FUTURE OF HONG KONG ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/MR LUCE

MR DONALD

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PROTDERT GASRK

COPY TO:

MR COLES, No. 10 DOWNING ST

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00 FCO (DESKBY 191230Z)

OO HONG KONG

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IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FROM PEKING 191040Z OCT 83

TO HAMEDHATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1050 OF 19/10/83

REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDITATE HONG KONG

- 1. IN SPOKE FIRST. IN REMINDED YAO GUANG THAT THE MESSAGE IN HAD CONVEYED TO HIM ON 14 OCTOBER HAD RESULTED FROM CONSULTATIONS IN LONDON WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE BECAUSE OF THE PRIME MUNISTER'S CONCERN AT THE DIFFERENCES STILL DIVIDING THE TWO SIDES. IN REPEATED OUR BELIEF THAT HONG KONG' FUTURE COULD BE ASSURED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT WE REMAINED COMMITTED TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE OR OUR SINCERITY AND OF OUR WISH TO MOVE FORWARD IN A SPIRIT OF FLEXIBILITY AND CO-OPERATION.
- 2. IN THEN REPEATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (PARAS 4 TO 7 OF FCO TEL NO 669) SO THAT UT WOULD BE FORMALLY ENTERED HIN THE RECORD OF THE DISCUSSIONS.
- 3. 1 CONTINUED BY EXPRESSING OUR PROFOUND HOPE THAT THE CHINESE SHIDE WOULD RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE STEP WE WERE NOW TAKING. AT WAS A MAJOR ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE CHINESE VIEWS ON SOVEREIGNTY AND ADMINISTRATION AND IN CALLED FOR AN EQUIVALENT RESPONSE. WE BELITEVED THAT THE WAY SHOULD NOW BE CLEAR FOR SUBSTANTHAL PROGRESS. A REPEATED THE CONTINUING NECESSITY FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXISTENCE AND CONTENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE REMAINING SECRET. IN AGAIN WARNED YAO THAT ANY PUBLIC MIS-REPRES-ENTATION OF THE AMPORTANT STEP WE WERE NOW TAKING WOULD MAKE AT NECESSARY FOR US TO CLARIFY OUR POSTITION AN PUBLIC. SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WOULD MAKE BOTH SHIDES! TASK MORE DIFFICULT. " HOPED THAT HT WAS BY NOW EVADENT THAT WE HAD DONE OUR UTMOST TO CREATE A CALM AND STABLE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH TO CONTINUE THE TALKS. THIS SHOULD NOT BE PUT AT RISK BY FURTHER PUBLIC QUARRELLING. WE HOPED THAT THE AMPORTANT STEP EMBODIED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WOULD BE REFLECTED IN A MORE POSITIVE OUTCOME AND IN SUBSTANTINE PROGRESS.
- 4. YAO THANKED ME FOR FORMALLY CONVEYING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND FOR MY EXPLANATORY COMMENTS. HE HAD ALREADY MADE A DETAILED REPORT TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. THE CHINESE SINDE WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPECTATION THAT THE TALKS WOULD MAKE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. THEY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE BRITISH EFFORTS TO MOVE FORWARD. THEY HOPED THIS WOULD LEAD TO A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. HIT HAD BEEN CHINA'S CONSISTENT POSITION THAT THE HONG KONG QUESTION SHOULD BE SETTLED BY FRIENDLY CONSULTATIONS. YAO NOTED THAT WE UNDER-

BE SETTLED BY FRIENDLY CONSULTATIONS. YAO NOTED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY AND ADMINISTRATION AND WERE NO LONGER INSISTING ON THE BROTASH LINK AS A PREREQUISATE. CHIND HOPED THAT THIS WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, HE HAD FRANKLY TO POINT OUT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER STILL HELD THE VIEW THAT CONTINUING BRATISH ADMINISTRATION WAS THE BEST AND SUREST BASIS FOR HONG KONG'S CONTINUING STABILITY AND PROSPERITY AND THAT THAT VIEW HAD NOT CHANGED. YAO WONDERED HOW, IF THAT STILL REMAINED OUR VIEW, EFFECTIVE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS. THE CHINESE PROPOSALS WHERE BASED ON THE CHINESE PREMISE. THIS WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE HONG KONG QUESTION.

- 5. YAO THEN CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF OUR CONTACTS ON HONG KONG SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT LAST SEPTEMBER. HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE LEADERS HAD EXPLAINED FULLY AND CLEARLY THE PRINCIPLE UPON WHICH A SETTLEMENT COULD BE BASED: CHINA WOULD RECOVER SOVEREIGNTY WHILST MAINTAINING PROSPERITY ON HONG KONG. SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE. CHINA WOULD RECOVER THE ENTIRE AREA OF HONG KONG NOT LATER THAN 1997. IT HAD BEEN ON THIS PREMISE THAT THE CHINESE LEADERS HAD AGREED TO THE ORIGINAL COMMUNIQUE. THE SUBSEQUENT DELAYS HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF BRITISH DISREGARD FOR THE CHINESE PRINCIPLE ON SOVEREIGNTY AND ADMINISTRATION. THIS LESSON SHOULD BE FIRMLY BORNE IN MIND.
- MADE A 'COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT' OF CHINA'S NATENDED POLICIES
 TOWARDS HONG KONG. THE CHINESE SIDE HAD EXPECTED US TO JOHN
 IN CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THESE PROPOSALS BUT HAD HAD NO POSITIVE
 RESPONSE. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER WAS NOW WILLING TO NEGOTIATE
 ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS. HE WOULD THEREFORE REPEAT
 THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTENDED CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS HONG
 KONG.
- 7. YAO GUANG THEN REPEATED, AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE WORD FOR WORD, THE POLICIES HE HAD OUTLINED ON 25 JULY (PARA 12 OF THE FULL RECORD OF THAT SESSION). HE ADDED ONLY THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING KEEPING THESE POLICIES UNCHANGED OVER A LONG PERIOD. SAY FOR 50 YEARS. TO ENSURE THAT THE NEGOTIA-TIONS WOULD PROCEED SMOOTHLY ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE POLICIES HE CONSIDERED UT NECESSARY TO EMPHASISE THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY.

- GOVERNMENT'S CONSISTENT POLICY BUT THE BASIC ISSUE MUST NOT BE EVADED: THE HONG KONG AREA WAS CHINESE TERRITORY AND CHINA HAD THE RIGHT TO RESUME THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY. SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE. THE POLICIES HE HAD JUST RECOUNTED WERE BASED ON AND MUST PROCEED FROM THE CHINESE PREMISE. THE CHINESE SIDE WERE MAKING A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH THE UK. THE ABOVE POINTS MUST FIRST BE CLARIFIED AND CONFIRMED.
- (B) CHINA'S INTENDED POLICIES TOWARDS HONG KONG WERE PART OF HER INTERNAL AFFAIRS AS A SOVEREIGN STATE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UK AND BECAUSE OF BRITTISH WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILLITY AND PROSPERITY IN HONG KONG, CHINA WAS WILLIAMS TO BRIEF THE UK IN ADVANCE OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF HER INTENDED POLICIES AND TO LISTEN TO HER USEFUL OPENIONS AND PROPOSALS.
- TO BRATISH INTERESTS. THE TWO SADES COULD DISCUSS
 THESE POLICIES AS LONG AS THE DISCUSSION ACCORDED
 WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN SOVEREIGN
 STATES. THE CHINESE LOOKED FORWARD TO A POSITIVE
 RESPONSE TO THEIR INTENDED POLICIES AND THEIR
 L EXPLANATIONS OF PRINCIPLE.

Q

- 8. YAO THEN TOOK UP MY COMMENTS ON CONFEDENTIVALISTY. HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT DISCLOSE DETAILS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OR THE TALKS. ANY PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THESE DID NOT EMINATE FROM THE CHINESE SIDE. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO BOTH SIDES' RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN CONFEDENTIVALITY.
- 9. AFTER A RECESS, IN TOLD YAO GUANG THAT IN HAD LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO HIS STATEMENT. WE WERE GLAD THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAD BEEN ABLE TO WELCOME THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

 THIS WAS VERY ENCOURAGING FOR, IN STRESSED AGAIN, INT WAS A MOST IMPORTANT MESSAGE. HAT REPRESENTED A MAJOR MINISTRATIVE AND DESERVED A CORRESPONDING RESPONSE. THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE.

 HIT MADE QUITE CLEAR THE BASIS UPON WHICH WE APPROACHED THE TALKS.

AN RESPONSE TO YAO, PUZZLEMENT AT HOW WE COULD CONTINUE EFFECTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASINS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS WHILST RETAINING OUR BELIEF THAT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTED THE BEST AND SUREST BASIS FOR HONG KONG'S STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, II SAID THAT WE HAD STATED OUR HONEST AND SINCERE WIEW BUT THAT THAT DID NOT PREVENT US, IN A SPIRIT OF ACCOMMODATION, FROM EXPLOR-ING OTHER METHODS WITH THE CHINESE SIDE. IF WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN CONSTRUCTING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ALTHOUGH IN OUR VIEW NOT HDEAL, WOULD, ASSURE HONG KONG'S CONTINUED STABILITY AND PROSPERITY AND MEET THE CONDITTIONS IN THE PM'S MESSAGE, WE WERE READY TO RECOMMEND THEM TO PARLHAMENT. 11. HN RESPONSE TO YAO REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, IN SAND THAT THE TEMPTATION TO RAKE OVER THE PAST SHOULD BE RESISTED. HT WAS IMPORTANT TO LOOK FORWARDS. HT WAS IN THIS SPIRAT THAT A WOULD MOVE ON TO THE LATTER PART OF HIS STATEMENT. 12. IT TOOK YAO UP ON HIS DESCRIPTION OF HIS 25 JULY STATEMENT OF CHINESE INTENTIONS TOWARDS HONG KONG AS ''COMPREHENSIVE''. WE DID NOT SEE UT QUITE AS THAT BUT AS A HELPFUL STARTING POINT. WE NEEDED A GREAT DEAL MORE DETAIL. WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WAS WILLING TO BRIEF US AND TO LISTEN TO OUR REACTHONS. IN EMPHASISED THAT THESE WOULD BE HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. WE WISHED TO BE POSITIVE. OUR AIM WAS TWOFOLD:

(A) TO UNDERSTAND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CHINESE PLAN FOR THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF HONT KONG

LIFE. THE CHINESE SLIDE HAD SPOKEN OF NO FUNDAM—
ENTAL CHANGES. HT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE

CONFIRMATION THAT THIS WOULD BE THENR GENERAL

APPROACH.

WE SHOULD LIKE TO HEAR MORE OF HOW HONG KONG PEOPLE
AND HMG WOULD BE ASSURED THAT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS
WOULD CONTINUE. WE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE
CHINESE SUGGESTION THAT THE SYSTEMS SHOULD REMAIN
UNCHANGED FOR A PERIOD OF 50 YEARS. THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT HAD SAID THAT PROVINCION EXHISTED UNDER THEIR
CONSTITUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN SAR
WITH SPECIAL LAWS. DID THE CHINESE SIDE HAVE
OTHER ASSURANCES IN MIND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE
EXISTENCE OF ONE SYSTEM ON THE MAINLAND AND ANOTHER

13. P THEN MOVED ON TO TAKE THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE. IL SAID THAT IF OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT, THE CHINESE GOVERN-MENT ANTENDED TO LEAVE THE HONG KONG LEGAL SYSTEM TO OPERATE BASHCALLY AS HT WAS AT PRESENT. THE ONLY CHANGES WE HAD HEARD SUGGESTED WERE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO APPEAL TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THAT COLONIAL LAWS MUST CHANGE. WE NEEDED FURTHER CLARIFICATION. FOR EXAMPLE, DID THE REFERENCE TO COLONIAL LAWS IMPLY A CHANGE SOLELY TO TERMINOLOGY OR WERE THERE SPECIFIC LAWS THAT THE CHINESE SIDE CONSIDERED AS COLONIAL LAWS AND WOULD THEREFORE WISH TO ALTER. IN DESCRIBED THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HONG KONG'S EXTERNAL CONN-ECTIONS. THE HONG KONG COURTS DREW ON DECISIONS MADE IN COURTS THROUGHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH. CERTAIN HONG KONG JUDGES WERE DRAWN FROM OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. WE ASSUMED THAT UNDER THE CHINESE PLAN THIS COULD CONTINUE ON THE BASHS OF NO BASIC CHANGE. THE LEGAL SYSTEM PROWNDED AN IMPORTANT EXAMPLE OF THE SORT OF CLARIFICATION WE NEEDED AND OF THE SORT OF DISCUSSIONS WE COULD PURSUE. IL EMPHASISED AGAIN OUR WISH TO TALK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE BASIS SET OUT IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. H WAS SURE THAT WE SHOULD NOW BE ABLE TO MOVE TO DETAILED DISCUSSION.

- 14. YAO GUANG REPLIED THAT HE HAD LISTENED WITH GREAT CARE. HOWEVER HE STILL NEEDED FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON A NUMBER OF POINTS:
 - (A) EXACTLY WHAT DID WE MEAN WHEN WE SPOKE IN THE PRIME MUNISTER'S MESSAGE OF 'OTHER EFFECTIVE METHODS' ?
 - (B) DID WE AGREE THAT THE PRINCIPLES HE HAD UNDENTIFIED AS UNDERLYING THE CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG SHOULD BE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS?
 - (C) WHAT DAD WE SEE AS THE NATURE AND FORM OF A FUTURE BRATUSH ROLE?
 - (D) WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BRITTISH LINK
 TO WHICH WE WERE NOW REFERRING AND THE ONE TO WHICH
 WE HAD REFERRED IN THE PAST?

15. W REPLIED THAT WE WAS A LITTLE CONCERNED THAT CLARIFICATION WAS STILL NEEDED ON SUCH AMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE MESSAGE WHICH MITSELF WAS VERY CLEAR. WE WOULD REPEAT THE EXPLANATIONS OF HAD

GIVEN ON 14 OCTOBER.

- THAN THOSE WHICH WE HAD HITHERTO ADVOCATED, IE OTHER THAN BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. YAO GUANG INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS UNSURE WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS OR HAD WE OTHER METHODS IN MIND? WE WERE READY TO TRY TO CONSTRUCT ARRANGEMENTS OF LASTING VALUE TO THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS.
- 17. ON YAO'S POINT (B) , I SAID THAT THE MESSAGE WAS CLEAR. A RE-READ TO HIM THE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THE MESSAGE. A SAID THAT IN DID NOT THINK IN NEEDED FURTHER TO UNTERPRET THE MESSAGE. IFT WAS CLEAR THAT WE WERE NO LONGER INSISTING UPON BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AS A PRE-REQUISITE. THE CHINESE SIDE HAD SAID BEFORE THAT OUR PASHSTENCE ON MAINTAINING THE BRITISH LINK WAS AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. WE HAD NOW REMOVED THAT OBSTACLE AND HOPED FOR AN EQUIVALENT RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE SHIDE WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE RAPID PROGRESS. THE CHINESE SIDE HAD MADE PLANN THAT THEY SAW THEIR PROPOSALS AND PREMISE AS BEING UNDESSOLUBLY LUNKED. THE MESSAGE SPOKE CLEARLY. IN REPEATED INT SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE. III CONTINUED BY REMINDING YAO OF THE CONSTITUTUONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE PRIME MINISTER. SOVERENGNTY DID NOT LIE IN HER GIFT. ON THUS ONLY PARLSTAMENT COULD DECIDE. BUT IN EMPHASISED THAT HE WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MET THE CONDITIONS IN THE MESSAGE WE WERE READY TO RECOMMEND THESE ARRANGEMENTS TO PARLHAMENT.
- 18. ON YAO'S POINT (C), A SAID THAT HERE WE WERE REPEATING A PHRASE USED BY FOREIGN MINISTER WU IN HIS TALKS IN NEW YORK WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. WE SHOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN MCLARIFICATION OF THE CHINESE THOUGHTS. THE EXACT MEANING OF A FUTURE BRITISH ROLE SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION IN FURTHER DETAILED TALKS. HOWEVER IN COULD CONFIRM THAT IT DID NOT MEAN BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE SENSE WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ADVOCATED.
- A BRITISH LINK WAS A SHORTHAND PHRASE FOR THE VERY CLOSE
 RELATIONS IN MANY SPHERES BETWEEN THE UK AND HONG KONG. WE HAD
 SUBMITTED MUCH MATERIAL WHICH FYPLACIED THESE VARIOUS LINKS

RELATIONS IN MANY SPHERES BETWEEN THE UK AND HONG KONG. WE HAD SUBMITTED MUCH MATERIAL WHICH EXPLAINED THESE VARIOUS LINKS. DPTAIL ABOUT THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND HONG KONG WOULD EMERGE FROM OUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. HEREPEATED AGAIN THAT WE NO LONGER INSISTED UPON CONTINUING BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AS A PREREQUEISNIE. WE WISHED TO MOVE FORWARDS HELPFULLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE BASHS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS TO SEE WHAT WE CAN BUILD. 20. YAO THEN MADE A LONG AND RAMBLING RESPONSE. THE MAIN POINTS BOHLED DOWN TO (A) HE APPRECIATED MY EMPHASIS ON OUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH: (B) DID WE UNDERSTAND AND AGREE WITH THE THREE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CHINESE INTENDED POLICY FOR HONG KONG (I.E. THE CHINESE PREMISE)? IF WE DID NOT DISAGREE COULD BE CONFIRM THEM? (C) IF THE PREMISE WERE NOT CLEARLY AFFIRMED. HOW COULD DISCUSSIONS BE CONDUCTED FURTHER, SINCE ALL THE CHINESE INTENDED POLICIES WERE BASED UPON THE PREMISE? (D) COULD WE FIRST OF ALL REACH UNDERSTANDING ON THE PREMISE? THEN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE DETAIL OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS COULD BEGIN VERY SOON. . (E) IN HAD STITLLNOT CLARIFFED EXACTLY WHAT SORT OF ROLE WE ENVISAGED FOR THE UK.

(F) HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FORWARDS IN OUR DISCUSSIONS BUT INT WAS RELEVANT FOR THE UK SIDE TO ASK INTSELF WHERE THE BLAME FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS

HITHERTO LAY.

21. WE THEN ADJOURNED. IN TOLD YAO THAT IN WOULD REPLY ON 20 OCTOBER TO THE POINTS HAD HAD MADE IN HIS FINAL STATEMENT.

22. SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT.

CRADOCK

PS-

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BESTDINGLAHDER

COPY TO:

MR COLES, No. 10 DOWNING ST

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DESKBY 191300Z

FROM PEKSING 191130Z OCT 83

TO HAMEDHATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1051 OF 19/10/83

REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

Prime Minister.

We shall lave to writ

to see how tomorrow

MIPT: FUTURE OF HONG KONG: FIFTH ROUND: FIRST DAY

COMMENT

1. THERE WASHINGTHALLY A NOTICEABLE IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE. YAO'S FIRST STATEMENT WAS MILDER THAN WE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED AND HIS WELCOME, ALBERT QUALIFIED, FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WAS ENCOURAGING. ALTHOUGH HIS SECOND STATEMENT STARTED OFF HOPEFULLY (WITH REFERENCES TO A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF CHINESE POLICIES) IT

QUICKLY TURNED SOURER AND HE SPENT THE REST OF THE
TIME TRYING TO PUN US DOWN TO AFFIRMING CATEGORICALLY THAT WE
ACCEPTED THE CHINESE PREMISE.

2. HT IS DIFFICULT AT THIS STAGE TO SAY HOW MUCH SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO YAO'S INSISTNENCE ON THE PREMISE.

HE MAY HAVE RECEIVED ONLY PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION FROM HIS LEADERS TO SOUND US OUT AND SEE HOW FAR HE CAN PUSH US OVER DIT.

LESS PLAUSHBLYH BUT POSSIBLY, THE LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE DECIDED TO MASHET ON HOLDING OUT FOR THEIR FULL TERMS TO BE MET.

IN ANY EVENT HT AS CLEAR THAT THE CHINESE ARE INTENSELY SUSPECTIOUS OF OUR NEW LINE AND MOTIVES. THEY FIND AT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE REALLY ADDS UP TO THE STEP THAT WE ARE REPEATEDLY DESCRIBING AND EXPLAINING TO THEM.

3. WHAT THE MESSAGE HAS MAMEDIATELY ACHIEVED IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY FURTHER THREATS TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS.

SHAT INT HAS YET TO ACHIEVE, AND INT LOOKS AS HE INT WILL TAKE UP THE REST OF THIS ROUND IN TRYING TO ACHIEVE INT, IS TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE TO MOVE FORWARD TO DISCUSS THEIR PROPOSALS.

@RADOCK

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