

DD 191400Z THE HAGUE
GRS 1293
SECRET
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DESKBY 191400Z
FM FCO 191318Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 19 SEPTEMBER
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER FROM PS/FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: NEXT ROUND OF TALKS

1. YOU HAVE SEEN THE GOVERNOR'S REPORT ON HIS MEETINGS ON 14/15 SEPTEMBER WITH EXCO (HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBERS 1356, 1367 AND 1368). BRIEFLY, THERE WAS A RANGE OF VIEWS IN EXCO ON THE PROBLEMS LIKELY TO RESULT FROM A STALEMATE OR BREAKDOWN, FROM THOSE WHO THOUGHT THAT THE CRISIS WOULD BE NO WORSE THAN LAST AUTUMN TO OTHERS WHO TOOK A LESS SANGUINE VIEW. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT A GOOD DEAL WOULD DEPEND ON HOW A STALEMATE OR BREAKDOWN OCCURRED AND HOW IT WAS PRESENTED. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MUCH WORSE IF THE CHINESE CHOSE TO PRESENT IT AS A CONFRONTATION.
2. ON THE WAY AHEAD, EXCO MEMBERS AGREED THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ARGUE FOR CONTINUED BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AT THE MEETING ON 22 SEPTEMBER. THEREAFTER, THEY DID NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD AT THIS STAGE PURSUE THE OPTION OF STICKING TO THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE LINK WHILE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE DETAILED CHANGES WITH THE CHINESE. THEIR VIEW WAS THAT TO OFFER SUCH CHANGES WOULD WEAKEN THE BRITISH NEGOTIATING POSITION WITHOUT GAINING ANYTHING IN RETURN.
3. ALL MEMBERS HOWEVER THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT THE TACTIC OF TELLING THE CHINESE THAT OUR OWN VIEW REMAINED THAT CONTINUED BRITISH ADMINISTRATION WAS ESSENTIAL TO CONFIDENCE: BUT THAT AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD INVITE THEM TO DEVELOP AND PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS OF THEIR OWN PLAN AND IN PARTICULAR TO SAY WHAT GUARANTEES FOR HONG KONG'S AUTONOMY THEIR PLANS WOULD GIVE. THEY CONSIDERED THAT IF THE CHINESE PROVED ADAMANT ON 22 SEPTEMBER THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THIS TACTIC SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED AT THE END OF THE SESSION, IE ON 23 SEPTEMBER IF THE NEGOTIATORS THOUGHT IT NECESSARY. IT WAS THE GENERAL VIEW THAT OUR TEAM SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID A BREAKDOWN AT THE NEXT SESSION AND SHOULD IF NECESSARY LEAVE THE CHINESE IN NO DOUBT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BREAKDOWN OF A CONFRONTATIONAL KIND.

Telegram sent.

WR 27.

Prime Minister

24

We discussed. Agree para. 11, plus an instruction to Sir Jerry Conrad that he should avoid any impression that the U.K. has shied at its position and was now working on the basis of the Chinese proposal?

A.S.C. 15/9

4. THE OTHER MAIN POINT WHICH EXCO CONSIDERED WAS THE BRITISH PUBLIC RELATIONS STANCE. THEY SHOWED CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF CURRENT CHINESE PROPAGANDA COUPLED WITH OUR OWN SILENCE ON THE TALKS AND ON THE BRITISH POSITION. THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE TIME HAD YET COME FOR A FORMAL PUBLIC STATEMENT OF HMG'S POSITION BUT THEY BELIEVED THAT COMPLETE SILENCE WAS NO LONGER TOLERABLE. THEY WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH MR LUCE DURING HIS VISIT FROM 24 - 28 SEPTEMBER.

5. EXCO'S VIEWS ON THE WAY AHEAD ARE INTERESTING AND GENERALLY HELPFUL. WHILE REJECTING OUR 'OPTION B' FOR A MODIFIED FORM OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE LINK, THEY HAVE COME UP, WITHOUT PROMPTING, WITH THE PROPOSAL THAT THE CHINESE SHOULD BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER ON THEIR OWN PLAN. THIS IS VERY CLOSE TO THE SUGGESTION MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AT HER MEETING ON 5 SEPTEMBER. YOU WILL RECALL THAT SHE PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD TELL THE CHINESE THAT WE HAD DESCRIBED THE FACTORS WHICH WE BELIEVED TO BE NECESSARY FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY: THE CHINESE FOR THEIR PART CLAIMED TO HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE: WE SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THEY SHOULD DESCRIBE THIS SYSTEM IN DETAIL IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE TALKS. IN DISCUSSING THE IDEA, THE GOVERNOR PUT SPECIFICALLY TO EXCO THE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH SIR P CRADOCK HAD REFERRED AT THE 5 SEPTEMBER MEETING: THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT TAKE OUR WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO DETAILS OF THEIR FORMULA AS A PRELUDE TO ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR CONDITION ON BOTH SOVEREIGNTY AND ADMINISTRATION: OR ALTERNATIVELY THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN US SUFFICIENT DETAIL AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT GO FURTHER WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR POSITION. EXCO THOUGHT THAT THESE RISKS WERE WORTH RUNNING. THEY CLEARLY REGARD THIS TACTIC AS A MEANS OF PURSUING OUR PRESENT OBJECTIVE AND NOT AS A DEPARTURE FROM IT. THEY CONSIDERED THAT IF THE CHINESE TRY TO MISREPRESENT OUR POSITION WE SHOULD HAVE A CREDIBLE PUBLIC DEFENCE.

8. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO AUTHORISE OUR NEGOTIATORS TO USE THIS TACTIC AT THEIR DISCRETION. BUT WE MUST FULLY RECOGNISE THE DANGER OF THE CHINESE REGARDING IT, AS THEY HAVE DONE OUR CONDITIONAL MOVE ON SOVEREIGNTY, AS A CONCESSION ALREADY MADE, AND PRESENTING IT AS SUCH PUBLICLY. IT MAY BE VERY

DIFFICULT TO GO BACK AGAIN, ONCE WE HAVE INVITED THE CHINESE TO
OUTLINE THEIR IDEAS, TO DISCUSSIONS BASED ON OUR PRESENT POSITION
INDEED, AN ATTEMPT TO DO SO COULD PROVOKE A BREAKDOWN IN EVEN-
WORSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAN A BREAKDOWN NOW. IN OTHER
WORDS THE EXCO IDEA MAY LEAD US WILLY NILLY TO THE POSITION OF
NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE ON AN OPTION C BASIS. THE FOREIGN
SECRETARY THINKS THAT BEFORE THE MEETING ON 22 SEPTEMBER
WE SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR AGAIN TO EXCO
(WITHOUT OF COURSE MENTIONING OPTION C) TO HELP PREVENT ANY
RECRIMINATIONS AFTERWARDS. THERE CAN OF COURSE BE NO GUARANTEE
IN ANY CASE THAT OUR TACTIC WILL WORK. WE SHOULD HAVE TO MAKE
CLEAR THAT OUR BASIC POSITION HAD NOT ALTERED: AND THE
PROPOSITION MIGHT FOUNDER ON THAT POINT. BUT WE SHOULD STRESS
OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS TO SUSTAIN CONFIDENCE
AND TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN HONG KONG WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
OUR POSITION ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT. AT THE LEAST THIS TACTIC
SHOULD HELP TO GET THE CHINESE TO AGREE TO ANOTHER MEETING AFTER
THE 22/23 SEPTEMBER ROUND.

*Too much
of a hint?
A.J.C. 18/9*

9. WE WILL NEED TO BE READY TO COUNTER CHINESE LEAKS OR PUBLIC
INSINUATIONS THAT WE HAD CONCEDED THEIR CONDITIONS. THIS TOUCHES
ON EXCO'S SECOND POINT ON PUBLIC RELATIONS. OUR VIEW SO FAR
HAS BEEN THAT, WHILE THE SITUATION IN THE TALKS IS DEVELOPING
RAPIDLY, THERE IS NO SCOPE FOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS: BUT THIS
IS CLEARLY SOMETHING WE NEED TO THINK ABOUT FURTHER AND TO
DISCUSS AGAIN WITH EXCO. JUDICIOUS USE OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING ✓
OF THE RESPONSIBLE MEDIA MAY WELL BE PART OF THE ANSWER, BUT WE
ALSO HAVE TO LOOK AHEAD TO MR LUCE'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE
END OF HIS VISIT, TO THE GOVERNOR'S OPENING SPEECH TO THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON 5 OCTOBER AND LATER TO THE RESUMPTION OF
PARLIMENT.

*We may
have to
if the talks
go badly.*

10. FINALLY, HOWEVER THE NEXT ROUND GOES, BUT PARTICULARLY
IF THE CHINESE APPEAR RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO A FURTHER MEETING,
WE SHALL NEED TO INSTRUCT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO PUT VERY FIRMLY
TO THE CHINESE SIDE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY DAMAGED CONFIDENCE
IN HONG KONG AND PARTICULARLY THE EFFECT OF THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA.
WE SHOULD URGE ON THE CHINESE THE NEED TO LOOK AT THIS TOGETHER
AND IF POSSIBLE TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT DESIGNED TO BOOST

CONFIDENCE. WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT WILL BE EASY TO PERSUADE THEM. CHINESE PROPAGANDA INCREASINGLY APPEARS TO BE PART AND PARCEL OF THEIR NEGOTIATING METHOD, DESIGNED TO PUT PRESSURE ON US. THEY MAY WELL CHOOSE TO SEE SUCH AN APPROACH BY US AS A DIVERSIONARY MOVE. NEVERTHELESS THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY THINKS THAT WE SHOULD TRY IT.

11. IN SUMMARY I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER AGREES THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR P CRADOCK FOR 22/23 SEPTEMBER SHOULD COVER THE FOLLOWING:

- (A) ON 22 SEPTEMBER, A FIRM BUT NON-COMBATIVE STATEMENT THAT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF CHINESE PROPOSALS WE STILL CONSIDERED THAT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION PROVIDED THE ONLY EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FOR CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG:
- (B) AFTER TOUCHING BASE WITH EXCO AGAIN, AUTHORITY TO USE ON THE SECOND DAY THE TACTIC OF DRAWING THE CHINESE OUT ON THE DETAIL OF THEIR PROPOSALS WHILE ^{firmly} MAINTAINING OUR POSITION [~~IN PRINCIPLE~~]
- (C) STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS AND THE SETTING OF A DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND TO BE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED:
- (D) A PROPOSAL THAT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS BOTH SIDES SHOULD COLLABORATE ON PRESERVING CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG.

HOWE

P.S. - When how do we introduce Hong Kong opinion?

NNNN

I think we can use B provided it is clear that our own views on Brit. Admin have SS NOT changed and that we can say why we believe the Chinese plans won't maintain confidence. The alternative to deploying that tactic may otherwise be a breakdown in great hostility. Mr

SECRET

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DD 210100Z PEKING
GRS 170
SECRET
DESKBY PEKING 210100Z
FM FCO 201900Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING
TELEGRAM NUMBER 619 OF 20 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG AND BRUNEI (PERSONAL FOR PS/MR LUCE)

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: MIPT: OPENING STATEMENT FOR 22/23 SEPTEMBER
TALKS

1. TEXT IS AS IN OUR TELNO 895, WITH THE FOLLOWING
AMENDMENTS:

(A) PARA 9, SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES. AMEND TO READ:

'THE ADMINISTRATION, IT IS TRUE, IS HEADED BY A GOVERNOR
APPOINTED FROM LONDON BUT IN PRACTICE A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
EXISTS IN HONG KONG, AND THE TERRITORY IN A VERY REAL SENSE
ADMINISTERS ITSELF.'

PENULTIMATE SENTENCE: DELETE 'ADMINISTRATIVE' (PEKING TELNO 915
REFERS).

(B) PARA 11 AMEND SECOND SENTENCE TO READ:

'WE HOPE THAT THESE PAPERS HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO THE CHINESE AND
HAVE HELPED THE CHINESE TO DEEPEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE WAY
HONG KONG OPERATES TODAY.'

(C) PARA 11 INSERT BEFORE LAST SENTENCE:

'WE SHOULD ALSO BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER MATERIAL THAT
MIGHT BE HELPFUL, AND TO CONSIDER ANY MATERIAL WHICH THE
CHINESE SIDE WOULD LIKE TO PROVIDE.' (PEKING TEL 892 REFERS)

HOWE

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

LIMITED

HD/HKD

HD/FED

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/PUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR DONALD

MR WRIGHT

COPIES TO

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MR BURROWS LEGAL ADVISER

MR ROBERTS NEWS D

MR MARTIN ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

MR FLOWER PUSD

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR A PARSONS NO 10 DOWNING STREET

MR WALKER RESEARCH D GOGGS

SECRET

File on Hong Kong

26

SECRET

19334 - 1

DD 210100Z PEKING

GRS 600

SECRET

DESKBY 210100Z PEKING

FM FCO 201900Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING

TELEGRAM NUMBER 618 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR

GOVERNOR) AND BRUNEI (FOR PS/MR LUCE)

HONG KONG TELNOS 1356, 1367 AND 1368: FUTURE OF HONG KONG: NEXT
ROUND OF TALKS

1. FOLLOWING THE GOVERNOR'S DISCUSSIONS WITH EXCO, REPORTED IN
TURS, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED THE LINE FOR YOU TO TAKE AT
THE NEXT ROUND ON 22/23 SEPTEMBER. AS BEFORE YOU HAVE DISCRETION
TO DEPLOY THE BRITISH POSITION DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT
THE TIME BUT YOU SHOULD COVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(BEGIN UNDERLINING) OPENING STATEMENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER (CEASE
UNDERLINING)

2. YOU SHOULD SPEAK ON THE GENERAL LINES OF THE TEXT IN MY
TELNO 895 TO HONG KONG, AS AMENDED BY MIFT.

(BEGIN UNDERLINING) TACTICS ON THE SECOND DAY (CEASE UNDERLINING)

3. IF THE CHINESE, AS EXPECTED, REJECT OUR ARGUMENTS FOR
CONTINUING BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, IT IS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT
YOU SHOULD USE THE TACTIC OF INVITING THE CHINESE TO PROVIDE
FURTHER DETAILS OF THEIR PROPOSALS WHILE FIRMLY MAINTAINING OUR
POSITION ON THE NEED FOR BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. (PARAGRAPH 6 OF
HONG KONG TELNO 1368).

YOU WILL OF COURSE AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE
ACCEPTED THE CHINESE PROMISE. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EXCO
SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ABOUT THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR
CHANGE OF TACTIC, IN PARTICULAR THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT TRY TO
PRESENT IT AS A FURTHER CONCESSION ON OUR PART, SO THAT IT MIGHT
LEAD TO OUR NEGOTIATING IN PRACTICE ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE
CONDITIONS. I REALISE THAT THE GOVERNOR HAS ALREADY POINTED OUT THIS
DANGER TO EXCO. NEVERTHELESS WE MUST AVOID ANY POSSIBLE
MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS. INSTRUCTIONS ARE THEREFORE BEING

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SECRET

TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY TO ASK THE ACTING GOVERNOR TO TOUCH BASE WITH EXCO ONCE MORE. YOUR USE OF THIS TACTIC IN THE TALKS SHOULD BE CONTINGENT ON CONFIRMATION FROM HONG KONG THAT EXCO ACCEPT THE POSITION.

(BEGIN UNDERLINING) CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS (CEASE UNDERLINING)

4. WHATEVER THE CHINESE REACTION ON SUBSTANCE, A KEY OBJECTIVE OF THIS ROUND MUST BE THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS AND TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DATE FOR A FURTHER MEETING.

(BEGIN UNDERLINING) CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG (CEASE UNDERLINING)

5. CONCERN IN HONG KONG HAS RECENTLY INCREASED, PARTLY BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE POSITION IN THE TALKS BUT MORE BECAUSE OF THE INTENSIFICATION OF CHINESE PROPAGANDA. I REALISE THAT THE LATTER IS PART OF THE CHINESE NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO ANY PROTESTS ON OUR PART. NEVERTHELESS, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO THEM STRONGLY THE DAMAGE WHICH IS BEING DONE, EMPHASISE OUR COMMON INTEREST IN MAINTAINING CONFIDENCE AND URGE THEIR COOPERATION IN SUSTAINING IT. YOU SHOULD REFUTE EMPHATICALLY ANY SUGGESTION BY THE CHINESE THAT THE DECLINE IN CONFIDENCE IS DUE TO MANIPULATION BY THE BRITISH OR HONG KONG GOVERNMENTS. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST THAT A JOINT STATEMENT REITERATING THE BRITISH AND CHINESE INTEREST IN PURSUING THE COMMON AIM WOULD BE HELPFUL. DEPENDING ON THE FORM OF AGREEMENT ON CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS, THIS COULD BE PART OF A CONCLUDING COMMUNIQUE ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

6. MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO THE TEXT IN HONG KONG TELNO 1377. YOU MAY VARY THE DETAILED TEXT BUT SHOULD DRAW ON THIS LINE WHICH NOW COVERS OUR TACTICAL MOVE, THE QUESTION OF THE NEXT MEETING AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE.

7. WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT MR LUCE IS FULLY UP TO DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS WHILE ON TOUR. HIS TIMETABLE IS:

20-21 SEPTEMBER IN SINGAPORE (DEPART 0915 ON 21 SEPTEMBER):

21- EVENING OF 23 SEPTEMBER IN BRUNEI:

23-24 SEPTEMBER IN SINGAPORE (DEPART 1550 FOR HONG KONG).

PLEASE REPEAT TELEGRAMS ACCORDINGLY, PERSONAL FOR PS/MR LUCE.

HOWE

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

LIMITED

HD/HKD

HD/FED

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/PUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

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MR WALKER RESEARCH D (GOGGS)

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SECRET

GRS 200

SECRET

DE DIP

FM THE HAGUE 200840Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 262 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

SECRET *M.*

25
PS/NO 10
DO NOTIFY IT

YOUR TEL NO 112: FUTURE OF HONG KONG: NEXT ROUND OF TALKS.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY
FROM PS, PRIME MINISTER.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREES WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF TUR SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS.
2. WE SHOULD AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT THE UK HAS SHIFTED ITS POSITION AND IS NOW WORKING ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS.
3. WITH REGARD TO YOUR PARAGRAPH 11B, THE PRIME MINISTER CONSIDERS THAT RATHER THAN 'MAINTAINING OUR POSITION IN PRINCIPLE' WE SHOULD 'FIRMLY MAINTAIN OUR POSITION'. SHE HAS COMMENTED THAT IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT OUR OWN VIEWS ON BRITISH ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT CHANGED AND THAT IT WILL BE OPEN TO US, HAVING HEARD AN EXPOSITION OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS, TO STATE WHY WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR PLANS WILL NOT MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE.
4. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT IN REACHING THESE CONCLUSIONS THE PRIME MINISTER WAS MUCH INFLUENCED BY THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO DEPLOYING THE TACTICS PROPOSED MIGHT BE A BREAK-DOWN IN THE TALKS OR A VERY CONSIDERABLE WORSENING OF THE ATMOSPHERE.

MANSFIELD

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HD/ HKD

HD/ FED

PS

PS/ MR LUCE

PS/ PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR DONALD

COPIES TO

PS/NO 10 DST.

SECRET