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23 June 1982

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BRUSSELS

28/29 JUNE 1982

POLITICAL COOPERATION

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The following briefs on Political Cooperation are attached:

- ANNEX A Middle East (except Iran/Iraq)
- ANNEX B Iran/Iraq
- ANNEX C East/West Relations: Poland
- ANNEX D East/West Relations: Afghanistan

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ANNEX A: MIDDLE EAST

OBJECTIVE

1. Consider European role in Lebanese crisis: issue statement reaffirming European commitment to work for peace both in Lebanon and the region.

Points to Make

2. Priority must remain Israeli withdrawal in accordance with SCR 509. Peacekeeping force will be needed to achieve this. Opportunity for Ten to make practical contribution. Recognise difficulties with UN peacekeeping operation. But non-UN force could cause difficulties with Arab world and would play into Russian hands. Agree public signal of Ten's willingness to help and support for strong Lebanese Government.

3. Measures against Israel. Need to give substance to our commitment to further action in the absence of Israeli withdrawal. Favour suspension by Ten of defence supplies. Views of others?

4. Destruction of mainstream PLO in Beirut risks making solution of Palestinian problem more not less difficult. Extremism and terrorism could grow. Lasting peace in Lebanon must involve overall settlement embracing Palestinian rights.

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Background

References

- A: Statement by Ten Foreign Ministers, 9 June.
- B: Security Council Resolution 508.
- C: Security Council Resolution 509.
- D: Draft communique on Middle East for European Council.

1. Discussions are continuing in the political cooperation machinery to prepare a draft communique for the European Council: the latest version is at reference D. There is general agreement that the statement should indicate a willingness to contribute in practical ways to a solution of the Lebanese crisis including Israeli withdrawal. To bring this about a peacekeeping force of some kind will clearly be necessary. Thinking in the Ten is moving in favour of trying in the first place for a UN force. Although no partners have yet taken decisions, a number have said that they would find it much easier to participate in a UN force. The Irish, who already contribute to UNIFIL, are debarred by their constitution from participating in a non-UN operation. This latter option would, however, remain if the Soviet Union vetoed a UN force. If it is the general view in the Ten that a UN force should be the first choice, there would be value in partners making this clear to the Americans and others, with the aim of influencing their thinking and preventing a situation in which the Ten are faced with a pressing invitation to participate in a less acceptable, non-UN force.

2. Measures. Discussions will also be continuing over the next few days among the Ten on the question of suspending defence sales to Israel. The impression from sounding taken so far is that the Ten would agree to a suspension if the UK took the lead in pressing for one. The Prime Minister will

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be consulted again on this before the European Council. The scope for further economic measures under Israel's Cooperation Agreement with the Community seems limited. The signature of the Second Financial Protocol has already been postponed sine die.

3. There is general agreement among the Ten that the European Council should issue a statement dealing with the Lebanon, the continuing need for progress on the Palestinian problem and with Iran/Iraq. A reaffirmation of the Ten's Middle East policy along Venice lines will help to correct an impression of confusion in Europe's policy created by conflicting statements by Messrs Tindemans and Cheysson in the region.

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STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON: 9 JUNE

1. The member states of the European Community vigorously condemn the new Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
2. Like the bombardments which preceded it and which caused intolerably high loss of human life, this action cannot be justified. It constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the most basic humanitarian principles. Furthermore it compromises the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of the Middle East and creates the imminent danger of a generalised conflict.
3. The Ten reaffirm the importance they attach to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and notional unity of Lebanon, which are indispensable for peace in the region.
4. The Ten strongly support the appeals made by the Secretary General of the United Nations. They urgently call on all the parties concerned to act in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, and in particular on Israel to withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally from the Lebanon and to place the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in a position to accomplish its mission without hindrance.
5. Should Israel continue to refuse compliance with the above Resolutions the Ten will examine the possibilities for future action.
6. The objective of the Ten is to work for a Lebanon free from the cycle of violence which they have repeatedly condemned in the past. This cannot be dissociated from the establishment of a global, just and lasting peace in the region. They are ready to assist in bringing the parties concerned to accept measures intended to lower the level of tension, re-establish confidence and facilitate a negotiated solution.
7. The Ten will urgently examine within the institutions of the Community the use of the means at the disposal of the Community to give aid to the victims of these events.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052345Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 060800Z)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 942 OF 5 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS  
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 508.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978), 426 (1978) AND  
THE ENSUING RESOLUTIONS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY, SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 501 (1982).

TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTERS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF  
LEBANON DATED 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15161 AND S/15162),  
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE DETERIORATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN  
LEBANON AND IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA, AND ITS  
CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,  
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY,  
INDEPENDENCE, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON,  
REAFFIRMING AND SUPPORTING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AND  
THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15163), AS  
WELL AS THE URGENT APPEAL ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 4 JUNE  
1982,

TAKING NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

1. CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY  
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS  
THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND NO LATER THAN 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME  
ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982;
2. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO  
BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR UPON THOSE CONCERNED SO THAT THE CESS-  
ATION OF HOSTILITIES DECLARED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 490  
(1981) CAN BE RESPECTED;
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDER TAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS  
TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS  
RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS  
POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF  
THIS RESOLUTION.

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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DESKBY 070800Z (FCO)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070301Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 6 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN WASHINGTON,

MODUK,

PRIORITY CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AND JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION 509.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978) OF 19 MARCH 1978 AND 508 (1982) OF 5 JUNE 1982,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING THE NEED FOR STRICT RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES,

1. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW ALL ITS MILITARY FORCES FORTHWITH AND UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF LEBANON;

2. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES OBSERVE STRICTLY THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 508 (1982) WHICH CALLED ON THEM TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.

3. CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WITHIN 24 HOURS;

4. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION.

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DRAFT EUROPEAN COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE: MIDDLE EAST

As agreed by Middle East Working Group 22 June (unofficial translation).

1. The Ten member states of the European Community reiterate the vigorous condemnation they expressed in Bonn on 9 June of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon [aimed at the elimination of the Palestinian resistance] which has caused intolerable suffering among the population and threatens at any moment to provoke a wider conflict with unforeseeable consequences.
2. The Ten remain deeply committed to the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, and once more appeal urgently to Israel to comply with Security Council resolutions 508 and 509. They call for the reestablishment of the authority of the Lebanese Government over all its national territory and, in order to achieve that objective, the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign troops except where the international community decides otherwise following a request from the legitimate Lebanese Government.
3. The Ten support the current efforts to form a Government representing all elements of the Lebanese Community in view of the crucial need for national reconciliation. They are continuing their assistance to those in distress and are ready to contribute at a later stage to the reconstruction of the country. [In this context they call on all parties to comply with Security Council resolution 512 and to cooperate with United Nations and UNIFIL personnel in their humanitarian efforts]. All international efforts must now be directed to creating conditions which guarantee the security and stability of Lebanon and of the region. The Ten stand ready to cooperate in this enterprise [and in particular to participate collectively, according to their respective abilities, in a peacekeeping force].



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4. All efforts to reestablish lasting peace and security in Lebanon require an equal effort to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people some of whom have found refuge on Lebanese soil. The Ten therefore demand that this people should be permitted, in the framework of a comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise their right to self-determination [and that they should have the right to provide themselves with state structures of their choice] or [and that no options should be closed in the exercise of this right].

5. The Ten remain certain that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must of necessity be based on all of the principles contained in the Venice Declaration. They are convinced that negotiations are better able to bring about lasting security than armed conflict, and call forthwith on all parties concerned [including the PLO] or [including the Palestinian people and consequently the PLO] to substitute the logic of dialogue for that of armed force and thenceforward to assert their rights purely by political means. Europe would not fail to support them if they took this step.

6. To facilitate this essential process of dialogue, the Ten invite all parties to the conflict to take immediate steps aimed at reducing tension. They commit themselves to support and encourage by all means at their disposal any negotiations launched according to the principles for which they adhere.

7. The Ten furthermore express their grave concern at the continuation of the Iran/Iraq war, which also poses a serious threat to the security and stability of the region. They renew the appeal they made on 24 May for an end to hostilities and for a negotiated settlement. They call for a redoubling of peace efforts and pledge themselves to play their part in these efforts.

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ANNEX B - IRAN/IRAQ

OBJECTIVE

1. To discourage any ill-judged initiative by the Ten.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. Western objectives should be to work to reduce Iranian threat to Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, and prevent further drift by Iran towards Soviet Union.

3. No major role for the West.

4. Lead should be taken by Islamic States and in particular Arab neighbours of Iran and Iraq.

5. Partners should be ready to play constructive role in support of any action at UN or elsewhere which has realistic chance of contributing towards a negotiated settlement.

6. Iraqi withdrawal helps, but dialogue needed to deal with other outstanding points of difference.

7. US recognise no scope for US-inspired initiative.

8. Would not wish to go beyond draft statement prepared by Working Group.

BACKGROUND

References

- A Statement by Foreign Ministers of the Ten on Iran/Iraq war
- B Iranian reply to EC démarche
- C Draft statement prepared by Middle East Working Group on  
22 June

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State of the War

9. Iran has now re-taken most of the territory occupied by Iraq but has not yet crossed the frontier.

10. On 10 June, Baghdad Radio announced willingness to accept binding arbitration by Islamic Conference Organisation. Building on this unilateral declaration, President Saddam Hussein announced on 20 June that all remaining Iraqi troops would be withdrawn from Iranian territory within ten days. He made no reference to a ceasefire proposal. On 21 June Ayatollah Khomeini said that Saddam Hussein's offer alone would not lead to a ceasefire and that four other conditions would have to be satisfied: return of exiled Iraqi dissidents; payment of reparations; punishment of the aggressor; and the right to send Iranian troops through Iraqi territory to the Lebanon. Iran has also said that peace would be impossible until removal of Saddam Hussein.

11. US has told Iraq that it does not see sufficient support for early discussion of Iran/Iraq war in Security Council. Earlier Jordanian attempts to raise question in informal Security Council meeting on 31 May misfired.

12. Iran/Iraq discussed in detail by Non-Aligned Movement 31 May to 4 June. The meeting was to prepare for the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Baghdad in September. NAM's decision to go ahead has angered the Iranians. NAM's credentials as mediators have been damaged.

13. Iraq interpreted EC Ministers' statement on mediation as support for her position. Iran commented in reply to EC démarche that Western countries only became concerned when Iraq was under threat. Gulf States working towards move to propitiate Iran (eg reparations) and action to persuade Iraq to

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modify its position on unconditional withdrawal and perhaps even to encourage departure of Saddam Hussein.

14. Officials of the Ten meeting on 22 June prepared a statement on the Middle East to be issued by the European Council. It reiterated the Ten's concern about the continuation of the Iran/Iraq war. Given the Iranians' lukewarm reaction to 24 May Declaration, repeated calls by the Ten for peace serve little purpose and may be provocative rather than palliative.

Soviet Union

15. Soviet Union in a dilemma and would wish to avoid making choice between Iran and Iraq. Soviet/Iran relations are not warm. Soviet Union would be opposed to Iranian invasion of Iraq but has also pointed out in private that her friendship treaty with Iraq did not commit the Soviet Union to provide military assistance. The Soviet Union's ally in the Middle East ie Syria has also come out strongly against any Iranian invasion of Iraq.

16. Iraq has asked Japan to sponsor an action in the UN Security Council. Japan has replied by asking whether Iraq would consider a unilateral withdrawal to 1975 boundaries to create the conditions for serious negotiations. Japan's Foreign Minister is due to meet the Iranian Foreign Minister in New York on 8 July at Iranian request.

17. Fresh efforts at mediation by the Islamic Conference Good Offices Committee have not been well received in Tehran. For form's sake they will continue to try but probably accept that their chances of succeeding are slim.

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18. Algerians acted as honest brokers in negotiating the Algiers Agreement of 1975 between Iran and Iraq. Some evidence that they may be trying to mediate on the basis of this Agreement (which was unilaterally abrogated by Iraq in August 1980).

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241712Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2073 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN

THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK

WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING STRASBOURG

M I P T: DECLARATION OF THE TEN ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

1) THE TEN EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH HAS NOW LASTED TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED VERY NUMEROUS VICTIMS, LED TO CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, CREATED GRAVE SUFFERING FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND HAS DIVERTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

2) WHILE REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVERIGNTY OF STATES AND OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE TEN EXPRESS THE GRAVE CONCERN WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF THE FIGHTING CAUSES THEM. THEY DEPLORE THIS THE MORE BECAUSE THEY HAVE LONG STANDING AND CLOSE LINKS WITH EACH OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS AS WELL AS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THEY RECALL THAT SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER 1980 THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

3) THE TEN PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

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4) THE TEN, FOR THEIR OWN PART, EARNESTLY DESIRE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS THOSE DEFINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION NO 479 OF THE 28 OF SEPTEMBER 1980. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A JUST AND LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE TWO STATES IN RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THEIR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY, IS MORE THAN EVER URGENT AND NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION ASPIRE.

5) THE TEN ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN EVERY EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARDS PEACE, TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES REQUEST THEM TO DO SO, AS WELL AS TO CONSIDER, WHEN HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATING IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

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FCO PASS SAVING STRASBOURG

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OBJET : DECLARATION DES DIX SUR LE CONFLIT IRANO-IRAKIEN.

REF. CPE/MUL ETR 2089

LA PRESIDENCE INFORME SES PARTENAIRES QUE SON AMBASSADEUR A TEHERAN A EFFECTUE LE 1ER JUIN UNE DEMARCHE RELATIVE A LA DECLARATION DES DIX SUR LE CONFLIT IRANO-IRAKIEN. A CETTE OCCASION, LE VICE-MINISTRE IRANIEN DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES A TENU LES PROPOS SUIVANTS :

- A) IL A NOTE QUE LES DIX S'INTERESSENT TOUT D'UN COUP AU CONFLIT EN QUESTION PARCE QUE L'IRAK SE TROUVE MAINTENANT DANS UNE MAUVAISE POSITION.
- B) LES CONDITIONS IRANIENNES POUR LE RETABLISSEMENT DE LA PAIX DOIVENT ETRE ACCEPTEES.
- C) LES DIX DOIVENT CONDAMNER L'AGRESSION IRAKIENNE S'ILS VEULENT ETRE PRIS EN CONSIDERATION POUR UNE MEDIATION.
- D) LA CHUTE DE SADDAM HUSSEIN EST ABSOLUMENT INDISPENSABLE "PARCE QU'IL EST ANORMAL ET PARCE QU'IL CONSTITUE UNE MENACE POUR LA STABILITE DE LA REGION".
- E) LES DIX ONT INTERET A INCITER L'IRAK A LA MODERATION "CAR UN TANKER COULE AU MAUVAIS ENDROIT POURRAIT BLOQUER LE PASSAGE DE PETROLE".
- F) L'IRAN EST CAPABLE DE LIBERER L'ENSEMBLE DE SES TERRITOIRES OCCUPES.
- G) L'IRAN REMERCIE LES DIX POUR LEUR PROPOSITION D'AIDE A LA RECONSTRUCTION. LA RAFFINERIE DE PETROLE D'ABADAN ET QUELQUES USINES FIGURENT PARMIS LES PRIORITES IRANIENNES EN LA MATIERE.

L'AMBASSADEUR DE LA PRESIDENCE A EU L'IMPRESSION QUE LES IRANIENS SONT VRAIMENT OBSEDES PAR LA DESTABILISATION DU REGIME DE SADDAM HUSSEIN ET QUE LA CHUTE DU PRESIDENT IRAKIEN EST POUR EUX UNE CONDITION "SINE QUA NON" POUR UN ARRET DES HOSTILITES.

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FIN DE TEXTE

LIMITED  
MED  
NENAD  
ECD (E)

MR BULLARD  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR MOBERLY  
MR HANNAY

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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DRAFT EUROPEAN COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE: MIDDLE EAST

As agreed by Middle East Working Group 22 June (unofficial translation).

1. The Ten member states of the European Community reiterate the vigorous condemnation they expressed in Bonn on 9 June of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon [aimed at the elimination of the Palestinian resistance] which has caused intolerable suffering among the population and threatens at any moment to provoke a wider conflict with unforeseeable consequences.
2. The Ten remain deeply committed to the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, and once more appeal urgently to Israel to comply with Security Council resolutions 508 and 509. They call for the reestablishment of the authority of the Lebanese Government over all its national territory and, in order to achieve that objective, the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign troops except where the international community decides otherwise following a request from the legitimate Lebanese Government.
3. The Ten support the current efforts to form a Government representing all elements of the Lebanese Community in view of the crucial need for national reconciliation. They are continuing their assistance to those in distress and are ready to contribute at a later stage to the reconstruction of the country. [In this context they call on all parties to comply with Security Council resolution 512 and to cooperate with United Nations and UNIFIL personnel in their humanitarian efforts]. All international efforts must now be directed to creating conditions which guarantee the security and stability of Lebanon and of the region. The Ten stand ready to cooperate in this enterprise [and in particular to participate collectively, according to their respective abilities, in a peacekeeping force].

4. All efforts to reestablish lasting peace and security in Lebanon require an equal effort to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people some of whom have found refuge on Lebanese soil. The Ten therefore demand that this people should be permitted, in the framework of a comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise their right to self-determination [and that they should have the right to provide themselves with state structures of their choice] or [and that no options should be closed in the exercise of this right].
5. The Ten remain certain that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must of necessity be based on all of the principles contained in the Venice Declaration. They are convinced that negotiations are better able to bring about lasting security than armed conflict, and call forthwith on all parties concerned [including the PLO] or [including the Palestinian people and consequently the PLO] to substitute the logic of dialogue for that of armed force and thenceforward to assert their rights purely by political means. Europe would not fail to support them if they took this step.
6. To facilitate this essential process of dialogue, the Ten invite all parties to the conflict to take immediate steps aimed at reducing tension. They commit themselves to support and encourage by all means at their disposal any negotiations launched according to the principles for which they adhere.
7. The Ten furthermore express their grave concern at the continuation of the Iran/Iraq war, which also poses a serious threat to the security and stability of the region. They renew the appeal they made on 24 May for an end to hostilities and for a negotiated settlement. They call for a redoubling of peace efforts and pledge themselves to play their part in these efforts.

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ANNEX C EAST/WEST RELATIONS: POLAND

OBJECTIVE

1. To review the situation and reaffirm validity of present policies which are shared with Community partners.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. Recent demonstrations reveal underlying discontent with regime's policies. Jaruzelski's dilemma remains: any meaningful relaxation will permit resurgence of popular opposition but continuation of martial law offers no lasting solution to Poland's problems.
3. Unless regime is more responsive to popular pressure dissatisfaction will grow; economic recovery likely to be postponed further. A visit by Pope in August could give fresh impetus to Church's plans for national reconciliation but prospects for compromise between Government and Solidarity seem slight.
4. Western measures having an effect. Important to maintain firm and united Western line. Recent relaxations of martial law insufficient to warrant any change of policy at present.

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5. (If appropriate) Glad further formal Commission proposal for humanitarian aid to Poland about to be submitted. Believe Western relief has helped to ease food and medical shortages. Right EC funds should continue to be channelled through NGO's.

6. (If raised) No question of new credits for Poland at present. Clearly difficult in absence of progress on West's three criteria for West to move ahead on rescheduling talks. But in West's interests to settle Poland's debt repayments in an orderly fashion. Not in our interests to continue indefinitely to give the Poles present 100% debt relief. Important to consider implications carefully with US when creditors meet on 9 July.

7. (If raised). Aware of US thought that West might offer Poland massive economic assistance in return for political concessions. Any such proposal would require careful study: Polish hard currency needs in 1982 alone in order of \$10 billion (without rescheduling). More prudent at this stage therefore to keep to line that satisfaction by Poland of West's three criteria would enable us to restore normal economic relations.

#### BACKGROUND

#### References

A. Statement of Heads of State and Government of the Ten of 31 March.

B. Extract from Luxembourg NATO Foreign Ministers' Communique of 18 May.

C. Washington tel no 2194 of 18 June.

8. Situation in Poland is now calmer following mass protest demonstrations in May, 6 month anniversary of martial law on 13 June provoked few public protest actions. Government

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announced on 12 June release of 275 internees and relaxations of curfew in Warsaw and other cities. Some 2,000 people however are believed to remain in detention and a further 3,000 have been arrested and charged with offences under martial law.

9. Government claim they are pursuing policy of consultation and reconciliation and there are rumours of possible further relaxations, possibly to coincide with national day celebrations on 22 July. But there has been no movement by the Government to resume a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity or to relax the basic political restrictions of martial law. Latest reports suggest the Pope may now visit Poland in August on a pastoral basis. But Government have not yet endorsed invitation from the Polish bishop. Both Governments and Church apparently hope this visit may provide a new political initiative.

10. European Council Statement of 12 March and Luxembourg Communiqué of 18 May firmly reiterated Western demands for lifting of martial law, release of those detained and resumption of dialogue with Church and Solidarity. Discussions in Political Committee on 14 June confirmed general adherence in Ten to this line despite some minor differences of interpretation of policy.

11. Statement by President Reagan on 18 June (reference C) emphasised that there had been no movement in Poland to enable US to undertake 'positive reciprocal measures' towards Poland or lift present measures. Firm US stand against resumption of rescheduling talks in present circumstances therefore likely to continue.

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II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- (a) The Heads of State and of Government noted that the situation in Poland continued to place a strain on East-West relations, and thus to affect the relations of the Ten with Poland and the USSR, which bore a clear responsibility in this situation.

The Ten recalled their earlier statements on the grave consequences of the present situation in Poland for security and cooperation in Europe, and for East-West relations as a whole. They renewed their call to the Polish authorities with the minimum delay to end the state of martial law, release those arrested and resume a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

The Ten also noted with concern the recent statements of the Polish authorities on the possibility of the departure of detainees from the country. The Ten rejected any attempt to place pressure on those concerned. They would interpret such a policy as a further deterioration of the situation in Poland, and a grave breach of fundamental human rights.

(The Greek delegation has reserved its position on the section of the first sentence which indicates that the Polish situation affects the relations of the Ten with the USSR)

EXTRACT FROM NATO FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMUNIQUÉ,

LUXEMBOURG 18 MAY 1982

Poland

1. The continued oppression of the Polish people violates the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The Allies recall their declaration of 11 January 1982 and again urge the Polish authorities to end the state of martial law, release all those detained and restore genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity. Hopes of progress in this direction were disappointed when recent limited relaxation of certain measures taken under martial law was followed so quickly by new repressive measures. The Polish authorities should refrain from forcing Polish citizens into exile.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2194 OF 18 JUNE  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS AND BONN

MY TELNO 2193: SIBERIAN PIPELINE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT.  
BEGINS:-

I HAVE REVIEWED THE SANCTIONS AND THE EXPORT OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION IMPOSED ON DECEMBER 30 1981 AND HAVE DECIDED TO EXTEND THESE SANCTIONS THROUGH ADOPTION OF NEW REGULATIONS TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT PRODUCED BY SUBSIDIARIES OF US COMPANIES ABROAD AS WELL AS EQUIPMENT PRODUCED ABROAD UNDER LICENSES ISSUED BY US COMPANIES.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IN IMPOSING THE SANCTIONS HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE TO ADVANCE RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. SINCE DECEMBER 30 1981 LITTLE HAS CHANGED CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN POLAND; THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVEMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO UNDERTAKE POSITIVE RECIPROCAL MEASURES.

THE DECISION TAKEN TODAY WILL, WE BELIEVE, ADVANCE OUR OBJECTIVES OF RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. ENDS.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM BRIDGES AND GOWLLAND (TRED)

FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO CORLEY (DOT) AND HAVELOCK (DOI)

HENDERSON  
LIMITED  
TRED  
EESD  
WED  
NAD  
PLANNING STAFF  
PUSD  
LORD BRIDGES  
MREEVANS  
MR GOODISON

COPIES TO  
MR CORLEY DOT  
MR HAVELOCK DOI

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ANNEX D - AFGHANISTAN

OBJECTIVE

1. To remind the Ten of the continuing importance of Soviet occupation.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. Must try to prevent issue from dropping from sight. Must continually remind Russians and world opinion that Afghanistan remains a central issue in East/West relations.

3. No sign that Cordovez's "indirect talks" at Geneva are making progress.

BACKGROUND

4. Since the UNGA vote on 18 November 1981 (116-23-12), Afghanistan has attracted little international attention in the past six months (apart from Afghanistan Day on 21 March). Western Governments generally continue to mention Afghanistan in public statements, but it has become increasingly overlaid as other problems supervene.

5. Ten's initiative remains on table, and there is no scope for a new Western initiative at present. The Islamic Conference is inactive.

6. International activity centres on the "indirect talks" which started in Geneva on 16 June under the auspices of Diego Cordovez, the UN Secretary-General's representative on Afghanistan. Pakistan has been cooperative over procedures, but continues to take a firm stand over the key principles of Soviet withdrawal and self-determination for the Afghan people. First reports suggest that discussions (with Cordovez acting as  
[an intermediary

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an intermediary) have not progressed beyond a statement of position by the Pakistani and Afghan foreign ministers. It had been expected that Iran might take part in the indirect dialogue, but so far they have not done so.

7. The growing number of refugees (now 2.7m in Pakistan alone) is creating a serious humanitarian and financial problem. A conference could serve humanitarian and political purposes. Pakistan did not want to propose one this year, but may next year ask the UNHCR to convene one.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

23 June 1982

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