

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16



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~~SIR J LEAHY~~
MR EGERTON.
SIR J BULLARD HANNAY
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FM AMMAN 100840Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 9 MAY 1983
REPEATED ROUTINE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, PARIS,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 219: US/MIDDLE EAST

1. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS NOW GIVEN ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS DURING MR SHULTZ'S VISIT TO AMMAN ON 6/7 MAY.

2. SHULTZ BRIEFED THE JORDANIANS ON THE AGREEMENT REACHED OVER LEBANON (THE DETAILS OF WHICH I ASSUME ARE KNOWN TO YOU). SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT THE KEY LEBANESE REQUEST FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON HAD BEEN MET. THERE WOULD HOWEVER BE SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN A ZONE BOUNDED BY THE AWALAH RIVER, THE SOUTHERN APPROACHES TO THE BUKHRA MOUNTAINS AND A LINE IN THE BEKAA VALLEY, WHERE JOINT LEBANESE/ISRAELI VERIFICATION TEAMS (NOT MORE THAN EIGHT TEAMS IN ALL), COMPOSED OF TEN LEBANESE AND TEN ISRAELIS UNDER LEBANESE COMMAND, WOULD OPERATE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, SUPERVISED BY A LEBANESE/ISRAELI/US COMMITTEE. THE AGREEMENT MADE NO PROVISION FOR DIPLOMATIC TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SEMICOLON THE IMPORTATION FROM ISRAEL OF GOODS WHICH LEBANON PRODUCES FOR EXPORT WAS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED.

3. KING HUSSEIN HAD WARMLY WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT AND PLEDGED THAT JORDAN WOULD DO ALL SHE COULD TO PROMOTE ITS ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION, ALTHOUGH HE EXPRESSED DOUBT HOW FAR OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD PROVE WILLING TO GO IN THEIR BACKING FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE KING

TO GO IN THEIR BACKING FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE KING HIMSELF WAS PLANNING TO SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO LEBANON THIS WEEK AS A GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT JORDAN FOUND HERSELF IN MANY WAYS IN A SIMILAR POSITION TO LEBANON AND DERIVED HOPE FROM THE RECENT LEBANESE EXPERIENCE THAT A WEAK COUNTRY COULD GET TO GRIPS WITH ITS PROBLEMS, HOWEVER ADVERSE THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. THERE WAS ALSO A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON HOW THE PEACE PROCESS MIGHT BE CONTINUED. THE KING EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE POLARISATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE REGION, AND ALSO HIS FRUSTRATION BOTH WITH THE PLO AND WITH THE LUKE-WARM SUPPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MODERATE ARAB LEADERS. THE KING HAD SAID HE DID NOT WISH THE JORDAN/PLO TALKS TO END WITHOUT RESULT AND REAFFIRMED THAT JORDAN REMAINED FULLY DETERMINED TO WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE. HE HOPED THE AGREEMENT ON LEBANON WOULD HELP IN THIS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF RECENT MOROCCAN ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION, SHULTZ ASSURED THE KING THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH HIM AND THROUGH NO-ONE ELSE. THE KING URGED THE AMERICANS TO MAKE THEIR POSITION ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE SAUDIS AND MOROCCANS, AND TO PRESS THEM TO PERSUADE ARAFAT TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN. HE ALSO ASKED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE PLO. THE KING PRESSED SHULTZ FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION REMAINED DETERMINED TO SEE THINGS THROUGH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SHULTZ SAID THE AMERICANS WOULD INDEED CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT AND WERE AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO MORE WITH THE SAUDIS AND ALSO TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE TENSION BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. SHULTZ TOLD THE KING THAT THERE WERE NOW 6,000 SOVIET ADVISERS IN SYRIA. NONETHELESS HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE SYRIANS REALLY WANTED TO START A WAR. IF THEY DID, ISRAEL WOULD WIN IT SEMICOLON MOREOVER IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO INTERVENE IN A WAR WHICH SYRIA HAD STARTED. SHULTZ ADDED THAT THE US WERE NOT ABOUT TO BE FACED DOWN BY THE RUSSIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE KING CONTRASTED THE LACK OF SUPPORT FOR JORDAN FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHERS WITH CONTINUING SAUDI FINANCIAL LARGESSE TO SYRIA.

6. SUMMING UP HIS OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE VISIT, VIETS SAID SHULTZ HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY GLAD THAT THE KING HAD UNEQUIVOCALLY AND PUBLICLY ENDORSED THE AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

7. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHEN I SAW HIM YESTERDAY, WAS MUCH LESS POSITIVE ABOUT THE TALKS WITH SHULTZ AND CLAIMED THAT THE JORDANIAN SIDE HAD MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO EXPOSE JORDAN AGAIN TO THE DANGERS OF ATTEMPTING TO LEAD THE WAY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE MOVES UNLESS OTHERS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION THAN HITHERTO. QASEM THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS, HAVING IMPROVED THEIR IMAGE BY OFFERING TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, WOULD NOW EXPLOIT SYRIAN REJECTION TO

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WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, WOULD NOW EXPLOIT SYRIAN REJECTION TO
AVOID DOING SO. QASEM, WHO DID NOT REFER TO HIS OWN PROPOSED VISIT
TO BEIRUT (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE), SEEMED PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED OVER THE CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT COVERING TRADE
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND SAID THAT, IF THE LEBANON
WERE PILLORIED IN AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING FOR IMPORTING GOODS
FROM ISRAEL, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR EVEN THE MODERATE
EBBETWQBEDTBISDPBRSEHERBQZODTTED
AS EGYPT HAD BEEN. ACCORDING TO VIETS, QASEM DID NOT RAISE
THIS POINT IN THE PLENARY SESSION WITH SHULTZ SEMICOLON
HOWEVER, HE SUMMONED VIETS AFTERWARDS AND SPOKE AT LENGTH
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL DANGERS HE SAW FOR LEBANON IN THIS ASPECT
OF THE AGREEMENT.

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