

010
CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1984

Dear Charles,

UK/Soviet Relations

The programme and arrangements for Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to Moscow are close to completion.

The visit looks as if it will follow much the same pattern as those for Herr Genscher and Sr Andreotti earlier this year. The main events will be two sessions of talks with Mr Gromyko and a call on President Chernenko. The latter has not yet been put formally into the programme but the Head of Protocol at the Soviet MFA has told Sir I Sutherland that time had been reserved on 3 July for a call on Chernenko.

During the course of the visit, Sir Geoffrey Howe will invite Mr Gromyko to pay a return visit to London in 1985. He will also express the hope that Mr Gorbachev will accept the invitation extended to him recently by Sir A Kershaw to lead a Soviet parliamentary delegation which has been invited to visit London in the first week of December. Following the visit, we will be taking up the question of an invitation to Aliiev with the Soviet Ambassador (as envisaged in my letter of 4 June - he has been on sick leave).

No
Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that there would be advantage if, during his call on President Chernenko, he were able to extend to the latter an invitation from the Prime Minister to visit the United Kingdom. President Chernenko has already received an invitation from President Mitterrand, while Chancellor Kohl's 1983 invitation to Andropov has now been extended to Chernenko. His response to an invitation by the Prime Minister would not go further than an acceptance in principle with no suggestion of dates.

It would be for subsequent discussion here when such a visit might be appropriate. Sir Geoffrey Howe would at present not envisage this before 1986, and there is anyway still some uncertainty about Chernenko's health. Presentationally the announcement that an invitation had been extended would be a useful demonstration of the Government's publicly stated intention to establish a broad political

/dialogue

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



dialogue at all levels with the Soviet Union. The last formal meeting at Prime Minister/General Secretary level was between Mr Wilson and Mr Brezhnev in 1975 in Moscow. At that time invitations to Mr Brezhnev, Mr Kosygin and Mr Gromyko were extended. Those for Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin have, of course, since lapsed. Mr Gromyko visited London in 1976.

In purely protocol terms, it could be argued that an invitation to Chernenko, which had not been taken up, might inhibit the timing of a visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister. But in practice our view is that if there were sufficient reason for the Prime Minister to visit Moscow at a particular time, these protocol considerations would not present a real problem.

Finally, I enclose a text of the speech which Sir Geoffrey Howe will be making on the first day of his visit at a lunch given by Mr Gromyko. It will serve as the major public statement of the British Government's views during the visit. It is, however, likely that the Russians will omit large sections on, for example, Afghanistan and human rights in any text that they publish in the Soviet press. The deadline for any comments would be that they should reach our Embassy in Moscow by close of play on Saturday.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT SPEECH FOR SECRETARY OF STATE IN MOSCOW

1. Mr Minister it is with great pleasure that I have accepted your invitation this week. It is the fourth time we have met since I became Foreign Secretary. But this is the first time we have been able to sit down to a full and extensive programme of talks. I greatly welcome this. I am also glad to be in Moscow, particularly on this the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. As Pushkin put it in Eugene Onegin: "How pleased I was when all at once the semi-circle of Churches and belfries, of gardens and palaces opened before me". The skyline of Moscow may look different today: but it is still one of the world's greatest cities.

2. Mr Gromyko, six months ago we were both in Stockholm for opening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In my speech, I said that a main aim of the process begun at Helsinki nine years ago should be to foster dialogue and contact; that this in turn should lead to more trust and confidence; and that the need for such trust and confidence was as pressing now as at any time since 1973. I went on to propose that we should give this process a new impetus. We should widen the dialogue between East and West and give it

more substance: that was the only way we could come to know and understand each other better. It is in this spirit that I have come to Moscow. It is in this spirit that I approach our two days of talks.

3. The starting point for greater knowledge and understanding must be realism. We must recognise the world for what it is, not for what we would like it to be. We live in a rapidly changing world where new "industrial revolutions" come and go in a matter of years. Within the memories of most of us round this table, the idea of men walking in space was strictly for science-fiction stories. It is on the way to becoming an everyday event. Computers are still something of a novelty to me: in British schools they are as much part of the furniture as the inkwell used to be. What more will the last sixteen years of this century hold in store? Certainly new advances will have profound economic, social, and, if we choose to use them for those purposes, military implications. These changes will create challenges we all will face in West and East, North and South.

4. How can we begin to tackle these problems? The first prerequisite is peace. A month ago, we remembered the terrible sacrifices which Britain and the Soviet Union shared and suffered in the last great European war. I am convinced those sacrifices were not

made in vain. I am convinced it is in our power to maintain the peace our continent has enjoyed now for the last forty years. I agree entirely with the words of the CMEA Summit two weeks ago: "no world problems, including the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, can be resolved militarily".

5. The question of security is therefore a key issue. New weapons, new technologies are making it a more complex, a more truly global question. Now more than ever, the way in which each country seeks security affects the security of all the others.

6. Now as in the past, no country or Alliance can achieve absolute security. Absolute security for one country would mean absolute insecurity for another. What we can do is to achieve a stable equilibrium. Then we can work to reduce the numbers of weapons on both sides. It would be a major achievement if we could do this. It is also a necessity. We all have more constructive purposes to which to devote our resources. We all wish to bring about greater prosperity and a better life for our people. We know this cannot be done if we have to go on developing ever-newer, ever-dearer weapons programmes. There are therefore good reasons of economics and common sense for agreeing to beat our swords into ploughshares.

7. Security of course has two aspects. The visible one, on which we concentrate in arms control, is the number of missiles or soldiers on each side. The invisible one, which underlies it, is intention. Weapons do not have policies: it is their owners who decide how they shall be used. And if we misunderstand each other's intentions, in a nuclear age, this could have tragic results for civilisation.

8. That is why in our talks this week I want to concentrate on the intentions of our two governments. This is the area of greatest mutual ignorance. Both of our countries, alone or with our allies, have made important statements about it. In Bonn in 1982 the British Prime Minister, with all her NATO colleagues, stated that none of our weapons would ever be used except in response to attack. This important pledge was repeated by NATO Foreign Ministers in Washington just five weeks ago. We also pointed out in Washington that dialogue could only bear fruit if each party was confident of its own security, and prepared to respect the legitimate interests of others.

9. You and your Allies also addressed these matters at the CMEA Summit. You stated afterwards that there was no more important task today than that of safe-guarding world peace and averting nuclear catastrophe. You said that if the principle of

equality and equal security were strictly observed, the nuclear arms build up could be halted. You called for political will, and for honest, equal and constructive dialogue. If you meant what you said, the gap between our intentions is not as wide as the gloom-mongers would have us believe. We for our part are all in favour of an honest, equal and constructive dialogue. Let us talk frankly about our plans: let us turn our joint will for peace into concrete action.

10. That means tackling some of the specific problems of security. There are many places and opportunities for this:

In Stockholm, we have a real chance to agree mutually beneficial measures that would reassure both sides and would give more substance to our shared commitment to the non use of force;

In Vienna, the latest Western proposals are built on some ideas put forward by the East. We must resolve the differences over the balance of forces which have held up these important talks for so long;

In Geneva, the elements for a comprehensive and fully verifiable ban on chemical weapons are now there on the negotiating table. We urge the

Soviet side to join us in a real effort to secure agreement.

But there is one gap which should give everyone in this room cause for great concern. The control of nuclear weapons, the most destructive of all, is not being discussed anywhere at the moment. Logic and self interest on both sides point to the need for an early return to the negotiating tables to resume talks. It is clear that without negotiations these problems will not be resolved. Staying away from the negotiating table is a self-defeating course. The Soviet Union will find that the United States is ready to negotiate at any time without preconditions.

11. And there are other areas of arms control which we cannot neglect. In the context of outer space, you will probably have seen that in Washington in May the Western Allies welcomed US willingness to discuss research programmes on strategic defence: Soviet reluctance to enter such discussions is hard to understand.

12. Security, of course, is not a purely European or North Atlantic concern. All wars since the Second World War have been outside this area. Britain and her Allies have many and diverse interests throughout the world. The Soviet Union and her Allies also have their

legitimate interests in events beyond their borders. East and West have an over-riding common interest in international stability. This means trying to ensure that regional conflicts do not occur: and if they do, that they are not made worse by outside interference. This is an area in which an active East/West dialogue can be helpful. We can establish each others' interests and concerns. We can and should seek ways of co-operating to reduce regional tension.

13. One regional issue that acutely concerns the third world as well as East and West, is Afghanistan. It is three years, almost to the day, since my predecessor Lord Carrington came here to put forward proposals for a political solution, on behalf of the Heads of State and Government of the ten members of the European Community. The views of the Ten have not changed. They are in line with the views of more than two-thirds of the members of the United Nations. We support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General. I believe that there can be a peaceful solution which takes account of the legitimate security interests of your country. But this requires that the people of Afghanistan be free to express their views. That they cannot do in present circumstances, which have lead to a fifth of them are living as refugees in neighbouring countries.

14. Security in all its aspects lies at the heart of our relations. But it is only one element in a wider picture. All participants in the historic agreement of 1975, at Helsinki, agreed that security could not be divorced from economic and human considerations. I would like now briefly to touch on these.

15. On the economic side, there are great and obvious differences of history and achievements between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. But there are certain striking similarities too. We both face the challenges of modernising industry: of making it more efficient: of introducing new technology to increase per capita output. We both recognise the importance of increased trade.

16. As the Madrid Concluding Document pointed out, increased trade is a useful way of adding substance to our relations. There is certainly great scope for this in the case of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. When Deputy Prime Minister Kostandov came to Britain last year, he suggested we should aim to double the present level of our trade. This is an ambitious goal. But let us make the effort.

17. Some useful ground work has been laid. Mr Channon came here in May for our Joint Economic Commission and

was very pleased with the progress made with Mr Patolichev. The Working Group on Agriculture, Food Processing and Packaging had a good meeting last month. I was particularly glad to see a number of smaller British firms in the delegation which came to Moscow. One of my Government's aims is to encourage small and medium sized enterprises. One of the commitments in the Madrid Concluding Document is that we should encourage their wider participation in East/West trade.

18. So we have made some useful progress on the economic side. What of the human and social elements? The challenge for us as politicians is not only to make policy comprehensible to the man in the street, but also relevant to his problems.

19. This is not an easy challenge to meet. Everywhere we see the diversity of human nature: diversity of religion, culture, language and tradition. We should welcome the challenge of this diversity. Indeed all the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to respect it. Governments must protect the rights of individuals. As you know from what I and others have told you, the Soviet Government is not seen to be acting in this field in accordance with the obligations which you have yourselves undertaken.

I say this not at all in a confrontational spirit. But this surely is a field in which deeds rather than words should be the guiding principle. Without that, real and long lasting trust and confidence between East and West, resting on a broad base of popular consent, will prove, like the Firebird's tail in Russian legend, easier to gaze at than to grasp.

20. But Governments can also play a constructive role in helping to reconcile wide differences of culture, tradition and behaviour. One way in which they can do this is by helping to spread information and to foster more personal contacts. Contacts between individuals are one of the most useful ways in which we can break down the barriers of misunderstanding. At one level this means contact between myself and you, Mr Gromyko. At another it could be the party of Soviet citizens who recently made a visit to Margate in Kent. All have their part in helping to increase East/West understanding.

21. When my Prime Minister saw Mr Chernenko in February she was at pains to stress that she saw her visit as part of a long term policy: a policy designed to increase confidence between East and West. This meant recognising our common interest in peace and security at a lower level of weapons. It also meant working towards a broader understanding and a climate

of confidence, so that we could give our negotiators the instructions they needed for progress.

22. In March this year a collection of Mr Chernenko's speeches were published in Britain. In the introduction he referred to the need for active and fruitful dialogue and for the creation of a climate of trust. He argued that we should multiply our efforts towards mutual understanding, to preserve peace and to guarantee every nation the right to full and independent development. He ended:

"I would like the people of the Soviet Union and Great Britain to be partners in making progress towards these goals."

These words encourage me to hope, Mr Minister, that whatever the ideological differences between us, there should also be important areas of common ground. Let us try to seek these out and build on them.

S14AAI