

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR ~~EO~~ERTON
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/... ..

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

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PUSD (2)

NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 121945Z APRIL 1983

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 175 OF 12 APRIL 1983

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TWO IPTS: SECRETARY OF STATES VISIT TO JORDAN:
LEBANON.

1. IN THEIR TALKS ON 12 APRIL, KING HUSSEIN GAVE THE SECRETARY OF STATE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER EARLIER THE SAME MORNING.

2. SALEM HAD TOLD THE KING THAT NO PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON DEMANDS WHICH THE LEBANESE COULD NOT MEET. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WANTED MAJOR HADDAD TO COMMAND ALL FORCES SOUTH OF THE LITANI RIVER, ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS ATTACHED TO LEBANESE UNITS DOWN TO COMPANY LEVEL AND JOINT ISRAELI/LEBANESE PATROLS IN THE AREA WITH THE RIGHT TO SEARCH AND OPEN FIRE IF NECESSARY. THE ISRAELIS WERE DEMANDING VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT DEPOTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH BETWEEN 15 AND 25 ISRAELI OFFICERS STATIONED IN THE AREA. THEY WERE ALSO INSISTING ON OPEN

~~DEPOTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH BETWEEN 15 AND 25 ISRAELI OFFICERS~~
PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE AREA. THEY WERE ALSO INSISTING ON OPEN
BORDERS AND FULL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
LEBANON IMMEDIATELY, WHEREAS THE LEBANESE HAD ASKED FOR A SIX
MONTHS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

3. SALEM HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN THAT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING
POSITION WAS VERY WEAK, IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG US
SUPPORT, AND THAT THEY HAD GONE A VERY LONG WAY TO MEET ISRAELI DE-
MANDS. BUT THEY WERE RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE POINT WHEN LEBANON
WOULD BE BARGAINING AWAY HER SOVEREIGNTY. THE LEBANESE HAD FOR
EXAMPLE AGREED TO A DEMILITARISED ZONE 37 KILOMETRES IN DEPTH,
BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON 45 KILOMETRES.
THEY HAD ALSO AGREED TO INCORPORATE ALL HADDAD'S MILITIA INTO
LEBANESE UNITS, AND HAD ACCEPTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY
WOULD ONLY BE EQUIPPED WITH LIGHT ARMS IN THE SOUTH SEMICOLON
THEY HAD ALSO RENOUNCED ANY ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY WHICH
COULD PREVENT ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER LEBANON.
THERE WOULD BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUING DIALOGUE BETWEEN
THE PARTIES THROUGH THE TRIPARTITE US/ISRAELI/LEBANESE COMMITTEES.

4. IN ADDITION THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT US TEAMS
TO TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY TO COMBAT TERRORISM,
AND SPECIAL US EQUIPMENT TO PREVENT INFILTRATION. THEY HAD ALSO
AGREED TO THE PRESENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE AREAS
ROUND TYRE AND SIDON. BUT THE LEBANESE HAD NOW REACHED THE
LIMIT OF POSSIBLE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT ANY APPARENT WILLINGNESS
ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS TO REACH AGREEMENT.

5. KING HUSSEIN AGREED WHEN MR PYM SUGGESTED THAT ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS PRECISELY THE KIND OF INDICATOR
NEEDED TO RE-ESTABLISH ARAB CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES,
BUT WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF
HIS TALKS WITH SALEM.

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