

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

08

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NENAD
ED/MED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/ECG(E) ...
ED/CONSULAR DEPT
ED/NAD ...
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PRESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 191645Z JAN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 057 OF 19 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV TUNIS AMMAN
INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA CAIRO ATHENS EMBASSY BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS
UKNIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING MOSCOW ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DOHA
DUBAI JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANA'A TRIPOLI
UKDEL NATO

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE: BONN
18/19 JANUARY: ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGREED THAT:

(A) IN A MUCH MORE REAL SENSE THAN HITHERTO, THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR
AN ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT WAS RUNNING OUT FAST:

(B) IT WAS ESSENTIAL AND URGENT TO TAKE UP GUMUTZIS SUGGESTION OF

~~AN ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT WAS RUNNING OUT FAST.~~

(B) IT WAS ESSENTIAL AND URGENT TO TAKE UP SHULTZ'S SUGGESTION OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE TEN ON THE MIDDLE EAST (PRESIDENCY WILL SEEK TO ARRANGE THIS DURING BUSH'S VISIT AND/OR OTHERWISE): THE MAIN POINTS SHOULD BE THE READINESS OF THE TEN TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ESPECIALLY WITH JORDAN AND THE PLO, BUT ALSO THE COMPLEMENTARY NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE STEPS TO REINFORCE JORDAN/PLO CONFIDENCE IN ITS COMMITMENT TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT, EG BY SOME SHIFT IN ITS POSITION ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND/OR SOME MORE EFFECTIVE MOVE AGAINST ISRAELI POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

(C) PRESIDENCY SHOULD ACT ON AMERICAN REQUEST FOR APPROACHES TO SAUDIS AND OTHER MODERATE ARABS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE PLO TO LOSE NO MORE TIME IN FINALIZING DETAILS OF THEIR COOPERATION WITH JORDAN IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE:

(D) DURING SHAMIR'S VISIT TO BONN ON 7-8 FEBRUARY THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY SHOULD SPEAK TO HIM NO LESS FRANKLY THAN DID THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN HE VISITED ISRAEL LAST YEAR:

(E) THE PRESIDENCY AND THE TEN INDIVIDUALLY SHOULD POINT OUT TO THE PLO THE DAMAGING EFFECT OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS (SUCH AS THE ATTACK ON A BUS IN TEL AVIV ON 8 JANUARY) ON PALESTINIAN INTERESTS.

DETAIL

2. PFEFFER (GERMAN PRESIDENCY) SAID ALL PARTNERS WERE AGREED THAT CONSTANT COORDINATION WITH THE US WAS VERY IMPORTANT SINCE ONLY THE US COULD PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE. THIS COORDINATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGH THE PRESIDENCY'S DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICANS, A TROIKA MEETING (SEE MY TELNO 38) AND MINISTERIAL CONTACTS EG DURING VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO EUROPE LATER THIS MONTH. EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTARY TO US POLICY, WITH THE SHARED OBJECTIVE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. AN INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE BY THE TEN SHOULD NOT BE EXPEDIENT AT PRESENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT TO THE US THE IDEA PROPOSED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL (MY TELNO 33) THAT SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE REAGAN PLAN, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT IN THE EUROPEAN VIEW THIS WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE OUTCOME OF SELF DETERMINATION COULD NOT BE ANTICIPATED. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD ALSO URGE ON THE US THE NEED FOR A MORATORIUM ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. OTHERWISE KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE UNABLE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AND THERE WOULD SOON BE LITTLE LEFT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. EUROPEANS SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE US EFFORTS TO BRING WEST BANK POLITICIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IF THEY WERE CLOSE TO THE PLO (THOUGH NOT ACTUAL PLO REPRESENTATIVES). PFEFFER WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE US THE TEN'S DESIRE FOR AN EARLY TROIKA MEETING AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL.

PLO REPRESENTATIVES). PFEFFER WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE US THE TEN'S DESIRE FOR AN EARLY TROIKA MEETING AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL.

3. DYVIG (DENMARK) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY TROIKA MEETING BUT FELT THAT THE WORKING GROUP REPORT WAS TOO SPECIFIC IN SPEAKING OF RECONCILING THE REAGAN AND FEZ PLANS. HE WOULD PREFER A MORE GENERAL APPROACH. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE US WOULD AGREE TO ADOPT THE CONCEPT OF SELF DETERMINATION BECAUSE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS IN OTHER AREAS EG PUERTO RICO.

4. BULLARD (UK) SAID THAT THE TEN MUST ENSURE AT ALL COSTS THAT SHULTZ'S PROPOSAL OF US/EUROPEAN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TAKEN UP URGENTLY. THE OBJECTIVES OF SUCH TALKS WERE USEFULLY SET OUT IN THE WORKING GROUP REPORT THOUGH HE HOPED IT WAS SELF EVIDENT BY NOW THAT EUROPEANS WISHED TO COMPLEMENT AND NOT RIVAL US EFFORTS. KING HUSSEIN WAS RIGHT TO SEE THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY CLOSING FAST, WITH CONTINUING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE APPROACH OF THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE KING HAD TOLD THE PLO THAT THEY MUST DECIDE BY 1 MARCH ON THE MECHANICS OF THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THE WAY IN WHICH AN EVENTUAL PALESTINIAN POLITICAL UNIT SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH JORDAN. IT WAS ALWAYS EASY IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO SAY THAT SOMEBODY ELSE SHOULD MOVE. BUT THE SITUATION NOW REQUIRED EVERYBODY TO THINK WHAT THEY THEMSELVES COULD DO. EUROPEANS SHOULD SAY TO THE US THAT, THOUGH THEY DID NOT HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL, THEY DID HAVE SOME WITH JORDAN AND THE PLO, BUT THAT NEITHER OF THE LATTER WERE FULLY CONVINCED OF US COMMITMENT TO THE REAGAN PLAN, AND ASK IF THE US COULD PRODUCE A NEW FORMULA ON SELF DETERMINATION, ADJUST ITS POSITION ON CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND/OR MOVE BEYOND THE STATEMENT OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982 TO PRACTICAL (PROBABLY FINANCIAL) MEASURES AGAINST ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS POLICY.

5. DE LA BATIE (FRANCE) URGED THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH THE US BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE TO MAKE THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY BULLARD, AND TO COORDINATE VIEWS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AS A WHOLE. A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE FOUND SOMEWHERE HALF WAY BETWEEN THE REAGAN AND FEZ PLANS. RECONCILIATION OF THESE TWO WAS WHAT WAS NEEDED. SELF DETERMINATION WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT BUT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE US TO BRING ABOUT A FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS.

6. MCKERNAN (IRELAND) AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EARLY CONTACTS WITH THE US, INCLUDING THE POINT ABOUT SELF DETERMINATION (KLIBI HAD BEEN IN DUBLIN AS WELL AS BONN). HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS

THE US, INCLUDING THE POINT ABOUT SELF DETERMINATION (KLIBI HAD BEEN IN DUBLIN AS WELL AS BONN). HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS SUSPICION OF THE US IN JORDAN AND THE PLO, AND THAT A US GESTURE WAS PARTICULARLY NEEDED BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 14 FEBRUARY. BURT'S MEETING WITH THE EUROPEAN TROIKA IN NEW YORK LAST SEPTEMBER HAD SHOWN US INTEREST IN EXPLOITING EUROPEAN CONTACTS WITH THE PLO.

7. KATAPODIS (GREECE) FELT THAT CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE IN ALL POSSIBLE WAYS WITH THE AMERICANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AGREED WITH THE UK, FRANCE AND IRELAND ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH CONTACTS. THE US HELD THE KEY. THE

TEN DID NOT, BUT COULD HELP. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BY THE TEN WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THE TALKS WITH THE US, NOT LEAST THAT OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1982. REFERENCES TO SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD AT LEAST NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.

8. WIJNAENDTS (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE TEN SHOULD STICK TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE STATEMENT OF 20 SEPTEMBER AS A BASIS FOR TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS.

9. CAHEN (BELGIUM) AGREED THAT EARLY TALKS WITH THE US WERE NEEDED AND THAT THE US MUST RESTORE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH JORDAN AND THE QUOTE ARAFAT WING UNQUOTE OF THE PLO.

10. PFEFFER SUMMED UP THAT THE TEN WANTED EARLY TALKS WITH THE US AT BOTH MINISTERIAL AND SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM INCLUDING SELF DETERMINATION AND SETTLEMENTS. AT UK INSTIGATION HE ADDED THE POINT THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT: IT WAS A MATTER OF MONTHS RATHER THAN YEARS.

11. PFEFFER RECALLED THAT THE US HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE TEN TO URGE THE SAUDIS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS GIVEN ENOUGH ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. PFEFFER PREFERRED AN INFORMAL TO A FORMAL APPROACH.

12. KATAPODIS (GREECE) FELT AN APPROACH WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE TEN COULD TELL THE SAUDIS THAT THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE US HAD BORN SOME FRUIT. PFEFFER SAW MERIT IN THIS IDEA.

13. BULLARD SUGGESTED THAT CONTACTS WITH MODERATE ARABS MIGHT ALSO BE USED TO REINFORCE THE POINT ABOUT TIME RUNNING OUT. A FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WOULD LOSE VALUABLE WEEKS.

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14. BOTTAI (ITALY) SAW NO REASON TO DELAY CONTACT WITH THE SAUDIS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS WITH THE US. WIJNAENDTS PREFERRED INDIVIDUAL DEMARCHES TO THE SAUDIS RATHER THAN ONE BY THE PRESIDENCY. THIS IDEA DID NOT FIND FAVOUR WITH OTHERS THOUGH IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT PARTNERS MIGHT ACT SEPARATELY AS WELL IF THEY WISHED. DYVIG (DENMARK) DID NOT WANT TOO FORMAL OR TOO SPECIFIC A DEMARCHE. KATAPODIS AGREED BUT DID WANT THE PRESIDENCY TO SAY THAT THE TEN WERE DOING WHAT THEY COULD TO PERSUADE THE US OF THE MERITS OF SOME ARAB DESIDERATA.

15. PFEFFER CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD SPEAK IN GENERAL TERMS TO THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB MODERATES.

16. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF LEBANON DYVIG DESCRIBED HOW THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN TAKEN ABACK BY THE FIRMNESS OF THE LINE WHICH THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TAKEN WITH THEM AS PRESIDENCY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY'S LINE SHOULD BE AS FIRM AND SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUITY OF EUROPEAN POLICY. PFEFFER ACCEPTED THIS.

17. DULLARD SAID THAT THE UK BELIEVED THAT THE DAMASCUS ARM OF THE PLO WAS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON A BUS IN TEL AVIV ON 8 JANUARY. THIS WAS THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME FOR THE PLO TO MOUNT TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE TEN SHOULD USE ANY CONTACTS WITH THE PLO TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS. PFEFFER AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD USE SUCH MEANS AS WERE OPEN TO THEM AND SUGGESTED THAT OTHERS MIGHT ACT SIMILARLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

TAYLOR

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