

Middle East Site

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/FUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR ~~EBERTON~~  
SIR J BULLARD  
ED/NENAD  
ED/MED  
ED/UND

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/... ..

ED/CONSULAR DEPT

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FUSD (2)

NEWS D

~~WASHINGTON CLARK~~

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GRS 920

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TUNIS 221208Z APRIL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 22 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN BEIRUT  
CAIRO DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT  
RABAT SANA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI ATHENS BONN UKREP BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME AND MOSCOW

MY TEL NO 69: MR HURD'S MEETING WITH QADDUMI

1. MR HURD SAW QADDUMI FOR FORTY FIVE MINUTES AT THE RESIDENCE THIS MORNING. RAMLAWI AND DAJANI WERE ALSO PRESENT. THE MEETING WAS FRANK AND BUSINESS LIKE.

2. QADDUMI BEGAN BY DESCRIBING HOW THE SITUATION HAD CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE SINCE THE INVASION OF LEBANON. THE US BORE MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY, THE BOMBING OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT SHOWED THE INCREASING FRUSTRATION OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WITH THE AMERICAN ROLE. THE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN HAD BROKEN DOWN BECAUSE ALL THE PRESSURE HAD BEEN ON THE PALESTINIANS TO GIVE MORE CONCESSIONS. AS IT STOOD, THE REAGAN PLAN COULD NOT PRODUCE A PERMANENT AND JUST SOLUTION SINCE IT DID NOT RECOGNISE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND SELF-DETERMINATION, AND IGNORED THE PLO AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE PLO HAD MADE CLEAR TO KING HUSSEIN AT THE OUTSET THAT ANY PALESTINIAN DELEGATION AT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT, THE PLO WANTED TO NEGOTIATE BUT WOULD NOT DO SO THROUGH SUBSTITUTES. IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF THE FEZ PLAN AND UN RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE

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PALESTINIANS. A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ENDORSED BY AN INTERNATIONAL  
CONFERENCE INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAD INTERESTS IN THE  
AREA WHICH COULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. IF THERE WERE TO BE A  
SETTLEMENT THE AMERICANS MUST NOW IMPROVE THEIR OFFER: ONLY  
THIS COULD CHANGE THE PRESENT IMPASSE. IT WAS VITAL THAT AMERICANS  
PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS WHICH WITH SUFFICIENT  
DETERMINATION, THEY COULD DO, AS THEY HAD SHOWN IN 1956. QADDUMI  
ALSO REFERRED TO HMG'S HISTORICAL AND MORE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE  
PALESTINIANS. OUR ABILITY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS,  
INFLUENCE OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND EXERT LEVERAGE OVER THE ISRAELIS  
GAVE US AN IMPORTANT ROLE. OUR VIEWS HAD DEVELOPED A GREAT DEAL,  
ALTHOUGH SLOWLY. BUT WE COULD DO MORE, FOR EXAMPLE BY CLARIFYING  
OUR POSITION ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. MR HURD SAID THAT THE FEZ SUMMIT HAD MARKED A HIGH POINT  
IN EUROPEAN SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PALESTINIANS.  
BUT THE QUESTION THEN WAS HOW IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE REAGAN  
PLAN, HOWEVER OPEN TO CRITICISM FOR ITS SHORT COMINGS, WAS A MEANS  
OF IMPLEMENTING THE POSSIBILITIES THROWN UP AT FEZ. THE EUROPEANS  
HAD HOPED THAT THE PLO WOULD HAVE AGREED TO ALLOW KING HUSSEIN TO  
EDGER ONTO NEGOTIATIONS. THAT WOULD HAVE MAXIMISED THE FBSK  
POSSIBILITIES OF AMERICAN PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND PROVIDE A REAL  
CHANCE TO BREAK  
THE DEADLOCK. WE HOPED THAT CHANCE REMAINED. BUT THE PLO'S  
REFUSAL WAS A SETBACK. EUROPEAN PEOPLE WERE FINDING IT DIFFICULT  
TO UNDERSTAND THE PLO'S DECISION. IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT  
NOW TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL., THOSE ISRAELIS AND ARABS WHO DID  
NOT WANT PEACE WERE REJOICING. A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PLO  
TO WIN SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN LOST. IT WAS A BAD  
AND A CRUCIAL MOMENT. A PRACTICABLE WAY FORWARD WAS NOW NEEDED  
IF THE SITUATION WAS TO BE RETRIEVED. FOR THIS REASON WE  
DOUBTED THE POINT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE WERE IN  
CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND WOULD CONTINUE TO  
ENCOURAGE THEM IN THEIR PEACE EFFORTS. BUT WERE WERE NOT A  
DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

4. QADDOUMI COMMENTED THAT THE PRESENT PEACE PROCESS COULD  
NOT SUCCEED BECAUSE THE PLO WAS BEING ASKED TO MAKE ALL THE  
CONCESSIONS AT THE START. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EXPLANATION OF  
HIS PLAN HAD CONTAINED MANY UNHELPFUL ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ITS  
COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID, ITS FAILURE TO RECOGNISE THE PLO OR  
GUARANTEE THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ITS TOLERANCE OF  
EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. THIS DID NOT GIVE A BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE.  
IF THE PLO WERE TO TAKE A RISK THEY MUST FIRST SEE THE BENEFITS.  
BUT THEY COULD NOT GIVE WAY AT THE OUTSET ON THEIR THREE  
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS TO REPRESENTATION, SELF-DETERMINATION AND AN  
INDEPENDENT STATE. THE INITIATIVE MUST THEREFORE LIE WITH THE  
AMERICANS, NOT THE PALESTINIANS. THEY MUST COME FORWARD WITH NEW  
ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THE PALESTINIANS THAT A RISK WAS  
WORTH TAKING. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION QADDOUMI SAID THAT IT  
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE US WOULD TALK DIRECT TO THE PLO AND  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET TO LAY DOWN SECURITY GUARANTEES  
FOR A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE. NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO  
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~~THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET TO LAY DOWN SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE. NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. GENUINE PROGRESS ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, PERHAPS INCLUDING A TIMETABLE FOR THE PROGRESSIVE RETURN OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF REFUGEES, WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. INDEED THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS THE HEART OF THE MATTER.~~

5. MR HURD SAID THAT NO-ONE WAS EXPECTING THE PALESTINIANS TO ABANDON THEIR IDEAS OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND A JUST SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. BUT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION REMAINED WHETHER THE PLO WOULD ALLOW HUSSEIN TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE REAGAN PLAN. THIS WOULD HAVE CREATED THE CONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1957. WE WERE NOT SURPRISED THAT HUSSEIN HAD REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE ALONE. BUT WE WERE SURPRISED BY THE PLO'S DECISION. MR HURD EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT IT GAVE RISE TO THE FEELING THAT THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP WERE CONTENT TO REMAIN AS THEY WERE WITH THEIR CONSTANT TRAVELS AND MEETINGS RATHER THAN TAKE RISKS FOR THOSE WHO SUFFERED ON THE WEST BANK. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE NEW MOVES ASKED FOR BY QADDOUMI WERE LIKELY. QADDOUMI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, WITHOUT FURTHER CONCESSIONS FROM THE US, THE PLO WERE IN NO HURRY.

6. QADDOUMI REFERRED AT ONE STAGE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY ARAB SUMMIT. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER PLO TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN.

STIRLING

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SENT/RECD AT 22/1340Z CJS/DL