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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 229 OF 28 JANUARY 1983,

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK,
DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TUNIS, MOSCOW,
INFO SAVING TRIPOLI, ADDIS ABABA, MOGADISHU, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,
PARIS, ROME.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS SATISFIED THAT VISIT REPAIRED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP STRAINED BY ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON. PREDICTABLE EGYPTIAN PRESSURE FOR EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, A PRECONDITION INTER ALIA, FOR IMPROVED EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND KEMP (NSC) BRIEFED US TODAY ON THE VISIT OF MUBARAK AND FIVE OF HIS MINISTERS TO WASHINGTON FROM 26 TO 28 JANUARY. IN ADDITION TO TWO HOURS OF TALKS AND LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HABIB, MUBARAK HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ, WEINBERGER, REGAN, BROCK, THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE IMF, THE US/JEWISH LEADERS AND MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE VISIT BUILT ON THAT BY KHAL HASSAN ALI LAST NOVEMBER, IN REPAIRING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD BEEN STRAINED BY THE ISRAELI INVASION AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON. MUBARAK HAD BEEN FORCEFUL AND IMPRESSIVE, ESPECIALLY IN HANDLING TOUGH QUESTIONING FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AS A CORNERSTONE OF U S POLICY AND THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK DESCRIBED THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL BUT HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEND HIS AMBASSADOR BACK TO TEL AVIV ONCE THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. MUBARAK HAD PREDICTABLY URGED CONTINUED AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS TO THIS END, BUT HAD PUT FORWARD NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. HE STRESSED THAT GEMAYEL WANTED THE AMERICANS TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. MUBARAK HAD BEEN CONFIDENT THAT EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD IMPROVE ONCE PROGRESS WERE MADE ON LEBANON. HE SHOWED SOME RESENTMENT OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, AND HINTED THAT A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY. THE EGYPTIANS EXPRESSED CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT LIBYAN SUBVERSION IN CHAD AND THE SUDAN AND ABOUT THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA. THEY WERE TRYING DISCREETLY TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH MENGISTU AND HAD URGED THE SOMALIS TO SEEK TO REPAIR THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ETHIOPIANS.

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5. CONTRARY TO A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY KAMAL HASSAN ALI PRIOR TO THE VISIT HUBARAK DID NOT DELIVER ANY SPECIFIC MESSAGE FROM ARAFAT. ACCORDING TO THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY, HOWEVER, ARAFAT HAD SIGNALLED TO THE EGYPTIANS HIS READINESS TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO COOPERATE OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. BUT HE STILL WANTED AMERICAN GUPANTEES, FOR EXAMPLE OVER SETTLEMENTS. THE EGYPTIANS WERE URGING ARAFAT TO TAKE A CHANCE AND GO AHEAD, IF NECESSARY WITH FATAH ONLY.

6. THERE WAS EVIDENTLY LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE AMERICANS EXPECT THE EGYPTIANS TO ALLOW A SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO IN DUE COURSE. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ASKED THEM NOT TO OVERREACT TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT.

7. TELELETTER FOLLOWS (NOT TO ALL) ON BILATERAL ISSUES.

FCO PASS SAVING: TRIPOLI, ADDIS ABABA, MOGADISHU, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS AND ROME.

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