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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 420 OF 14 OCT 81

REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SAVING TO (FOR INFO) PARIS, ROME, JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO 407 : ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. THE BROAD LINES OF PROPOSALS WHICH THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO PRESENT TO THE AMERICANS AND LEBANESE MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY (SHAMIR IN WASHINGTON, KIMCHE IN BEIRUT) HAVE BEEN WELL AIRED PUBLICLY. THE LATEST ACCOUNTS CONTAIN NO SURPRISES. IN ESSENCE, THEY AMOUNT TO THE FOLLOWING:

- A) A 40-50 KILOMETRE BUFFER ZONE IN SOUTH LEBANON SEMI COLON
- B) FORMAL LEBANESE ASSURANCES, GIVEN DIRECT TO THE ISRAELIS, THAT THEY WOULD PGEVENT THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FORCES OR IRREGULAR UNITS TO THIS ZONE SEMI COLON
- C) A ROLE FOR THE HADDAD MILITIA IN POLICING THE BUFFER ZONE SEMI COLON
- D) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, WITH THE PLO LEAVING FIRST (BUT HINTS OF ACCEPTANCE DESPITE DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY THAT IN PRACTICE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL BY THE PLO, SYRIANS AND IDF IS PROBABLY THE BEST THAT CAN BE NEGOTIATED).

THE ISRAELIS SEE NO ROLE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, WHETHER UN OR MULTINATIONAL (BUT SEE PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW). WHILE THEY ARE ASKING FOR A FORMAL PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON, THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WOULD SETTLE FOR A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND WRITTEN UNDERTAKINGS ABOUT THE BUFFER ZONE.

2. THE FACT THAT IT TOOK TWO SESSIONS OF THE ISRAELI CABINET TO AGREE FORMAL GUIDELINES FOR SHAMIR IN WASHINGTON SUGGESTS THAT SOME MINISTERS BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO REFINE ISRAELI THINKING, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE AMERICAN ROLE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS MODERATED HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS RECENTLY, SHARON CONTINUES TO ARGUE SOMEWHAT DELPHICLY THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO PROMOTE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. WHAT THIS APPEARS TO MEAN IS THAT HE AND SOME OTHER MINISTERS FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES ARE INSISTING ON ACTING AS GO-BETWEEN, THEREBY KEEPING ISRAEL AND LEBANON APART RATHER THAN HELPING THEM TO CONDUCT THEIR BUSINESS DIRECTLY AND OPENLY.

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3. THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF ISRAELI IDEAS CONTAINS A GOOD DEAL THAT IS BLURRED AT THE EDGES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD MAINTAIN A RESIDUAL MONITORING ROLE IN THE BUFFER ZONE. AAERIAL OVERFLIGHTS, JOINT PATROLS AND OTHER JOINT SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY ARE ALL MENTIONED. THE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT, PENDING SHAMIR'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON, HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD MORE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED PROPOSALS TO MAKE. HARE SUSPECTED HOWEVER THAT THEY THOUGHT IN TERMS OF A RANGE OF AOPTIONS. THE MAIN EMPHASIS IN THEIR IDEAS WAS ON POLICING OF THE BUFFER ZONE BY THE LEBANESE ARMY AND HADDAD MILITIA. HADDAD'S OWN ROLE WAS ANOTHER MATTER. SOME FACE SAVING JOB FOR HIM WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND (ONE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAS SUGGESTED TO US PRIVATELY THAT HE MIGHT BE SENT ABROAD AS LEBANESE MILITARY ATTACHE SOMEWHERE). IT WAS CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS IF NOT ISRAELIS THAT AN OVERT ROLE FOR HADDAD PERSONALLY WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF LEBANESE INTERNAL POLITICS.

4. HARE CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN DISTINCTLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A ROLE FOR A UN OR MULTINATIONAL FORCE. AMONG OTHER REASONS, SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE LESS MALLEABLE AND LESS SUBJECT TO ISRAELI PRESSURE. BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD PRIVATELY RULED IT OUT OF COURT IN CASE IT TURNED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE.

5. ASKED ABOUT ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN KEEPING THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE APART, HARE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS RESENTED THE FACT THAT THE CLOSE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP THEY HAD ENJOYED WITH BASHIR HAD WITHERED AFTER HIS DEATH AND THE RETURN OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO BEIRUT. AMIN WOULD WANT UNDOUBTEDLY WANT A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT ITS FORM AND EXTENT REMAINED TO BE DETERMINED. HE AGREED THAT THE PROSPECT OF SEPERATE ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WITH BOTH AMERICANS AND LEBANESE SOUNDED A RECIPE FOR CONFUSION. BUT HARE HOPED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH SHAMIR AND THEN AMIN GEMAYEL WOULD PRODUCE A WORKABLE BUREAUCRATIC FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON AND IN ANY CASE AMERICAN AND LEBANESE VIEWS ON SUBSTANCE WERE CLOSE.

6. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, HARE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT REMAINING PROBLEM WAS HOW TO REMOVE THE REMAINING PLO FROM NORTHERN AND EASTERN LEBANON.

F C O PLEASE PASS ALL ADDRESSEES EXCEPT JERUSALEM
MOBERLY

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

STANDARD

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