



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 June 1982

*Dear John,*Falklands: Briefing for Versailles Summit

As requested in David Goodall's letter of 2 June to Andrew Burns, I attach briefing for the Prime Minister's use at Versailles on the attitude of each of our 6 partners to the Falklands crisis. We have included a section on the Community, and also a note on Western relations with Latin America. Some basic documents, including Security Council Resolutions 502 and 505, are also attached. This material has been cleared with the Ministry of Defence.

I wrote to you separately this morning about the Prime Minister's meeting in Paris on 4 June with President Reagan.

In discussing the Falklands more widely at Versailles, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, the other heads of state or Government are likely particularly to ask about our policy once the Islands are recaptured. They are likely to be particularly interested in the future of relations with Argentina, relations with Latin America in general and Soviet influence in the area. As far as Argentina is concerned, the Prime Minister will wish to point out that much will depend on whether the Argentines realize the extent of their miscalculation over the invasion and end hostilities. We hope that they will and that relations can gradually return to normal. If they do not, continuing economic pressure on them will be needed, as well as tight restrictions on arms supplies. Relations with Latin America are covered in Annex 9.

On the dangers of Soviet influence, the Prime Minister will want to make clear our awareness of the Soviet dimension. But she could point to the already existing momentum of Argentine-Soviet relations (grain sales etc) and make clear that the risk of Soviet influence should not be overestimated. Traditional Argentine views are greatly against it. Equally

/the Soviet Union

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the Soviet Union's own economic weakness may make her think twice about an expensive commitment in a country which is likely to be economically unsound and politically unstable.

I am copying this letter to Mrs McGraffin in the Cabinet Office and to Mr Webb in MOD.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

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10 Downing Street

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FALKLANDS : BRIEFING FOR VERSAILLES SUMMIT

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VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER
SUMMIT COUNTRIES

BELGIUM

1. The Belgian Government has supported Britain firmly since the beginning of the crisis. Mr Tindemans, the Foreign Minister, has been robust in his support both in public and privately. King Baudouin has also expressed to our Ambassador his personal support. At the debate in the UN Security Council on 23 May the Belgian representative made a most helpful contribution. The Belgians were also active in their EC Presidency role in securing the renewal of trade sanctions against Argentina.
2. Belgian press comment has been generally balanced and often positively in support of the British position. However, there have been some dissenting voices in the smaller circulation periodicals and, as time goes on, anxiety is being expressed as to the long-term solution of the problem.

10. EL SALVADOR DELIVERED A LEGALISTIC BUT MODERATE STATEMENT (INDEED, ALL THE CENTRAL AMERICANS, EXCEPT NICARAGUA, HAVE BEEN STRIKINGLY MODERATE). THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD PROMOTE A CEASEFIRE AND THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IF HE HAD BEEN GIVEN MORE TIME QUOTE WHICH ARGENTINA APPEARED TO BE READY TO GIVE HIM UNQUOTE. THE COUNCIL SHOULD THEREFORE GIVE HIM A FORMAL MANDATE TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 502.

11. Mlle Dever (Belgium) SPOKE NEXT (TEXT BY FACSIMILE TO EMERGENCY UNIT). HER STATEMENT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN THOSE OF EITHER FRANCE OR THE UNITED STATES. SHE MENTIONED THE TENDENCY TO FORGET THAT THE ARGENTINE INVASION HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. ARGENTINA HAD DISREGARDED SCR 502. THERE WERE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES AT STAKE. THE USE OF FORCE WAS INADMISSIBLE. TO REWARD IT WOULD ENCOURAGE OTHERS WITH TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. THE REACTION OF SMALL COUNTRIES HAD INDICATED THAT THIS POINT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD. BELGIUM REJECTED THE NOVEL DOCTRINE THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 41 OF THE CHARTER. IN TAKING PART IN THOSE SANCTIONS BELGIUM, LIKE ITS PARTNERS, HAD WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DISAPPROVAL OF A CHARTER VIOLATION CONDEMNED BY A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND ABOVE ALL TO SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO FIND A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

12. KAMIL (INDONESIA) CONGRATULATED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CALLED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THE AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE BUILT UPON. HE RECALLED THAT IN THE CASE OF WEST IRIAN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD PLAYED A ROLE WHICH HAD BROUGHT THE WAR TO AN END. ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE DIFFERENCES IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT WAS A PRECEDENT THAT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A CEASEFIRE, IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER HIS AUSPICES.

13. CALLE Y CALLE (PERU) MADE A STRONGLY PRO-ARGENTINE STATEMENT. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE IN 1833 IT WOULD HAVE DEMANDED BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. SCR 502 WAS PARTIAL BECAUSE IT DID NOT COVER THE DE-COLONISATION ASPECT. IT HAD NOT PROMOTED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. CALLE Y CALLE REVIEWED BELAUNDE'S EFFORTS: THE ORIGINAL CALL FOR A TRUCE; THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF APRIL; AND THE MOST RECENT PROPOSALS. HE SUCCEEDED IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FAILURE OF PERU'S EFFORTS HAD BEEN DUE TO BRITISH INSISTENCE THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION LAY IN PRIOR WITHDRAWAL BY ARGENTINA, I.E. RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO, WHICH ARGENTINA COULD OBVIOUSLY NOT ACCEPT. BUT THE MOST RECENT PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN REJECTED BY THE UK, SO THE IDEA WAS STILL ALIVE. MEANWHILE, THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADOPT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND GIVING A NEW MANDATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER
SUMMIT COUNTRIES

CANADA

1. The Canadians have taken a robust and helpful attitude over the Falklands. Mr Trudeau has said publicly that Canada is 100% behind the British, and Mr MacGuigan declared Canada's full support of whatever action Britain took. They reacted quickly by imposing a ban on arms shipments and withdrawing their Ambassador from Buenos Aires for consultations. Following the EC decision they also imposed sanctions by banning imports and new official export credits. These did not affect the arrangements for continuing to service the Candu nuclear reactor which the Canadians have sold to the Argentines. There is widespread public support in Canada for Britain's policy on the dispute.

2. After Versailles, Mr Trudeau is going on to visit Spain (7-9 June) and Yugoslavia (10-13 June). He could be asked to put the following points on the Falklands to his hosts:-

(a) In Spain. Britain's stance on Falklands not a confrontation between the West and Latin America. Britain greatly values its historic links with Latin America and hopes to build on them. Our sole objective in relation to Falkland Islands is to end Argentina's ill-considered invasion and to restore British administration. Spain would be well placed to assure their Latin American friends of this.

(b) In Yugoslavia. British actions in South Atlantic purely in self-defence, following Argentina's initial invasion and persistent refusal to withdraw its forces peacefully. Falkland Islanders fully entitled, like other peoples, to the right to self-determination.

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VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER
SUMMIT COUNTRIES

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

1. In the first week after the invasion the member States agreed to embargo arm exports to Argentina. They later agreed that there would in practice be no offers of new officially supported export credit to Argentina. On 16 April a one month ban on all imports from Argentina was introduced. On 17 May it was extended for one week. Italy and Ireland did not apply the extension, but agreed to make arrangements to prevent this leading to trade diversion.

However, Denmark no longer applies the ban on a Community basis but has introduced equivalent national measures. On 24 May the ban was again extended without time limit, on the same basis.

2. Immediately after the invasion the European Community issued its own statement condemning Argentine aggression. Since then, the Commission has consistently been helpful in preparing and implementing Community decisions on economic measures against Argentina.

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER SUMMIT COUNTRIES

FRANCE

1. The French Government have from the outset been unequivocal in their support for British action over the Falklands, both at the UN and elsewhere, although France has adopted no formal position on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. President Mitterrand, has made several public statements of support : the latest on American television over the weekend of May 29/30. The French position has been based on recognition of the issues of principle involved (international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, Argentina the aggressor), the implications for French overseas territories, and solidarity with a fellow EC/NATO/permanent UN Security Council member.

2. The Communist Ministers have maintained government solidarity over the Falklands, although the Communist Party leader and the official Communist daily L'Humanité, have condemned British action as colonialist in inspiration. For the rest, with one or two exceptions, press reporting has been reasonably fair and objective.

3. French government support has been translated into practical intervention on the UK's behalf, eg with the Japanese, and over arms supplies by third countries. The French have supported EC sanctions throughout.

4. French support will continue 'as long as the conflict lasts'. President Mitterrand has told the Prime Minister that he always expected the present phase to end in military recapture of the Falklands. But he is concerned that a long-term solution should be found and that relations between Europe and Latin America should not be permanently damaged. He has urged publicly and privately that diplomacy should be active in the next phase. France's economic and commercial interests in Latin America will be a factor in her attitude.

5. The Prime Minister will know of the latest developments

concerning the French block on Exocet deliveries to Peru. The French Government have given us vital cooperation in our efforts to prevent Argentina obtaining Exocets via third parties. They have come under strong pressure as a result from the manufacturers, which they believe they have resisted. The French have also provided, on a confidential basis, a considerable amount of technical information on French arms held by Argentina, as well as practice for our pilots against Mirages. On 2 occasions articles in the British press (notably a Sunday Times piece on the sale of Exocet to Argentina) have resulted in French complaints. Those have been smoothed over by letters from Mr Nott to M. Hernu, and by public statements acknowledging French support.

6. Separate briefing is being provided on Lt Cdr Astiz.

France / Falklands

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FALKLANDS : FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. SPEAKING ABOUT THE FALKLANDS IN THE COURSE OF A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 24 MAY IN THE IVORY COAST, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IS QUOTED BY LE MONDE AS SAYING THAT " BRITAIN IS OUR ALLY, IT IS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE LIVED OVER THE COURSE OF THIS CENTURY THROUGH THE MOST TRAGIC MOMENTS OF OUR EXISTENCE. WE HAVE LIVED THROUGH A PERIOD OF INTENSE SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AND BRITAIN WITH US. ALL THESE LINKS BETWEEN US CANNOT BE AT THE MERCY OF EVENTS, HOWEVER REGRETTABLE, SUCH AS THOSE GOING ON AT THE MOMENT". AFTER DESCRIBING LATIN AMERICAN VIEWS THAT BRITAIN'S BEHAVIOUR WAS COLONIALIST AS "RATHER EXCESSIVE", MITTERRAND WENT ON: "FRANCE HAS VERY STRONG STRONG LINKS WITH LATIN AMERICA WHICH GO BEYOND TRADE LINKS, WHICH DERIVE FROM FACTORS OF CIVILISATION. WE THEREFORE WANT THE FRIENDSHIP OF THESE PEOPLES, WE HAVE IT AND WE DON'T WANT TO LOSE IT". MITTERRAND ADDED THAT THE ARGENTINE INITIATIVE HAD OFFENDED "BRITAIN, OUR FRIEND" IN ITS INTERESTS AND ITS PRIDE. HE OBSERVED THAT FROM THE MOMENT WHEN BRITAIN IT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FAIT ACCOMPLI IN THE FALKLANDS, ITS FLEETS COULD NOT RETURN HOME WITHOUT FULFILLING ITS MISSION WHICH COULD NOT BE JUST ONE OF INTIMIDATION. MITTERRAND CONCLUDED: "FRANCE WILL ALWAYS BE A FIRM SUPPORTER OF A RETURN TO A JUST PEACE ('PAIX DANS LE RESPECT DU DROIT')". THIS MEANS THAT EVERYTHING THAT MIGHT BE DONE AND SAID TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THE FIGHTING WHILE RESPECTING THE LAW WILL BE DONE BY FRANCE. HOWEVER WE WILL NOT DO IT OUT OF INDULGENCE TOWARDS ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER, WE WILL DO IT BECAUSE THE RETURN TO A JUST PEACE IS A CONSTANT THEME OF FRENCH DIPLOMACY". IN THIS CONNECTION, MITTERRAND RECALLED FRANCE'S ATTACHMENT TO RESOLUTION 502.

2. SPEAKING IN SIMILAR VEIN AT AIX-EN-PROVENCE ON 23 MAY, THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER SAID " IF WE WANT PEACE THAT MEANS A JUST PEACE ALLOW THE DEFENCE MINISTER TO SAY IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE AGRESSOR IS ARGENTINA, AND THE VICTIM IS BRITAIN, AND THAT BRITAIN IS DEFENDING ITS RIGHTS".

3. HERNU IS ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY OFFICIAL REQUEST FROM MR NOTT OR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE LOAN OF FRENCH PLANES TO BRITAIN. HE WAS COMMENTING ON REPORTS STEMMING APPARENTLY FROM A CLAIM

MARCEL

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MARCEL DASSAULT HAD MADE ON THE RADIO THAT BRITAIN HAD ASKED FOR THE LOAN OF SUPER-ETANDARDS AND MIRAGES TO STUDY THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

4. FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE OF THE PENDING HAS BEEN REASONABLY FAVOURABLE. LE FIGARO AND LE QUOTIDIEN (BOTH RIGHT-WING) HAVE CARRIED STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE EDITORIALS AND EVEN LE MONDE IN ITS EDITORIAL ON 23 MAY ADMITTED THAT WHATEVER ARGENTINA'S RIGHTS MIGHT BE OVER THE FALKLANDS IT HAS BEEN THE AGGRESSOR.
FRETWELL

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France/Falklands

FALKLANDS: US TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

1. IN A US TELEVISION INTERVIEW AT THE WEEKEND (A CURTAIN RAISER TO THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT) PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WAS ASKED WHETHER CONTINUED FIGHTING BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WOULD INTRUDE ON THE SUMMIT. HE REPLIED :

'IT SO HAPPENS THAT LIKE MANY OTHERS WE FOUND OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE — EMBARRASSING SITUATION — BECAUSE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. ON THE ONE HAND, GREAT BRITAIN, AN ALLY, A FRIEND, THE WHOLE HISTORY OF THAT COUNTRY IS INTERWOVEN WITH OUR OWN, MANY, MANY YEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CENTURY, WITH TWO WORLD WARS, WE ARE REALLY WELDED TOGETHER WITH GREAT BRITAIN. AND SO IF THERE ISN'T A REFLEX OF SOLIDARITY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE THEN BETWEEN WHOM COULD SUCH A REFLEX EXIST?

WE AREN'T, IN SAYING THAT, SETTLING THE PROBLEM IN LAW. BY USING FORCE, BY CHOOSING FORCE, ARGENTINA HAS IN FACT BROKEN THE RULE OF LAW AND DISPLACED SOMETHING WRONG. AND SO, THE BRITISH REACTION WAS A FAIRLY OBVIOUS ONE. THE BRITISH WOULDN'T HAVE SENT A NAVAL TASK FORCE ALL THAT DISTANCE JUST TO MAKE IT GO ON, SAIL TOWARDS CHINA OR POLYNESIA.

WE HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, AND WE ARE REALLY VERY SAD TO BE IN SUCH A SITUATION IN WHICH THOSE COUNTRIES COULD PERHAPS DOUBT OUR FRIENDSHIP, THE COMMON BASIS, THE COMMON CIVILIZATION THAT WE HAVE. SO WE ARE IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS ONLY A BAD SIDE TO IT AND THAT OF COURSE IS VERY FREQUENT IN POLITICAL LIFE. SO I DECIDED THAT OUR DUTY WAS FIRST OF ALL TO SHOW FULL SOLIDARITY WITH THE BRITISH, NUMBER ONE, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN THE VICTIMS OF AN OPPRESSION. THEY HAVE BEEN INJURED, THEIR INTERESTS, AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL PRIDE AS WELL.

THE SECOND POINT IS THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING THAT WE CAN DO BECAUSE, ONCE GREAT BRITAIN HAS MANAGED TO AGAIN GET CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OR PART OF THE PROPERTY, THEN WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN POSSIBLY DO IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE BY THE VARIOUS MEANS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL EVOLVE, IN PARTICULAR, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION. AND AS WE SAID AT THE VERY BEGINNING, THROUGH RESOLUTION 502 IN PARTICULAR WE MUST MOVE TOWARDS PEACE THROUGH LAW. SO THAT IS THE SITUATION''.

HENDERSON

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER SUMMIT COUNTRIES

GERMANY

1. The Federal Government have made it clear that they will support us over the Falklands 'as long as the conflict lasts' (Schmidt with Mitterrand, 15 May) and have agreed to extend Community sanctions indefinitely. They also made valiant efforts to keep the Italians on board over sanctions. But German support, which wobbled greatly after the sinking of the Belgrano, has become reluctant since the first UN negotiations broke down and our landing took place. The Chancellor repeated last week in public that German support is not a 'blank cheque' for Britain, and indeed gives Germany a 'moral duty' to impress on Britain the need for 'proportionality' in her reactions. Members of the Chancellor's office have told us of the Chancellor's deep concern over our present stance on negotiations. Herr Genscher has been staunch in his support for our rights and principles, but told the Cabinet on 26 May, we understand, that he had agreed to extend sanctions only on the understanding that the UK as well as Argentina would do everything possible to achieve a political solution.

2. The German Government condemn Argentina's aggression and the breach of international law involved. They were impressed by our efforts to find a peaceful solution, embodied in our draft interim agreement of 17 May, but felt that we abandoned the attempt too quickly.

3. Behind this attitude lies the emotional German aversion to war. Two other worries have loomed larger in the past ten days. One is the possibility of damage to Europe's and (especially) the US's relations with Latin America, from which they believe only the USSR stand to gain. The other is the possible effect in both short and long term on our NATO contribution and our forces in the FRG.

4. The German interest in trade with Argentina is very substantial. They took 28% of all the European Community's imports from Argentina

5. German firms have a contract to build four frigates for Argentina. The first of these is one for delivery at the end of this year, but sea trials have been delayed partly as a result of the withdrawal of Rolls Royce engineers. Completion of the subsequent three vessels will be at five monthly intervals after the first. The value of the contract is £430 million of which contracts awarded to UK companies are in excess of £35 million. The value of progress payments is not known but can be assumed to be about a third.

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER SUMMIT COUNTRIES

ITALY

1. About half of Argentina's population is of Italian extraction. There are over one million Italian passport holders in the country, who are entitled to vote in Italy's national elections and therefore form an important lobby. Italy has important commercial interests in Argentina and generally in South America.
2. Italian foreign policy often closely reflects internal political considerations. The Prime Minister, Spadolini, along with Foreign Minister, Colombo, was keen to maintain Community solidarity (a constant in Italian foreign policy) by renewing EC sanctions against Argentina, but his tiny Republican party commands only 3% of the Italian vote. The Christian Democrats and Socialists, the two largest coalition partners, were opposed. Had Spadolini gone ahead with a renewal of EC sanctions the government could have collapsed.
3. Many Italians saw sanctions as contributing to the escalation of the conflict. They saw opportunities for the Soviet Union in Argentina and adverse effects on long term relations between Europe and Latin America. Coupled with this were doubts about the efficacy of sanctions. Many Italians, including politicians, thought they would make matters worse by hardening junta attitudes.
4. Among Italian politicians and public there is an automatic assumption that every problem can be solved by negotiation. Issues tend to be sidestepped in search of acceptable compromise rather than tackled head on. The common press clichés are that the hostilities are 'absurd' and Britain's reaction to the Argentine invasion 'disproportionate'. The Pope's comments on the tragedy of war and senseless loss of life will understandably have struck a chord with most Italians.
5. Since the decision not to renew sanctions there has been some

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criticism of the Government's stance. Spadolini and Colombo have stressed that there has been no weakening in Italy's political support for the UK. Spadolini took a robust line in a meeting with the new Argentine Ambassador to Italy on 24 May, (Rome telno 282).

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 282 OF 26 MAY 82

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INFO SAVING BIS BUENOS AIRES

MY TELNO 274: FALKLANDS: ITALIAN VIEWS

1. SPADOLINI RECEIVED LUCHETTA, THE NEW ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR, ON 24 MAY. OUR TRANSLATION OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTERWARDS IS AS FOLLOWS :

QUOTE. SPADOLINI STATED THE ITALAIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THERE ARE NO ALTERNATIVES TO NEGOTIATION FOR THE GRAVE CONFLICT WHICH HAS STRUCK THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, FOLLOWING ON FROM THE ARMED VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CARRIED OUT BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WITH THEIR INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND FROM ALL THE MILITARY ACTION WHICH RESULTED. SPADOLINI RECALLED ITALY'S CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF FORCE TO SOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND HER CALL , IN COMMON WITH THE EC COUNTRIES, FOR THE FULL APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 502. ITALY HAD DEMONSTRATED IN DIFFICULT CONDITIONS THAT SHE TOOK ACCOUNT OF HER ETHNIC LINKS WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. SPADOLINI ASKED LUCHETTA TO TRANSMIT TO HIS AUTHORITIES AN URGENT APPEAL TO GIVE PROOF OF A GREATER SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, COOPERATING IN EVERY WAY FOR A PEACEFUL AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UN INITIATIVE, AN INITIATIVE WHICH WAS ITSELF WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF THE US MEDIATION.

UNQUOTE.

2. THE MFA ASSURE US THAT THE COMMUNIQUE ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE FIRM LINE TAKEN BY SPADOLINI. THEY BELIEVE THE PHRASE ABOUT "GREATER SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY" MAY CAUSE DIFFICULTY IN BUENOS AIRES.

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VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER SUMMIT COUNTRIES

JAPAN

1. Japan voted for SCR 502, although there were reports of some initial hesitation. Thereafter, although the Japanese Government claimed to have spoken firmly to Argentine representatives and to have warned of the possible economic consequences, they took no clear economic measures for several weeks. The letter of 12 April from the Japanese Prime Minister sets out the Japanese view in general terms, and was amplified when the Japanese Ambassador told the FCO on the same day that no application for new commitments for export credit to Argentina was expected (but was not prepared to make a public statement to this effect). A further message from the Japanese Prime Minister delivered on 27 April said that the Japanese Government would advise Japanese businessmen not 'unduly' to take advantage of the import ban imposed by the EC and other countries. A reply from Mrs Thatcher dated 28 April took up the reference to 'unduly' and asked Japan to consider imposing actual restrictions on trade. There has been no response. Japan's reluctance to do more is based on her economic interests in Argentina, including a large surplus on bilateral trade; the large numbers of Japanese nationals or people of Japanese origin in Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America; and claimed difficulties about taking specific action on imports in the absence of an explicit UN resolution, because of the restrictions of GATT and of Japan's domestic legislation.

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MIPT FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR SUZUKI'S LETTER TO MRS THATCHER:-

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR DETAILED MESSAGE CONCERNING THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO ME
THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR, SIR HUGH CORTAZZI. I HAVE BEEN
FOLLOWING WITH A SENSE OF GRAVE CONCERN THE DEVELOPMENTS
IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SINCE MILITARY ACTION
WAS TAKEN BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. I HAVE ALSO READ
YOUR MESSAGE WITH GREAT ATTENTION. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
CONSIDERS THAT THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA VIOLATES THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS AND
NON-USE OF FORCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THAT SUCH
ACTION CAN NEVER BE ACCEPTED. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WILL BE PROMPTLY REALIZED
AND THAT THIS DISPUTE PEACEFULLY SETTLED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
NEGOTIATIONS.

IT WAS FROM THIS BASIC STANDPOINT THAT JAPAN IMMEDIATELY
SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION Tabled BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT, ALSO IN
TOKYO, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY EXPLAINED OUR POSITION
BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

THIS POSITION OF JAPAN HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO THE
ARGENTINE SIDE ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS, AND ON APRIL 12, THE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN CONFORMITY WITH MY WISHES,
MADE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR:

(I) WE DEEPLY REGRET THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA
AND URGE THAT ITS FORCES WITHDRAW IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION:

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(11) THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN PLACES HIGH EXPECTATIONS ON GOOD OFFICES BY THE UNITED STATES AND HOPES THAT ARGENTINIAN WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS GOOD OFFICES AND WILL TRY TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO STATE SIMILARLY TO YOU THAT JAPAN PLACES, FOR THE PRESENT, EXPECTATIONS ON THE EFFORTS OF GOOD OFFICES BY THE UNITED STATES.

TO YOUR REQUEST FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE CONCRETE MEASURES PROPOSED IN YOUR MESSAGE, I SHOULD LIKE TO REPLY AS FOLLOWS:

THE BASIC IDEA OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS THAT MEASURES TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON APRIL 3 SHOULD PRIMARILY BE SOUGHT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CHARTER. WE ARE CERTAINLY PREPARED TO MAKE EFFORTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION BY DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER MEANS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS, TOO. SUCH EFFORTS SHOULD BE NATURALLY EXERTED IN SUCH A MANNER AS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. IT IS ALSO NATURAL THAT WE SHALL EXERT SUCH EFFORTS ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE JUDGE FOR OURSELVES TO BE THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD.

IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS, JAPAN PURSUES THE POLICY OF ABSTAINING FROM EXPORTING ARMS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND IS SATISFIED THAT IT IS THUS CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. THIS POLICY IS BEING APPLIED STRICTLY TO ARGENTINA.

BEARING THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, WE STATED TO THE ARGENTINE SIDE IN OUR REPRESENTATIONS OF APRIL 12 THAT IF THE PRESENT CRISIS IS PROLONGED, IT IS FEARED THAT THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN IN THAT COUNTRY'S FUTURE MIGHT BE UNDERMINED AND THAT THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE IMPEDED, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, AND EXPRESSED OUR HOPE THAT FOR THESE AND OTHER REASONS THE ARGENTINE SIDE WILL ENDEAVOUR FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION.

WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SEE THAT THE ARGENTINE SIDE IS REMINDED OF IT.

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AS A STATESMAN SHOULDERING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT AS YOU ARE, I CAN IMAGINE HOW SERIOUSLY YOU ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AFFAIR. BUT I HAVE KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME YOUR OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP IN A BROAD RANGE OF STATE AFFAIRS. IN THE FIRM BELIEF THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL NOT FAIL TO TIME OVER THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION UNDER YOUR ABLE GUIDANCE, I SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR GOOD HEALTH AND FOR EVERY SUCCESS IN THE DISCHARGE OF YOUR IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES

YOURS SINCERELY,

ZENKO SUZUKI
PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

FCO PASS SAYING WELLINGTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 271730Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 28 APRIL 1982

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION

1. TEXT OF MR SUZUKI'S LETTER:

BEGINS: DEAR MRS THATCHER,

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH SERIOUS CONCERN - AS I MENTIONED IN MY LETTER OF APRIL 12TH - THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND EARNESTLY HOPING FOR AN EARLY AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE, EVER SINCE THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION.

IN PURSUANCE OF ITS NATIONAL POLICY OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, JAPAN DEEPLY REGRETS THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE AND CONSIDERS THAT THEIR FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW PROMPTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502 OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. IN LINE WITH THIS POSITION, MY GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED TO MAKE APPROACHES TO THE ARGENTINE SIDE. OUR ACTIONS, AS MENTIONED IN MY PREVIOUS LETTER AND REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED AS OUR OFFICIAL VIEWS, ARE BASED ON THE CONSIDERATION, INTER ALIA, THAT THEY SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS - INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER - WHILE ENSURING THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD WITH DUE ATTENTION TO UNITY AND COOPERATION WITH THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES.

FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, MY GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO GUIDE THE BUSINESS CIRCLES TO PAY DUE ATTENTION NOT TO UNDULY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MEASURES TO BAN IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA TAKEN BY THE EC MEMBERS AND OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE BENEFIT OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF JAPAN. I BELIEVE THAT IT NOT ONLY CONFORMS TO JAPAN'S BASIC POSITION, BUT ALSO MEETS YOUR REQUESTS.

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GRS 249

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 271700Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 28 APRIL 1982

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT FALKLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION

1. YOU SHOULD DELIVER AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOLLOWING REPLY
FROM PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS: DEAR MR SUZUKI,

I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR LETTER WHICH YOUR AMBASSADOR DELIVERED ON
27 APRIL. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE
DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER SUPPORT TO OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE ARGENTINE
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WERE ABLE TO AGREE VERY
SWIFTLY TO BAN IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, AND OTHER INDUSTRIALISED
COUNTRIES (NOT ALL FROM THE COMMONWEALTH) HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR
MEASURES. WHILE I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSURANCE THAT JAPANESE
BUSINESS CIRCLES WILL BE GUIDED 'NOT TO UNDULY TAKE ADVANTAGE'
OF THESE RESTRICTIONS, I AM BOUND TO SAY THAT
THIS DOES NOT FULLY MEET OUR REQUEST. PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE
WOULD CERTAINLY NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF ANY (UNDERLINED) INCREASED
TRADE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND JAPAN WERE TO RESULT. I SHOULD LIKE
TO URGE YOU NOW TO RECONSIDER WHETHER JAPAN COULD NOT IMPOSE
ACTUAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH ARGENTINA. AND MAKE PUBLIC THE
DECISION YOU TAKE, AS WELL AS THOSE YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN. IN
MY VIEW SUCH A MOVE BY JAPAN, IF UNDERTAKEN SWIFTLY,
COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT IN SHOWING ARGENTINA THE
SERIOUS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER ENDS

PYM

FCO

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MR LITTLE

MR HAWTHIN

MR FRIEDT

MR ILETT

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SIR M PALMER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICLSON (EMP DIR) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS

DSW 60

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT : ATTITUDES TO THE FALKLANDS OF OTHER
SUMMIT COUNTRIES

UNITED STATES

1. There have been sharp divisions in the US Administration between those who have argued for support for Britain, and those who have favoured the preservation of US relations with Latin America, particularly in order to limit Soviet and Cuban influence in South and Central America. Haig and Weinberger have been on our side, Mrs Kirkpatrick and most of the National Security Council on the other. President Reagan, after an initial show of evenhandedness, has been with us, though in his public pronouncements he has sought to maintain a reasonable relationship with Latin American countries.

2. The pull of opposing factors led to Haig's initial attempts at mediation, but when these failed the Americans came down firmly, though after much thought, on our side. They banned arms supplies to Argentina (in effect closing loopholes in an earlier not fully effective ban), and agreed to withhold export credit cover on new business. We asked if they would consider a ban on imports from Argentina, but in view of their reluctance, and their support in other areas, we have not pressed this. Above all, they agreed to provide us with material support. US relations with Argentina and other Latin American States have suffered as a result of these measures. Nevertheless this did not prevent Haig making a firm statement in support of us at the Rio Treaty meeting on 27-29 May.

3. Subsequent American reluctance to commit themselves to a security guarantee for the Islands shows that their support for us has limits. But material support (see Washington telno 1977 paragraph 5) has been very considerable. (The MOD are providing a further brief on this for President Reagan's visit to London next week). Haig has also offered help with the welfare and repatriation of POWs after Stanley is taken.

4. US public opinion was initially very strongly in support of our policies, but has shown signs recently of wavering.

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5. Sir N Henderson has stressed that we should 'bear in mind that US assistance should not be taken for granted : that it requires constant working on the US Administration, Congress and public opinion to keep them in the right position : often its value to us is very great'. In discussions at Versailles Reagan and Haig are likely to concentrate on asking about our plans for the future of the Islands once they are repossessed, and to stress the risk of growing Soviet influence in Argentina.

6. The following telegrams are attached as background:

- i) Washington telno 1964, giving Haig's most recent ideas for a settlement;
- ii) Washington telno 1977 : Falklands : what USA support has meant;
- iii) Washington telno 1979 : Falklands : Haig/Kirkpatrick;
- iv) FCO telno 1098 of 2 June giving Sir N Henderson instructions for a call on Reagan : and our reply to (i) above.

DBY 292330Z

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/PUSD
 MR REED, PUSD
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE
 PS/HOME SECRETARY
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
 PS/SIR M PALLISER
 PS/SIR A DUFF
 MR WADE-GERY
 MR FULLER
 MR COLVIN
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
 MENTS STAFF
 DIO
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET OFFICE

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DESKBY 292330Z

FM WASHINGTON 292144Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1964 OF 29 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PAPER HAIG HAS GIVEN ME.

IDEAS FOR AN APPROACH

WHEN BRITISH MILITARY SUCCESS IS AT HAND, THE US AND BRAZIL WOULD PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT TO THE UK AND ARGENTINA CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS TAKEN AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE.

1. GENERAL AND PERMANENT CEASEFIRE (INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR THE NON-RESUPPLY AND THE REGROUPING OF ARGENTINE FORCES);
- ESTABLISHMENT OF A TEMPORARY BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION;
- LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY ARGENTINA; THE UK AND THIRD COUNTRIES

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TEMPORARY BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION:
LIFTING OF SANCTIONS BY ARGENTINA, THE UK AND THIRD COUNTRIES:
2. IMMEDIATE INTRODUCTION OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE CONSISTING OF
CONTINGENTS FROM THE US AND BRAZIL TO VERIFY THE CEASEFIRE AND
ENSURE THE SEPARATION OF FORCES:
3. RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES:
4. CREATION OF A CONTACT GROUP CONSISTING OF THE UK, THE US,
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA:
5. END OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND START OF LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT BY THE LOCAL COUNCILS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP RATIFYING
ALL DECISIONS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT:
6. PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES, WITH THE PEACE-KEEPING
FORCE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS
FOR A LIMITED PERIOD:
7. NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, ON THE DEFINITIVE
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP:
8. UNDERTAKING BY BOTH PARTIES NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION THAT
WOULD PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 012135Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1977 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR P/S S OF S AND CD5).

FALKLANDS: WHAT USA SUPPORT HAS MEANT.

1. IT IS NOW A LITTLE MORE THAN A MONTH SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION MADE ITS PUBLIC DECLARATION OF U S SUPPORT IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND PROMISED MATERIEL ASSISTANCE. THE DECISION ANNOUNCED BY HAIG ON 30 APRIL WAS NOT AUTOMATIC GIVEN OTHER U S INTERESTS AT STAKE. AS WILL BE EVIDENT FROM THE ACCOUNTS WE HAVE SENT YOU OF THE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE U S ADMINISTRATION, IT WAS NOT ARRIVED AT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. ON THE OTHER SIDE THERE WERE THOSE WHO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PRESERVATION OF U S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA; THE NEED TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS NO OPPORTUNITIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE; THE GENERAL ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM; AND THE WIDELY HELD VIEW, HOWEVER UNREASONABLE, THAT THE FALKLANDS ARE A QUOTE COLONIAL UNQUOTE PROBLEM. ALL THESE FACTIONS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE U S TO CONTINUE TO SIT ON THE FENCE. PRESERVING ITS ROLE AS A MEDIATOR.

2. THE U S ADMINISTRATION HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION HAS STOOD FIRMLY BY IT, THOUGH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND THE LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC HAVE CONSTANTLY AND MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING FOR IT

FIRMLY BY IT, THOUGH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND THE LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC HAVE CONSTANTLY AND MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING PUBLIC SUPPORT. U S PUBLIC OPINION WHILE GENERALLY VERY SUPPORTIVE HAS ON OCCASIONS SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF WAVERING, WITH CONCERN ABOUT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DAMAGE TO U S INTERESTS. HAIG PUT UP A COURAGEOUS PERFORMANCE IN THE OAS LAST WEEK WHERE U S POLICY WAS UNIVERSALLY DENOUNCED. THE PRESIDENT HAS REMAINED FIRM IN SUPPORT OF HIS DECISION, THOUGH SOME OF THOSE AROUND HIM HAVE NOT. U S SUPPORT HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY ATTRIBUTABLE, HOWEVER TO THE EFFORTS OF HAIG AND WEINBERGER.

3. HAIG HAS I REALISE AN EXTREMELY DISCONCERTING TENDENCY TO SHIFT HIS POSITION FROM DAY TO DAY. HE IS HYPERACTIVE AND ANXIOUS TO GET INTO THE ACT AND EVER READY TO COME UP WITH SOME PLAN. THE CONTRADICTIONS WE GET IN HIS THINKING ARE ALSO A FUNCTION OF HIS CONCERN TO CONFIDE IN US AT EVERY STAGE, EVEN WHEN HIS IDEAS ARE HALF-FORMED.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT IS I THINK IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT U S ASSISTANCE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED; THAT IT REQUIRES CONSTANT WORKING ON THE U S ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO KEEP THEM IN THE RIGHT POSITION; AND THAT ITS VALUE TO US IS VERY GREAT.

5. I DO NOT NEED TO GO INTO DETAILS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN, THE FULL EXTENT OF WHICH IS WELLKNOWN TO THE JIC. SO FAR AS COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ARE CONCERNED, THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE ESPECIALLY AVAILABLE SATELLITE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO THEIR OWN OPERATIONS, COMMUNICATION SETS FOR OUR SPECIAL FORCES ON THE ISLANDS, SECURE SPEECH FACILITIES WITH THE FLEET AND SATELLITE WEATHER INFORMATION. SO FAR AS EQUIPMENT IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE OVER THE LAST MONTH PROCURED AT LEAST DOLLARS 122 MILLION OF U S MATERIEL MADE AVAILABLE AT VERY SHORT NOTICE AND FREQUENTLY FROM STOCKS NORMALLY EARMARKED FOR U S OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THIS EQUIPMENT HAS INCLUDED THE LATEST AIR TO AIR SIDE-WINDER MISSILES URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR USE BY THE HARRIERS, THE VULCAN PHALANX ANTI-MISSILE GUN SYSTEM FOR HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, 4730 TONS OF AIRSTRIP MATTING FOR PORT STANLEY AIRPORT ONCE IT HAS BEEN RECAPTURED, CONVERSION OF THE SS STENA INSPECTOR FOR USE AS A REPAIR SHIP IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, SHRIKE MISSILES FOR USE BY THE VULCANS, HELICOPTER ENGINES,

PORT STANLEY AIRPORT ONCE IT HAS BEEN RECAPTURED, CONVERSION OF THE SS STENA INSPECTOR FOR USE AS A REPAIR SHIP IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, SHRIKE MISSILES FOR USE BY THE VULCANS, HELICOPTER ENGINES, SUBMARINE DETECTION DEVICES FOR USE BY THE SEA KING HELICOPTERS, TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION ON A LARGE SCALE FOR ASCENSION ISLAND FOR OUR FORCES, STINGER GROUND TO AIR MISSILES (ALREADY USED SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT), AS WELL AS THE USUAL ARRAY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. MANY OF THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN PROCURED AT EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE (OFTEN 24 HOURS) AND FLOWN IMMEDIATELY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OR ASCENSION ISLAND. BOTH HAIG AND WEINBERGER HAVE TAKEN THE CLOSEST INTEREST IN THE PROCESSING OF THESE REQUESTS, WITH WEINBERGER INTERVENING TO ENSURE THAT THE LARGER AND MORE DIFFICULT ITEMS WERE MADE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AT WHATEVER THE COST TO U S FORCES' REQUIREMENTS. THERE HAS BEEN THE SAME PATTERN OF HELP WITH THE NUMEROUS REQUESTS WE HAVE PROCESSED FOR URGENT TECHNICAL ADVICE IN RELATION TO U S SUPPLIED WEAPONRY AND THEIR MATTERS.

6. AS YOU KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATION IS ANXIOUS THAT THE DETAILS OF THE HELP THEY HAVE GIVEN SHOULD NOT OFFICIALLY BE MADE PUBLIC, DESPITE THE MANY LEAKS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE. BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE FULL EXTENT OF THEIR ASSISTANCE WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HAIG. THEY CERTAINLY FEEL THAT IN TERMS OF PRACTICAL SUPPORT AND IN WAYS THAT REALLY MATTER THEY HAVE, DONE, AS THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO, A VERY GREAT DEAL TO ASSIST US.

7. F C O PLEASE PASS TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST.

HENDERSON

NNNN

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP BIS NEW YORK

GR 333

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 012150Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1979 OF 1 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK BIS NEW YORK

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MY TELNO 1965: FALKLANDS; HAIG/KIRKPATRICK

1. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN HAIG AND MRS KIRKPATRICK OVER THE FALKLANDS. NEWSWEEK HAS NOW GIVEN A CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND, WE ARE TOLD, GENERALLY ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF A 45-MINUTE TELEPHONE QUOTE SLANGING MATCH UNQUOTE BETWEEN HAIG AND MRS KIRKPATRICK AS THE MOST DRAMATIC EXAMPLE YET OF THE RUNNING BATTLE BETWEEN THE TWO.
2. AS WELL AS DEPICTING HAIG AND HIS AIDES AS QUOTE AMATEURS ... BRITS IN AMERICAN CLOTHING ... TOTALLY INSENSITIVE TO LATIN CULTURES ... UNQUOTE, MRS KIRKPATRICK IS SAID TO HAVE DISMISSED AS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC THE STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW THAT QUOTE EVENTUALLY THE LATINs WILL COME WHORING AFTER US BECAUSE THEY ARE, FOR THE MOST PART, RIGHT-WING JUNTAS. UNQUOTE ALLUDING TO HAIG'S SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN AS A BOYS CLUB VERSION OF GANG LOYALTY, MRS KIRKPATRICK IS SAID TO HAVE ASKED HAIG WHY HE DID NOT JUST DISBAND THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND HAVE THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE MAKE US POLICY.
3. REPORTING MRS KIRKPATRICK'S PUBLICLY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE US SHOULD HAVE REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE DISPUTE, NEWSWEEK SAYS THAT SHE TRIED TO PERSUADE REAGAN AND CLARK THAT THIS WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE BUT THAT HAIG OVERRULED HER. REMAINING NEUTRAL HE ARGUED, WOULD HAVE STRAINED THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WORRIED OTHER KEY ALLIES AND AWARDED LEGITIMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE IN SETTLING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT, SINCE MRS KIRKPATRICK IS THE SOLE WOMAN IN REAGAN'S CABINET AND THE LAST DARLING OF THE NEW RIGHT IN THE ADMINISTRATION, AND HAS THE BEST LINK TO LATIN AMERICA, SHE WILL NOT BE FIRED. THE WHITE

KIRKPATRICK IS THE SOLE WOMAN IN REAGAN'S CABINET AND THE LAST DARLING OF THE NEW RIGHT IN THE ADMINISTRATION, AND HAS THE BEST LINK TO LATIN AMERICA, SHE WILL NOT BE FIRED. THE WHITE HOUSE IS SAID TO BE TRYING NOT TO GET INVOLVED: QUOTE ALL WE CAN DO IS STAND ON THE SIDELINES AND HOLD THE JACKETS UNQUOTE.

4. TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST BOTH REPORT THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK, HAVING TOLD HAIG THAT SHE REPRESENTED NOT HIM BUT THE PRESIDENT, INSISTED ON SEEING THE PRESIDENT FOR 40 MINUTES YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS HER POINT OF VIEW.

HENDERSON

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ZZ WASHINGTON
OO UKMIS NEW YORK



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FROM FCO 021136Z JUN 82
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1098 OF 2 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 1971: FALKLANDS



1. WHEN YOU CALL ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, PLEASE SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE ASKED YOU TO TELL HIM ONCE AGAIN BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR EUROPE HOW VERY GREATLY WE APPRECIATE ALL THE SUPPORT WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED AND ARE CONTINUING TO RECEIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS PERIOD. THE VERY CLOSE DIALOGUE WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN WITH HAIG, CLARK AND OTHERS HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. THE PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE OPEN BRACKETS YOUR TELNO 1977 CLOSE BRACKETS WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE AVAILABLE HAS FACILITATED OUR OPERATIONS AS NOTHING ELSE COULD HAVE DONE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED TO THE UNITED STATES BY ARGENTINA'S ATTACK ON THE FALKLANDS OPEN BRACKETS YOUR TELNO 1978 CLOSE BRACKETS ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, AND ESPECIALLY HIS PUBLIC INSISTENCE THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY HAS BEEN AND REMAINS AN IMMENSELY BENEFICIAL INFLUENCE.

2. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT WE LOOK FORWARD GREATLY TO OUR FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS IN VERSAILLES AND LONDON. WE HAD TO CONCLUDE IN RESPONSE TO HAIG'S MOST RECENT SUGGESTIONS THAT THESE COULD NOT BE PURSUED SO LONG AS ARGENTINA CONTINUES TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 502. IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARGENTINE COMMANDER TO EFFECT AN HONOURABLE WITHDRAWAL, AND THUS PROBABLY TO SAVE MANY LIVES. UNFORTUNATELY, WE SEE NO SIGN THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS. WE CONSIDER THAT THE BEST HOPE LIES IN LEAVING THEM TO CONFRONT THE CHOICE THEMSELVES. WE HAD

S E C R E T

RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

1. The Falklands crisis has affected not only Britain's relations with Latin America but also those of the European Community and, more particularly, of the United States.
2. Following repossession of the Falkland Islands, Britain and the West will need to give priority to repairing relations with the region. The scope for this will be influenced by the military outcome: in particular, whether Argentina continues hostilities and seeks Latin American support. The policy which we ourselves adopt towards the future of the Falkland Islands will play its part. It is hard to make predictions at this stage. But, if active confrontation continues, the task of restoring relations with the region will be made much more difficult.
3. For Britain, Latin America is important primarily for economic and commercial reasons. It is an area of vigorous growth and is an expanding source of commodities and raw materials. Venezuela and Mexico are major oil-producers. Brazil, Argentina (and also Mexico) have ambitious and advanced civil nuclear programmes. There is substantial British investment in the region and British banks have played an important role in financing Latin America's development needs. Although British exporters have so far failed to capitalise sufficiently on the opportunities, the area offers a substantial and fast-growing market and considerable major project business.
4. The area is also of increasing political significance. The UK has sought in recent years to repair previous neglect and to demonstrate that we take Latin America seriously. Although the region as a whole is not of first importance to us strategically, the inherent instability of many Latin American Governments and internal economic disparities provide potential for Soviet/Cuban mischief-making, of which the dangers have already been clearly shown in Central America. A defeated Argentina may give further

/opportunities

opportunities to the Soviet Union. The West, including Britain, needs to work to buttress stability and democracy in the region so as to preclude opportunities for Soviet infiltration. We have also to take account of the growing political influence of Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico and to encourage them to play a more forward and moderating role in international fora and to serve as a bridge between North and South. The accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community will give fresh impetus to the Community's efforts to consolidate and develop relations with the region.

5. It is also in the Latin American interest to rebuild relations with Britain and with Europe generally. Here again the prime interest is economic and commercial. The Community is an important market for their commodities and the provision of finance and technology is essential for the region's development. But there has also been a genuine wish to improve the level of political exchanges. The region has close historical and cultural affinities with Europe and, whatever the Third World labels, is generally pro-Western in its underlying sympathies. Europe has offered an alternative to the increasingly uneasy relationship with the United States. Memories of British participation in the Latin American independence struggle, the leading part played by British capital and entrepreneurs in the region's development and the sizeable British communities which remain in Latin America have provided a solid platform of goodwill towards Britain.

6. These factors have been reflected in Latin American reactions to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. With certain exceptions (eg Venezuela, Panama), the countries of the region have responded slowly and with reluctance to Argentine pressures. There is little love for Argentina or for its military government in the region: either openly or in private, there has been wide condemnation of the Argentine aggression. It has in the

/circumstances

circumstances been quite remarkable that, despite Latin American support for Argentina's sovereignty claim and the considerable pull of regional solidarity, the military conflict in the Falklands has reached its culminating stage without any Latin American country, other than Argentina itself, as yet taking direct action on its relations with the UK. Provided that we can now repossess the Islands quickly and without too much bloodshed, there is a good chance that we can emerge from the crisis with our bilateral relations bruised (badly in some cases) but not seriously or lastingly damaged.

7. In moving to restore good relations the UK will nonetheless need to move with tactful regard for Latin American sensitivities. A breathing-space will be required during which contacts can be gradually resumed. Ministerial exchanges may have to wait a while. We shall also need to be selective in our approach, taking account of countries' individual attitudes and interests: as well as bearing in mind that too early or too demonstrative gestures towards those countries who have given most active support to Argentina (eg Venezuela) would be badly received in this country. We should make particular targets of the moderates (Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica) and of those who might act as a restraining influence on future Argentine action (Brazil). We shall need to be sensitive towards Chile (where the price for the support given us may require a softening of our previous attitude to its human rights performance).

8. In seeking to pick up the threads of our relations, we shall need to move gradually, using traditional methods of political and commercial diplomacy, such as:

- promotion of non-official visits (inward and outward) in the cultural, academic and trade fields through the British Council, Canning House, Chambers of Commerce, etc:
- coordination of an official visits programme (first at senior official level and, when and where the situation allows, at Ministerial level);

- a vigorous information effort both through our Embassies and through Latin American correspondents in London. Special attention to Latin America in official speeches and statements;
- encouragement to British businessmen to visit the market;
- Government funding for major project business: a positive review of ECGD credit levels for Latin America: a review of our aid programme to Latin America.

9. In working to reassert the general Western interest in Latin America (and to limit the scope for the Soviet Union to gain influence by default), we should recognise that, at least in the immediate aftermath of the Falklands crisis, our EC partners may be able to act more effectively than we can. This will of course be particularly the case in attempts to restrain Argentina itself from any dangerous political re-alignment. We have however to keep in mind that if Argentina continues hostilities there will be a need for us to seek to maintain EC sanctions. On this will depend whether the EC will be able to get back on terms with other countries in the region. If so, the scope for positive policies to consolidate the relationship (EC/Andean Pact, EC/GRULA, encouragement of European Parliament links with Latin America) might be considered at an early stage by the Ten.

10. For the United States the problem of restoring relations with the region will be particularly acute. The Reagan Administration has given a high priority to its relations with Latin America and to strengthening the region's resistance to Soviet/Cuban expansionism. The Falklands crisis has been a severe setback. The US has borne a great deal of the brunt of Latin American criticism, and doubts about US motives in the region have been accentuated. It will be a matter of urgency for the US to repair the damage. But developments on the Falklands will continue to affect their ability to do this and will thus have a bearing on UK/US relations.

/Conclusions

Conclusions

11. Western relations with Latin America will inevitably have suffered considerable damage as a result of the Falklands crisis. Developments in the Falklands, particularly the degree of Argentine determination to continued confrontation, will condition the scope for healing the wounds. But Latin American countries have so far shown reluctance to move from rhetoric to action: and there will be a mutual interest in a gradual resumption of normal relations. It will be to our advantage to support Community action to repair the relationship. We shall need to take particular account of the very high priority which the United States attaches to its relations with the region.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/502 (1982)
3 April 1982

Annex 10 A
S

RESOLUTION 502 (1982)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2350th meeting,
on 3 April 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Security Council on 1 April 1982 (S/14944) calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities;
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);
3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/505 (1982)
26 May 1982

UNITED NATIONS

MASTER COPY

RESOLUTION 505 (1982)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2368th meeting
on 26 May 1982

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982,

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council at its 2360th meeting on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements in the debate of the representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Concerned to achieve as a matter of the greatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts which he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices bearing in mind Security Council resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Argentine Aggression

1. It is now almost 7 weeks since Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. This unlawful use of force in unprovoked aggression threatened not only to destroy the democratic way of life freely chosen by the Falkland Islanders but also the basis on which international order rests. The invasion was also a singular act of bad faith: it took place when Britain and Argentina were engaged in negotiations in accordance with requests from the United Nations.

2. On 1 April the President of the United Nations Security Council had formally appealed to Argentina not to invade the Falkland Islands. Yet on 2 April Argentina invaded. On 3 April, the United Nations Security Council passed its mandatory resolution 502, demanding a cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands. The same day, Argentina took South Georgia. In the ensuing weeks she has shown no sign of complying with the Security Council Resolution: on the contrary, she has continued a massive build up of the occupying forces on the Falkland Islands. There could hardly be a clearer demonstration of disregard for international law and for the United Nations itself.

The British Response

3. Britain need have done nothing more than rest on the mandatory resolution of the Security Council. Indeed Britain's inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter would have justified the Government in adopting

a purely military policy for ending the crisis. But in pursuit of a peaceful settlement, Britain adopted a policy, frequently explained by the Government in Parliament, of building up pressure on Argentina. Military pressure was exerted by the rapid assembly and despatch of the British naval task force. Diplomatic pressure, first expressed in Security Council Resolution 502, was built up by the clear statements of condemnation of Argentine aggression which were made by many countries across the world. It was widely recognised that aggression could not be allowed to stand, since otherwise international peace and order would be dangerously prejudiced in many regions. The members of the European Community, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway joined Britain in rapidly imposing economic measures against Argentina, as did the United States a little later.

Efforts for a Negotiated Settlement

4. Britain dedicated her maximum diplomatic efforts to the search for a negotiated solution, and the Government kept Parliament as fully informed as the confidentiality of difficult negotiations would allow. Efforts for an interim agreement to end the crisis were first undertaken by the United States Secretary of State, Mr Alexander Haig. His ideas for an interim agreement were discussed repeatedly with Argentina and Britain. The Government expressed their willingness to consider Mr Haig's final proposals, although they presented certain real difficulties. Argentina rejected them. The next stage of negotiations was based on proposals originally advanced by President Belaunde of Peru and modified in consultations between him and the United States Secretary of State. As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

/informed

informed Parliament on 7 May, Britain was willing to accept the final version of these proposals for an interim agreement. But Argentina rejected it.

5. Since then, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar, has been conducting negotiations with Britain, represented by our Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, and Argentina, represented by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Senor Ros. In these negotiations, as in earlier ones, Britain made repeated efforts to establish whether Argentina was willing to be sufficiently flexible to make a reasonable interim agreement possible. But it became increasingly clear that Argentina was not seeking an agreement but was playing for time in the negotiations in the hope of holding on to the fruits of aggression, with all that this would imply for the international rule of law. There was an important meeting of British Ministers, attended by Sir Anthony Parsons and the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson, on Sunday 16 May. On the following day, Sir Anthony Parsons returned to New York and handed to the United Nations Secretary-General two documents:

- a draft interim agreement between Britain and Argentina which set out the British position in full;
- a letter to the Secretary-General making clear the British position that the Falkland Islands Dependencies were not covered by the draft interim agreement.

The draft agreement is in Annex A to this Paper and the letter is in Annex B.

6. Sir Anthony Parsons made clear to the Secretary-General that the draft agreement represented the furthest that Britain could go in the negotiations. He requested that the Secretary-General should give the draft to the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister. The Secretary-General did this, and asked for a response within two days. Argentina's response, which the Government received on the evening of 19 May, represented a hardening of the Argentine position and amounted to a rejection of the British proposals.

Britain's Fundamental Principles in Negotiations

7. The Government's approach in all the negotiations has been based on important principles, which Ministers have set out repeatedly in Parliament:

- a. International Law. Argentina's unlawful aggression must end and Security Council Resolution 502 must be implemented. Aggression must not be rewarded, or small countries across the world would feel threatened by neighbours with territorial ambitions.
- b. Freedom. The Falkland Islanders are used to enjoying free institutions. The Executive and Legislative Councils were established with their agreement and functioned with their participation. Britain insisted that any interim administration in the Falkland Islands must involve democratically elected representatives of the Islanders, so as to enable the latter to continue to participate in the administration of their affairs and to ensure that they could express freely their wishes about the future of the Islands, in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

c. Sovereignty. Britain has no doubt of her sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, having administered them peacefully since 1833. Nevertheless, successive British governments have been willing, without prejudice, to include the question of sovereignty in negotiations with Argentina about the future of the Falkland Islands. In the recent negotiations, the Government have been willing that an interim agreement should provide for new negotiations about the future of the Islands, which likewise could discuss sovereignty in good faith, so long as there was no prejudgement as to the outcome of negotiations.

8. Britain upheld these principles in the draft agreement which we presented on 17 May to the United Nations Secretary-General:

- The agreement provided for complete Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands within 14 days, thus terminating the aggression and upholding international law.
- It provided that the Legislative and Executive Councils representing the Falkland Islanders would continue in existence and be consulted by the UN interim Administrator, thus maintaining the democratic structure of the Administration.
- It provided explicitly that the outcome of negotiations about the future of the Islands was not prejudged, thus safeguarding the British position on sovereignty.

9. In the Secretary-General's negotiations, Britain has insisted that the Falkland Islands Dependencies should not be

covered by an interim agreement to end the crisis. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are geographically distant from the Falkland Islands themselves. They have no settled population. The British title to them of which the Government have no doubt, does not derive from the Falkland Islands, and these territories have been treated as Dependencies of the Falkland Islands only for reasons of administrative convenience.

10. Throughout the negotiations, Britain, while being firm on the essential principles, has been willing to negotiate on matters where these principles were not breached. In particular:

- a. In-return-for Argentine withdrawal from a zone of 150 nautical miles radius around the Falkland Islands and an undertaking in the agreement that no forces would return, Britain was willing (Article 2(3)) to withdraw her Task Force from the zone and not return during the interim period. She proposed international verification (Article 6(4)) of the mutual withdrawal, in which the United Nations might have made use of surveillance aircraft from third countries.
- b. Britain was willing that the exclusion zones (Article 3) declared by herself and Argentina, and the economic measures (Article 5) introduced during the present crisis, should be lifted from the moment of ceasefire, although these actions would give more comfort to Argentina than to Britain.

- c. Britain was prepared to accept the appointment of a UN Administrator (Article 6(3)) to administer the Government of the Falkland Islands. Britain wanted him to discharge his functions in consultation with the representative institutions in the Islands - the Legislative and Executive Councils - which have been developed in accordance with the terms of Article 73 of the UN Charter. (This makes clear that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories are paramount and refers to the need to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples.) It is inconceivable that Britain, or any other democratic country, could accept that her people should be deprived of their democratic rights. Britain was nevertheless willing to accept that one representative from the Argentine population of the Islands (some 30 people out of 1800) should be added to each of the Councils. Additionally, Britain was willing to accept the presence of up to 3 Argentine observers on the Islands in the interim period.
- d. Britain was willing (Article 7) to agree to re-establishment of communications, travel, transport, postage, etc, between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainland, on the basis existing before the invasion.
- e. Britain was willing to enter into negotiations (Article 8) under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General for a peaceful settlement of the dispute with Argentina about the Falkland Islands and to seek the completion

of these negotiations by the target date of 31 December 1982. Our position was that no outcome to the negotiations should be either excluded or predetermined.

11. Argentina's final position in the negotiations speaks for itself. In particular:

- a. Argentina insisted that South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands be covered by the interim agreement. One effect of this would be that British forces would have to withdraw from the British territory of South Georgia.
- b. Argentina wanted thirty days for the completion of the withdrawal of forces. She wanted all forces to return to their normal bases and areas of operation, thus requiring British forces to be enormously further away than Argentine ones.
- c. Argentina wanted the Administration of the Islands to be exclusively the responsibility of the United Nations. There would have been Argentine and British observers. The Administration would have been free to appoint advisers from the population of the Islands, in equal numbers from the Argentine population and from the population of British origin. The flags of Britain and Argentina would have flown, together with that of the United Nations.
- d. Argentina wanted free access for her nationals to the Islands, with respect inter alia to residence, work and property. Argentina also opposed a provision in the

British draft agreement (end of Article 6(3)) about the UN Administrator exercising his powers in conformity with the laws and practices traditionally observed in the Islands. It was evident that Argentina hoped to change the nature of Falklands society and its demographic make-up in the interim period, and thus prejudge the future.

- e. Argentina proposed a formula about negotiations on the future of the Islands which stated that they should be 'initiated' without prejudice to the rights and claims and positions of the two parties. Argentina would not accept an additional phrase stating also that the outcome would not be prejudged. Argentine leaders continued in public to say that Argentina insisted on having sovereignty. In the negotiations Argentina also resisted a provision in the British draft (beginning of Article 9) which would have ensured that the interim arrangements should stay in place until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands could be implemented. Argentina's evident aim in resisting this was that, if no definitive agreement had been reached by the target date of 31 December 1982, the interim administration would cease to exist and a vacuum be created which Argentina could hope to fill.

12. The present crisis was brought about by Argentina's unlawful act of aggression. In their subsequent attitude the Argentine government showed that they had no respect either for democratic principles nor for the rule of law. Britain stands firmly for both.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: PROPOSED INTERIM AGREEMENT

The Government of the Republic of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Responding to Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) adopted on 3 April 1982 under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations

Having entered into negotiations through the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an Interim Agreement concerning the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), hereinafter referred to as 'the Islands',

Having in mind the obligations with regard to non-self-governing territories set out in Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the text of which is annexed hereto,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

(1) No provision of this Interim Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute over the Islands.

(2) No acts or activities taking place whilst this Interim Agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty over the Islands or create any rights of sovereignty over them.

Article 2

(1) With effect from a specified time, 24 hours after signature of this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as Time 'T'), each Party undertakes to cease and thereafter to refrain from all firing and other hostile actions.

(2) Argentina undertakes:

(a) to commence withdrawal of its armed forces from the Islands with effect from Time 'T';

(b) to withdraw half of its armed forces to at least 150

nautical miles away from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus 7 days; and

(c) to complete its withdrawal to at least 150 nautical miles away by Time 'T' plus 14 days.

(3) The United Kingdom undertakes:

(a) to commence withdrawal of its armed forces from the Islands with effect from Time 'T';

(b) to withdraw half of its armed forces to at least 150 nautical miles away from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus 7 days; and

(c) to complete its withdrawal to at least 150 nautical miles away by Time 'T' plus 14 days.

Article 3

With effect from Time 'T', each Party undertakes to lift the exclusion zones, warnings and similar measures which have been imposed.

Article 4

On the completion of the steps for withdrawal specified in Article 2, each Party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces into the Islands or within 150 nautical miles thereof.

Article 5

Each Party undertakes to lift with effect from Time 'T' the economic measures it has taken against the other and to seek the lifting of similar measures taken by third parties.

Article 6

(1) Immediately after the signature of the present Agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom shall jointly sponsor a draft Resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the Security Council would take note of the present Agreement, acknowledge the role conferred upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations therein, and authorize him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

(2) Immediately after the adoption of the Resolution referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article, a United Nations Administrator, being a person acceptable to Argentina and the United Kingdom, shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and will be the officer administering the government of the Islands.

(3) The United Nations Administrator shall have the authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to ensure the continuing administration of the government of the Islands. He shall discharge his functions in consultation with the representative institutions in the Islands which have been developed in accordance with the terms of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, with the exception that one representative from the Argentine population normally resident on the Islands shall be appointed by the Administrator to each of the two institutions. The Administrator shall exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and in conformity with the laws and practices traditionally obtaining in the Islands.

(4) The United Nations Administrator shall verify the withdrawal of all armed forces from the Islands, and shall devise an effective method of ensuring their non-reintroduction.

(5) The United Nations Administrator shall have such staff as may be agreed by Argentina and the United Kingdom to be necessary for the performance of his functions under this Agreement.

(6) Each Party may have no more than three observers in the Islands.

Article 7

Except as may be otherwise agreed between them, the Parties shall, during the currency of this Agreement, reactivate the Exchange of Notes of 5 August 1971, together with the Joint Statement on Communications between the Islands and the Argentine mainland referred to therein. The Parties shall accordingly take appropriate steps to establish a special consultative committee to carry out the functions entrusted to the Special Consultative Committee referred to in the Joint Statement.

Article 8

The Parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the Parties and without prejudgement of the outcome.

Article 9

This Interim Agreement shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until a definitive Agreement about the future of the Islands has been reached and implemented by the Parties. The Secretary-General will immediately communicate its text to the Security Council and register it in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done in
in the English and Spanish languages, in a single copy.

For the Republic of Argentina

For the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern
Ireland

ARTICLE 73 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- c. to further international peace and security;
- d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
- e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

TEXT OF LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1982 FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

You will note from the text of the Interim Agreement which I have given you on behalf of the United Kingdom that it concerns "the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) hereinafter referred to as 'the Islands'".

I wish to confirm the understanding of the British Government that this description excludes the Dependencies. I should be grateful if you would be good enough to acknowledge receipt of this letter and its terms.

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TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1491 OF 28 APRIL

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TOP COPY

M I P T: FALKLANDS/RIO TREATY.

1. TEXT OF RESOLUTION APPROVED BY THE RIO SIGNATORIES THIS MORNING
IS AS FOLLOWS:

SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,

CONSIDERING:

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION AND
THE NEED TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO ANY SITUATION THAT
ENDANGERS THE PEACE OF THE AMERICAS:

THAT A DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION HAS ARISEN BETWEEN THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, WHICH WAS AGGRAVATED TODAY BY THE EVENTS
ARISING FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE BRITISH NAVY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC,
WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE RIO
TREATY:

THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF
RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE IS THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY
OF THE HEMISPHERE, WHICH, IN THE CASE THAT HAS ARISEN, REQUIRES
ENSURING THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE:

THAT TO FACILITATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, IT IS
URGENT THAT THE HOSTILITIES CEASE, SINCE THEY DISTURB THE PEACE OF
THE HEMISPHERE AND MAY REACH UNFORESEEABLE PROPORTIONS:

THAT IT IS AN UNCHANGING PRINCIPLE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
THAT PEACE BE PRESERVED AND THAT ALL THE AMERICAN STATES UNANIMOUSLY
REJECT THE INTERVENTION OF EXTRA-CONTINENTAL OR CONTINENTAL ARMED
FORCES IN ANY OF THE NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE:

THAT ARGENTINA'S RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS
(FALKLAND) ISLANDS, AS STATED IN SOME IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS PASSED
BY VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, INCLUDING THE DECLARATION OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 16, 1976, WHICH
STATES: QUOTE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA HAS AN UNDENIABLE
RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS UNQUOTE, MUST BE
BORNE IN MIND AND

THAT THE PEACE EFFORTS BEING MADE WITH THE
CONSENT OF THE PARTIES MUST BE EMPHASIZED, AND THAT INTER-AMERICAN

/ SOLIDARITY

SERIOUS PRECEDENT INASMUCH AS THEY ARE NOT COVERED BY RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CHARTERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE O A S AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (G A T T).

7. TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO TRANSMIT THE APPEAL CONTAINED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3 OF THIS RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, AND ALSO TO INFORM THEM, ON BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE AMERICAS, THAT HE IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT THIS APPEAL WILL BE RECEIVED FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD.

8. TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION IMMEDIATELY TO PRESENT THIS RESOLUTION FORMALLY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SO HE MAY BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

9. TO KEEP THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OPEN, ESPECIALLY TO OVERSEE FAITHFUL COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AND TO TAKE SUCH ADDITIONAL MEASURES AS ARE DEEMED NECESSARY TO RESTORE AND PRESERVE PEACE AND SETTLE THE CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

HENDERSON

FOO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLER

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MR LITTLE

MR HAWKIN

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)} TREASURY

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MR A WILLIAMS RM60 DSW

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1958 OF 29 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, OAS POSTS.

29 MAY

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MIPT : FALKLANDS/RIO TREATY

1. TEXT OF RESOLUTION APPROVED TODAY, 29 APRIL, IS AS FOLLOWS:

SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

HEREAS:

RESOLUTION I OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ADOPTED ON APRIL 28, 1982, DECIDED QUOTE TO KEEP THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OPEN, ESPECIALLY TO OVERSEE FAITHFUL COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION, AND TO TAKE SUCH ADDITIONAL MEASURES AS ARE DEEMED NECESSARY TO RESTORE AND PRESERVE PEACE AND SETTLE THE CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS UNQUOTE:

THAT RESOLUTION URGED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM QUOTE IMMEDIATELY TO CEASE THE HOSTILITIES IT IS CARRYING ON WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION DEFINED BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, AND ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MAY AFFECT INTER-AMERICAN PEACE AND SECURITY, UNQUOTE AND URGED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA QUOTE TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY ACTION THAT MAY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION UNQUOTE:

THE SAME RESOLUTION URGED THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC QUOTE TO CALL A TRUCE THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RESUME AND PROCEED NORMALLY WITH THE NEGOTIATION AIMED AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS UNQUOTE:

WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC INFORMED THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION OF ITS FULL ADHERENCE TO RESOLUTION I AND ACTED CONSISTENTLY THERE WITH, THE BRITISH FORCES PROCEEDED TO CARRY OUT SERIOUS AND REPEATED ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IN THE ZONE OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS, WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION DEFINED BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, WHICH MEANS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS IGNORED THE APPEAL MADE TO

WHICH MEANS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS IGNORED THE APPEAL MADE
IT BY THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION:

FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 1, THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DECIDED TO APPLY COERCIVE MEASURES
AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND IS GIVING ITS SUPPORT, INCLUDING
MATERIAL SUPPORT, TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH CONTRAVENES THE SPIRIT
AND THE LETTER OF RESOLUTION 1:

AS A CULMINATION OF ITS REPEATED ARMED ATTACKS, BEGINNING ON
MAY 21, 1982, THE BRITISH FORCES LAUNCHED A BROAD-SCALE MILITARY
ATTACK AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IN THE AREA OF THE MALVINAS
ISLANDS WHICH AFFECTS THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE:

THE DEPLORABLE SITUATION RAISED BY THE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC COERCIVE MEASURES THAT ARE NOT BASED ON PRESENT INTERN-
ATIONAL LAW AND ARE HARMFUL TO THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, CARRIED OUT BY
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY—WITH THE EXCEPTION OF IRELAND AND
ITALY—AND BY OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED STATES, IS CONTINUING: AND

THE PURPOSE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTA-
NCE IS TO QUOTE ASSURE PEACE, THROUGH ADEQUATE MEANS, TO PROVIDE
FOR EFFECTIVE RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE TO MEET ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST
ANY AMERICAN STATE, AND IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THREATS OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST ANY OF THEM, UNQUOTE.

RESOLVES:

1. TO CONDEMN MOST VIGOROUSLY THE UNJUSTIFIED AND DISPROPORT-
IONATE ARMED ATTACK PERPETRATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND ITS
DECISION, WHICH AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE AMERICAN HEMIS-
PHERE, OF ARBITRARILY DECLARING AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF UP TO 12 MILES
FROM THE AMERICAN COASTS AS A ZONE OF HOSTILITIES, WHICH IS
AGGRAVATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WHEN THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN ALL
POSSIBILITIES OF NEGOTIATION SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE
CONFLICT HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED.

2. TO REITERATE ITS FIRM DEMAND UPON THE UNITED KINGDOM THAT IT
CEASE IMMEDIATELY ITS ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC
AND ORDER THE IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THEIR USUAL STATIONS OF ITS TASK
FORCE AND ALL OF ITS ARMED FORCES DETAILED THERE.

3. TO DEPLORE THE FACT THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
HAS HELPED TO FRUSTRATE THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
THAT WERE CONDUCTED BY MR. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. TO EXPRESS ITS CONVICTION THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO REACH
WITH THE GREATEST URGENCY A PEACEFUL AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT OF
THE CONFLICT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE CONFLICT, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN THAT CONNECTION, TO RECOGNIZE THE PRAISEWORTHY EFFORTS AND GOOD OFFICES OF MR. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO PROVIDE ITS FULL SUPPORT TO THE TASK ENTRUSTED TO HIM BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO ORDER THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF THE COERCIVE MEASURES APPLIED AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF HEMISPHEREIC SOLIDARITY RECOGNIZED IN THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE.

6. TO URGE THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, AND THE OTHER STATES THAT HAVE TAKEN THEM, TO LIFT IMMEDIATELY THE COERCIVE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

7. TO REQUEST THE STATES PARTIES OF THE RIO TREATY TO GIVE THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC THE SUPPORT THAT EACH JUDGES APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IT IN THIS SERIOUS SITUATION, AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THAT OBJECTIVE. IF NECESSARY, SUCH SUPPORT MAY BE ADOPTED WITH ADEQUATE COORDINATION.

8. TO REAFFIRM THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE THAT REFER TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

9. TO KEEP THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT WITH THEIR PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN ANY WAY IT MAY SUPPORT THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION TO KEEP IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

10. TO KEEP THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OPEN TO SEE TO IT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION ARE FAITHFULLY AND IMMEDIATELY CARRIED OUT AND TO TAKE, IF NECESSARY, ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT MAY BE AGREED UPON TO PRESERVE INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION.