the Falklands) But we have no
 22 real interest in having this question come to the Security
 23 Council in a way which will antagonise the Iranians and possibly
 24 even give the Soviet Union opportunities to improve their
 25 standing in Iran. We see no likelihood that the Council will be
 26 able to adopt a resolution of the kind suggested by the King.
 27 The best that it could probably do in present circumstances
 28 would be to ask the Secretary General (again) to explore the
 29 possibilities of a solution that was acceptable to both sides.
 30

/// 31 PYM

// 32 NNNN

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34

NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword