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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK.

INFO PRIORITY BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA

UKDEL CSCE MADRID.

ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS AND ALL EAST EUROPEAN POSTS.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : GROMYKO'S SPEECH ON EAST/WEST AND ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS.

SUMMARY.

1. AT HIS LUNCH TODAY IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S HONOUR, GROMYKO DELIVERED A HARSH ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACH WHICH IN PARTICULAR DISMISSED WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE.

DETAIL.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF GROMYKO'S SPEECH :

ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

- (1) IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET UNION'S FAULT THAT IN RECENT YEARS ANGLO/ SOVIET RELATIONS HAD STAGNATED AND IN SOME CASES GONE INTO REVERSE.
- PRESERVED. ''WE ARE FAR FROM UNDERESTIMATING THE EXISTING TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH BRITAIN'' WHICH HAD PROVED THEIR VITALITY DESPITE SANCTIONS AND OTHER DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES ''RESORTED TO BY THOSE WHO DO NOT FIND TO THEIR LIKING THIS OR THAT ASPECT OF OUR POLICY OF PEACE''.
- (111) IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE WHERE THIS MORBID ALLERGY TO DETENTE CAME FROM. IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO RELY UPON TIME ONLY TO CURE THIS DISEASE.
- (IV) THE SOVIET UNION WANTED ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS TO DEVELOP ON AN ASCENDING LINE. THIS WAS A PRINCIPLED POSITION OF THE SOVIET LÉADERSHIP.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

(V) THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF THE POLICY OF A GROUP OF COUNTRIES, FIRST OF ALL THE UNITED

STATES. THIS WAS A POLICY OF THE ARMS RACE, OF STOCKPILING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OF PREPARING FOR WAR. THE MAIN THREAT TO PEACE LAY IN WASHINGTON'S DRIVE TO BREAK THE EXISTING MILITARY BALANCE AND TO OBTAIN SUPERIORITY. ATTAMPTS WERE MADE TO BIND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES 'BY THIS HOPELESS BUT DANGEROUS COURSE'.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS, THE USA IS TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS WAYS ON OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERFERE UNSCRUPULOUSLY IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY RESORT TO THE MOST CRIMINAL MEANS AND METHODS NOT STOPPING SHORT OF STATE TERRORISM. THERE IS A SORT OF TERRORISM CULT IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN US POLICY TODAY. THAT IS HOW THEY ACTED AND CONTINUE TO ACT IN LEBANON, GRENADA, WITH REGARD TO NICUAGUA AND IN EL SALVADOR. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE NOT AVERSE TO INDULGE IN FALSE SENTIMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

(VII) TO COVER UP THEIR INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS, THE AMERICANS
RESORTED TO GROUNDLESS ANTI-SOVIET ATTACKS. NOBODY WOULD BE ABLE
TO BLACKEN SOVIET PEACE POLICY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME FORWARD
WITH CONCRETE INITIATIVES ON ARMS CONTROL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION.
ALL OF THEM HAD RUN INTO OBSTACLES CREATED BY NATO.

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(VIII) THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS THE MOST BURNING QUESTION OF THE DAY. THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE BY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. 'NEW MISSILES FROM AMERICA CANNOT BRING SECURITY. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE WHO ACCEPT THEM IN THEIR HOMELAND ARE INCREASING THE DANGER'. WASHINGTON DID NOT HAVE A SERIOUS DISIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT: 'THE WORDMONGERING PRACTISED THERE IN ORDER TO CHASE VOTES DOES NOT HELP MATTERS IN ANY WAY ... BRITAIN COULD DO A USEFUL THING' TO BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF THE ARMS RACE.

## SPACE.

- (IX) THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ADDRESSED TO THE US FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO PREVENT THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE WAS OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE. NUCLEAR OR OTHER WEAPONS MUST NOT BE DEPLOYED IN OUTER SPACE. ''WE REGRET THAT WASHINGTON GAVE A NEGATIVE REPLY PERMEATED WITH THE SPIRIT OF STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE AND SPREADING IT TO OUTER SPACE. AS A PRE-CONDITION A DEMAND IS MADE TO COMBINE NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTER SPACE WITH TALKS ON MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IN OTHER WORDS TO COMBINE WITH THE TALKS WHICH HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY WASHINGTON''.
- (X) THIS WAS A GAME WITH DOCTORED CARDS. NOT MANY PEOPLE IN THE US WOULD FALL FOR THIS ELECTORAL DECEPTION. THE AIM WAS TO CONFUSE PEOPLE. WASHINGTON DID NOT WANT NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS PILLING UP PRE-CONDITIONS. ''EVEN TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH WASHINGTON'S REPLY TOUCHES THE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF OUTER SPACE IT BASHFULLY MENTIONS A POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING ONLY SOME SORT OF APPROACH TO THAT SUBJECT .... WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE

THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD STILL APPROACH THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS IN A MORE SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER WITHOUT BLOCKING THEM WITH PRE-CONDITIONS WHICH MOREOVER HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. WE HOPE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE STAND WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. CTB. (XI) IT WOULD BE NATURAL TO EXPECT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO TAKE AN ACTIVE STAND IN FAVOUR OF RESUMING TALKS ON A TOTAL AND COMPLETE BAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS WHICH WERE BROKEN OFF BY WASHINGTON. NUF/NOFUF. (XII) "THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE WOULD NO DOUBT HELP TO NORMALISE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD' . AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON THE NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, OF MILITARY FORCES IN GENERAL. CDE. (XIII) AT THE CDE LARGE-SCALE POLITICAL AND LEGAL STEPS AS WELL AS CERTAIN MEASURES OF A MILITARY AND TECHNICAL NATURE WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION. BUT ''DISTURBING SYMPTOMS'' COULD BE OBSERVED IN THE STOCKHOLM DISCUSSIONS. THERE WERE THOSE CLEARLY SEEKING TO TURN THE CONFERENCE AWAY FROM CREATING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE. (XIV) THE SOVIET UNION'S AND BRITAIN'S COMMITMENTS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES DID NOT EXCLUDE, BUT PRESUPPOSED, THE NEED FOR JOINT OR PARALLEL EFFORTS TO AVERT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. SUTHERLAND FCO(PALACE)/WHITEHALL SOVIET D