

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 535 OF 29 NOV
INFO PRIORITY RABAT, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON: ROUTINE OTHER
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, ROME.

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

1. THE US AMBASSADOR (WHO WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TALKS) HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF MR PHILIP HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS IN AMMAN ON 27 NOVEMBER WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS, WHICH FOCUSED MAINLY ON THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND THE KING'S FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WASHINGTON ON 21 DECEMBER.
2. KING HUSSEIN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION FROM HABIB ON THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE US ADMINISTRATION AND ALSO ON THE ROLE ENVISAGED BY THE AMERICANS FOR THE PLO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB RECALLED TO THE KING THE TERMS FOR A US/PLO DIALOGUE WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SET OUT IN A LETTER TO KING FAHD WHICH HE ALSO READ OUT TO THE KING THE

IN A LETTER TO KING FAHD SEMICLN HE ALSO READ OUT TO THE KING THE FORMULA ON RECOGNITION WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO: "ALL STATES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING ISRAEL, HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS WITHIN SECURE BORDERS." HABIB TOLD THE KING THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THESE LINES, PLUS ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, WOULD ENABLE THE AMERICANS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. BUT THE POINTS MUST BE STATED CLEARLY BY ARAFAT, WITHOUT AMBIGUITY AND AND WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS BEING ATTACHED.

3. HABIB HAD ALSO URGED THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT BE "HUNG UP" ON THE NEED FOR A PLO NAME-PLATE TO BE DISPLAYED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD EXPLAIN THE LIMITS OF THE US POSITION TO THE PLO AND WOULD URGE THEM NOT TO PRESS FOR EXCESSIVE AND UNREALISTIC DEMANDS. HABIB SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF KING HUSSEIN COULD BRING WITH HIM TO WASHINGTON SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE FORMULAE FOR PLO PARTICIPATION, SO THAT HE COULD DISCUSS WITH THE AMERICANS WHICH OF THEM HAD THE BEST CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. HABIB HAD IN ADDITION TOLD THE KING IN TERMS THAT A PLO STATEMENT ON RECOGNITION WOULD NOT BE RECIPROCATED BY ISRAEL: INSISTENCE ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION WOULD THEREFORE GIVE ISRAEL A VETO ON THE US/PLO DIALOGUE AND WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE MEET US CONDITIONS FOR OPENING IT (SEE PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 517 FOR AN ACCOUNT OF EARLIER US/JORDANIAN DIFFICULTIES ON THIS POINT).

4. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN TO HABIB THAT, ONCE JORDAN HAD JOINED IN A MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE, HE MIGHT DISCOVER THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT WILLING TO SEE IT THROUGH. HE HAD STRESSED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE PROGRESS ON THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, AS LACK OF IT WAS UNDERMINING US CREDIBILITY. HE HAD, HOWEVER, AGREED WITH HABIB THAT A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN PROGRESS OVER THE LEBANON AND THE WIDER PEACE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE MADE. HABIB HAD TOLD THE KING THAT, EVEN IF IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE FULL EVACUATION FROM LEBANON BY THE END OF 1982, HE STILL BELIEVED THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

5. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO SAID THAT HE WANTED A FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS BEFORE HE COULD ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WAS CRITICAL FOR US CREDIBILITY. BUT ONLY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF COULD REALLY TACKLE MR BEGIN ON THIS. HE WOULD ALREADY HAVE DONE SO BUT FOR THE CANCELLATION OF HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN DURING THE LATTER'S LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HABIB CLAIMED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHARED THE KING'S VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS SEMICLN AT THE SAME TIME HABIB URGED THE KING NOT TO MAKE IT A PRE-CONDITION FOR ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS. THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT IT WAS HARD FOR HIM TO ASSEMBLE A NEGOTIATING TEAM IN THE ABSENCE OF A

HARD FOR HIM TO ASSEMBLE A NEGOTIATING TEAM IN THE ABSENCE OF A FREEZE: WHILE HE DID NOT SEE IT AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS A CRITICAL ISSUE IN THE DEBATE GOING ON WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT BETWEEN THOSE WHO FAVOURED ENTERING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO DOING SO.

6. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO RAISED WITH HABIB THE DIFFICULTIES HE WAS HAVING WITH THE OTHER MODERATE ARAB LEADERS, CLAIMING THAT KING FAHD, KING HASSAN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD DONE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE PLO TO BE REASONABLE. KING HASSAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD PROPOSED A VOTE BY THE WEST BANK INHABITANTS UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES TO DETERMINE WHETHER KING HUSSEIN OR THE PLO WAS THEIR LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE. MUBARAK HAD NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH JORDAN SINCE THE WEST BANK CRISIS (ALTHOUGH OSAMA AL BAZ IS DUE IN AMMAN TODAY). KING FAHD WAS NOT BEING HELPFUL OVER JORDAN'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES: ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS HAD PAID WHAT THEY OWED JORDAN UNDER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT ARRANGEMENTS, THEY HAD NOT USED THEIR INFLUENCE TO MAKE OTHERS PAY. THE TOTAL SHORT-FALL ON MONEY PLEDGED TO JORDAN AT BAGHDAD IN 1978 WAS NOW DOLLARS 360 MILLION SINCE THE GULF STATES WERE HEAVILY IN ARREARS, TO THE TUNE OF DOLLARS 290 MILLION (THESE FIGURES ARE FAR HIGHER THAN ANY YET PUBLICLY RELEASED BY THE JORDANIANS). HABIB HAD UNDERTAKEN TO URGE FAHD, HASSAN AND MUBARAK TO GIVE MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT TO JORDAN.

7. KING HUSSEIN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS MAIN OBJECTIVE DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON WOULD BE TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION AND TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT THE AMERICANS WERE COMMITTED TO ENTER FULLY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS AND SEE IT THROUGH RATHER THAN JUST INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD REGARD THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TO JORDANIAN ARMS REQUESTS AS AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF US RESOLVE TO SUPPORT JORDAN. HE SAID HE WOULD ALSO PREPARE IN ADVANCE A PAPER SETTING OUT THE POINTS WHICH HE WISHED TO TAKE UP WITH THE PRESIDENT. HABIB HAD TOLD THE KING THAT IT WAS OF COURSE FOR THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF TO GIVE THE KING THE ANSWERS HE WAS SEEKING, BUT HE URGED THE KING TO CONCENTRATE IN HIS TALKS IN THE US ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO SEEK MORE SPECIFIC US VIEWS ON THEM. IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO BE MORE PRECISE AT THIS STAGE ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AS THAT WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE KING HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HABIB THAT HE HELD STRONG VIEWS REGARDING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: IN PARTICULAR, HE FELT THAT 5 YEARS WAS FAR TOO LONG. HABIB HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE AMERICANS OF NOT BREACHING THEIR COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL, BUT THOUGHT THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (UNDER CAMP DAVID, THEY ARE DUE TO START NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR OF

CAMP DAVID, THEY ARE DUE TO START NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD).

8. KING HUSSEIN UNDERTOOK TO HABIB TO GIVE THE US AMBASSADOR HERE A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT ON 28 NOVEMBER SINCE AN ACCOUNT OF THESE IS CONTAINED IN MIPT. I HAVE NOT YET HEARD THE KING'S VERSION OF HOW HIS TALKS WITH HABIB AND ARAFAT WENT.

9. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD STRESSED TO HABIB THE IMPORTANCE HE SAW IN KEEPING US VERY FULLY IN THE PICTURE CONCERNING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (AND I ASSUME THE VERY FULL BRIEFING I HAVE BEEN GIVEN ON HABIB'S TALKS IS A DIRECT RESULT OF THIS). ACCORDING TO VIETS, HABIB'S PLAN AFTER VISITING EGYPT AND MOROCCO (TO SEE KING FAHD AND POSSIBLY KING HASSAN) WAS TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN FLORENCE BEFORE MEETING SHULTZ IN BRUSSELS, HIS INTENTION BEING TO LEAVE THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO DRAPER FOR THE MOMENT SINCE BUT HABIB REALISED THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO RETURN TO LEBANON SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. VIETS TOLD ME HE HAD URGED HABIB TO STOP OFF IN LONDON TO GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS, BUT VIETS REMAINED UNCERTAIN WHETHER HABIB'S SCHEDULE WOULD ALLOW HIM TO DO THIS. IT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE OPEN TO US TO INVITE HABIB TO COME TO LONDON, ALTHOUGH I THINK THAT IN DOING SO IT WOULD BE BEST TO OMIT ANY REFERENCE TO VIETS' ROLE. QUITE SEPARATELY, HABIB TOLD ME WHEN I SAW HIM ON 27 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 533 REFERS) THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION HE HAD RECEIVED TO VISIT DITCHLEY AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

URWICK

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