PRIME MINISTER

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## FRANKS COMMITTEE

I spoke to the Secretary again this morning. He told me that the Committee would not consider until Friday what specific questions they wished to put to you. He would be in touch with me again then.

Lord Carrington has sent us a transcript of his evidence. He wants it back when we have finished with it. I have therefore had the attached photocopy made for you, which you are at liberty to mark as you will. Having spoken to Lord Carrington, I think he will be grateful if we protect the fact that he has sent this document to us. I see nothing wrong in his doing so but there is clearly a danger of misinterpretation.

A list of the documents you saw when you saw them is under preparation.

May I suggest that you decide this week who should accompany you to the proceedings. There are, I think, only three candidates: Robin, Robert Armstrong and myself. You may like to discuss.

While, as stated above, I cannot usefully prepare a definitive list of possible questions until Friday, I have compiled the attached provisional list. This is based on further thoughts which the Committee's Secretary put to me this morning, a reading of Lord Carrington's evidence and my own guesses. I am also working on some answers which I should have available shortly.

A.J.C.

20 October 1982

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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## POSSIBLE QUESTIONS FOR PRIME MINISTER

- 1. What role did you play in foreign affairs at the time?
- 2. How far did you look to the Foreign Secretary for advice?
- 3. What sort of (a) telegrams; (b) intelligence reports did you expect to see?
- 4. What was the role of your Private Secretaries?
- 5. Why did OD not meet on this subject between January 1981 and March 1982?
- 6. In January/February 1982 how aware were you of developments affecting Argentina and the Falkland Islands?
- 7. When Argentina issued a unilateral statement about the New York Communique, should this not have been read as a warning of possible military action?

## SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 8. When you minuted on 3 March: "We must make contingency plans" what did that mean? Did you have military action in mind?
- 9. Why was no report made to Cabinet after the New York talks?
- 10. A minute by Lord Carrington of 15 February to you said that Argentina was adopting a tougher stance towards the negotiations. Nothing seems to have been done about this observation. Why?
- 11. When were you first aware that Argentina might be contemplating military activities?
- 12. Were you personally involved in the orders given to "ENDURANCE" to sail?